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Lane F. Fargher, Verenice 
Y. Heredia Espinoza, and 
Cynthia L. Bedell
Although archaeology experienced a major reorienta-
tion with the rise of New Archaeology and the incor-
poration of neoevolutionist theory beginning in the 
1960s and early 1970s (e.g., Binford 1962; Flannery 1972, 
1973; Sanders and Price 1968; Watson et al. 1971), it was 
only somewhat later that a mature, theoretically and 
epistemologically complex, processual archaeology 
began to take shape. This mature processual archae-
ology, also called “alternative pathways to complexity,” 
moved beyond neoevolutionism’s obsession with ex-
plaining centralization, power, and exploitation based 
on environmental conditions, to recognize that other 
factors including agency, negotiation, and cooperation 
are important factors shaping complex societies. The 
development of “alternative pathways to complex-
ity” can be attributed to a number of key scholars, but 
we think Richard Blanton merits special recognition 
for both his contribution and leadership. His work is 
especially important because he looked to econom-
ics, sociology, political science, and geography in or-
der to broaden his thinking on complexity. Inspired 
by research in these disciplines, he worked to develop 
a holistic approach that applied his wide theoretical 
and methodological purview to understanding the 
role of households, urbanism, regions, markets, world-
systems, and political economics in cultural evolution. 
In the process, he has developed an impressive, robust, 
and flexible toolkit for understanding the evolution of 
social complexity that has inspired scholars working 
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in diverse world areas, including Mesoamerica and the Old World, as well 
as scholars engaged in cross-cultural comparative research, to look at social 
complexity in new ways.
Therefore, in order to highlight the contribution that he has made to anthro-
pological and archaeological thinking on the evolution of complexity, we gath-
ered a group of distinguished scholars and asked them to prepare a series of 
chapters that apply Rich’s ideas to the study of architecture, economics, and 
power in Mesoamerica, the Old World, and cross-cultural analysis. Here, we 
document how Rich became interested in archaeology, as well as the individu-
als, publications, and field research that coalesced to shape his research and 
theoretical paradigm.
A LittLe History
Rich’s interest in archaeology is rooted in his family history and experi-
ences growing up in Colorado. Rich’s paternal grandfather was a miner who 
had moved the family there to work in the gold mines. During the Great 
Depression, Ed, Rich’s father, and Helen Maxine, his mother, graduated from 
high school and got married. Ed and Maxine were too poor to attend col-
lege, and the only work Ed could find was in a gold mine even though it was 
dangerous work, as evidenced by the fact that his father had been trapped for 
several days in a mine collapse. In spite of the challenging work he did in the 
mines and his own father’s traumatic experience, Ed developed a life-long 
interest in Colorado mines and mining. As a boy, Rich and Ed, as well as other 
family members, would hike up into abandoned mining towns in the Rockies 
west of Denver (figure 0.1). While Ed explored historical mines, Rich explored 
the “ghost towns.” As he sifted through what people had left behind in their 
houses, Rich developed a fascination for understanding how people lived from 
the study of material remains. Rich’s interest in archaeology received another 
boost from a trip to Mexico when he was 15 years old. Ed and Maxine loved 
to travel, taking the four children on long adventures. One of these, a lengthy 
driving trip through Mexico, exposed Rich to Central Mexican archaeological 
sites, such as Cuicuilco and Teotihuacan. In his own words, Rich discovered 
on those trips that he liked, “old stuff that is trashed out.”
After graduating from Denver’s Abraham Lincoln High School in 1962, 
Rich accepted a gymnastic scholarship from the University of Michigan with 
the intention of studying anthropology. At the University of Michigan, Leslie 
White, Elman Service, Marshall Sahlins, Roy Rappaport, and Eric Wolf 
encouraged him to think about anthropology holistically, to look at large-scale 
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processes, and to immerse himself in theory. James B. Griffin encouraged 
him to think in new ways and to go beyond the faculty. In the Museum of 
Anthropology’s graduate program he was exposed to probability statistics 
in the quantitative methods course taught by Bob Whallon. Jeffrey Parsons 
(his major professor) introduced him to a new survey methodology that was 
beginning to provide important new insights on regional systems and socio-
cultural processes in prehispanic Central Mexico. Henry Wright, who was 
becoming interested in regional systems in the Near East as well, suggested 
that he look into cultural geography, spatial analysis, and regional market sys-
tems as potentially useful material for understanding the regional systems he 
was studying in archaeology.
After finishing his doctorate in 1970 under the guidance of Jeff Parsons, 
Rich moved first to Rice University and then to Hunter College at the City 
University of New York. In New York, he joined a distinguished group schol-
ars who converged there in the early 1970s, including, among others, fellow 
Michigan graduates John Speth and Greg Johnson; a Penn State student, 
Figure 0.1. Richard Blanton (on the left) at age 18 on a climbing expedition in the 
Rockies with a friend. 
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Chris Hamlin; as well as Melvin and Carol Ember, Susan Lees, Daniel Bates, 
Robert Sussman, Jane Schneider, and Eric Wolf. Chris Hamlin, a computer 
expert, showed Rich how to use computers and introduced him to statisti-
cal analysis software. Melvin and Carol Ember introduced him to systematic 
cross-cultural analysis and the potential it held for addressing questions related 
to scale and complexity. From Hunter College, Rich moved to Purdue in 1976, 
where he benefited from participating in a joint Sociology-Anthropology 
department, which included a number of scholars with strong backgrounds in 
statistical analysis as well as resources for software and statistical support. He 
also had the opportunity to interact with Tenzing Takla, who introduced him 
to classical social theory, especially that of Max Weber.
Rich also became involved in the Society of Economic Anthropology in 
the early 1980s and eventually served on the board and as its president. At 
the society’s meetings, he interacted with a number of stimulating scholars, 
including Sutti Ortiz, Frank Cancian, Robert McC. Netting, Frances Berdan, 
Stuart Plattner, Carol Smith, and Harold Schneider, among others. These 
scholars stimulated and contributed to his thinking and research regarding 
markets and commercialization in ancient states and civilizations.
At each turn in his career, Rich has shown a singular capacity not only to 
learn from both his professors and his colleagues but to bring together dispa-
rate research and thinking from across the social sciences to provide a deeper 
and more holistic understanding of premodern complex societies within a 
scientific epistemology that is rigorous, empirical, and oriented toward test-
ing and falsification. An approach he often encouraged his students and col-
leagues to adopt, including the editors of this volume.
This approach has also contributed to his ever-dynamic theoretical and 
research paradigm and increasingly complex empirical projects. Rich ini-
tially worked on Jeff Parson’s Texcoco settlement pattern project (Parsons 
1971) and then directed a regional survey of the Ixtapalapa peninsula 
(Blanton 1972), both in the Basin of Mexico. From these projects, he was 
invited by Kent Flannery to bring the regional survey methodology devel-
oped in the Basin of Mexico to the Valley of Oaxaca. He first directed an 
intensive survey and mapping project at Monte Albán (Blanton 1978) and 
then a regional survey of the southern arm of the Valley of Oaxaca (Blanton 
et al. 1982). Incorporating former students and colleagues as codirectors, 
Rich encouraged the expansion of the Valley of Oaxaca Settlement Pattern 
Project to the entire Valley of Oaxaca (Kowalewki et al. 1989). From Oaxaca, 
Rich turned his research attention to systematic cross-cultural research on 
the built environment (households) and, most recently, rational choice and 
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collective action theory (Blanton 1994; Blanton and Fargher 2008; Blanton 
and Taylor 1995). He also returned to the field to carry out a regional survey 
in Turkey and an intensive site survey at Tlaxcallan (Blanton 2000; Fargher, 
Blanton, et al. 2011).
Through this research and more synthetic works, Rich continued to refine 
and expand his—and in the process, scholarly—understanding of social 
complexity. Specifically, his academic production has brought to bear ideas 
concerning markets and commercialization, world-systems, political eco-
nomic and egalitarian behavior (especially cooperation), households, demog-
raphy and settlement patterns, urbanism, scale issues, boundedness, social 
integration, architectural analysis, public goods, bureaucratization, and ratio-
nal decision-making on theories concerning the evolution of social com-
plexity and states (e.g., Blanton 1975, 1976, 1978, 1983a, 1983b, 1985, 1989, 1994, 
1995, 1996, 1998a; Blanton and Fargher 2008; Blanton and Feinman 1984; 
Blanton et al. 1982, 1993, 1996, 2005; Fargher and Blanton 2007; Fargher et 
al. 2010; Fargher, Heredia Espinoza, and Blanton 2011; Feinman et al. 1984, 
1985; Kowalewski et al. 1983, 1989). All of this using a comparative and sys-
tematic methodology geared toward robust (statistical-based) testing and 
falsification. The impact of Rich’s scholarly endeavors on archaeology and 
other social sciences, especially scholars interested in ancient or premodern 
states, is amply evidenced by the more than 4,200 citations that his publica-
tions have received at the time of this writing.
tHe Contents of tHis VoLume
Thus, to honor his contribution to and leadership in the study of the evolu-
tion of social complexity and ancient states, we invited a group of highly dis-
tinguished scholars to prepare a series of theoretically and empirically robust 
chapters. These chapters focus on at least one of the research themes that have 
interested Rich (e.g., architecture, economics, power, and cross-cultural analy-
sis) and employ methodologies involving variously regional studies, testing, 
falsification, and/or comparison. We asked these scholars to address issues in 
novel ways and to experiment with new explanations. We think that “pushing 
the envelope” in terms of explanation is the best way to honor Rich’s contribu-
tion because he has been a constant innovator across his career.
Given the diversity of areas and themes in this volume, organizing the 
chapters thematically proved overly complex. Thus, in order to avoid a confus-
ing array of sections and subsections, we opted for a simple ordering based on 
world areas. The first section is dedicated to Mesoamerica, the second section 
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to the Old World (Europe, Africa, and South Asia), and the final section to 
cross-cultural comparison. Given Rich’s primary focus on Mesoamerica, the 
number of chapters dealing with Mesoamerica is slightly more than the Old 
World; yet the Old World contribution is substantial and illustrates the broad 
appeal and extensive impact of his scholarship.
Mesoamerica
The first two chapters in this section are dedicated to Oaxaca. In chapter 1, 
Stephen Kowalewski argues that markets significantly impacted Mesoamerica 
before the conquest and identifies six implications of a market-dominated 
economy. He then looks for material evidence of market economies in the 
prehispanic Mixteca Alta of Oaxaca. He concludes that markets affected the 
spatial distribution of cities, regional specialization, economic integration, 
wealth stratification, consumption, and economic cycles. In chapter 2, Arthur 
Joyce and Sarah Barber compare Monte Albán and Río Viejo during the later 
Formative (350 BC–AD 250). They argue that during the later Formative polit-
ical architects at both sites initially built complex political structures around 
corporate and collective strategies. But by the end of the Terminal Formative, 
these structures came under attack by exclusionary strategies resulting in major 
reorganization at the outset of the Classic period. Río Viejo collapsed, while 
the political elite at Monte Albán built a hierarchical structure that persisted 
for another 400 years. They conclude that the differences in the ability of the 
ruling elite to transform local corporate structures into regionwide integrative 
institutions resulted in the different pathways followed by each polity.
The second pair of chapters is dedicated to West Mexico. In chapter 3, 
Christopher Beekman works to link corporate and exclusionary strategies 
with regional data in the southern Tequila valleys. He uses Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of fields to tie specific strategies to particular physical spaces. Within 
this framework, Beekman concludes that individualizing rituals, marked by 
elaborate shaft tombs, declined as more and more communities in Jalisco 
adopted circular architecture and corporate rituals after AD 200. In chapter 4, 
Verenice Heredia Espinoza addresses the role of corporate political strategies 
in the northern Tequila valleys during the Postclassic. This region was under 
threat from the Tarascans and the Caxcanes, yet it maintained its indepen-
dence by building small collective polities that could be mobilized for defense 
but that could not be dominated by a single individual or lineage. Conversely, 
the more exclusionary polities located in neighboring regions were easily con-
quered and incorporated by the Tarascans.
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The remaining chapters in this section focus on Veracruz, the Basin 
of Mexico, and the Maya area. In chapter 5, Barbara Stark uses data on 
“Standard Plan” (SP) architectural arrangements from the Classic-period 
Gulf Lowlands to develop a more nuanced application of the corporate-net-
work continuum. She concludes that the SP provided a physical arena where 
a tug-of-war between divergent corporate/collective and network strate-
gies played out. Hence, a middle-ground political strategy where corporate 
groups were important but not dominant best explains the Classic period in 
south-central Veracruz. In chapter 6, Frances Berdan looks at the ways that 
a single commodity complex, feathered ornaments, transformed an array of 
secondary production activities that fed into the manufacture of these orna-
ments. In chapter 7, Lisa LeCount examines the development of markets 
in the Mopan River valley, Belize. She concludes that while marketplaces 
were present throughout the Maya Lowlands during the Late and Terminal 
Classic, commercialization was more limited. The political elite manipulated 
the flow of highly elaborate ceramics and obsidian by controlling the markets 
in which they could be sold and by price fixing. As a result, rural households 
were more poorly supplied with these goods despite being well supply with 
plain ware ceramics.
Old World
In the second part of the book we grouped chapters on Europe (Sweden), 
sub-Saharan Africa (Nyoro), the Near East (Mari), and South Asia (Indus 
Valley and Sri Lanka). In chapter 8, T. L. Thurston argues that both collec-
tive ideologies and political strategies have deep roots in the Swedish state. 
Focusing on the emergence of the first state in Sweden, Thurston analyzes 
the conflict between the Svear crown and the strongly collective organization 
of Småland pastoralists, who occupied a region that housed natural resources 
(e.g., iron ore) coveted by the Crown. As the Crown moved in, the Smålanders 
faced increasingly unfair and brutal tax oppression. At first, they responded by 
moving into higher and more remote valleys to escape voracious tax-famers 
and thugs employed by the Crown. Then, when they had exhausted their exit 
options, they violently pushed back against the Crown and successfully main-
tained the ambitions of absolutist rulers in check over many centuries. Thus, 
Thurston argues, the Smålanders were instrumental in laying the foundation 
for modern democracy in Sweden. In chapter 9, Peter Robertshaw examines 
the history of the Nyoro state from the perspective of collective action theory 
and corporate-power strategies. He argues that the Nyoro state originally 
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developed with a more corporate political economy and shifted toward a high 
degree of “despotism” in the nineteenth century. Yet, the Nyoro state expressed 
a “tension” between the people and the ruler and, thus, between more col-
lective and more exclusionary strategies throughout its history. In chapter 10, 
Rita Wright compares the ways in which objective bases of power and corpo-
rate cognitive codes limited individual power in Mari, in the Near East, and 
the Indus civilization, in South Asia. She concludes in both cases that corpo-
rate cognitive codes, built around the collective ideologies of pastoralists in the 
case of Mari and craft-producer and merchant communities in the case of the 
Indus, were important for limiting the power of individual rulers. In chapter 
11, Deborah Winslow examines changes in Sinhalese houses in the village of 
Walangama, Sri Lanka, from the perspective of canonical and indexical com-
munication. She notes that although economic changes over the last 30 years 
have brought much more wealth to the community, wealth display on house-
hold façades has remained muted, a pattern consistent with the maintenance 
of a strong collective ethic in the village.
Cross-Cultural Comparison
In chapter 12, Peter Peregrine and Carol Ember evaluate the degree to 
which the corporate-network continuum is related to socialization for mis-
trust, unpredictable natural disasters, and external warfare. Their cross-cultural 
analysis finds support for the hypothesis that network strategies are associ-
ated with unpredictable natural disasters as well as more frequent external 
warfare, but they did not find support for the hypothesis that xenophobia is 
more strongly associated with network than corporate strategies. In chapter 
13, Gary Feinman and Linda Nicholas argue that archaeological thought on 
the origins of hierarchical societies should focus on patterns of diversity as 
opposed to uniform types, and on historical sequences instead of individual 
stages. In chapter 14, Tim Earle explores how resource mobilization, especially 
productive “bottlenecks,” are related to diverse political-economic strategies 
(e.g., the corporate-network continuum). He concludes that property rights 
over productive bottlenecks are key aspects of political economy. The degree 
to which the state or ruling elite monopolizes bottlenecks affects the degree 
to which resources may be mobilized for exclusionary political economies. In 
the final chapter, Lane Fargher examines the relationship between corporate 
political strategies and collective action. Building on Blanton’s work on corpo-
rate strategies and statistical assays, he determines that corporate strategies are 
strongly correlated with several aspects of collectivity (e.g., internal revenues, 
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public goods, and control of principal agency). Accordingly, he concludes that 
corporate strategies are an important tool that can be deployed in building 
collective states, especially for controlling rulers or a powerful nobility.
ConCLusion
Each one of the chapters included in this volume investigates the myriad 
pathways to complexity followed by human societies across the globe and 
throughout history in new and provocative ways. Following Rich’s leader-
ship, they show that multiscalar analysis, recognition of human agency, and 
a robust and diverse theoretical toolkit are necessary for understanding cul-
tural evolution and complexity. Especially important is the accumulation of 
knowledge in this volume that demonstrates that cooperation and market 
development are as much a part of the development of complex societies 
and states as coercion and exploitation, regardless of geographical area. The 
chapters in this volume collectively show, in accordance with Rich’s theoreti-
cal arguments, that collective action and competitive market systems played 
a decisive role in the cultural evolution of social complexity and civilization, 








It Was the Economy, Stupid
Stephen A. Kowalewski
Were the major cycles of growth and decline in Meso-
american civilization (and other urban societies) 
caused by uncommon (in alphabetical order) aliens, 
droughts, eruptions, exhaustions, invaders, or rap-
tures? This chapter reviews a theory of the ancient 
Mesoamerican economy, tests some of its expectations, 
and proposes that common economic forces would 
be a reasonable and sufficient cause for episodes of 
growth and decline. Despite problems of archaeologi-
cal specification, there is sufficient reason to develop 
this line of research, in which preindustrial urban 
societies are treated as subject not to exotic forces but 
to things familiar to our own experience. Our field 
is weak in general theory concerning the long-term 
dynamics of urban societies. Explanations tend to be 
ad hoc, particularistic, long-since discredited, or reli-
ant on exogenous causes; social science needs to iden-
tify regularities and processes in its domain, society 
itself—and central to social life is economics. Hence 
the title of this chapter: in 1992 the political advisor 
James Carville kept admonishing the Bill Clinton 
campaign to stick to the main issue, insisting it’s “the 
economy, stupid” (Kelly 1992).
In a recent essay (Kowalewski 2012), I explored 
in conceptual or theoretical terms how the ancient 
Mesoamerican economy worked. Here I develop 
observable implications of the theory, using data from 
five decades of regional archaeological survey in high-
land Oaxaca.
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tHeoretiCAL BAse
What follows is a general model of the ancient Mesoamerican economy. As 
a model it is not an empirical description. To distinguish the two, I use present 
tense for the model and past tense for the past observable world. The theo-
retical model is general, not designed for one place or time in Mesoamerican 
history. It is formal in the sense of using general concepts or principles not 
tied to specific cultural contexts. And in its economic anthropology style it is 
formalist rather than substantivist, as explained by Cook (1966).
Formal models such as what follows are not made from sensory data, but 
from principles; they are not data but they tell you what data are. The purpose 
of models is to run them up against real situations so one can see whether 
something was acting as if it were doing so according to one model’s princi-
ples or those of another. The model is an ideal type designed for comparison—
data against model, and by means of data, model against model (e.g., Apostel 
1961; Braudel 1970; Clarke 1972; Weber 1947).
As I present parts of the theory here, I include a few key references to the 
relevant Mesoamerican archaeology and history. In themselves these sources 
do not “prove” the principle or premise, but only show that applying the prem-
ise here is reasonable and that it can have connection to Mesoamerica.
The following paragraphs describe this theoretical model of the ancient 
Mesoamerican economy. This economy works by market principles of supply 
and demand. Many scholars would deny that it is a market economy. Perhaps 
calling it a commercial economy (commerce means goods exchange) would 
be more agreeable. The real task is to explain how the economy functions and 
how economy and society shape each other.
I begin with the actors, which are households, mostly but not entirely small-
holders. Households do not produce all the goods and services they consume. 
They desire to consume and they produce for exchange. Goods and services 
(including labor) circulate. The household is the firm, the marketer, and the 
consumer all in one. These premises are realistic given the abundant archaeo-
logical studies showing that in Mesoamerica the household or house was the 
unit of production and consumption (e.g., Hendon 1996; Hirth 2009, 2013; 
Robin 2003a; Santley and Hirth 1993). (That the household is the firm and the 
locus of specialization, and that there are so many household-firms, suggests 
that the ancient economy is a better case of the economist’s “perfect competi-
tion” than is oligopoly capitalism.)
Products in ancient Mesoamerica are elaborated, specialized, differentiated, 
subject to fashion, and consumed in great quantities. Notice that the proper-
ties just listed are not exclusive to industrial manufacturing. This blurs the 
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distinction in Western economics between agricultural and industrial sectors 
and in anthropology between industrial and preindustrial economies. Again, 
these premises about products are realistic (see Berdan, chapter 6, this volume), 
and for examples from the large literature on Mesoamerican technologies, 
Sahagún (1950–1982) for sixteenth-century historical descriptions, Feinman 
and Nicholas (2000) on shell, Healan (2011) on obsidian, and Tarkanian and 
Hosler (2011) on rubber.
Households produce for the market and consume from the market. Urban 
concentration increases exchange and market dependence. Given Meso amer-
ica’s large urban and rural populations, the demand for goods and services 
requires widespread and daily participation in exchange. There is a high volume 
of transactions. In fact, urbanization rates in Mesoamerica were comparable 
in many respects to those in preindustrial Mesopotamia, China, and Europe 
(Kowalewski 1990). On theoretical grounds, Kohler et al. (2000) argued for 
anonymous market exchange rather than personal reciprocal exchange for late 
prehistoric pueblos in New Mexico, where populations and population den-
sity were much lower than in Mesoamerica.
Exchange takes place by means of goods markets (in and outside of mar-
ketplaces) in which prices are determined by supply and demand (a key char-
acteristic of market economy, e.g., Pryor 1977). Mesoamerica’s systems of peri-
odic markets are well known. Comparative research by Richard Blanton (1985) 
showed that the density of market places was equal to or higher than that 
in preindustrial Europe and China. Recent archaeological studies of markets 
and marketing in Mesoamerica include for example LeCount (chapter 7, this 
volume) and Stark and Garraty (2010). Some prices may be set by tradition or 
local law but these too must vary in response to supply and demand in the lon-
ger run. Exchange also takes place through nonmarket mechanisms. The rela-
tive importance and relationship between market and nonmarket mechanisms 
is an important factor in the dynamics of the economy, as discussed below.
Given the high volumes of exchange, it is improbable that transactions take 
place without credit and culturally defined media of exchange. This is not barter. 
(Graeber 2011:21–41 argues that the barter economy is a myth.) There are mul-
tiple commodity monies, used as means of exchange, standards of value, stored 
value, and means of credit or account. For Mesoamerican monies, Millon (1955) 
compiled historic descriptions of cacao as money (see also Smith 2012).
The degree to which Mesoamerica diverged from the Old World in the 
matter of money has not been seriously investigated. Mesoamerica did not 
have state-minted coins nor carefully measured bullion. Nor is there evidence 
of the strong silver-staple grain nexus seen in the Near East (e.g., Davies 2002; 
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Powell 1996; Wray 2004). Whether Mesoamerican commodity monies were 
a more popular, less statist method of exchange is an interesting speculative 
problem best left aside for now.
The preponderance of transactions takes place outside the tax or tribute system, 
that is, among the masses of household producer-marketer-consumer firms. The 
economy is largely structured by the principles governing the household con-
sumption-exchange-production circuit, not tribute. On tribute in Mesoamerica, 
see for example Berdan and Anawalt (1992) for the Aztec Matrícula de Tributos/
Codex Mendoza and Landa (1941) for Yucatán. The impressive total volume 
of the Aztec tribute needs to be tempered with per capita measurements (e.g., 
Kowalewski et al. 2010). The weight of the tribute burden would have varied with 
state power, core versus periphery position, local resources, and other factors.
The degree of regional specialization and division of labor is a function of 
transaction costs. This premise follows models developed by Krugman and 
colleagues (Fujita et al. 1999; Krugman 1980). Although these models explic-
itly privilege industry over agriculture, I see no reason to assume that the 
process only works with industry, since Mesoamerican agriculture and forestry 
could themselves be quite differentiated and dynamic.
The production, consumption, and exchange activities of firms—house-
holds, that is—drives the economy. In turn the aggregate household behavior 
sets the conditions that actors have to deal with in their affairs. The economy 
works by the invisible hand, or the aggregate effect of households consuming, 
exchanging, and producing. Lords and the wealthy, operating as large houses, 
manipulate and take advantage of exchange and accumulated labor, but this is 
not a state or command economy.
Consumption, production, savings, and investment are variable, not con-
stant. Likewise, exchange through market versus nonmarket institutions is 
variable, not constant. A key factor influencing household behavior in these 
things is access to efficient markets. If access is poor or markets cannot deliver 
goods at acceptable prices, households can withdraw from participation; if 
access and efficiency are better, that encourages participation. High levels of 
demand encourage more market participation, all other things being equal, 
and withdrawal from the market, if sufficiently prevalent, makes the market 
less efficient. Participation depends on prices, expectations, demand, trust, and 
confidence. Here we have the ingredients for volatility, for good times and bad, 
and cycles of boom and bust.
These ideas were more developed in the longer article (Kowalewski 2012). 
In this essay, I ground aspects of the larger theory to archaeological data from 
highland Oaxaca, especially several features that should be manifest at the 
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regional scale. Testing a broad theory of economy has to be done piece by 
piece, some of the pieces are more amenable than others; features that are 
better addressed at macro, local, or household scales are beyond the scope of 
this chapter.
If the ancient economy operated by market principles, then certain expecta-
tions follow. The distribution of cities should conform more to commercial 
than political needs. Regional specializations should take hold in response to 
market mechanisms. Economic cycles of growth and decline should affect rates 
of production and consumption; that is, output and consumption should be 
variable, not fixed, and they should be related to market integration. The dis-
tribution of material wealth among households should be strongly influenced 
by market participation. Some of these expectations can be tested fairly easily 
but others are more difficult because of the magnitude of the data requirements.
Cit y systems
To what degree was the distribution of cities determined by commercial 
factors—the invisible hand? Alternatively, did the landscape reflect the vision 
of the kingdom—the visible hand of power? We can assess whether the invis-
ible hand or the naked hand was the stronger, because the two processes lead 
to distinctive settlement patterns.
In preview, the settlement pattern difference is this: if the hand of power is 
stronger, exchange is oriented toward a single center in an exclusive territory. 
If the invisible hand is stronger, exchange is distributed among multiple nodes 
in a network, boundaries are permeable, and commerce draws participants 
close together regardless of political affiliation.
Here I develop and use a simple model to measure where regional city sys-
tems fit on a continuum between these two polar positions, the political and 
the commercial. In the former, rulers place their capitals at a maximum dis-
tance from one another in order to have exclusive sovereign control over as 
much territory and as many subjects as possible, with a buffer zone between 
themselves and their counterparts. Christaller thought of this as a sociopoliti-
cal, noneconomic principle, which he called separation: “The ideal . . . has the 
nucleus as the capital (a central place of a higher rank), around it, a wreath of 
satellites places of lesser importance, and toward the edge of the region a thin-
ning population density—and even uninhabited areas” (Christaller 1966:77).
Christaller’s separation principle resembles closely an idealized, isolated 
Mesoamerican city-state, in Aztec terms, the altepetl. Mesoamerica had 
many cities, states tended to be small although they could be combined into 
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larger alliances or empires, the state had a capital that was the largest city 
in its domain, and the city-state had a longstanding territorial nucleus. In 
Mesoamerica, the city did not have the legal autonomy that many cities in 
Europe did, and the state was not always defined as a contiguous territory, 
since hereditary rulers sometimes had subjects or holdings in scattered places 
(Hirth 2003; Smith 2008). These particularities aside, the altepetl was a politi-
cal, autonomous entity, defined by itself without relation to its neighbors, and 
it resided in a persistent core territory. The separation principle is thus a good 
representation of the Mesoamerican political vision.
I needed another ideal model for the other, commercial end of the contin-
uum. I considered Christaller’s supply or marketing principle: “The system of 
central places has been developed, on the basis of the range of the central goods, 
from the point of view that all parts of the region are supplied with all conceiv-
able central goods from the minimum possible number of functioning central 
places” (Christaller 1966:72). This principle entails four assumptions that were 
difficult for me to make: that I knew the central goods (estimated population 
size of centers is what we have), goods were supplied everywhere, they were 
supplied by a minimal number of centers (Christaller wanted efficiency), and 
land was an isotropic plain (highland Oaxaca is not). I needed a simpler model.
I found the basic idea for a simpler model in Christaller’s results and conclu-
sions. He had observed that the wealthier, more populous regions in southern 
Germany had more numerous high-order central places, which tended to clus-
ter and be close to one another, but the poorer regions had fewer high-order 
places and other central places were more widely spaced. For Germany as a 
whole, cities also tended to cluster together in the wealthy regions (such as 
the Rhine-Ruhr Valleys), whereas poorer regions had fewer, more separated, 
but larger high-order centers (Berlin and Munich, for example) (Christaller 
1966:193; Smith and Branom 1937). This contrast gave me the direction I needed.
When commercial activity dominates, cities tend to cluster, as buyers and 
sellers of central-place goods try to increase the number of exchange partners 
within their reach. Cities are contagious, they are attracted to one another. 
But they are not totally drawn into one megacenter, because neither economic 
nor political power is monopolized and because competing centers serve 
and draw from hinterland customers and producers. Unlike the conceptual 
model of the independent kingdom, cities created in the commercial world 
are expressly situated in relation to each other in a wider world. The result 
is a galaxy or cluster of roughly equal-size centers located near one another, 
with overlapping wedge- or pie-shaped hinterlands expanding outward. In 
this manner the entire developed region is served not by one monopolistic 
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center but by competing centers that may offer varying ranges of specialized 
goods. The borders of political territories are permeable and population does 
not thin out toward borders. In essence, the commercial economy develops 
multiple high-order central places relatively close to one another, without 
regard to borders.
City distributions can be assessed against the contrasting expectations of the 
ideal separation (altepetl) model versus this ideal commercial model. Richard 
Blanton (1996) mapped the distribution of Aztec altepetl centers overlaid on 
a reconstructed understanding of the regional market system in the Basin of 
Mexico. He was able to show that the market system was already an influence 
on the location of centers in Early Aztec times, and that the market network 
filled in and became more integrated in the Late Aztec period.
In the next several pages, I evaluate the spatial distribution of central places 
using three slightly different approaches: at a macroregional scale using only 
the largest cities; a regional scale that adds middle-size central places; and 
regional-scale analysis of large and middle-size central places that examines 
the location of centers with regard to the borders of political territories. Factors 
such as land quality, topography, and transport differentials influence city dis-
tributions. I can control these other factors partially by comparing change over 
several periods of time in the same place.
Figure 1.1 shows the regional archaeological survey coverage, now over 
7,500 km2, from the Mixteca Alta to the Valley of Oaxaca. The data are from 
the following sources: Tamazulapan/Tejupan (Byland 1980); Coixtlahuaca 
(García Ayala 2011) and work by this author’s project in progress; Cuicatlán 
(Spencer and Redmond 1997); Central Mixteca Alta (Kowalewski et al. 2009; 
Pérez Rodríguez, Anderson, and Neff 2011; Spores and Robles García 2007); 
Nochixtlán (Byland and Pohl 1994; Plunket 1983; Pohl and Byland 1990; Spores 
1972); Peñoles (Finsten 1996; Smith 1993); Sosola/Tenango (Drennan 1989); 
Valley of Oaxaca (Blanton 1978; Blanton et al. 1982; Kowalewski et al. 1989); 
Sola (Balkansky 2002); Ejutla (Feinman and Nicholas 1990); Miahuatlán 
(Markman 1981); Guirún (Feinman and Nicholas 2004).
There are limitations on the comparability of data sets gathered over five 
decades by different projects, but if I restrict the analysis to those things that 
can be compared, especially the largest settlements, these survey data meet 
present purposes quite well. The older surveys have broader periodizations 
than the more recent ones. For example the Nochixtlán survey used a general 
Ramos period (Late and Terminal Formative) whereas the Central Mixteca 
Alta survey split Ramos into Early and Late. Because of this Nochixtlán may be 
somewhat underrepresented in the discussion that follows. I am not including 
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the Mixteca Baja, west of the area under consideration (Rivera Guzmán 1999), 
because the surveys there are not contiguous to those in the Mixteca Alta. For 
discussion of comparability problems with highland Mesoamerican survey 
data see Smith (2002).
The first approach concentrates on just the largest cities—that is, all settle-
ments with estimated populations greater than 5,000. I am using this limit 
of 5,000 inhabitants for all time periods to improve comparability, to exclude 
sites that were just overgrown villages without the full array of urban central-
place functions, and to simplify the visual presentation. Figure 1.1 shows the 
distributions and relative sizes of the cities as I defined them, the top-ranked 
central places with populations over 5,000; the maps do not show the many 
smaller cities and towns. The time periods are the Terminal Formative (Monte 
Albán II in the Valley of Oaxaca and Late Ramos in the Mixteca Alta), Early 
Classic (IIIA and Early Las Flores), Late Classic/Epiclassic (IIIB-IV and 
Late Las Flores), and Postclassic, which is mostly but not exclusively Late 
Postclassic (V and Natividad).
Figure 1.1. Spatial distribution and sizes of cities. (Data sources are cited in the text.) 
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Multiple urban centers emerged in the Terminal Formative. The principal 
ones were Monte Albán and Huamelulpan, and the third, Ñiaxugue-Naduza 
in Coixtlahuaca, has the minimum size but still might be suspect as an urban 
place. Monte Albán had a well-developed system of towns in its hinterland 
but the same cannot be said for the Mixteca Alta, where in this time period 
much of the rural area was abandoned and population concentrated into the 
immediate environs of the large center. Compared to the later periods, the two 
(or three) cities were quite distant from one another, as in the ideal type of the 
political landscape.
Both the Valley of Oaxaca and the Mixteca Alta had developed city systems 
in the Early Classic. There were clusters of four leading cities in both regions. 
These largest cities were quite close to one another (20 km in the Valley of 
Oaxaca and 8–18 km in the Mixteca Alta). The maximum distance between 
these centers—the size of the cluster along its long axis—was 47 km in the 
Valley and 23 km in the Mixteca Alta. Both regions had substantial develop-
ment of smaller cities and towns not shown on the map (internally and also 
extending to the south in both cases). Using the political/commercial land-
scape model, I suggest two observations: (1) that within each region commer-
cial forces attracted the largest centers toward each other; and (2) that there 
was still quite a bit of distancing between the major regions (the Mixteca Alta 
and the Valley of Oaxaca).
In the Late Classic/Epiclassic, the Mixteca Alta did have some settlement, 
but many areas seem to have been totally abandoned. The Valley of Oaxaca 
had Monte Albán, which grew to its maximum and then collapsed in this 
period, two places that seem to have grown early and then collapsed, and two 
that seem to have grown larger as the others fell. All five of these disappeared 
as cities by the end of the Epiclassic.
Finally, the Postclassic had a much larger urban system. This was the time 
of maximum population in all regions. There were two large clusters of top-
ranked cities, and all regions had strong development of lesser cities and 
towns. The Valley of Oaxaca had a more dispersed settlement pattern, while 
in the Mixteca Alta a greater proportion resided in large cities. The second- 
largest city in the Mixteca Alta is Cerro Jazmín, which according to the most 
recent study had most of its occupation a bit earlier in the Postclassic (Pérez 
Rodríguez, Anderson, and Neff 2011). The other very large city was Inguiteria 
or Coixtlahuaca, known to be quite late.
In the Postclassic, cities clustered together. One clump in the Mixteca Alta 
measures 77 km in maximum length, the other in the Valley of Oaxaca extends 
over 49 km, suggesting attraction and the commercial side of the continuum. 
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Within each of these clusters, spacing was rather close—the average nearest-
neighbor distance between these top-ranked cities was about 10 km, a two-
way trip easily walked in a day. Perhaps the very large sizes of Jazmín and 
Inguiteria indicate another level emerging at the top of the urban hierarchy.
The Postclassic settlement patterns were not simply a result of population 
growth and filling-in of available space. Instead, people aggregated into cities 
that were distributed in a particular way. Within regional systems the largest 
cities were closely spaced. The mutual attraction of the top cities, that is, the 
persistent clustering into hierarchically organized, regional systems of cities, 
suggests commercial forces operating at the regional and intraregional scales.
Moving to the second approach, I expand the range of central places 
to include middle-size places. Three decades ago Jill Appel (1986) used 
Christaller’s central-place models to study Valley of Oaxaca central-place pat-
terns. She tested whether the Early Classic and Late Postclassic conformed 
more to a k = 3 pattern (each center equally spaced from three higher-level 
centers, ideally) or a k = 4 pattern (each center equally spaced between two 
higher ranking places). A k = 3 system is most efficient for rural consumers 
where transport is not developed; k = 4 optimizes the movement of bulk goods 
along straight roads between centers. Appel found that the settlement pattern 
fit the k = 3, rural-retail model, especially the Late Postclassic but also the 
Early Classic.
The Mixteca Alta has many small valleys surrounded by mountains, quite 
different from the open plain of the Valley of Oaxaca. I use our Central 
Mixteca Alta survey area to examine central place distributions. The size of 
this study area is 1622 km2, roughly 44 × 37 km. The top-ranked population 
centers in the Classic and Postclassic had about 17,000 and 32,000 inhabitants, 
respectively, and considering the top 30 centers, the smallest had about 1,000 
inhabitants (table 1.1).
Half of the total population of the area resided in the top 20 centers (in both 
time periods), which is a high rate of urbanization. The top population centers 
were physically close to one another—the average distances from each center 
to its nearest neighbor center were only 3.3–5.0 km (depending on time period), 
less than an hour’s walking time. This aggregation into central places situated 
close to one another is consistent with the model of commercial exchange.
The spatial distribution of population centers is expected to be even or regu-
lar under the separation principle but more clustered under the commercial 
principle. To assess this expectation, I use the nearest-neighbor statistic R 
(the simplest uncorrected measure in Pinder et al. 1979). The conventional 
interpretation of R is that 0 is perfectly clustered, 1.0 is random (random 
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distributions have some clustering), and 2.15 is perfectly even or regular. Since 
R is quite sensitive to the size of the study area, and since the Mixteca Alta’s 
natural resources are clumped and not evenly distributed, a strict interpreta-
tion of the numeric values is not as informative as their relative tendencies. 
For the top 20 population centers, the nearest neighbor R values are 1.10 for 
the Early Classic, 0.89 for the Postclassic, and 1.32 for 1990; for the top 30 
centers, R = 0.80 for the Classic and 0.74 for the Postclassic (table 1.1). (I did 
not calculate, R for the top 30 centers in 1990 because that list would extend 
to small places with no central functions). In the prehispanic periods, centers 
tended toward clustering, with R dipping below 1.0 (random) in three of the 
four samples. Postclassic cities were more clustered than Early Classic cities. 
The recent settlements are more evenly distributed, as expected since most 
are the administrative centers for their municipalities. My interpretation is 
that the nearest-neighbor statistic is discriminating between the dominant 
administrative principle of recent times versus the more commercial principle 
of prehispanic times.
My third analytical approach to the spatial distribution of central places con-
siders political territories and their borders. Our work in the Central Mixteca 
Alta (Kowalewski et al. 2009) used both historical and archaeological infor-
mation to identify and describe the development of the ñuu, the small king-
doms that could be independent states or could be combined with other ñuu 
into a larger state (yuhuitayu). The ñuu is like the altepetl. If human settlement 
Table 1.1. Spacing and size range of centers in the central Mixteca Alta (NN = nearest 
neighbor)
  Classic Postclassic 1990
Top Twenty Centers      
Pop. of Largest Center 17,180 31,996 9,555
Pop. of Smallest Center 1305 2145 437
Average NN Distance (km) 5.0 4.0 5.9
NN Statistic R 1.1 0.89 1.32
Top Thirty Centers      
Pop. of Largest Center 17,180 31,996  
Pop. of Smallest Center 963 1475  
Average NN Distance (km) 3.6 3.3  
NN Statistic R 0.80 0.74  
Source: Kowalewski et al. 2009.
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were dictated by administrative needs, there would be civic-ceremonial build-
ings at a capital, the capital should be central to the territorial core of the polity, 
and the demographic center of gravity should also be in the territorial center. 
Capitals of different polities should be as far from one another as the degree 
of packing of polities permits (the separation principle). Thus the relevant 
variables are the specific locations of the civic-ceremonial centers (the palaces), 
the borders and geographical centers of these irregularly shaped territories, 
and the locations of the major populated places. Not counting the polities that 
we only partially surveyed because they extended beyond our study area to the 
east or to the west, we identified 17 ñuu in the Central Mixteca Alta.
In the Late Postclassic, the palaces were usually at the demographic center 
of the ñuu (e.g., Teposcolula), in the largest settlement (Magdalena/San Isidro 
Peñasco), or at another place more demographically central (Achiutla) (figure 
1.2). This relationship conforms to the political model.
But there was also a strong tendency for the leading demographic cen-
ter not to be situated in the geographical center of the polity. Instead the 
demographic center was attracted toward similar population concentrations 
in neighboring polities. For example the “inner basin” group of the 10 ñuu in 
the southern third of the study area all had populations strongly attracted to 
their neighbors. Apparently the political center was not in this cluster at all—
it was in Tlaxiaco, 15 km to the west. A second cluster is made up of Yucuxaco, 
Huamelulpan, and Tayata. In the north all the polities have their populations 
skewed toward population centers in Teposcolula, which was also the seat of a 
yuhuitayu lord. (Yodobada and Lagunas also have a second attraction toward 
the Tejupan center, just north of the study area.)
Quantitative tests reinforce these observations. Cities and large towns 
tended to be pulled toward the borders of the ñuu instead of being located in 
the polity’s geographic center. The mean distance from geographic center to 
nearest border is 2.7 km. This represents the maximum potential separation of 
cities from a neighboring territory. Since I measured from the centers of the 
settlements, the minimum possible distance to the border is a bit larger than 
zero, about 0.2 km for the smaller of these centers. How do the observed loca-
tions for the largest population centers in each polity fall along this scale? In 
the Early Classic the mean distance to border was 1.7 km; in the Postclassic 
it was 1.5 km, and in 1990 it was 2.0 km (p = < 0.05 for the three groups). The 
largest cities or towns were pulled from the center toward the edge of the ter-
ritory in prehispanic times, and in the Postclassic they were actually closer to 
border than to the geographical center. The recent locations conform much 
more to the administrative expectation than the prehispanic.
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That populations would be attracted away from the geographical center of 
the polity and toward each other is not accounted for by the purely political 
model of the ñuu or altepetl. Economic—commercial/labor/consumption—
forces were stronger than the political ideal. One might wryly propose that the 
Figure 1.2. Postclassic sites in the Central Mixteca Alta. (Map by John F. Chamblee 
and John C. Burns.) 
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people located as they wished and the kings came to perch on top of them, but 
lords were also involved in commerce and wanted to be where the action was.
To summarize, if the commercial economy determined settlement pattern 
more so than political forces, then cities should cluster. The three means of 
analysis all indicate the same result. At the broad macroregional scale the 
largest cities did tend to cluster, somewhat in the Early Classic and more so 
in the Postclassic. Within regions, the top- and middle-ranked central places 
also tended to cluster, noticeably in the Early Classic and more so in the 
Postclassic. Large and middle-ranked population centers were situated near 
each other, regardless of political borders. In the Late and Terminal Formative, 
political forces were relatively stronger, but by the Early Classic and especially 
in the Postclassic, settlement patterns were more heavily determined by com-
mercial forces.
Mesoamerican stelae, codices, and lienzos depict the indigenous lord’s con-
cept of the kingdom. Apparently no one commissioned monuments to the 
invisible hand. But the archaeological evidence indicates that by Classic times 
commercial forces were powerful determinants of settlement pattern.
Regional Specialization
Nineteenth-century economists understood regional or zonal specializa-
tion (Ricardo 1821:ch. VII). In market economies, zonal specialization works 
by comparative advantage. It originates and is maintained by low transac-
tion costs, which include transportation and other costs such as tariffs, bribes, 
arrangements, and so on. Fargher (2009) provides a cross-cultural analysis of 
five premodern or early modern states in which there developed strongly dif-
ferentiated core zones of intensive agriculture and peripheral zones of mixed 
extensive agriculture along with other activities such as craft production. Since 
the marginal returns to labor in the more fertile areas are high with intensi-
fication, farmers in these zones specialize in farming, even though they could 
do other things; likewise, producers in less-fertile zones should turn sooner to 
other activities besides crops because the returns will be comparatively higher 
(Fargher 2009).
In the early periods in highland Oaxaca the hinterlands of the first urban 
centers did not show much evidence of this zonal specialization. Agriculture 
and other sectors were intensified, but this took place everywhere in the urban 
hinterland and without the clear emergence of zones of specialization.
Zonal specialization in the Valley of Oaxaca emerged in the Early Classic. 
Settlement patterns indicate intensive agriculture in the fertile northern arm 
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of the valley. Extensive agriculture, cultivation of xerophytic plants, and inten-
sive chipped-stone production and use took place in the drier southern and 
eastern valley (Kowalewski et al. 1989; Feinman et al. 2007).
There is less evidence of Early Classic zonal specialization in the Mixteca 
Alta. Differences in settlement types and locations strongly suggest extensive 
upland farming and intensive farming using terraces, but the zonal pattern-
ing does not appear to have been as pronounced as in the Valley of Oaxaca 
(Kowalewski et al. 2009).
The growth and decline during the Late Classic and Epiclassic created 
short-lived and fairly small zones of specialization. This was the first time the 
mountains west of the Valley of Oaxaca were intensively occupied (Finsten 
1996; Garvin 1994).(There had been similar high-elevation settlement farther 
west, in the Central Mixteca Alta, earlier.) It is likely that charcoal, fuel-wood, 
construction timber, flowers, fruit, other mountain products, and perhaps 
labor were being drawn into valley markets. Some places in the Valley of 
Oaxaca, such as Lambityeco, Macuilxochitl, and a number of Etla towns, had 
remarkable spurts of growth and construction for a few generations, as did 
several new subdivisions at Monte Albán (Blanton 1978; Lind and Urcid 2010). 
Growth was fueled by intensive canal irrigation in Etla, floodwater farming 
in Tlacolula, extensive agriculture in uplands, and exploitation of mountain 
products. At times, hilltop-terrace towns and villages in the drier south and 
east may have provided surplus labor. These systems of zonal specialization 
were fairly small in spatial scale and they probably did not last very long.
In the Late Postclassic zonal specialization is evident in all regions. In the 
Valley of Oaxaca the northern Etla arm was a zone of intensive agriculture, 
with much less specialization in other crafts. The eastern (Tlacolula) and 
southeastern (Ocotlán) zones of the Valley have abundant evidence for craft 
specialization in chipped and ground stone, pottery, salt, lime, and xerophytic 
plants. Production in the mountains west of the Valley was at an all-time high.
Interestingly the Valley of Oaxaca regained a strong zonal specialization by 
the nineteenth century. The zonal pattern mirrors that of the Postclassic: Etla 
had intensive agriculture and dairy oriented to the urban market; Tlacolula 
and Ocotlán had more craft specialization (Kowalewski 1995).
In the Mixteca Alta, especially in the Postclassic, labor-and-land intensive 
agriculture was carried out in core areas, especially on the fertile, loose soils 
of the Yanhuitlán-Jaltepec geological formations. This specialization involved 
making and maintaining cross-drainage and contour terraces. These works 
were so extensive that they covered and transformed the whole landscape. The 
highest populations are found in these core agricultural areas.
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In several outlying subregions of the Central Mixteca Alta, we found very 
extensive chipped-stone quarries and workshops. Some of the products were 
destined to population centers in core areas and some may have been used in 
the processing of upland products.
Archaeological surveys in the Mixteca Alta have not found much evidence 
of pottery-making places, compared to the Valley of Oaxaca. Although the 
surveys were conducted with the same methods, the lack of evidence for pot-
tery-making places in the Mixteca Alta conceivably could be an unknown 
identification problem. But another possibility is that the Mixteca Alta sur-
veys have concentrated in core areas and that the pottery making took place in 
marginal zones. The recent pottery-making villages are located (with only one 
exception) in upland places outside the core areas where intensive agriculture 
is practiced (figure 1.3). Whether this pattern in the historical era was true of 
the Postclassic is not known.
Alliances between petty kingdoms, or blocks of ñuu subject to one ruling 
house, could have promoted internal exchange. Perhaps a consequence of state 
or royal house expansion was to lower the costs of transactions within the 
territory of the state or among its subjects. One example is the yuhuitayu 
of Teposcolula, which was centered in the agricultural core zones in the 
Teposcolula and Tamazulapan valleys and had subject ñuu in all the surround-
ing upland valleys. (The holdings of a royal house were not always contiguous, 
nor were alliances always between contiguous polities, but on the archaeologi-
cal time scale the patterns of core and periphery are detectable and persistent.)
Another institutional mechanism for lowering transactions costs and 
promoting specialization and exchange is ritual obligation (e.g., Wells and 
Davis-Salazar 2007). At the intravillage scale, Monaghan (1995) showed 
how much exchange was generated by calendrical and other ritual events. 
At the regional scale in Michoacán, Castilleja (2011) has been documenting 
ritual exchanges that link Purépecha towns and villages to one another. A 
few years ago I attended the major fiesta in San Juan Bautista Coixtlahuaca, 
Oaxaca, a town of a thousand inhabitants, for which the mayordomo spent 
the equivalent of $150,000 USD, a figure that does not include the offerings, 
contributions, and expenses of scores of other families. Zonal specialization 
is symbolized and reinforced in the ritual cycle of this fiesta by outlying 
villages supplying considerable labor, animals, food, and materials. The fies-
tas also entail pilgrimages, offerings, and commitments from participants 
in Veracruz, Puebla, and Mexico City. Participants say these practices are a 
continuation of precolumbian ties that Coixtlahuaca had as a major inter-
national marketplace.
Figure 1.3. Twentieth-century pottery-making villages and agricultural core areas in 
the Mixteca Alta. The villages are San Miguel Adequez, Santa Inés del Río, Buenavista 
Jaltepec, Santo Domingo Tonaltepec, Vista Hermosa Tonaltepec, Río Blanco Tonaltepec, 
Magdalena Peñasco, San Juan Mixtepec, Rancho Morelos Tinú, San Antonio Nduaxico, 
Santa María Cuquila, Atatlahuaca, and San Juan Numí (Spores 2007:108; Warner 1976). 
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The role of ritual in the economy is somewhat contradictory because partici-
pation is very demanding of time and effort, and it is a drain on savings that 
could potentially go toward capital investment. Yet ritual obligation involves 
many nonmarket exchanges that stimulate production and consumption. 
Ritual obligations act as stimulus because they turn household savings into 
investment, and they pave the way for nonritual exchange. Plus, nonmarket 
offerings of goods and services contribute to the success of the fiesta, which as 
a whole has a major and widespread effect on economic activity.
Market Integration
Since at least Early Classic times, regional urban systems had well-devel-
oped systems of market places. Market places need accessible, appropriate 
spaces. We studied potential market places in the Central Mixteca Alta 
(Pluckhahn and Kowalewski 2003), where the terrain is quite mountainous. 
The lack of naturally occurring flat spots means that if people were to have 
market places in appropriate, accessible locations they had to build the space. 
Our survey found many of these public spaces or plazas. Of course we can-
not be sure that each plaza was used as a market, but we can say that these 
were likely the best potential or possible market places. For the Classic and 
Postclassic, we identified potential market plazas at a rate of one for every 
2,000–4,000 people, or one for every 40 km2. This would be a high mar-
ket density even if only half the places functioned as markets (cf. Blanton 
1985). By comparison, in the 1960s the Nochixtlán cyclical market area had 
20 markets (Warner 1976)—one market for every 5,400 people and one for 
every 280 km2.
At times market systems in adjacent regions are poorly connected; at other 
times the connections may be so good that we can consider it a single pool of 
producers and consumers. Greater integration spreads risk; smaller systems 
are subject to higher probabilities of supply-demand mismatches. The degree 
of connectedness was a major variable in the cycles of development in civiliza-
tions (see Smith 2002 for Mesoamerica).
Market integration is understood as the degree to which prices are coordi-
nated over space and among different commodities. For present purposes, I 
focus on the spatial aspect of market integration. Under preindustrial condi-
tions for the integration of markets in two different regions, consumer demand 
should be continuous in the intervening space, transportation and transac-
tion costs should not be prohibitive, and there should be nodes of exchange 
such that local demands might be satisfied by competitors from both regions. 
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Market integration would thus be unlikely if the two regions were separated 
by uninhabited area and if market places were too far apart.
We have appropriate data to assess whether some of the conditions for mar-
ket integration were met in highland Oaxaca. Consider the Mixteca Alta and 
the Valley of Oaxaca as two regions. Did the intervening area have the popula-
tion and market centers sufficient to allow the regular exchange of goods and 
services and were producers and consumers in the same market? The Valley 
of Oaxaca and the Mixteca Alta are separated by 30 km of mountains, some 
of which, the Sosola-Tenango area, was surveyed by Drennan and another 
area, Peñoles, by Finsten and myself (Drennan 1989; Finsten 1996). Again it 
is helpful to evaluate the relative potential for integration from one period to 
the next. Figure 1.4 shows the locations of the largest cities, just as in figure 1.1; 
Figure 1.4. Relative interconnectedness of Mixteca Alta and Valley of Oaxaca regions as 
gauged by the numbers of sites in the intervening mountains. 
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the numbers in the Sosola-Tenango and Peñoles regions are the numbers of 
settlements. The Nochixtlán and Etla Valleys are the sectors of the Mixteca 
Alta and the Valley of Oaxaca closest to the intervening area.
The Terminal Formative was the least-likely period for market integration, 
as the mountains between the Mixteca Alta and the Valley of Oaxaca were 
very sparsely populated.
The Etla arm of the Valley of Oaxaca had some settlement in the Early 
Classic, a string of towns down the middle of the valley, and this string may 
have continued with several villages in Peñoles. But overall the mountains were 
not much occupied and Etla was less important than the highly developed 
eastern and southern arms of the Valley of Oaxaca and parts of the Mixteca 
Alta. Substantial growth and development occurred in the two regions, but the 
intervening area did not play much of a role.
The Late Classic/Epiclassic panel in figure 1.4 shows that in the Mixteca 
Alta no large cities are identified; except for a few places in the Nochixtlán 
Valley much of the region appears to have been little occupied. In the Valley 
of Oaxaca there was strong but stuttering growth in the Late Classic before 
collapse at the end of the Epiclassic. Monte Albán grew larger than ever and 
then collapsed. Tlacochahuaya and towns in Etla thrived early and then col-
lapsed; Jalieza and Lambityeco were at their largest a bit later, then declined. 
The mountains outside the Valley to the north and west had villages and a few 
towns—some earlier, some later, some a bit of both.
The Late Postclassic had strong urban and rural growth in both the Mixteca 
Alta and the Valley of Oaxaca, and the strongest development ever in the inter-
vening mountains. Sosola-Tenango and especially Peñoles had multiple towns 
and villages with plazas. In Peñoles the market orientation over most of the area 
was toward the Valley of Oaxaca, except for the northwestern quarter, which was 
oriented west to the Nochixtlán Valley. That most of Peñoles traded more with 
the Valley of Oaxaca is interesting because historically it is Mixtec-speaking, 
like its neighbors to the west, and its prehispanic ritual artifacts are mostly in 
the Mixteca Alta style. Yet the Valley of Oaxaca was predominately Zapotec 
speaking. Economic ties thus criss-crossed linguistic and cultural boundaries.
In sum the Late Postclassic had the most intensive and most extensive mar-
ket integration, in which the Valley of Oaxaca and the Mixteca Alta, more 
than any previous time, were connected together into a single system.
It is more difficult to assess market integration in the sense of equivalent 
prices for goods and thus equivalent cost for the factors of their produc-
tion. Blanton and colleagues (Blanton et al. 2005) and Williams (2004), have 
proposed that certain strategic or world-system goods marked broadscale 
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exchange of common commodities and shaped economic relations. These 
goods provide another line of evidence for market integration. Obsidian is 
one such commodity. It was much more common in the two periods of greater 
spatial integration, the Early Classic and (more so) the Late Postclassic; it is 
less common in the Terminal Formative and the fragmenting Late Classic/
Epiclassic, even in the regions experiencing some growth during that time.
And then there is pottery. I think that in market disintegration, standard 
bulk pottery and its styles are of poor quality and do not travel very far. This 
stands to reason and one need look no farther than the G-35 type for a bulk 
good that perhaps for very good reason did not travel very far, whereas the 
Postclassic G-3M and polychrome did. Likewise the predominant and tell-
tale orange look of Early Classic pottery was followed by multiple producers 
and the style was widely known in common goods.
But pottery and styles traveling far is scarcely a late thing; otherwise, cross-
dating would not work as well as it does in all phases from the Early Formative 
on. We need to be cautious here. Perhaps with urbanization market integra-
tion could have been a factor in pottery quality, but it is not the only relevant 
variable and there is not a very good understanding of why Formative pots 
and styles traveled as far and as regularly as they did.
Wealth Stratification
The economy shaped the distribution of wealth and livelihood. Mesoamerican 
social organization is often described in terms of its class system of nobles, 
a small class of merchants and luxury crafters with intermediate privileges, 
commoners landed and landless, and slaves. These are ideal or legal categories; 
these categories may not correspond to the distribution of wealth (Chase and 
Chase 1992). An indication of the importance of the market would be the 
degree of divergence between legal class categories and the distribution of 
household wealth. Feinman and colleagues studied this problem in detail with 
well-controlled, excavated houses at El Palmillo, a Classic-period town in the 
Valley of Oaxaca (Feinman et al. 2007). They observed the distribution of 21 
different everyday, uncommon, and ritual objects and found that there were 
differences in household wealth, but that the differences were continuous and 
quantitative. Our review (Steere and Kowalewski 2012) of house and artifac-
tual data from excavations and mapping projects in Central Mexico, Oaxaca, 
and the Maya area concludes that wealth distributions were indeed variable, 
they tended to be continuous, and they often had a stronger middle than pre-
dicted under the nobility/commoner model of social stratification.
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Variable Consumption
My understanding of the ancient Mesoamerican economy implies that 
household consumption was not fixed but variable, and that it varied with 
market dependence and participation. In 1970 I worked for John Paddock 
at Lambityeco, a town in the Valley of Oaxaca dating to around AD 700. 
Paddock talked about Lambityeco as decadent, usually pronouncing the word 
“decay-dent” (Paddock 1970), because the ancient Lambityecans, to his mind, 
made almost nothing of artistic quality even though they consumed enor-
mous quantities of stuff. For a relatively short occupation—most of it in just 
a few generations—Lambityeco certainly did leave a lot of débris. Ancient 
Mesoamericans did that at some times and places, but not always. The 
Lambityeco bubble was not only relatively brief, it was also localized.
Measuring household consumption rates is not easy because it requires 
good chronological control, a way of getting at consumption per unit time, 
and large, representative samples. It requires quantitative measurement. This is 
why early professional economists in Western countries campaigned for better 
statistics (i.e., reliable numbers on such things as manufacturing output, sales, 
employment, and the flow of money). Understanding a modern economy 
requires quantitative measurement with reliable data. Why should we think 
the ancient Mesoamerican economy was any different?
Economic Cycles
In our experience today we understand that poorly controlled markets fluc-
tuate between exuberance, stability, and depression. This is not a new revela-
tion. In the fourteenth century Ibn Khaldûn described economic cycles of 
growth and decline that lasted about 40 years. He suggested a sophisticated 
explanation based on movements in wages, prices, supply, demand, and expen-
ditures in different sectors (Boulakia 1971; Khaldûn 1967:2:291ff.; Soofi 1995). 
Cycles of various periodicities are recognized by modern historians and there 
is considerable literature on their causes (reviewed by Berry 1991).
Did Mesoamerica have a business cycle? If so, was it faster or slower than in 
economies with metal coinage? Were there economic waves of longer periods? 
Does the cyclical notion of time characteristic of some civilizations have to 
do with people trying to understand and control the good and bad times of 
economic cycles?
Civilizations have longer-period cycles of growth and decline, unification 
and disintegration. Prolonged stability or growth is not known. All civilizations 
cycle. Older ideas about rise and fall (Spengler 1926–1928) were discredited 
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long ago, but they keep returning (as in drought causing the Classic Maya 
collapse, e.g., Haug et al. 2003). Modern social science has not dealt with the 
problem very well (McAnany and Yoffee 2010). Anthropologists have typi-
cally opted to emphasize particular histories instead of general regularities, 
or they assert that preindustrial societies were a different species from mod-
ern societies and not subject to uniformitarian processes. Admittedly this is 
a large and difficult problem, and I for one do not have the cross-cultural 
expertise in this area, but our abdication has left the field open for all sorts 
of even lesser-qualified advocates for exogenous causes and externalities. The 
professionals leave the field and the amateurs take over.
DisCussion
In this chapter I have tried to ground in archaeological evidence six impli-
cations of a general theory of a market-dominated Mesoamerican economy: 
(1) the spatial distribution of cities, (2) regional specialization, (3) market inte-
gration, (4) wealth stratification, (5) variable consumption, and (6) economic 
cycles. These are observable at the regional scale but some are better studied 
with locality and household data. The present analysis is limited because it is 
confined to highland Oaxaca. Some of the implications are fairly well under-
stood and supported; others are reasonable but still speculative.
If cities were located according to the political needs of rulers, they 
should have been spaced far from one another. This was true in the Terminal 
Formative. But by the Early Classic they were not far from one another, they 
clustered together. Cities were even more attracted to one another in the Late 
Postclassic. Urban attraction is a characteristic of commercial economies but 
it is not anticipated in the idealized political landscape of the Mesoamerican 
city-state.
Market systems can grow in spatial scale and regional market systems can 
have different degrees of articulation with each other. In highland Oaxaca, 
Terminal Formative market systems did not extend beyond their capital city’s 
hinterland (small for Huamelulpan, larger for Monte Albán). Regional sys-
tems were quite integrated in the Early Classic but they did not extend far-
ther than the region in terms of daily, high-volume exchange. In the Late 
Postclassic, regional systems were highly integrated internally and the two 
core regions—the Mixteca Alta and the Valley of Oaxaca—had the highest 
degree of interconnectedness. The Late Classic/Epiclassic was a time of spa-
tially smaller systems, sometimes well integrated internally, but not so inte-
grated at the interregional scale.
38 STEPHEN A. KOWALEWSKI
In market economies zones of specialized economic activity develop as trans-
actions costs are sufficiently low and producers find comparative advantage in 
mutual exchange. This happened in Mesoamerica. In Oaxaca, archaeological 
evidence of regional specialization is strongest in the Late Postclassic and is 
also found for the Valley of Oaxaca in the Classic period. It was weakly devel-
oped in the Early Classic in the Mixteca Alta and there is little indication of it 
in the Terminal Formative. Because regional or zonal specialization has such 
an impact on local and household economies, linking variation in domestic 
production to role in regional system is a promising area for further testing.
Market economies create wealth disparities and continua in wealth distribu-
tions that deviate from expectations that wealth would be determined by legal 
status. Data on household wealth in numerous archaeological cases from dif-
ferent times and places in Mesoamerica do indicate both substantial variation 
and continuous (as opposed to categorical) variation. Variability in household 
wealth needs to be linked to other economic factors, such as market integration.
The general theory does not assume a static peasant with fixed need or wants; 
instead, consumption should be variable, depending in large part on market 
integration. In principle variable consumption rates are measurable, but practi-
cally this seems to me to be a knotty problem with archaeological data.
The commercial economy structured Mesoamerican society in fundamental 
things: where people lived, how they made a living, their standard of living, 
the rhythms of life, and so on. By the later periods the distribution of cit-
ies, towns, and villages and patterns of regional specializations were consis-
tent with the expectations of market economics. I use the term “market” in a 
broad sense that does not imply capitalist mechanisms or special institutions 
derived in the experience of industrialism. Integration of commercial systems 
was associated with increased production, consumption, market dependence, 
and demographic growth; market disintegration was associated with decline. 
I argue that the Mesoamerican economy, like other urbanized economies, 
underwent such cycles. Still, the intensity and speed of these movements in 
this commodity-money economy are not yet understood.
Mesoamerica does seem to belong in that set of civilizations within which it 
is totally appropriate to explore how market economies behave and how they 
might be better understood than if we relied only on the narrower range of 
experience of select Western countries in the past couple of centuries. Such 
a “modernist” stance, in which the past is not a caste apart but a relevant 
kindred of our own experience, has enlivened studies of the economic his-
tory of the Near East. Silver’s summary comment on Polanyi’s view of mar-
kets in the Near East applies just as well to Mesoamerica: “It is incorrect 
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to magnify the economic flows of temple or palace to Amazonian propor-
tions while shrinking the market to a mere brook” (Silver 1983:829). Temin 
(2013) has used Roman data to challenge the claim that the ancient economy 
was incapable of real growth and had only Malthusian growth. Similarly for 
Mesoamerica, Stark and colleagues (1998) pointed out nearly 20 years ago 
that Mesoamerica’s cotton sector exhibited growth and dynamism sufficiently 
powerful to affect important aspects of society and the regional and interre-
gional economy. Stark has explicitly taken up the question of economic growth, 
describing difficulties in archaeological measures, but concluding nevertheless 
that in precolumbian Mesoamerica “economic growth is largely episodic or 
unstable, but nevertheless exhibits some cumulative effects” (Stark 2013).
Anthropologists have as one of their special duties to science, the critical 
examination and broadening of theories that were originally developed in 
more culture-bound, usually Western contexts. Classical economic geography 
clearly improved when it was broadened to non-Western cases (e.g., Smith 
1976). Anthropological study of ancient urban economics might broaden and 
enrich general economic theory by reexamining basic concepts, including 







to Power in Formative 
Oaxaca
Arthur A. Joyce and 
Sarah B. Barber
Richard Blanton has been at the forefront of research 
aimed at broadening archaeological approaches to the 
development and organization of early complex societ-
ies (Blanton 1998a; Blanton and Fargher 2008; Blanton 
et al. 1996). In particular, he has challenged archaeolo-
gists to expand views of political complexity beyond 
traditional conceptions of highly integrated polities 
with well-developed hierarchies led by powerful rul-
ers. Instead, Blanton has sought to problematize the 
concept of social integration in complex societies and 
to consider collective or corporate forms of political 
organization by examining the ways that rulers and 
subordinates collaborate to develop and maintain poli-
ties. While collective political organization can entail 
assembly or council-based government without indi-
vidual rulers, it also includes governments with power-
ful rulers who gain and retain authority by complying 
with collective moral codes.
Blanton and his colleagues (Blanton and Fargher 
2008; Fargher et al. 2010) argue that a key process in 
complex polities involves bargaining between rulers 
and subjects. They assert that rulers will be more likely 
to bargain with subjects to the degree that the former 
are dependent on the surplus production, labor, and 
taxable commercial transactions of the latter. When 
rulers largely depend on resources mobilized from fol-
lowers (internal revenue), rather than external sources 
like imperial tribute or imported valuables (external 
revenue), followers are in a stronger position to make 
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demands from rulers in return for their compliance. Rulers, in turn, provide 
public goods and services like military defense, judicial services, and spon-
sorship of public rituals. Subaltern compliance can also be achieved through 
coercion, although the greater the force used to control subjects the greater the 
incentives for resistance and rebellion. Rulers and subjects therefore pursue a 
continuous process of negotiation through which a temporary and contingent 
form of social contract is constructed. We find Blanton’s perspective especially 
effective because, unlike traditional cultural evolutionist perspectives, it leaves 
room for agency as well as social and historical contingency.
In this chapter, we draw on Blanton’s work to compare the negotiation of 
political authority during the emergence of two complex, urban polities at the 
end of the Formative period in Oaxaca: Monte Albán in the Valley of Oaxaca 
and Río Viejo in the lower Río Verde valley in the Pacific coastal lowlands. 
Following from our previous research (Barber 2013; Barber and Joyce 2007; 
Joyce 2000, 2010), we examine evidence from both regions for tension and con-
flict between more traditional, corporate, and egalitarian (sensu Blanton 1998a) 
forms of authority and leaders who were trying to extend their political influ-
ence to the broader region. We argue that the outcomes of attempts to insti-
tutionalize more expansive forms of authority were dramatically different. The 
Río Viejo polity collapsed circa AD 250, perhaps due to internal conflict result-
ing ultimately from what Blanton and Fargher (2008:112) term “collective action 
problems.” In contrast, the rulers of Monte Albán were successful in estab-
lishing hierarchical institutions that persisted for centuries, although the evi-
dence suggests that their success may have come via the suppression of internal 
enemies and a greater reliance on external sources of revenue. Drawing on the 
collective action perspective of Blanton and Fargher (2008), we consider some 
of the factors that may account for the divergent histories of these two polities.
PoLitiCAL AutHorit y AnD integrAtion 
in LAter formAtiVe oAxACA
The Later Formative period (400 BC–AD 250) throughout much of Meso-
america was a time of emerging political centralization and the expansion 
of political authority over broader regions and larger populations (e.g., Joyce 
2010; Pool 2008; Sugiyama 1993). In Oaxaca, archaeologists have shown that 
the social changes that occurred with the emergence of early urban centers 
included increased inequality, warfare, the mobilization of labor for the con-
struction of monumental architecture, changes in settlement patterns and 
social organization, and innovations in religion, ideology, and economy.
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Monte Albán
The founding and early development of Monte Albán represents a dramatic 
transformation in social and political relations in the Oaxaca Valley. Monte 
Albán was founded circa 500 BC on a previously unoccupied series of hilltops 
in the center of the Oaxaca Valley (Blanton 1978; Joyce 2010; Marcus and 
Flannery 1996; Winter 2001) and quickly grew into an urban center. By 300 
BC Monte Albán far exceeded any other site in the valley in size, population, 
and scale of monumental architecture. During the Late Formative (300–100 
BC) the city grew to cover 442 ha with an estimated population of 10,200–
20,400 (Blanton 1978:44). Data pertaining to the first several centuries after 
the founding of Monte Albán indicate that hierarchical rulership emerged in 
the context of more traditional, communal forms of authority ( Joyce 2010). 
Indeed, hereditary status distinctions in the Valley of Oaxaca are clearly evi-
dent only a century or two prior to the founding of Monte Albán (Blanton et 
al. 1999:36–42; Joyce 2010:111–114; cf. Marcus and Flannery 1996:93–110).
Late Formative residential and mortuary data indicate increasing status 
differentiation although it appears that commoners could acquire significant 
wealth, a pattern consistent with more corporate forms of political organiza-
tion. Excavations at Monte Albán suggest that high-status residences were 
concentrated in areas around the North Platform, a public ceremonial space 
( Joyce 2010:142–143, 156). The most completely excavated Late Formative high-
status house in the region is the Area I residence at the site of El Palenque, 
which Spencer and Redmond (2004) argue was a ruler’s residence. It covered 
an area of 16 m x 16 m including eight rooms arranged around a central patio 
measuring 8 m x 8 m. Ritual feasting may have occurred in a paved courtyard 
east of the residence. Presumably, rulers’ houses at Monte Albán were at least 
as elaborate as the Area I residence at El Palenque. At Tomaltepec, Whalen 
(1988) excavated the residence of a local elite family. In contrast to the possible 
royal residence at El Palenque, the Tomaltepec residence is similar in size to 
low-status houses (Winter 1986), but included a stone masonry tomb with an 
elaborate offering. The Tomaltepec residence was located near the site’s cer-
emonial center, a pattern also seen with high-status residences at El Palenque 
and Monte Albán.
Although royal residences seem to have been considerably more elaborate 
than typical houses, mortuary data suggest that commoners could acquire sig-
nificant wealth (Whalen 1988:300–301; Winter 1995). Most interments were 
associated with residences and consisted of simple graves, fossa (graves lined 
with stones or adobes), cists, adobe tombs, and stone masonry tombs. The 
most elaborate interments were those in stone masonry tombs, which were 
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likely interments of hereditary nobles such as Monte Albán Tomb 43 with 72 
ceramic vessels and Tomb 111 with 51 vessels. There is considerable variability 
in offerings associated with other types of interments and even simple graves 
could include elaborate offerings such as Monte Albán Burial VI-12 with an 
offering of 29 vessels and onyx drill cores.
Another indicator of collective action and a corporate form of authority dur-
ing the Late Formative involves resources mobilized by rulers to fund admin-
istrative institutions and to acquire wealth. The evidence suggests that the 
most important resource was probably labor provided by people from Monte 
Albán and nearby communities, which constituted a form of internal revenue 
consistent with collective action. The concentration of approximately three-
quarters of the valley’s population within 20 km of Monte Albán (Kowalewski 
et al. 1989) would have facilitated labor mobilization and tribute collection. 
The scale of monumental public buildings and spaces at Monte Albán during 
the early years of the site was considerable (Winter 2001). The initial version 
of the Main Plaza, dating to the late Middle Formative and Late Formative 
(500–100 BC), consisted of the plaza, along with the western row of buildings 
and much of the eastern half of the massive North Platform (figure 2.1). Early 
public buildings included Building L-sub along the southwestern end of the 
plaza and Building IV-sub on the northwestern end of the plaza; the walls of 
both buildings were constructed with huge monoliths.
Other sources of revenue could have involved the mobilization of agricul-
tural production, tribute acquired through conquest, and the control of long-
distance trade. Agricultural production available to the inhabitants of Monte 
Albán was probably insufficient to provision the city, necessitating the taxa-
tion of agricultural producers in communities outside the city, especially in 
newly settled piedmont areas (Kowalewski et al. 1989:123–126). The scale of 
resource mobilization to provision Monte Albán and the degree to which 
elites controlled and benefited from such transactions is unclear, however. 
Several researchers in Oaxaca have argued that the rulers of Monte Albán 
were also able to mobilize large armies for military conquest (Marcus and 
Flannery 1996; Redmond and Spencer 2006), although other archaeologists 
disagree and view conflict at this time as much smaller in scale ( Joyce 2014; 
Zeitlin and Joyce 1999). Although some resources were probably acquired by 
Monte Albán through the establishment of tributary relationships, the evi-
dence for tribute extraction is minimal (see Spencer 1982:246–250). Evidence 
also suggests that nobles had preferential access to prestige goods imported 
from outside the valley such as nonlocal pottery and ornaments of greenstone 
and shell (Winter 1984; Whalen 1988). The data do not suggest that rulers 
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directly controlled key utilitarian resources such as land or the production of 
pottery and stone tools (Fargher 2007; Parry 1987; Whalen 1988). Most of the 
resources on which the rulers of Monte Albán were dependent therefore rep-
resented internal sources of revenue, which would have given subjects greater 
power in negotiating more favorable relations vis-à-vis public goods and ser-
vices (Blanton and Fargher 2008).
Since sources of revenue were largely internal, following Blanton and 
Fargher (2008) we would expect to see evidence of public goods provided by 
rulers in return. Although some exotic, nonlocal goods like ornamental shell 
and greenstone were available, the evidence suggests that public goods con-
trolled by rulers of Monte Albán consisted largely of religious knowledge and 
authority. The first several centuries following the founding of Monte Albán 
were characterized by major innovations in religious belief and practice sug-
gesting a connection with the dramatic political changes of the time (Blanton 
et al. 1999; Joyce 2000, 2010). Associations of elite residences and burials with 
religious symbols, spaces, and artifacts indicate that the nobility increasingly 
came to control ritual knowledge and authority, although high-ranking com-
moners may have also achieved positions of political and religious authority 
( Joyce 2010:143; Urcid 2011). Religious objects associated with elaborate tombs 
and burials included effigy vessels and urns, sometimes depicting the Zapotec 
rain deity Cocijo, and a variety of zoomorphic vessels usually representing 
animals associated with water, including ducks, conch shells, frogs, and toads. 
Hieroglyphic inscriptions and iconography indicate that rulers performed acts 
Figure 2.1. View of the Main Plaza of Monte Albán. (Photograph by Sarah Barber.) 
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of human sacrifice and autosacrifice (Urcid 2011). Sacrificial practices, espe-
cially human sacrifice, were particularly significant in contacting the other-
world, reenacting the cosmic creation, and renewing the world ( Joyce 2000; 
Monaghan 2009).
An important and widely shared aspect of Mesoamerican worldview was 
the idea that the current world was the result of a sacred covenant between 
humans and the divine whereby people petitioned deities for agricultural 
fertility and prosperity in return for sacrificial offerings. Sacrifice was both 
religious and ideological. It contributed to the legitimation of political author-
ity because nobles or priests trained in institutional contexts performed the 
most powerful sacrificial rituals and because noble blood was considered to 
be more potent in contacting divinities than that of commoners ( Joyce 2000). 
At the time of the Spanish Conquest, common people provided resources like 
labor and agricultural surpluses to the nobility with the expectation that elites 
would reciprocate by staging powerful ceremonies through which deities and 
ancestors were contacted on everyone’s behalf (Monaghan 2009). Thus, the 
economic and ritual obligations of the sacred covenant acted as a kind of social 
contract between elites, commoners, and the gods.
The archaeological evidence indicates that Monte Albán’s Main Plaza was 
the political and ceremonial center for the polity ( Joyce 2000, 2004; Marcus 
and Flannery 1996; Winter 2001). The scale, accessibility, artifacts, symbol-
ism, and architectural arrangement of the Main Plaza indicate that it was 
constructed as a performance space where thousands of people participated in 
politico-religious ceremonies led by the elite, including human sacrifice, auto-
sacrifice, ancestor veneration, and deity impersonation ( Joyce 2010:131–155; 
Urcid 2011). The spatial arrangement of architecture and iconography suggest 
that the Main Plaza symbolized the Zapotec version of the cosmos where rit-
uals could be performed that reenacted the cosmic creation ( Joyce 2000, 2004).
Although the evidence indicates that the wealth and political power of the 
nobility increased considerably during the Middle to Late Formative and that 
elites gained greater control over religious knowledge and authority, there 
appear to have been limits on the power of Monte Albán’s rulers that are 
consistent with more communal or collective forms of authority ( Joyce 2004, 
2010). We argue that public settings like the Main Plaza stressed the sym-
bols of communal authority and an emerging corporate identity, while muting 
representations of the increasingly powerful rulers of the city. The accessibil-
ity of the Main Plaza would have allowed people to monitor the behavior of 
rulers during public ceremonies and the sacred covenant may have acted as 
a strong moral code; both are means through which Blanton and Fargher 
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(2008:203–206) argue that subjects are able to monitor and gain trust in the 
behavior of rulers and ruling institutions.
Although nobles lived near the ceremonial precinct and directed public ritu-
als, until the Classic period (AD 200–800), the Main Plaza itself had few overt 
representations of local nobles and there were no high-status residences directly 
facing the plaza ( Joyce 2004). Rulers were represented solely in the hieroglyphic 
inscriptions set in Building L-sub, which were probably understandable only to 
the literate nobility (Urcid 2011). The earliest known ruler’s portrait, Monument 
J-41, probably dates to the end of the Late Formative. The size, accessibility, and 
symbolism of the Main Plaza suggests that during Monte Albán’s first four 
centuries the plaza was a focus of public ceremonies participated in by people 
from multiple communities in the valley. The plaza emphasized public build-
ings, public spaces, and cosmic symbolism including images depicting sacrifice, 
warfare, ancestors, and the shared Zapotec view of the cosmos.
Collective action is evident in the nearly 400 carved orthostats originally 
set into the walls of Building L-sub (frequently referred to as danzantes). In 
a recent reanalysis of the monuments, Urcid (2011; Urcid and Joyce 2014) has 
raised the possibility that the late Middle Formative and Late Formative rul-
ers of Monte Albán may have shared political authority with more communal 
institutions (see Joyce 2010:131–159). The stones that remain in situ consist of 
alternating rows of horizontal and vertical stones that differ somewhat in style. 
Using pan-Mesoamerican contextual comparisons he questions the long-
standing view that the Building L-sub orthostats represent sacrificial victims 
(e.g., Coe 1962; Marcus 1992). Instead, Urcid argues that the figures carved 
on the vertical stones represent men in the act of bloodletting by perforating 
their penises, with genital scrolls interpreted as blood (figure 2.2). The only 
representations of human sacrifice in his view are four depictions of severed 
heads. He interprets the horizontal figures on Building L-sub as ancestors 
contacted through the act of autosacrifice. The people performing autosac-
rifice are interpreted as members of a warrior sodality including low-status 
members depicted on the lower sections of the program and high status elders 
and Rain Deity impersonators on higher levels. While we find Urcid’s analysis 
to be compelling, the traditional conception of the stones as sacrificial victims 
would also demonstrate that early authority at Monte Albán was strongly 
collective. The Building L-sub imagery emphasizes the collectively beneficial 
outcome of political action, in this case human or autosacrifice, rather than 
glorifying the individuals performing those sacrifices.
Overall, the evidence from the Valley of Oaxaca indicates the emergence 
of more hierarchical and far-reaching forms of political authority by the 
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Late Formative period. Yet the data also indicate that the Monte Albán pol-
ity exhibited many aspects of collective forms of political organization and 
economy. Commoners provided labor and perhaps agricultural surpluses and 
in return rulers sponsored important politico-religious ceremonies. Yet evi-
dence suggests that the rituals carried out on Monte Albán’s Main Plaza were 
cast as communal in emphasis and the authority of the nobility was muted in 
iconographic representations. If Urcid (2011) is correct in his reinterpretation 
of the Building L-sub orthostats, then communal forms of authority persisted 
alongside newer, more hierarchical ones.
Finally, although the evidence shows that the political, economic, and reli-
gious innovations of the first 400 years of Monte Albán drew thousands of 
people to the urban center, there are also indications that some people and 
Figure 2.2. The carved-stone monuments from Building L-sub. (a) Photo of in situ 
horizontal and vertical monuments (photograph by Arthur Joyce); (b) elder from the upper 
section (redrawn with permission from Javier Urcid); (c) young adult from the lower row 
(redrawn with permission from Javier Urcid); (d) Rain God impersonator (redrawn with 
permission from Javier Urcid); (e) severed head (redrawn with permission from Javier Urcid). 
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communities resisted incorporation into the polity. Redmond and Spencer 
(2006) argue that the political seat of the Tilcajete polity located 20 km south-
east of Monte Albán successfully withstood attacks from Monte Albán for 
several hundred years.
Río Viejo
The Late Formative period in the lower Río Verde valley, like in the Valley 
of Oaxaca, was a time of population growth, increasing social inequality, the 
development of urbanism, and an increase in the construction of monumental 
buildings (Barber and Joyce 2007; Joyce 2006, 2010). In the lower Verde region, 
the development of urbanism lagged several centuries behind the Valley of 
Oaxaca. During the Late Formative, the two largest sites in the valley were 
Charco Redondo (70 ha) and San Francisco de Arriba (95 ha). Survey and 
excavations at both sites provide evidence for the construction of monumental 
public buildings (Butler 2011; Workinger 2002). Evidence from burials, domes-
tic architecture, and the distribution of social valuables found at sites across 
the valley demonstrates the existence of modest hereditary social inequality 
( Joyce 1991, 2010; Joyce et al. 1998). Taking these data together, we hypothesize 
that both Charco Redondo and San Francisco de Arriba were seats of small-
scale polities in the Late Formative.
Evidence suggests that the dominant locus of authority and identity during 
the Late Formative was communal, rather than hierarchical and exclusion-
ary (Barber and Joyce 2007; Joyce 2010). At both large and small sites people 
were creating socially meaningful places through the construction and use 
of shared public spaces and monumental facilities that embedded collective 
actions and histories in specific locations on the landscape. For example, at 
the 1.5-ha site of Cerro de la Cruz excavations revealed a communal cemetery 
beneath the floors and alongside the walls of a public building used by mul-
tiple domestic groups ( Joyce 1991). Adjacent to the building was a flagstone 
patio that included two hearths that far exceeded the size of typical domestic 
ones, suggesting their use in ritual feasts. In the presence of the dead, the 
living defined, maintained, and recreated a social group tied to the specific 
histories and spaces of Cerro de la Cruz. Similarly, the monumental public 
facilities of Charco Redondo and San Francisco de Arriba provided a locus 
at which supradomestic and probably multicommunity social ties were gener-
ated through collective actions ranging from labor to ritual.
The first urban center in the region emerged at Río Viejo, which grew to 
225 ha during the Terminal Formative period (100 BC–AD 250; Joyce 2010). 
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Like in the Valley of Oaxaca, archaeological evidence suggests that the rulers 
of Río Viejo depended largely on internal revenue in the form of labor and 
in return provided political and religious services to the populace as a form 
of public good (Barber and Joyce 2007; Joyce 2006, 2010; Joyce and Barber 
2011; Joyce et al. 2013). Monumental public buildings at Río Viejo provide the 
strongest evidence for labor as a source of internal revenue. The ceremonial 
core of the site consisted of two monumental earthen structures. The ear-
lier was Mound 9-Structure 4, a large rectangular platform raised over the 
site’s Late Formative residential areas ( Joyce et al. 1998). In the first century 
AD, the ceremonial center was shifted approximately 500 m to the west of 
Mound 9-Structure 4. The new ceremonial center was located on the site’s 
massive acropolis (Mound 1; figure 2.3). The acropolis was begun prior to AD 
100, but a major occupation is not evident until the following century. At 
this time, the acropolis consisted of a platform rising at least 6 m above the 
floodplain, supporting two large substructures on its northwest and eastern 
sides (Structures 1 and 2, respectively) both of which stood at least 16 m high 
( Joyce and Barber 2011; Joyce et al. 2013). To the south, a 5- to 7-m-tall set of 
mounds surrounded an open plaza, the use of which cannot be determined 
because Formative-period occupational surfaces are now below groundwater. 
Our conservative estimate of the volume of the Terminal Formative acropolis 
is 455,000 m3.
The acropolis was an enormous building project that almost certainly would 
have required labor from beyond Río Viejo itself because large segments of 
the structure were built all at once rather than via accretion ( Joyce et al. 2013). 
A large and well-organized labor pool is further evidenced by the labor-inten-
sive construction techniques used to build significant segments of the acrop-
olis. Much of the construction fill consists of a variety of earthen building 
techniques, including puddled adobe, adobe block, and rammed-earth (figure 
2.4). The variability in earthen and masonry construction techniques indicates 
that the acropolis was built by multiple work groups drawn from different 
communities with divergent building traditions. Energetics analysis suggests 
that the acropolis required a minimum of 2.1 million person-days to build, a 
number too large to have been provided by the inhabitants of Río Viejo alone, 
given that the acropolis was likely built over a relatively brief period of time 
( Joyce et al. 2013:table 5.2).
Other forms of internal revenue, such as taxation on market transactions 
or agricultural goods, are less evident. For instance, the location of Río Viejo 
in the river’s fertile floodplain makes it unlikely that the site needed to be 
provisioned with agricultural surpluses as was necessitated by Monte Albán’s 
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mountaintop location. Potentials sources of external revenue are similarly 
scarce. There is little evidence from the Formative period for craft specializa-
tion or the conquest of other regions that might have provided elites with 
external revenue. Although there is evidence that elites within the region 
exercised a degree of control over the importation of exotic, nonlocal goods 
such as greenstone, iron ore, and pottery, there are as yet no indications that 
these items were a major source of revenue exclusive to the rulers of Río Viejo 
(Barber 2013; Joyce et al. 1998; Levine 2002).
Construction and use of the Río Viejo acropolis indicate that Terminal 
Formative regional political authority was an outgrowth of preexisting notions 
of how social collectivities were defined and maintained. Both collective and 
Figure 2.3. Plan of the eastern half of Río Viejo showing Mound 1 and Mound 9, 
Structure 4. 
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exclusive activities occurred on the acropolis. Recent excavations demonstrate 
that large-scale food preparation and consumption took place in the Terminal 
Formative, most likely associated with large-scale ritual feasting. A series of 
large middens were deposited in deep pits dug into the fill in the southeast-
ern and southwestern corners of the acropolis. Materials included comals and 
other food-preparation vessels, dense lenses of estuarine mussel and other fau-
nal remains, as well as elaborate serving vessels, imported serving vessels, and 
figurines. At the base of Structure 2, we recovered the remains of a large earth 
oven and oven refuse, presumably resulting from food preparation associated 
with feasts. The oven refuse consisted of burned rock and sherds used to retain 
heat and measured at least 10 m in diameter. More exclusive and elaborate rit-
ual spaces were located on top of Structure 2, a large stepped platform, which 
supported an adobe superstructure with remnants of the only architectural 
stucco ever found in the valley ( Joyce 2006).
Figure 2.4. Retaining wall of an adobe platform on the acropolis at Río Viejo. 
(Photograph by Sarah Barber.) 
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Although settlement patterns and monumental architecture strongly indi-
cate that a ruling elite oversaw a regional-scale polity with its political seat at 
Río Viejo, evidence of rulers has proved remarkably difficult to find ( Joyce 
2010). There are no known rulers’ portraits or tombs in the region that date 
to the Terminal Formative. Instead, we see evidence for political authority in 
the distribution of the population, in the coordination required to underwrite 
monument construction, and in the sponsorship of feasting and other rituals. 
It is clear that inequality was well established regionally by this time; excava-
tions at other sites have recovered elite residences and burials with elaborate 
grave goods (Barber 2013). An elite residence was uncovered near the ceremo-
nial center of the secondary site of Cerro de la Virgen. The residence covered 
an area of 476 m2 and included several rooms surrounding a patio measuring 
13 × 13 m, making this residence far larger and more elaborate than typical resi-
dences in Oaxaca (e.g., Whalen 1988; Winter 1986). The house overlooked and 
was spatially associated with a monumental public plaza that included a ball-
court. Unlike Cerro de la Virgen, the Río Viejo acropolis, however, does not 
seem to have an elite residence adjacent to public spaces. The most elaborate 
Terminal Formative interment in the region comes from a public cemetery 
at the site of Yugüe. This burial was a male interred wearing a plaster-backed 
iron-ore mirror and holding an intricately incised bone flute. The flute’s incis-
ing depicts a skeletal male speaking or exhaling and likely indicates ritual 
responsibilities for the person with whom it was interred (Barber and Olvera 
Sánchez 2012).
Terminal Formative political relations in the lower Verde were dominated 
by collective action to an even greater extent than in the Oaxaca Valley. The 
evidence from Río Viejo’s acropolis suggests a political strategy that was both 
enabled and constrained by historically embedded notions of corporate iden-
tity and practice. The tradition of geographically focused collective action in 
the region provided a framework through which Río Viejo’s rulers were able 
to legitimize their authority at a regional scale. The relocation of the site center 
from Mound 9 to the acropolis would have made the new ceremonial center 
distinct from Río Viejo’s earlier, more local histories and social relations. By 
constructing and using a regionally significant place (Mound 1) that embod-
ied the history of the many communities in the valley that provided labor for 
its construction, Río Viejo’s rulers facilitated a process whereby the kinds of 
acts that had for generations defined local places and social groups came to 
define a polity (Barber and Joyce 2007). People from these communities sub-
sequently participated in ceremonial practices on the acropolis that included 
ritual feasting and perhaps other ceremonies ( Joyce et al. 2013).
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Indeed, sponsorship of these ceremonies was one of the primary public 
goods that rulers provided to followers. At the same time, the high visibility 
of such actions would have provided a means by which subalterns could moni-
tor rulers’ compliance with collective principles. The lack of rulers’ portraits 
and of a palace on the acropolis, for instance, may represent rulers’ efforts to 
demonstrate such compliance. Nonetheless, acts on the acropolis would have 
reiterated relations of domination and subordination. Its architecture was far 
larger than anything else in the region, providing highly visible evidence of 
the superordinate position of the rulers who sponsored construction and ritual 
action there.
Evidence for other public goods remains circumstantial. There is no evi-
dence during the Terminal Formative for warfare such as defensive walls or a 
shift to more easily defended locations in the piedmont ( Joyce 2010). Current 
data are insufficient to clarify whether this lack of conflict was a result of rul-
ers facilitating regional safety as a public good, an outgrowth of broader social 
conditions at the time, or a result of archaeological sampling. Evidence for 
economic public goods like facilitation of market exchange or redistribution 
is extremely limited, although more data are needed. There is evidence for 
increasing standardization in fineware pottery between the Late and Terminal 
Formative periods (Levine 2002:167), which may indicate specialized produc-
tion and perhaps regional exchange mechanisms that could either be taxed or 
aided by rulers.
outCome of formAtiVe-PerioD 
CoLLeCtiVe PoLities in oAxACA
Although complex, regional polities built on collective action developed at 
the end of the Formative period in both the Valley of Oaxaca and the lower 
Verde, the archaeological evidence suggests that political relations were char-
acterized by a degree of tension and conflict ( Joyce 2010). By the beginning of 
the Classic period (AD 250–800), both regions experienced major changes in 
political authority.
At Monte Albán, the Main Plaza had been a symbol of collective identity 
and authority during the Late Formative, but by the Terminal Formative it 
was increasingly controlled by and restricted to the nobility ( Joyce 2004:205–
207). New constructions on the plaza effectively closed off and restricted 
access to the ceremonial precinct. Noble residences began to be built directly 
on the North Platform and on the Main Plaza itself (Winter 2001). Given 
their proximity to the plaza, these residences may have been more “public” and 
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their residents more closely involved in politico-religious administration. If 
the Main Plaza and its public buildings and spaces operated as public goods as 
suggested above, then by the Terminal Formative rulers were restricting access 
to these goods, suggesting a more exclusionary form of political authority.
There are also indications that political elites at Monte Albán may have 
become less dependent on followers as sources of internal revenue and instead 
found resources (external revenue) that they controlled directly and used to 
fund political administration. For example, excavations at Monte Albán have 
discovered 31 ovens used for pottery production, most of which were located 
in the elite residential area north of the Main Plaza (Markens and Martínez 
2009). The ovens were used to make creamware and brownware ceramics, 
including creamware types C.11 and C.12. These creamwares were expensive 
to manufacture, often with postfire scratch incising and large hollow supports, 
and their distribution in the Valley of Oaxaca was markedly status linked 
(Elson and Sherman 2007; Kowalewski et al. 1989). Elson and Sherman (2007) 
argue that step-fret designs on creamware vessels symbolized Cocijo, the rain-
lightening deity, and were part of a pan-Mesoamerican system of elite display 
(see also Kowalewski et al. 1989). These symbols may have been another indica-
tion of the increasing control of important religious symbols and ceremonies 
by powerful elites. Furthermore, excavations in a nonresidential architectural 
complex on the northwestern corner of the Main Plaza recovered evidence of 
the production of shell ornaments and prismatic obsidian blades (Markens 
and Martínez 2009). These data indicate that elites at Monte Albán were 
involved in the specialized production of social valuables, making nobles less 
dependent on revenue provided by subjects.
The evidence therefore suggests that during the Terminal Formative politi-
cal authority was becoming less communal and more exclusionary. There are 
also indications that as the rulers of Monte Albán increasingly gained power 
by appropriating the Main Plaza and defeating their competitors in the Valley 
of Oaxaca, tensions between traditional communal leadership and the nobil-
ity intensified ( Joyce 2010). Evidence from the end of the Terminal Formative 
suggests that these tensions may have erupted in a political upheaval at Monte 
Albán around AD 200. At this time the major iconographic programs of the 
Late Formative, including the Building L-sub monuments, were dismantled 
(Urcid 2011). Building L-sub was partially demolished and buried under 
Building L and a temple on the North Platform was burned. A defensive 
wall was built around parts of the site and evidence suggests that one access 
point onto the Main Plaza was monitored through military force ( Joyce 
2010:159). Regardless of how the Building L-sub orthostats are interpreted, 
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the dismantling of these monuments may directly reflect the suppression of 
communal forms of authority that had existed alongside the hierarchical rul-
ers of the polity. Evidence for the increasing formalization of status distinc-
tions by the Early Classic period (AD 250–500) suggest that the more institu-
tionalized and hierarchical forms of authority gained prominence (see Fargher, 
chapter 15, this volume).
In the lower Verde the end of the Formative period saw even greater polit-
ical upheaval than in the Oaxaca Valley. Efforts to create a regional polity 
defined in terms of local and more egalitarian social groups were successful 
for a century or two, during which time Río Viejo remained the largest site in 
the valley and the seat of regional political authority. By AD 250, however, Río 
Viejo’s acropolis fell into disuse and the site was severely depopulated ( Joyce 
2006; Joyce and Barber 2011). Several other large Terminal Formative flood-
plain sites with mounded architecture declined significantly in size or were 
abandoned. By the Early Classic, the regional settlement hierarchy decreased 
from five to four levels and there were as many as eight first-order centers of 
roughly equivalent size, indicating a period of political fragmentation. The 
kind of large-scale corporate social organization that had enabled the con-
struction of Formative-period monumental buildings disappeared, and monu-
mental construction never again matched that of the Terminal Formative.
The causes of the political collapse are unclear, although we hypothesize 
that one factor was tension between traditional communal forms of author-
ity that were more local and egalitarian and the more exclusionary, hierar-
chical, and regional forms of rulership that were emerging at the end of the 
Formative. There is evidence that parts of the acropolis were heavily burned 
by fire prior to its abandonment. Excavations in several areas of the acropolis 
have revealed burned floors and burned adobe wall foundations. The burn-
ing was likely the result of termination rituals, although we cannot discount 
the possibility that it involved warfare or was accidental. Even though the 
acropolis was an important political and religious building that had required 
considerable communal labor to construct, it was left to slowly disintegrate 
over the next 250 years.
ConCLusions
In this chapter we have argued that both the early Monte Albán and Río 
Viejo polities exemplified the kind of corporate organization and collective 
action relationships that has been a focus of Richard Blanton’s theoretical 
work. Although both polities can be seen as examples of corporate political 
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organizations and collective action, they also exhibit considerable variability in 
how social complexity and political authority was expressed and negotiated. In 
the lower Verde regional political authority collapsed after a brief and tenuous 
florescence, while elites in the Valley of Oaxaca were successful in institutional-
izing hierarchical authority that would persist for more than a millennium.
We see a number of points of divergence that may have had significant con-
sequences in the history of these polities, especially as they relate to the ability 
of rulers to extend their authority across multiple communities throughout a 
broader region. In the Valley of Oaxaca, evidence suggests that the rulers of 
Monte Albán were initially successful in negotiating shared forms of political 
control with more traditional communal forms of leadership. Although we 
see political authority in the Late Formative Valley of Oaxaca as largely com-
munal, Monte Albán’s rulers were successful in linking their authority and 
identity to a series of innovations in politico-religious belief and practice that 
served to set themselves apart from common people and provide them with a 
public good desired by people in the valley. An important aspect of these polit-
ico-religious innovations was the Main Plaza of Monte Albán, which was a 
socially significant place marked by architecture and imagery that was clearly 
distinct from previous ceremonial precincts. Rulers at Monte Albán were also 
successful in establishing a variety of sources of revenue, which increasingly 
through the end of the Formative included external revenue independent 
from the labor of subjects. Finally, polity rulers had recourse to coercive force 
to bring communities in the valley into compliance. For example, although we 
question the degree to which areas outside the valley were conquered, there 
is good evidence that Tilcajete was eventually defeated and incorporated into 
the Monte Albán polity (Redmond and Spencer 2006).
Political authority in the lower Río Verde valley appears to have been both 
highly communal and less successful in creating a regional political identity 
and extending authority across the region. Despite the scale of monumental 
construction at Río Viejo, the regional polity seems to have been weakly inte-
grated and tenuous. At present, the evidence suggests that regionwide col-
lective relationships revolved around labor as revenue and the sponsoring of 
politico-religious ceremony as a public good. We suspect that rulers may have 
been limited in their ability to extend economic and political interactions out-
side of Río Viejo, discouraging the development of administrative institutions 
that might have tied together communities. There are few indications of inno-
vations in religious and political practice that would have distinguished rulers 
from followers and created pubic goods not available at the local level. Instead, 
what seems to have been new in terms of political relationships was limited to 
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a scaling-up of traditional practices that had previously materialized notions 
of local community identity including monumental construction programs 
and ritual feasting. The active maintenance of strong community identities 
coupled with the inability of rulers to distinguish themselves from local elites, 
establish pubic goods distinct from those that were locally available, estab-
lish sources of external revenue, or develop a significant coercive capacity may 
have doomed the Río Viejo polity to collapse.
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Built Space as 
Political Fields
Community versus Lineage 
Strategies in the Tequila Valleys
Christopher S. Beekman
This chapter operationalizes the corporate and exclu-
sionary strategies proposed by Blanton and his col-
leagues (1996) by associating them with four contempo-
raneous social institutions with manifestations in built 
space. I use iconographic data to support and refine 
interpretation of the archaeological evidence in a man-
ner similar to Small’s (2009) historical- archaeological 
analysis in Greece. Individually and relationally, these 
social institutions formed a field (Bourdieu 1990) in 
which different forms of capital both provided admis-
sion to and constituted the objectives of competition. 
Once archaeological correlates for the field of power 
have been proposed, I consider how we might reinter-
pret the existing settlement pattern data for the Tequila 
valleys of Jalisco in the Late Formative and Early 
Classic periods and their relationship to the Teuchitlán 
polity. This allows me to bridge the gap between 
Blanton’s work on political strategies and his regional 
settlement pattern research, and simultaneously con-
tribute to the growing interest in the spatial aspects of 
authority (A. T. Smith 2003).
Blanton’s more recent research with Fargher reori-
ents his prior work on corporate-exclusionary strate-
gies toward a rational choice model of human decision-
making and self-organizational models of institution 
building. I limit my use of the model here for several 
reasons. Their book on collective action theory and 
much subsequent work (Blanton and Fargher 2008:25–
32; Fargher et al. 2010) required detailed historical data 
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to reconstruct the relationships needed to truly assess the model’s utility (as 
used in political science; Ostrom 1990, 2003). Archaeological case studies 
such as Bronze Age Indus Valley society were considered and rejected as pos-
sessed of insufficient data for their purposes (Blanton and Fargher 2008:61–62). 
Further, while collective action stems from research in political science, the 
corporate-exclusionary model was designed by four archaeologists, drawing 
on archaeological antecedents, and defined around the interpretation of mate-
rial culture. It may therefore possess particular utility in dealing with strictly 
archaeological data, as can be seen in Fargher’s (see chapter 15, this volume) use 
of both collective action and corporate-exclusionary approaches as he juggles 
historical and archaeological comparisons. Corporate and exclusionary strate-
gies have also proven to be applicable at levels other than the polity or the 
society. The study here recognizes and expects that the different strategies at 
play within the Teuchitlán polity of central Jalisco will not all coincide with a 
generalization at the level of the entire polity (see Saitta 2013 for a similar rec-
ognition of distinct social interests while still using the term “collective action,” 
and Ferguson and Mansbach 1996 from political science). Once relationships 
between the different fields of power have been elucidated and recognized at 
the regional level, I do find certain observations from collective action theory 
useful for their interpretation. In this I follow Blanton and Fargher’s (2008:10) 
advice to “study up” from local data to the broader region. In this chapter 
devoted to the legacy of Richard Blanton, I therefore show that his past as well 
as present contributions continue to inspire novel analyses.
tHeoretiCAL BACkgrounD: strAtegies 
As situAteD witHin fieLD tHeory
This chapter takes the position that the exclusionary/network and corporate 
strategies described by Blanton and colleagues (Blanton 1998a; Blanton et al. 
1996) can be connected to specific institutions, often associated with formalized 
built space. These authors characterize exclusionary strategies as drawing upon 
wealth and external contacts to exclude others from power—dynastic ruler-
ship among the Classic southern lowland Maya is often cited as the canonical 
example, in which divine kings and queens successfully monopolized access to 
the symbols, tools, and positions of power. Social actors associated with corpo-
rate strategies pursue an inclusive group identity through ceremony and ritual, 
suppressing or redirecting competition. Teotihuacan with its apparent absence 
of aggrandizement for a dynastic lineage is characterized as corporate. Descent 
groups1 played significant roles in both political systems, but at Teotihuacan 
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a number of these social building blocks are argued to have shared power at 
some wider scale of political activity. Hence the terms “corporate” and “exclu-
sionary” cannot be used in isolation, but only in a relational sense to describe 
the strategy pursued by an individual or group vis-à-vis other groups.
Social and political strategies possess a contextual and spatial aspect that 
defines where and when it is appropriate for social actors to pursue them. In 
Pierre Bourdieu’s work, he pointed out that habitus and strategies play out 
differently in different fields, or socially defined contexts of competition for 
power (Wacquant 1989:38–41). His work typically interpreted field in terms 
of social space, so that art, business, academia, and so on each formed a field 
that might fit together relationally into a still larger one, such as the fields of 
cultural production or power or bureaucracy (see Bourdieu 1993, 1998, 2004). 
Fields encompass competition over one or more forms of capital (Bourdieu 
1986), and relate to other fields in complex ways. Corporate and exclusionary 
strategies can be understood within Bourdieu’s fields, such that social rules 
and cognitive codes ensure that people use and pursue different forms of capi-
tal within bounded social contexts.
Equating fields to physical spaces is not self-evident, and some interpreters 
of Bourdieu take pains to emphasize that fields more properly correspond to 
institutions and social space (Thomson 2008:74). But it is worth recalling that 
Bourdieu’s concept of the field is not unlike Turner’s (1974) contemporary idea 
of the arena, a physical space in which political conflict and competition are 
acted out through performance (cf. Inomata and Coben 2006; Postill 2011). 
Political strategies are cross-culturally bounded by proscriptions and prescrip-
tions (e.g., Boehm 1993), and political elites are obligated to have a visible and 
performative component to their activities. Formally designed spaces provide 
an appropriate venue for performance (accession rituals, bill signing, speeches, 
debates, etc.) and furthermore create opportunities for political elites to reach 
subjects through affective means (Smith 2000). This circumscription of com-
petition may also help to contain changes to the overarching field of power. 
The reproduction of one pathway to status and authority would have been 
partly insulated from disruption in another. Elites may seek to break down 
the barriers between fields and extend political activity beyond their socially 
accepted contexts, but these efforts to undermine cultural codes are more 
likely to engender resistance.
Blanton and colleagues noted the potential spatial associations of both 
their strategies: “Corporate and network strategies result in dissimilar and 
antagonistic political economies and so are likely to be temporally or spatially 
separated” (Blanton et al. 1996:7). Temporal distinctions have received most 
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attention to date, but a number of researchers have pointed to evidence for 
the contemporaneity of the two strategies (Fleming 2004; Porter 2002; Urban 
and Schortman 2004). So taking the example of the Classic southern lowland 
Maya above, just because they are seen to have primarily followed exclusion-
ary strategies, this would not preclude the pursuit of corporate strategies in 
distinct spatial settings—a council house, for example. The co-occurrence of 
opposing strategies forces a more direct consideration of their separate spatial 
needs and the fields in which they are active. Both possess significant perfor-
mative aspects, with corporate strategies being more inclusive and demanding 
of large public spaces in which political activity can be witnessed by a greater 
number of people. Network approaches can derive their exclusionary aspect 
by limiting participation, and defining a privileged audience more narrowly 
through the use of smaller and access-restricted spaces (see Uriarte Torres 2011 
for these and other predictive characteristics).
Complex societies rarely offer a single route to power, and there will likely 
be multiple examples of formalized built space that are appropriate for differ-
ent forms of political activity (I suggest McGuire 1983 to be an early recog-
nition of this point). Each of these formal architectural spaces are places in 
which political strategies could be acted out in the pursuit of different forms 
of capital. Hence to take an example from Bali that I have used previously 
(Beekman 2005:56), the irrigation temple networks studied by Lansing (1991, 
2006) continue to be built and maintained by a collection of farming coop-
eratives in a self-organized corporate or group-oriented strategy. Competing 
political elites and their kingdoms (Geertz 1980), on the other hand, made up 
a second route to power more reminiscent of an exclusionary strategy, and the 
political elites possessed no control over the irrigation systems. Hence these 
two strategies with their own sets of rules and expectations are associated with 
and are carried out within different networks of built space. Not all forms of 
power necessarily have spatial loci (the work of Michel Foucault best exempli-
fies this problem), and some places could potentially be made acceptable for 
either group or individual-oriented performance. Some of these difficulties 
may be overcome by integrating other data sets with the archaeological record.
To summarize the theoretical argument, struggles over political power are 
constrained cross-culturally by defining contextual limitations on political 
competition. This partial encapsulation thereby limits which structures of 
power will be reproduced or disrupted by political activity. Participation in 
these arenas is dependent upon the possession of some form of capital, and 
capital is the medium and goal of competition. More complex societies by 
definition include multiple routes to power (McGuire 1983) dependent on 
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different forms of capital, but they are kept contextually distinct by associat-
ing them with defined spaces. Once positions of power have been defined, the 
wider field of conflict over the relative importance of different forms of capital 
will become more apparent. This oscillation in the dominant form of capital 
is potentially the basis for the social transformations between corporate and 
exclusionary strategies.
formAL sPACes AnD strAtegies in LAte 
formAtiVe-eArLy CLAssiC CentrAL JALisCo
Compared to some areas of Mesoamerica, Late Formative/Early Classic 
central Jalisco shows evidence for a relatively limited number of recurring 
formal spaces (Beekman and Weigand 2008). Past archaeological research by 
Weigand (e.g., 1996) placed considerable emphasis upon architecture and built 
space, leading to his definition of a Teuchitlán tradition. It is possible to build 
upon this strictly material evidence to discuss the activities that took place 
in the architecture, and interpret them in terms of different kinds of strate-
gies. I will discuss three forms of built space and a possible fourth, taking into 
account surface and excavated evidence as well as contemporaneous ceramic 
models that depict activities within the architecture.
Shaft Tombs
For much of the twentieth century, archaeological research in western 
Mexico focused on the deep shaft and chamber tombs (Fowler et al. 2006) 
(figure 3.1a). Various lines of evidence have been used to associate the tombs 
with discrete descent groups (Beekman 2008; Ramos de la Vega and López 
Mestas Camberos 1996). Innumerable looted tombs exist, but fortunately 
there are approximately 40 examples that have been excavated and published 
in varying degrees of detail. Shaft tombs essentially break down into those 
grouped into cemeteries on the rural landscape (e.g., Galván Villegas 1991), 
and isolated tombs occurring beneath public architecture in ceremonial cen-
ters (e.g., Ramos de la Vega and López Mestas Camberos 1996). The latter 
tombs are larger, deeper, and accompanied by more varied and numerous 
offerings. The tombs beneath the public architecture also tend to have more 
consistent evidence of reuse and the interment of additional individuals, while 
the rural tombs can often have a single occupant. The tombs in the ceremonial 
centers thus demonstrated greater genealogical depth for group claims to the 
titles or ceremonial positions associated with the public architecture, much as 
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monumental inscriptions or codices did in other times and places. The rural 
cemeteries emphasized the presence and cohesion of larger groups, and were 
probably associated with claims to economic capital in the form of land rights.
Ceramic models depict formal processions in which the dead were carried 
toward a structure (von Winning 1969:figures 156–157) (figure 3.2). Elite shaft 
tombs are found beneath buildings, and these procession scenes make it clear 
that burial was a public display, a performance that emphasized a family’s 
Figure 3.1. Examples of each of the forms of built space proposed as associated with 
specific social institutions and strategies: (a) shaft tomb, (b) guachimontón (circular public 
architecture), (b') a guachimontón with one outsized platform, (c) ballcourt, and (d) elite 
residential group. (Images taken from Beekman [2005:figures 4.2 and 4.4] and courtesy of 
the Tequila Valley Regional Archaeological Project. 
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external connections through the exhibition of their objectified cultural capi-
tal (in the sense of Bourdieu 1986:50). Artifacts found within the tombs 
include ceramic vessels, shell or mineral jewelry, obsidian tools and jewelry, 
ceramic figurines, and hollow ceramic figures (the best published and exca-
vated examples being in Galván Villegas 1991; Ramos de la Vega and López 
Mestas Camberos 1996). The raw materials used for jewelry or figurines could 
be exotic: jade was imported from Guatemala, and shells were brought from 
both the Pacific and Caribbean coasts. Fine ceramic bowls, particularly of the 
Oconahua Red on Cream type, usually incorporate a quadripartite division 
of the vessel interior, making reference to the Mesoamerican cosmological 
model. But there are also finely made vessels with maize symbols arranged 
into rows and separated by lines representing water, likely depicting farming 
landscapes (Beekman 2009:figuras 7–8).
The combined evidence leaves little doubt but that elite lineages practiced 
exclusionary strategies in association with mortuary ritual, but through the 
conspicuous display of wealth rather than through access-limited family ritual. 
Death was an opportunity to draw attention to the wealth and connections of 
the descent group, well demonstrated by the models of open processions car-
rying the dead to the tomb. This public display was used to express and rein-
force the status and claims of the group (Beekman 2000). The tomb itself was 
Figure 3.2. Ceramic model depicting a burial procession with the dead being carried by 
pallbearers. (Drawing by Kathy Beekman, after von Winning and Hammer 1972:figure 87.) 
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a small and cramped space inappropriate for display, and the procession and 
mortuary rites were the true focus of the performance. In the spatial analysis 
that follows, I set aside rural cemeteries as potentially focused on different 
forms of capital and our record of their locations is in any case very incomplete.
Guachimontones
The circular public architecture (known as guachimontones) shows a clearly 
different pattern. The circular guachimontón form is composed of usually eight 
satellite platforms surrounding a central circular altar or pyramid (figure 3.1b). 
As reconstructed elsewhere, each of the surrounding platforms was built by a 
different descent group and occasionally had a shaft tomb beneath (Beekman 
2008). Our excavations of three circles at Llano Grande and Navajas have 
encountered an assemblage of ceramics, lithics, groundstone, figurines and 
hollow figures, plant remains, and quartz crystals. Analyses are ongoing but 
preliminary summaries exist (Beekman 2008; Beekman et al. 2004). The ceram-
ics include high-quality wares that nonetheless show only simple decoration 
( Johns 2014). Lithic remains include infrequent groundstone, manufacturing 
debris as well as finished products of obsidian, and limited evidence for obsid-
ian jewelry (Hoedl 2013; Wagner 2014). No jade or shell has been identified. 
We are currently engaged in trying to distinguish ordinary residential tasks 
(particularly food preparation) from more exotic forms of the same activities, 
such as feasting within an otherwise sacred space. This ambiguity attests to the 
quotidian nature of the assemblage compared to that found in the shaft tombs, 
and activities within the circles placed less emphasis on communicative style. 
I have interpreted this elsewhere (Beekman 2000) as a decrease or suppression 
of open competition within the guachimontones due to cultural conventions 
regarding inappropriate behavior within the ceremonial circles (see Blanton 
1998a:163–166).
Ceramic dioramas are a particularly rich source of information for what 
took place in the circles (figure 3.3). Models of the architecture often show 
consumption of food and drink (Butterwick 1998), musical performances, or 
dancing within the patio, perhaps on the occasion of a marriage (von Winning 
1971:348, figures 10, 11). Other models depict a pole-climbing ceremony identi-
fied as analogous to the Postclassic Xocotl Huetzi veintena ceremony asso-
ciated with the green-maize harvest (Beekman 2003a). The circles replicate 
the multilayered cosmological model so often found in Mesoamerican public 
architecture (Beekman 2003b; Kelley 1974). The occasional shaft tombs below 
represented the underworld, the patio with its very human activities was 
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Figure 3.3. Ceramic model 
depicting a simplified form of the 
guachimontón public architecture. 
(Drawing by Chris and Kathy 
Beekman, after von Winning and 
Hammer 1972: color plate 1.) 
associated with this world, and the central altar or pyramid with a pole raised 
in its center made direct reference to the sacred mountain and ties to the heav-
ens. The themes of agriculture and the cosmos were not specific to any particu-
lar descent group, and ritual performance drew together elites and subjects in 
an inclusive manner. Critically, none of the participating lineages was able to 
monopolize the link between human-built sacred space and the cosmos that 
it represented (Beekman 2008). The architecture replicated the Mesoamerican 
universe, but since the guachimontón form was divided into a series of com-
ponents, each built and maintained by different descent groups, no one group 
was in a position to claim the role of exclusive mediator to supernatural forces. 
Power was thus explicitly shared among a collection of descent groups, and no 
single dominant family was able to emerge. At least this was usually the case. 
There are just a few examples of guachimontones in which one of the satel-
lite platforms around the circle was enlarged to a degree unmatched by the 
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others (e.g., Beekman 2005:figure 4.4; Weigand 1993:191; Weigand and García 
de Weigand 1997:56). These may be cases in which a single descent group was 
able to subvert the architecturally enshrined equality among families in some 
manner (figure 3.1b'), and they receive further attention below.
Overall, the guachimontón architecture was the most visible type of formal 
built space in central Jalisco during this period, and the activities within corre-
spond very well with what we have come to expect from the corporate strategy 
described by Blanton and colleagues—ritual with cosmic or otherwise com-
munal themes. Important ceremonial roles were shared among several descent 
groups that were ranked more highly than others through their possession of 
cultural capital in the form of sacred knowledge. Holding a privileged position 
within the circles and participating in these ceremonies allowed elite families 
to accumulate increased prestige, reproducing their position and solidifying 
their social distance from subjects. Opportunities existed for these families or 
individual members to stand out through their participation in public ritual 
(Beekman 2000), but the difficulty for any group to claim exclusivity as medi-
ators with the supernatural prevented this from becoming institutionalized. 
Hence individual descent groups remained relatively equal when compared 
to one another.
Ballcourts
The third form of built space that can be associated with political strategies 
is the ballcourt (figure 3.1c). The Mesoamerican ballgame was a complex pub-
lic spectacle in which individuals or teams competed by keeping a rubber ball 
in motion and moving it down an open space marked on the ground or in a 
formal court (Scarborough and Wilcox 1991; Whittington 2001). It has been 
practiced in western Mexico for some 3,500 years. Some of the earliest evi-
dence for the ballgame occurs in the form of ballplayer figurines in the Early 
Formative El Opeño tombs of Michoacán (Oliveros Morales 2004:figuras 11a, 
11b, imágenes 17–19), and a form of the game has been documented from the 
early Colonial period up to the present day (Beals 1932:113, 1933:11–13; Kelly 
1943; Leyenaar 2001). The game was undoubtedly played for reasons of sport 
in the past, but this hardly requires a large and formally designed court, just 
as casual games of fútbol can be played nearly anywhere. The construction of 
a formal ballcourt creates a special form of built space especially conducive to 
special and public versions of the game.
Like the public rituals in the circles, there is an element of competition in 
which teams or individuals could potentially stand out through demonstrations 
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of their skill. Yet the ballgame once again has cosmic overtones—including 
sacrifice, renewal, and the dynamics of the universe, with specific variations 
on these abstract themes across Mesoamerica. Mediated by these higher goals, 
the ballgame became a controlled form of competition that reified and/or pro-
vided an outlet for entrenched social antagonisms (Blanco 2009; Gillespie 1991; 
Kowalewski et al. 1991; Weigand 1991). Ceramic figures and models in western 
Mexico portray ballplayers, the court, and their equipment (Day 1998) (figure 
3.4), but the rich iconography known elsewhere remains unrecognized to date, 
prompting greater dependence on archaeological evidence. Ballcourt sizes in 
Late Formative/Early Classic central Jalisco can be arranged into a hierarchy 
that has been related to different scales of inter- and intrapolity conflict reso-
lution (Blanco 2009; Weigand 1991). Blanco’s summary of the excavation evi-
dence at Los Guachimontones points particularly to the presence of human 
remains in pits within the court, and to the predominance of domestic wares 
rather than finewares (Blanco 2009:119–157). The similarity to practices within 
the guachimontones, and those proposed for a corporate strategy, are evident.
The intrasite placement of ballcourts in Jalisco indicates even closer links 
to the circles. There is no complete consideration of the ballcourts within the 
Tequila valleys, but of the 17 ballcourts illustrated in two major sources (Blanco 
2009; duVall 2007), one court aligns perpendicularly to two circles, seven are 
Figure 3.4. Ceramic 
model depicting a 
ballcourt with a 
ballgame in progress. 
(Drawing by Chris and 
Kathy Beekman, after 
Butterwick 2005:18.) 
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freestanding, and nine are appended to the circles such that the end platform 
for the ballcourt is also a satellite platform for the circle. All are found within 
the ceremonial centers. The two architectural forms thus share a close relation-
ship most of the time. More speculatively, this physical connection suggests 
a link between the two that was proposed for other areas of Mesoamerica 
by Schele and Guernsey Kappelman (2001). Those two authors have drawn 
attention to the Postclassic myth of Coatepec (Snake Mountain), in which 
the Aztecs built a temple to Huitzilopochtli atop Coatepec during one of their 
stops on the lengthy peregrinations toward central Mexico. They afterwards 
built a ballcourt at the base of the mountain. A subsequent story tells of flood-
ing within this court, a reference to the known association of ballcourts with 
a watery underworld. The authors identify this symbolic relationship between 
mountains and water across Formative and Classic Mesoamerica, primarily in 
iconography but also in the layouts of the ceremonial centers of Dzibilchaltún, 
Uaxactún, Tikal, and others. The visually similar layout of the combined ball-
court-guachimontón complex would therefore represent the juxtaposition of 
the sacred mountain and the watery underworld, duplicating and reinforc-
ing the cosmological model already present in the circle alone. The ballcourt 
and circle complex thus constitute a larger plan with its own cosmological 
meaning, cementing further their importance for group-oriented performa-
tive ritual in the Tequila valleys.
Elite Households
A final architectural form of potential importance is the elite household. It 
has been observed that “palaces” have not been identified in Late Formative/
Early Classic Jalisco (Nelson 2004), at least not in comparison with those 
known elsewhere in Mesoamerica. However, Smith Marquez (2009) has 
defined a series of size categories in residential groups that he calls “cruci-
forms,” since they are often composed of four symmetrically placed rectan-
gular structures around a leveled patio. Apart from the fact that this scheme 
artificially separates groups of four from other residential groups ranging from 
2 to 8 structures, his hierarchy duplicates an analysis that found a wide size 
range in residential groups as measured by structure area (Beekman 2009b). 
The largest groups are found in prominent areas within the ceremonial centers. 
For example, Group 3 at Navajas and Feature VI at Loma Alta resemble noth-
ing so much as oversized residential groups, with three or four rectangular 
structures facing a leveled patio (figure 3.1d). The largest of these groups were 
arguably the residences for elite families, even if they are not so differentiated 
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from commoner residences in their internal complexity to be considered as 
“palaces.” None of these has been excavated to date, and they pose some prob-
lems for their interpretation. Did they house all the descent groups associated 
with a circle? Do they suggest the preeminence of a single group? Most of 
the ceramic architectural dioramas depict individual buildings that may be 
residential or places of residential-like activities. These may be ordinary or 
outsized residences, or one of the satellite platforms around the guachimon-
tones, but either would suggest that the descent group is being highlighted 
rather than any wider social collectivity. The house models portray more pri-
vate, interior views of food preparation and consumption (everyday meals, or 
public feasting?) and/or seated and conferring individuals (family chats, or 
formal reception of visitors/supplicants?) (Day et al. 1996:table 1). A lower 
story is often shown, perhaps depicting a shaft tomb (e.g., Furst 1975) and 
further emphasizing the linkage of this space to families rather than com-
munity. Only excavation across the size categories of residential groups will 
clarify the situation, but the large residential complexes hold out the possibil-
ity of another form of built space that may be associated with descent groups 
that have succeeded in lineage aggrandizement. Although this interpretation 
is certainly tenuous, I consider the possibility below when discussing their 
spatial distribution.
The field of power in Late Formative/Early Classic central Jalisco consisted 
of descent groups in competition with one another in multiple ways and mul-
tiple venues. Following Archer (Archer 1982:462–463, 475–477; 1995:247–293; 
2000:253–305), I (Beekman 2005) have proposed that the descent groups were 
collective agents that served as important social actors in the Tequila valleys. 
Individual members aligned their interests to a significant degree with those 
of the group, since that affiliation is probably how they gained access to dif-
ferent forms of corporate property or capital, whether sacred knowledge, titles, 
or land. Yet the major tensions in central Jalisco were not between individu-
als and descent groups but between descent group and community interests. 
The broader institutions that sought to incorporate and dampen competition 
among the descent groups were the community rituals in the guachimontones 
and the ballcourts, and they would have been frequently challenged.
extenDing tHe APProACH outwArDs
The combination of imagery and archaeological data make it possible to 
imbue static architectural remains with some of the meanings associated with 
activities there. This presents an opportunity to unpack the social practices at 
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different ceremonial centers and assess how they changed over time. Instead 
of employing a settlement hierarchy that ranks centers by their aggregated 
population, architectural volume, and so on (Ohnersorgen and Varien 1996), 
we can instead conceptualize the webs of related practices that linked some 
settlements and not others in heterarchical fashion (Crumley 1979). The cul-
tural landscape takes on a different appearance, with multiple nodes where 
different forms of political strategies are more or less evident.
Over the course of 30 years, Weigand’s (1993) survey of the Tequila val-
leys identified the Teuchitlán culture and mapped the central architecture of 
many ceremonial centers. Weigand’s survey was most detailed in the southern 
valleys, and his work in the surrounding areas is being superseded by more 
systematic approaches (e.g., Anderson et al. 2013; Heredia Espinoza 2008). I 
focus my reconsideration primarily on the southern Tequila valleys, where 
Weigand recorded 38 ceremonial centers assigned to the long span from 300 
BC to AD 500. Since Weigand did not collect or analyze ceramic surface 
collections, these sites will need to be reexamined in the near future to better 
situate them within the ceramic chronology (Beekman and Weigand 2008). 
This analysis is therefore quite rough, and my discussion of temporal change is 
limited to those sites that can be placed within the ceramic sequence or dated 
directly through radiocarbon dates from excavations.
Statics
First, the southern Tequila valleys display a cluster of 38 ceremonial centers 
within 26 square miles. Ohnersorgen and Varien (1996) took a standard per-
spective that used the total volume of public architecture to divide these centers 
into four hierarchical levels labeled A–D (figure 3.5). Los Guachimontones is 
the only A site, with 10 circles, two ballcourts, and no shaft tombs. I consider 
the C site of Loma Alta lying only a short distance up the hill to be part of the 
same site and would add seven circles, two ballcourts, a large residential group, 
and substantial architectural volume to Los Guachimontones as a conse-
quence (Blanco 2009:figures 3.4, 3.12; duVall 2007:figure C.32; Smith Marquez 
2009). The only B site within the southern Tequila valleys is Ahualulco, lag-
ging far behind with a ballcourt and six circles (Weigand 1993:88). All other 
ceremonial centers within the southern concentration of rural settlement are 
much smaller C and D sites, with usually only one or two circles and perhaps 
a ballcourt. The map showing the settlement pattern based on site-size hierar-
chy emphasizes the centrality of Loma Alta/Los Guachimontones, and how 
sites of the next tier extend its reach into the rest of the Tequila valleys.
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If we interpret this settlement pattern using social institutions rather than 
sites, we obtain a different understanding of the political landscape. The gua-
chimontones and ballcourts are overwhelmingly concentrated in the south-
ern valleys, and this is also where we find the greatest evidence for archi-
tectural conformity. All the ceremonial centers have guachimontones as the 
minimal civic architectural unit—no sites possess only the large residences 
and/or ballcourts. Large residential groups that were probably elite in nature 
and potentially associated with one or more of the very highest ranking fami-
lies are only found in the primate center—Loma Alta/Los Guachimontones. 
The only other mapped sites with the large residential groups lie outside of 
the southern Tequila valleys. These are either B sites (Navajas [Beekman 
2005:figure 4.4]; Santa Quiteria [Weigand 1993:87]) or a C site that is the 
head of its own isolated settlement cluster (Huitzilapa [Weigand 1993:191]), 
and it may therefore have been the head of an independent polity, something 
not predicted on the basis of site size alone. Furthermore, there are some 
places where descent groups may have been successful in consolidating their 
authority relative to other groups around a circle. The proposed evidence is 
a guachimontón with a single oversized satellite platform that dwarfs the 
Figure 3.5. Map of the Tequila valleys, Jalisco, with sites identified by site-size hierarchy. 
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others. These locations—Navajas circle 4, Huitzilapa Cerro de las Navajas 
circle A, and Santa Rosalia circle A (Beekman 2005:figure 4.4; Weigand 
1993:191; Weigand and García de Weigand 1997:56)—are all outside of the 
southern Tequila valley settlement core and are once again B sites or the C 
site that was the head of its own isolated cluster. Finally, the only centers 
known to have the elite shaft tombs beneath public architecture are C or D 
centers (El Arenal, Cerro de los Monos, Huitzilapa, Resumidero, and San 
Andrés [Beekman 1996:159–164, figure 4.4; Long 1966:248–278, figures 8–10; 
Ramos de la Vega and López Mestas Camberos 1996:126–129, figures 3, 4, 12; 
Weigand and Beekman 1998:40, figures 8, 9]), and only one lies within the 
southern valleys.
The picture emerging from the distribution of distinctive spaces as opposed 
to sites suggests that the southern Tequila valley settlement zone constituted 
the most corporate area within these valleys. The south includes less indi-
cation of divergence from the corporate ideal and less evidence for descent 
group ceremonialism within the ceremonial centers; a large residential group 
is found only at the largest site in the zone (figure 3.6). Descent group aggran-
dizement and successful attempts to elevate one group over the others are 
notably limited to the more peripheral areas of the Tequila valleys. The site 
of Huitzilapa shows the greatest divergence from the corporate ideal of the 
south, but all of the significant centers in the periphery show similar evidence. 
This may point to the political independence of these distant centers, but it 
would be most appropriate to state that the corporate cognitive code (Blanton 
1998a:163–166; see also Fargher, chapter 15, this volume) was being challenged 
on the outer edges of the Tequila valleys. Why? Was it merely the distance 
factor that strained the ability of the Teuchitlán polity to enforce social con-
formity and dampen lineage aggrandizement?
Variations in economic organization may be more likely. Blanton and 
Fargher’s comparative analysis of the relative role of collective action across 
their sample of 30 premodern polities (Blanton and Fargher 2008:chapter 6, 
table 10.3) found that
a measure of the degree to which the main revenue sources are produced by 
commoners (e.g., what we call “internal revenues” such as agrarian surpluses 
from a free peasantry) is highly correlated with the quantity of public goods 
provided by the state . . ., with degree of bureaucratization . . ., and slightly less 
so, but still significantly with degree of control that can be exercised over the 
agency of governing principals. . . .We concluded from these strong statistical 
results that in the more collective states, because ordinary taxpayers (including 
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peasants) are the state’s principal source of revenue (what we call internal rev-
enue . . .), they are in a stronger position to demand public goods and forms of 
governance that are consistent with collective political goals. (Fargher, Heredia 
Espinoza, and Blanton 2011:320)
Or stated in a different way, when elites are able to develop external sources 
of revenue, they are better able to ignore commoner demands and pursue 
their own agendas (see Webster 1975:465–466 for the same argument tied spe-
cifically to the spoils of warfare). This proposal may have merit for explaining 
variations in the political landscape of the Teuchitlán polity. The southern 
valleys include broad zones of quality agricultural soils today exploited pri-
marily for sugar cane. I have argued previously that the dispersed residen-
tial pattern through the southern valleys would have been most appropriate 
for shifting cultivation of maize and associated crops in the precolumbian 
period (Beekman and Baden 2011), while the guachimontones themselves 
are associated through ritual and morphology with maize symbolism (Beek-
man 2003a, b). The northern and western valleys with most of the built space 
linked to lineage aggrandizement are environmentally distinct. West of the 
Figure 3.6. Map with locations of sites with large residential groups, shaft tombs under 
public architecture, and guachimontones with one oversized platform. 
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Tequila volcano is the Magdalena Lake Basin (Anderson et al. 2013), where 
the presence of lacustrine resources and more limited agricultural land would 
surely have altered the underlying subsistence economy. The rolling and often 
rocky agave landscape north of the Tequila volcano is hotter, has lower annual 
precipitation, and cultivation is today dedicated overwhelmingly to the blue 
agave (Heredia Espinoza 2008; Ojeda Gastélum, Benz, and López Mestas 
2008). Although this may point to different bases for the subsistence economy 
and are still potentially internal sources of revenue, their correspondence with 
the architectural evidence is suggestive. It may be that elites in the periph-
eral zones of the Tequila valleys successfully redefined land tenure or resource 
ownership in areas with different potential productivity. As survey progresses 
through the Tequila valleys, the distribution of residential settlement will need 
to receive close attention to evaluate this proposal.
Dynamics
A prior synthesis of the chronological data in the Tequila valleys found that 
the largest guachimontón temples are radiocarbon dated to the period prior to 
AD 200, after which only small additions and maintenance continued to take 
place (Beekman and Weigand 2008). Those circles whose construction could 
be dated to after AD 200 were all within Smith Marquez’s (2009) smallest 
categories. Furthermore, the shaft tombs declined in size and in the abun-
dance of offerings (e.g., Galván Villegas 1991), suggesting a shift in individual 
loyalties away from descent groups (see also Fargher, chapter 15, this volume). 
I interpreted this and other evidence to indicate that descent group ceremo-
nialism and aggrandizement were failing to reproduce the conditions of its 
own existence, while more centers in Jalisco and further abroad were adopting 
the circular architecture and its corporate rituals (Beekman 2007). Smaller 
communities were probably swapping descent group ceremonialism for com-
munity rituals, and community or even polity membership may have success-
fully replaced lineage membership as a primary axis of individual identity. The 
existing chronological data thus show a different trend from the spatial data, 
and further temporal refinements will be critical for testing these proposals.
DisCussion AnD ConCLusions
Richard Blanton’s research has provided archaeologists with useful tools 
for the study of political organization. I have chosen to highlight here dis-
tinctive contributions of the corporate-exclusionary continuum and collective 
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action theory, both of which continue to be fruitfully tapped by archaeologists 
(Carballo 2013; Daneels and Gutiérrez Mendoza 2012). Each approach was 
developed to further the investigation of political authority and in particular 
the limits on that authority, though they draw inspiration from different dis-
ciplines and different theoretical bases, and may be most useful when applied 
to different scales of analysis and using different types of data. In this case 
study, the association of different political interests with archaeologically rec-
ognizable spaces provided the entry point for a more in-depth analysis of the 
field of power as a component of the broader landscape. Blanton’s theoretical 
research on local strategies was combined with his interests in survey and 
regional settlement patterns for a more rich understanding of political action 
and its spatial variation. My foray in this direction was limited by the weak 
chronological and spatial data set for central Jalisco, but portrays the south-
ern Tequila valleys as a strongly corporate system during the Late Formative/
Early Classic when evaluated by forms of built space that structured political 
interaction rather than by entire sites.
The corporate-exclusionary continuum has been applied by many (includ-
ing myself [Beekman 2000]) at the scale of entire polities and societies, but 
the authors of the original model perceived that what was critical was the 
separation (be it temporal or spatial) of strategies. Tying the strategies to 
Bourdieu’s field concept highlights the different pathways to power within 
polities, and not just between them. The guachimontón temples and the often 
appended ballcourts were the most strongly dedicated of built spaces to the 
enactment of inclusive community ceremonies. The ceremonies that can be 
associated with each of these architectural forms celebrated maize and agri-
cultural success, reenacted cosmic myths, and built community through feast-
ing. Descent groups or individuals would have had opportunities to enhance 
their status, but the overarching setting in which the activities took place 
would have dampened or suppressed most attempts to capitalize upon a well-
performed ceremony or deftly executed ball play. The primary occasion on 
which a descent group could openly express their own importance and drama-
tize their status and accomplishments was in public mortuary ritual. Funeral 
processions appear to have passed through the patios of the circles on the 
way to their destination, so the total separation of these spaces is impossible. 
And we must note that the circles and ballcourts could encompass a degree of 
conflict when the actions of individuals were acknowledged within the more 
group-oriented rituals, just as teams and individual players each receive their 
accolades in modern sports. Further work with the corporate-exclusionary 
model will need to evaluate not only the relative presence of each strategy but 
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also the number of pathways present that make use of one or the other, as this 
internal heterogeneity is a defining component of complex society (Ferguson 
and Mansbach 1996; McGuire 1983).
Translating these interpretations to the regional settlement pattern data 
identified clear variation on the political landscape that may be explained 
using insights from the collective action perspective. The polity based in 
the more corporate southern Tequila valleys was probably associated with 
a maize-centered subsistence economy that provided the primary source of 
revenue for the Teuchitlán principals. This internal source of funding should 
have made elites less independent of commoners and required principals 
to reciprocate with more in the way of public goods, such as feasting. The 
peripheral and more lightly populated corners of the Tequila valleys provided 
opportunities for more exclusionary strategies that aggrandized descent 
groups and allowed transformation in the norms of the south. Following one 
of the key insights of collective action theory, it is likely that there were differ-
ences in the form of resource ownership and land tenure between these areas 
that made them external sources of revenue—elites had in essence succeeded 
in redefining the boundaries of the political field and its basis in capital. With 
access to resources that provided some measure of freedom from commoner 
influence, elites would have had greater opportunity to aggrandize family 
lines, build large residences, and so on. Ongoing surveys in the northern and 
western valleys promise to allow testing of these interpretations in the not 
too distant future.
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 1. “Corporate groups” would be a better term to encompass those groups formed 
through alliance as well as descent ( Joyce and Gillespie 2000), but this would only 






Corporate Power in 
Postclassic Jalisco
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Espinoza
Anthropological theory has turned attention from kings, 
palaces, and flashy remains to confederations, councils, 
and public architecture: in essence, more collective 
forms of governance to explain higher levels of integra-
tion and complexity (Blanton and Fargher 2008, 2016). 
These nuanced approaches have moved us beyond tradi-
tional theoretical perspectives on cultural evolution (e.g., 
Marcus 2008) and pointed to ways in which human 
agency (see also Brumfiel 1992) and the dynamic nature 
of social evolution combine to form a continuum of 
political strategies in the creation of nonhierarchical, 
decentralized, and more egalitarian social formations in 
complex societies (Blanton et al. 1996; Crumley 1995).
More than two decades ago, Blanton and colleagues 
(1996) brought to our attention a nontypological and 
nonlinear way of explaining social complexity. They 
presented two different complementary and non–mutu-
ally exclusive strategies used by social actors to accom-
plish political and economic goals, namely network 
and corporate strategies (Blanton et al. 1996). Since 
then, Blanton (1998a) continued to focus on corporate 
strategies such as those that suppress personal aggran-
dizement, including community-wide cooperation and 
participation, which result in more egalitarian politi-
cal structures where social mobility and commoner 
power are possible (see also Blanton and Fargher 
2008; Fargher, Heredia Espinoza, and Blanton 2011). 
Recently, Blanton and Fargher (2008) introduced col-
lective action to archaeological theory. Collective action 
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focuses on explaining variability in the organization of states as an outcome 
of the negotiation between rulers and ruled (Blanton and Fargher 2009:134). 
This new perspective shifted our attention from kings, palaces, and despotic 
governments to political strategies and social processes that may result in gov-
ernments built around cooperation. Jalisco, an under-theorized area in west 
Mexico, is benefiting from this theoretical maturation.
In this chapter, I use these new developments in anthropological theory to 
explain the political organization of the Tequila valleys of Jalisco during the 
Late Postclassic. According to ethnohistory and archaeological data, multiple 
ethnically and linguistically diverse peoples established independent polities 
in the area. State formation during this period was in part a response to pres-
sure from powerful groups, such as the Tarascans and Caxcanes. Yet, despite 
heightened tension and common threat, Postclassic Tequileños never unified 
into a single polity. Poor understanding of the nature of these societies has led 
scholars to reduce them into already constructed categories (e.g., bands, tribes, 
chiefdoms, states) or into descriptions from other regions of Mesoamerica 
(e.g., altepetl). Therefore, in this chapter, I take a first step toward filling this 
lacuna by adopting a more processual approach that pays special attention to 
political fragmentation at the regional scale and inclusive political strategies, 
along with the development of sequential hierarchies and corporate ideolo-
gies, at the intrasite scale. This approach lays a foundation for explaining the 
independent nature of these polities and at the same time their alliances in the 
face of common adversaries and threats.
PoLitiCAL eConomiC strAtegies AnD 
PoLitiCAL orgAnizAtion
Constant conflict and warfare reigned at the dawn of Spanish incursion in 
the Tequila valleys. Polities built temporary alliances among themselves to 
protect their territories, but they never unified into a single political structure; 
instead, they retained their political autonomy. Caxcanes and Tarascans had 
surrounded the valleys and, as the early documents suggest, they made several 
attempts to take control over this highly coveted region. How did these societ-
ies manage to stand off their enemies while at the same time preserving their 
autonomy rather than merging into a single polity?
In response to external military and political pressure, the political archi-
tects of the Tequila valleys could have deployed network strategies to recruit 
the followers necessary to maintain their independence (Blanton et al. 1996). 
In network strategies, individuals seek to concentrate power, authority, and 
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riches in particular families by manipulating wealth generated through long-
distance exchange (commercial, political, etc.). Wealth accrued through such 
trade is used to recruit clients locally via elaborate consumption, gifting, and 
feasting, accompanied by patrimonial rhetoric. An aura of tension and compe-
tition holds sway in these cases since there are multiple competing groups fos-
tered on personal relationships and gift-giving. In this scenario, alliances are 
highly volatile between people or groups; in addition, ties among the popula-
tion within these polities are weak, because only a portion of the population 
benefits from such relationships. The overall populace has little or no social 
mobility and their demands can be ignored because the power and author-
ity of leaders are grounded elsewhere or depend on external revenues (see 
Blanton and Fargher 2008 for a discussion of the impact of external revenues 
on political organization). This results in little incentive for elites to provide 
for voice and public goods in an effort to obtain compliance from a broad con-
stituency (e.g., free peasants). Rituals emphasizing community integration are 
also absent, hence large and accessible plazas that may suggest community-
wide gatherings do not figure into the overall configurations of towns and 
cities (see Fargher, Heredia Espinoza, and Uriarte Torres 2014). The result is a 
politically fragmented landscape that is in some ways analogous to the Tequila 
valleys during the Postclassic, as ethnohistoric sources suggest (see below). Yet, 
evidence of prestige goods and patrimonial rhetoric in the Tequila valleys dur-
ing the Postclassic is fleeting, suggesting that network strategies were not the 
basis of polity-building during this period.
Conversely, people in the Tequila valleys could have responded to the exter-
nal threats by using collective strategies to unify the polities in a single pow-
erful state with the capacity to mobilize the entire population for military 
defense, like their contemporaries in Tlaxcallan (Fargher et al. 2010; Fargher, 
Heredia Espinoza, and Blanton 2011). In Tlaxcallan (the prehispanic name of 
the state of Tlaxcala, Mexico), an ethnically diverse group responded to exter-
nal military pressure (from the Aztec Triple Alliance) by building an inclusive 
state grounded in collective action. In previous publications, my colleagues and 
I (Fargher et al. 2010; Fargher, Heredia Espinoza, and Blanton 2011) argued 
that Tlaxcallan was built around cooperation in which the state bureaucra-
tized to accommodate taxpayer voice and offer public goods, especially mili-
tary leadership, in exchange for revenue payments, especially military corvée, 
by commoners. However, the state went further in order to build the trust 
and confidence among Tlaxcaltecans necessary to cultivate compliance with 
their revenue demands. The state’s political architects instituted a powerful 
egalitarian or corporate ideology that rewarded service to the state, especially 
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in warfare, with promotion to “noble” status and political offices (including, 
possibly, a seat on the ruling council), as well as implementing a strict and 
austere moral code that governed the behavior of officials (cf. Fargher, chapter 
15, this volume). Religion was also employed to justify and reinforce the merit-
based egalitarian ethos, emphasizing Tezcatlipoca, a deity associated with 
merit, judicial equality, and self-sacrifice regardless of social position (Fargher 
2012; Fargher et al. 2010). Building on this corporate ideology, the Tlaxcaltecas 
created a unified political structure based on a ruling council that consisted of 
somewhere between 50 and 250 officials, who made consensus-based decisions 
and were promoted on merit (Fargher et al. 2010:238).
Much like Tlaxcallan, wealth and prestige goods were deemphasized in 
the political strategies employed in the Tequila valleys during the Postclassic; 
yet, the Tequila valleys remained decentralized and the political landscape 
was fragmented, which was very much unlike Tlaxcallan. Thus, I posit that 
an additional pathway to complexity was followed in Tequila that differed 
from both network (or external revenue) strategies and collective action 
based on internal revenues, bureaucratization, voice, and public goods. Here, 
the multiple multiethnic groups maintained their political autonomy, yet 
they created short-term alliances to defend their territories. Specifically, I 
contend, based on the archaeological record and ethnohistoric informa-
tion, that Late Postclassic political architects employed a form of sequential 
hierarchies and powerful corporate or egalitarian ideologies to build strong 
polities able to withstand common foes, retain political autonomy, and limit 
personalized power based on monopolies over long-distance exchange and 
ideological resources. They built a horizontal and highly collective political 
structure, but unlike other states high in collectivity, they did not assemble 
large amounts of revenue and invest in major public goods and/or a complex 
bureaucratic apparatus.
CorPorAte PoLitiCAL strAtegies
In the original formation, corporate strategies are those where aggrandiz-
ing behaviors are suppressed in favor of more egalitarian or group-oriented 
dimensions (Blanton et al. 1996). In these strategies, images of individuals are 
obscured and/or shown in groups or crowds. Depictions of specific person-
ages that could be identified with a name are absent and instead groups or 
individuals are depicted, if at all, wearing masks. Writing, where present, tends 
to be dedicated to keeping records of transactions, rituals, and other impor-
tant events and it is not used to document the deeds of specific individuals. 
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Corporate strategies used by political actors are implemented to create com-
munity-wide integration and cooperation, and can be recognized archaeologi-
cally by investment in public ceremonial and civic architecture, an emphasis 
on fertility rituals, community feasting, and the minimization of individual-
izing behaviors (Blanton et al. 1996; see also Blanton 1998a). Thus, palaces, 
personal monuments, elaborate tombs, and control over prestige goods are 
masked or absent.
As Fargher points out (chapter 15, this volume), corporate strategies are one 
tool that may be used in building collective states, but the institutional plan 
varies among polities. In the particular case of the Tequila valleys, corporate 
strategies involved power-sharing (probably in the form of consensus deci-
sion-making) and an egalitarian ideology but not heavy investment in the 
development of institutional infrastructure. Instead, I posit that consensual 
decision-making was achieved through the development of sequential hier-
archies and an ideology that downplayed the role of wealth accumulation in 
gaining political prestige and power.
Sequential Hierarchies and Corporate Strategies
Johnson (1982, 1983) pointed out that the information stress created by 
the nucleation of large numbers of individuals within a single site or polity 
could be solved through heterarchical strategies, such as sequential hierarchies, 
instead of developing more centralized and hierarchical structures through 
either network strategies or bureaucratization. The development of sequential 
hierarchies involves grouping individuals or households into larger and inclu-
sive decision-making units (e.g., complex households, clans, moieties, etc.) 
thereby diminishing their number and allowing for more horizontal decision-
making (e.g., power-sharing or consensus decision-making). As opposed to 
dealing with a myriad of small units, the reduced number of larger aggre-
gations decreases the number of individuals with whom consensus must be 
reached and, thus, decision-making stress is scaled down. At the same time, 
these larger units are horizontally constructed with unranked representatives 
who possess equivalent decision-making authority. They are also responsible 
for ensuring that their unit conforms and cooperates with decisions reached 
in council.
Sequential hierarchies have been documented in a range of societies from 
simple to complex (Bargatzky 1995; Johnson 1982, 1983; see also Kowalewski 
2006 for similar patterns). For example, the Huron and Iroquois used sequen-
tial hierarchies to build confederacies. Huron councils originated informally 
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from extended families. At the village scale, Huron ruling councils were built 
of the heads of the long houses (extended families) and larger political agglom-
erations (e.g., communities and peoples) were formed through supravillage 
councils made up of representatives from each member village. In both vil-
lage councils and supravillage councils, decisions were reached through voting 
and consensus (Trigger 2002:89–91). The position of chief was hereditary and 
within a community he was “recognized as the principal chief and spokesman 
for the entire community” (Trigger 2002:87–88). Two types of chiefs existed 
among the Huron: civil or peace chiefs and war chiefs. Only the former were 
members of the council and hence of the national and confederacy levels. 
Civil chiefs were selected from their own lineages, and their positions were 
inheritable within a lineage. Their main duties were to act as speakers or chair-
men: they assisted their group to reach agreements and represented them in 
foreign affairs (Trigger 2002:81). Although some chiefs were more prominent 
than others, there is no indication that they had more authority than the rest. 
In fact, chiefs could not coerce or force their will on anyone (Trigger 2002:84), 
their duties resided in being the spokesmen of their people. Given this nested 
political structure, all clan segments had representative chiefs at the Huron 
confederacy level.
Among the Iroquois, the structure of the confederacy of 50 sachems repre-
senting the six nations was formed through “nested hierarchies” that strongly 
resemble sequential hierarchies. At the very base of this political structure 
were households that made up tribes. A group of tribes (e.g., Onondaga, 
Seneca, Mohawk) constituted a nation. Tribes selected sachems, which then 
represented their nation and group decisions at the confederacy level. Each 
sachem possessed the same powers and shared equal rank and authority as all 
the other members of the confederacy despite the uneven number of represen-
tatives for each nation. The sachem office was hereditary within the tribe, but 
elective among the male members of the tribe itself (Morgan 1901).
Finally, the Cheyenne are another example of government by council where 
the council of 44 peace chiefs was established to prevent internal disagreement 
and to solve matters of war (Hoebel 1988). Those chiefs selected for the council 
possessed certain qualities, which included “good temper, generosity, energy, 
courage, altruism, wisdom” (Hoebel 1988:43). Chiefs selected for the council 
were experienced warriors who upon selection into the council became peace 
chiefs, losing their position (but not their memberships) as war chiefs (Hoebel 
1988:43). Hereditary factors did not play an important part as a requisite in 
the selection process, but frequently, after a 10-year term in office, a peace 
chief could choose a son as his successor (Hoebel 1988:51). A chief was both 
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a representative of his extended family and band; first and foremost, however, 
as member of the council he acted as protector of each member of the tribe 
(Hoebel 1988:43). Above all, the council made decisions such as “camp mov-
ing and tribal war polity” and in some cases (e.g., criminal acts) it acted as 
a judicial body (Hoebel 188:52). Decision-making was reached by prolonged 
debate until agreement was attained. All peace chiefs were equally ranked and 
as a council their authority was invested with supernatural skills, making it the 
supreme authority (Hoebel 1988:49).
The aforementioned forms of organization are quintessential examples of 
successful sequential hierarchies. Most important, this form of organization 
distributes authority and representation of the population in such a manner 
that people have a voice in the political decision-making process. Nonetheless, 
the distribution of decision-making among various segments is not sufficient 
for maintaining order and cohesion.
Creating a sequential hierarchy does not by itself prevent fissioning, inter-
nal conflict, or prestige-good consumption and wealth competition among 
groups (see for example the societies of the Northwest Coast [e.g., Ames 
1995]). As Stark points out (chapter 5, this volume), there is always tension 
between individuals seeking personal gain (network strategies) versus those 
who favor group interests and welfare (corporate strategies). Accordingly, indi-
viduals seeking personal power may attempt to derail or obstruct consensus-
building to thwart collective decision-making. As Blanton and Fargher (2016) 
point out, achieving cooperation in human societies is extremely difficult and 
designing functional governing structures based on collective action may be 
the most difficult challenged faced by humans as a species.
In order to control such behaviors, political architects must support sequen-
tial hierarchies with corporate cognitive codes. Such codes function to rein-
force group identity and an egalitarian ideology that suppresses prestige goods 
and network strategies. However, once codes are in place, ceremonialism and 
ritual activity become essential for group maintenance and cohesion. In situ-
ations where leaders seek to integrate multiethnic groups into larger aggrega-
tions, such as was the case in the Tequila valleys, a common symbolic language 
that would cross-cut linguistic barriers and allow integration and a shared 
identity must be developed (see Kowalewski 2006). Ritual, in these situations, 
plays a significant role in creating group cohesion and allowing corporate cog-
nitive codes to support a “corporate political structure” (Blanton et al. 1996:2).
Corporate cognitive codes also emphasize reciprocal obligations among 
groups of distinct origin through the enactment of rituals that “transcend 
local belief systems” (Blanton et al. 1996:4). Integration of different units 
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requires the creation of new myths and spaces for the enactment of these 
rituals. Sizable plazas capable of bringing together large numbers of people—
or conversely, multiple plazas—are indicative of such collective events (for 
examples, see Fargher et al. 2011; Fargher et al. 2014). The sizes of plazas or the 
number of them may indicate such collective codes, and public architecture, 
such as certain monuments, may also function as an integrative mechanism. 
Connectivity between different architectural groupings may also be indicative 
of such codes (e.g., Blanton and Fargher 2012; Fargher et al. 2014). Emphasis 
on shared identity through these communal events would have served as a key 
ingredient for the construction of strong polities.
A corporate cognitive code is also vital to restrain the emergence of exclu-
sionary strategies such as aggrandizement, massive and luxurious tombs or 
burials, or monuments in honor of particular individuals or dynasties (Blanton 
et al. 1996:6). Such codes allow power-sharing strategies “across different 
groups and sectors of society” (ibid. 1996:2; Blanton 1998a:158, 159), thereby 
inhibiting the power over decision-making by a particular group (see also 
Fargher, chapter 15, this volume). Representatives of the different units, and 
hence the people represented, would have voice in the decision-making pro-
cesses. Reduced wealth disparities are also consistent with a corporate cogni-
tive code, where significant hoarding of material riches and their use as politi-
cal currency is controlled. A corporate cognitive code and egalitarian ideology 
thus create unity in groups that cross-cuts ethnic and linguistic boundaries. 
This must have been extremely advantageous in times of warfare. Mobilization 
for military defense would have profited from these egalitarian strategies and 
ideologies as they effectively functioned to congregate an army when needed 
(cf. Kowalewski 2006).
Data Collection: Ethnohistory and Archaeology
A full-coverage systematic survey north of the Tequila volcano provides 
important data complementing the ethnohistoric information available 
on political organization. Using a modified version of the regional survey 
developed in Central Mexico and Oaxaca highlands (Kowalewski et al. 1989; 
Kowalewski et al. 2009; Sanders et al. 1979), the Tequila survey recorded 
all evidence of human occupation from small artifact scatters to sites cov-
ering hundreds of hectares. Our methodology consisted of walking every 
field with a distance of 20–40 m between surveyors. Site limits, identified 
by the fall-off frequency of artifacts and architectural limits, were drawn on 
the aerial photo. Our collections were of two different kinds: grab bags, or 
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general collections, and specific collections. General collections were usually 
taken at small sites that we recognized as single-period occupations. Specific 
collections were taken at exact locations within a site such as structures, ter-




The cultural history of the Tequila valleys of Jalisco can hardly be framed 
in simplistic diachronic terminology where early (or simple) societies gave 
way to more complex social formations. Here we see periods of stability and 
continuity, highlighted by rupture, coalescence, and diversity in the way that 
societies formed and were created at different points in time. This is the case 
for the Late Postclassic, when multiple independent, ethnically and linguis-
tically distinct polities occupied the Tequila valleys (Baus de Czitrom 1982; 
Soto de Arechavaleta 1994; Weigand 1993:136–137; Weigand and García de 
Weigand 1996:31–32). Ethnohistoric documents mention Cocas, Tecuexes, and 
Cazcanes among those ethnic groups (Acuña 1988; Baus de Czitrom 1982). 
Linguistically the region was also diverse and Cora, Coano, Cazcán (closely 
related to Nahuatl), Coca, Vitzurita or Wixárika, Tecozquín, and Nahuatl were 
spoken in the region (Yáñez Rosales 1994, 2004:85–86). In addition, Caxcanes 
(and other Chichimec groups) and Tarascans were encroaching on the valleys 
and, as the early documents suggest, both groups made several attempts to take 
control over this highly coveted region (Coria 1937:558; Weigand 2013:59–61).
Ethnohistoric data on the polities north of the Tequila volcano are paltry 
and dispersed in various documents. The Spanish understated the political 
organization of the region and descriptions are superficial, mixing terms such 
as señor, calpixque, and cacique, among others. Nonetheless, it is evident that 
not all towns shared a single organizational structure, and the documents also 
mention the existence of several polities, which indicate political fragmenta-
tion, decentralization, and the presence of many rulers. In some cases, sources 
(Coria 1937:559) document the presence of two calpixque. Calpixque, however, 
were not heads of towns such as a tlatoani; yet the presence of two in one town, 
each from a distinct ethnic group, points to some sort of power-sharing, where 
each ethnic group had a representative in government affairs. This informa-
tion indicates that each barrio or small settlement had a representative who 
ruled together and/or formed short alliances with his peers. Etzatlán, in the 
southwestern Tequila valleys, was a province (provincia) headed by a señor and 
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organized “a barrios,” each with its own representative (Weigand 2013:33–34). 
Weigand (2013:31) considers significant the fact that Etzatlán was organized “a 
barrios” and not “de barrios,” the difference being that the use of a barrios signi-
fies that the barrios were not continuous, but rather dispersed and de barrios 
refers to a single settlement subdivided in neighborhoods (Weigand 2013:31). 
A recent regional survey in Etzatlán recovered settlement-pattern data, indi-
cating a discontinuous settlement rather than a centralized capital (Heredia 
Espinoza 2014).
Finally, a ceramic stamp, from Etzatlán, portrays two defleshed faces or 
skulls that may represent regional variants of Xipe Totec and Tezcatlipoca, 
respectively (Weigand 2013:28). Tezcatlipoca has been suggested as an impor-
tant deity in the region (Weigand and García de Weigand 1995:23, 65–66), per-
haps originating in the Classic period. He is closely identified with the desert 
north and nomadic or seminomadic groups, such as the Caxcanes, who were 
encroaching on the Tequila valleys sometime before the Conquest. Caxcanes 
spoke some sort of corrupted Nahuatl that was intelligible with Nahuatl from 
the Basin of Mexico (Yáñez Rosales 1994:60). Nahuatl has been identified 
as one of the many languages spoken among the resident populations in the 
Tequila valleys (Baus de Czitrom 1982:25). As I noted above, Tezcatlipoca is 
associated with merit, judicial equality, self-sacrifice regardless of social posi-
tion, and egalitarianism. He is associated with Atecpanecatl, the “destroyer of 
royal privilege,” in opposition to Quetzalcoatl, who is associated with royal 
lineages and privileges (Fargher et al. 2010:241; Ringle et al. 1998). As such, the 
ideological association with Tezcatlipoca favored social mobility over injustice, 
aggrandizement, and strong hereditary power. Therefore, the promotion of his 
cult and associated ideology would have proved the basis for the type of egali-




In an area of 463 km2, we recorded 242 sites that date to the Postclassic 
(figure 4.1), and 119 sites with standing architecture. Although population 
densities may have been lower here than in Central Mexico or Oaxaca, a con-
servative population estimate suggests that tens of thousands of people occu-
pied the Tequila valleys at the Conquest (Weigand 1993:130) and nearly 15,000 
lived in the area surveyed (including Santa María but not Etzatlán) based 
on a conservative figure of 17.5 persons per hectare, but debate exists on how 
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densely populated these valleys were at the time (Weigand 1993:128–130). An 
increase in number of settlements and in the overall size of sites from previous 
occupation phases along with data on residential architecture and domestic 
debris are in line with these observations.
Late Postclassic sites are located on hills, lomas, and along the Río Santiago 
canyon (figure 4.1), but the largest centers and political seats tend to clus-
ter around the natural entryways into the valleys and toward the northern 
piedmont of the Tequila volcano. The canyon, which limits the valleys to the 
north, was occupied with small sites on hilltops and lomas, but no large site 
was recorded in this subregion. To the northwest is Santa María and to the 
southeast and into the Atemajac Valley is a cluster of four large sites. Etzatlán 
and Tala are mentioned in ethnohistoric documents as important centers in 
the Late Postclassic (Coria 1937; Tello 1968). The Tarascans ravaged Tala just 
50 years before the Conquest (Tello 1968), and it was located on the south-
eastern entry. Etzatlán on the other hand, was located on the southwestern 
Figure 4.1. The central valleys of Jalisco, showing the area surveyed, settlement patterns 
for the Postclassic, as well as various localities mentioned in the text. 
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passage. Recent archaeological survey identified a large and sprawling site on 
a piedmont ridge above (south and west of ) the modern town of Etzatlán that 
was probably the settlement of the same name mentioned by the Spanish. All 
of these are strategic locations for vigilance and to control access, themes of 
primary importance during this period.
Based on site size as a proxy for the political administrative hierarchy, I have 
identified at least four settlement tiers (figure 4.2). The first tier consists of one 
large site (Santa María) at the northwestern corner of the survey area (212 ha). 
The second tier is composed of six sites that range from 17 ha to 75 ha, located 
in the southern half of the survey region, including four clusters of sites in the 
southeastern corner. A rough population estimate of 10 to 25 persons per hect-
are indicates that together these centers housed approximately 7,000 individu-
als. The third tier consists of secondary centers ranging in size from 4 ha to 16 ha 
(10 people per hectare). The lowest level consists of dispersed rural settlement, 
artifact scatters, and isolated residences (5–10 people per hectare). Political seats 
are surrounded by secondary centers and rural settlement in compact clusters 
separated by shatter zones, or scantily occupied areas (figure 4.2).
The settlement pattern, evident in the map, suggests a highly decentralized 
or fragmented landscape (figure 4.2). There are two shatter zones, suggesting 
the presence of multiple polities (possibly three). In the southeast, four sites 
are clustered together, suggesting one polity, then a shatter zone of 6.5 km 
separates this cluster from another with two large sites at its center that may 
also represent another polity. The latter cluster is located near the center of the 
survey area. In the northwest, Santa María stands as a third polity. Unlike the 
two other polities, settlement at Santa María is highly nucleated, nearly every-
one lived in the capital and there was little or no rural settlement. This site cor-
responds with the settlement of Xochitepec (home of Guaxicar), now called 
Magdalena, described in ethnohistoric documents (Tello 1968:128). South of 
Santa María at the southern end of the Magdalena Basin, the archaeological 
site of Etzatlán forms the seat of yet another autonomous polity. Thus, I inter-
pret these settlement clusters, divided by shatter zones, as politically indepen-
dent units, which concurs with the fragmented political landscape described 
in early colonial documents (summarized in Soto de Arechavaleta 1994:346).
At 212 ha, Santa María is the largest Late Postclassic site. Based on survey 
data, it functioned as a political seat in the northern Magdalena basin. Only 
two small sites (< .4 ha) northeast of Santa María were recorded in this por-
tion of the valleys, indicating a strongly nucleated, primate settlement pattern 
for the polity. This cluster is separated from the nearest cluster to the east by a 
significant linear distance of 25 km.
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Of the six remaining large sites located north of the volcano, three of 
them do not have standing architecture due to their location in agave fields 
and toward the center of the valleys. It is my contention that these places 
were similar to Santa María, but mechanized agriculture has done away with 
extant architectural remains. This conclusion is based on our field obser-
vations, which recorded both construction stone and domestic debris on 
these sites. Besides Santa María, the only other primary site with standing 
architecture is located in the southeastern corner of the survey area on a 
smoothly sloping loma. Only two large residential platforms, superstruc-
tures, and stone alignments were visible on the surface, significantly less 
impressive than Santa María (see below). The loma has been affected by the 
contemporary urban growth of town of El Arenal (figure 4.1) and most of 
the site is currently planted with agave. Therefore, the possibility that many 
more structures existed is very likely. All of these primary sites are located 
within four to eight linear kilometers of one another, indicating dense popu-
lations in a politically decentralized landscape.
Figure 4.2. Postclassic settlement tiers, based on site size. 
92 VERENICE Y. HEREDIA ESPINOZA
Intrasite Architectural Arrangements
Previous studies in various regions of Mesoamerica have tested the degree 
of centralization and differing political strategies through architectural spatial 
configurations at the site level (Blanton 1989; Blanton and Fargher 2012; Fargher 
et al. 2011; Fargher et al. 2014; Heredia Espinoza 2007). Generally speaking, net-
work strategies (Blanton et al. 1996) are correlated with the presence of large 
palatial edifices, as well as small and enclosed (private) plazas that are, at times, 
directly associated with civic-ceremonial spaces. Conversely, corporate strate-
gies are often linked with open and accessible civic-ceremonial architecture; the 
presence of multiple, equally ranked public spaces or civic-ceremonial archi-
tecture point to community integration at multiple levels and power-sharing 
strategies (see Beekman, chapter 3, this volume; Fargher et al. 2011).
For major sites in the Tequila valleys north of the Tequila volcano, it is 
important to identify those potential spaces where public events would have 
taken place as well as their location within a site, since ritual is an important 
aspect in the organization of sequential hierarchies. Plaza sizes are also impor-
tant because they indicate the potential number of people who could have 
participated in various gatherings (e.g., large for public vs. small for private 
events). At Santa María, plaza sizes range from about 125 m2 to 835 m2. Some 
plazas are not formal, meaning they are open spaces that do not have walls nor 
are they delimited by buildings on all or some sides.
For the purposes of this section, I concentrate mostly on Santa María, which, 
I argue is exemplary of the architectural arrangement of polity capitals, and 
where archaeological preservation is optimal. A recurrent residential architec-
tural form, known as corrales, prevails in most Postclassic settlements. As yet, 
there are no excavated corrales, but we know that they had a limited distribu-
tion following the canyons to the north (Weigand and García de Weigand 
1996:51). During salvage work at Bugambilias, in the Atemajac valley to the 
east, Galván Villegas (1983) recorded several of these structures; and Hers 
(1977) reports on them in the Sierra del Nayar in Nayarit.
At first glance, corrales seem to conform to a regular construction style; 
two rows of stone blocks parallel to each other (between 40 and 60 cm apart), 
forming a rectangular C; but the survey recorded more information on their 
varied morphology. For example, corrales can be built directly on the surface 
or atop platforms and terraces. Most have a single entrance, but others have 
two or three entrances and staircases/steps, and therefore are of substantial 
size. Weigand and García de Weigand (1996:61) had already noted somewhat 
of a hierarchy of corrales in this area, yet they seem to be built following 
general guidelines. We think they were either special-function architecture 
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or the residences of principals within a settlement (as defined by Blanton 
and Fargher [2008:19], principals are “the chief decision-makers and policy-
makers of a polity). Sizes of corrales range from 12.5 m2 to 772.8 m2, following 
a lognormal distribution. The geometric standard deviation (1.852 m2) indi-
cates significant variation, and given the geometric mean (56.023 m2), there 
are some very large corrales that appear to be outliers. The largest corrales are 
found in primary centers. Differences in size may also be indicative of strati-
fication within the site such that larger corrales housed important, perhaps 
extended, families, while smaller structures served as residences for commoner 
households, possibly attached to the larger corrales. The importance of cor-
rales to this discussion lies in the fact that this type of architecture is ubiqui-
tous throughout the survey region, and it is to some extent a diagnostic feature 
of the Late Postclassic period.
In order to understand the architectural spatial patterning at Santa María, 
I drew Thiessen polygons between all standing residential architecture greater 
than 8m2, which allowed the easy identification of architectural clusters (fig-
ure 4.3). The polygons indicate that architecture clustered in groups consisting 
of several structures, small plazas, mounds, large corrales, and other features 
of unknown function. These architectural groups tend to be spread evenly 
across the site, pointing to a decentralized patterning within the site where 
several formal arrangements can be detected. These architectural clusters are 
the material representation of larger units (e.g., such as groups of households 
or neighborhoods).
Next, using structure areas as a proxy for labor investment (person days), 
I identified those places within the site that point to high amounts of labor 
(figure 4.3). Cluster analysis shows several locations where labor investment 
is highest, indicating that labor-intensive architecture is located in multiple 
locations within Santa María (a heterarchical pattern in the architecture). 
High amounts of labor investment concentrate at the highest point of the 
hill, where I mapped a three-mound group surrounding a small patio atop a 
high platform (figure 4.4). Terraces and structures run northeast and south-
west of this complex. To the west, there is an abrupt slope and from there the 
view of Laguna Magdalena is impressive. While we collected artifacts on the 
slopes around this three-mound group, we did not find a single artifact associ-
ated with it that suggested a nonresidential or civic-ceremonial function. This 
architectural group is located on one of the highest points of the mountain 
and is located in a cluster, which includes a number of large corrales, terraces, 
and structures. Its location at the center of a neighborhood cluster probably 
indicates that it functioned as the neighborhood civic-ceremonial space, as 
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Figure 4.3. Santa María architectural settlement clusters. 
well as the central architectural complex of the site. Hence, this architectural 
group can be interpreted as a unit formed by both residential and nonresiden-
tial architecture (e.g., civic-ceremonial).
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Figure 4.4. Three sections of Santa María, showing various residential groups: highest 
point of site. 
In the middle section of the site, spatial arrangement of the largest corrales 
and other residential architecture follows a pattern where open spaces or pla-
zas are surrounded by groups of three or four large corrales, smaller corrales, 
residential structures, and terraces (figure 4.5). These groupings are separated 
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Figure 4.5. Three sections of Santa María, showing various residential groups: hill. 
by natural topography such as drainages, constituting discrete or separate 
residential zones. In the northern portion of the site, several discrete groups 
of residences, divided by natural drainages, are arranged in circular fashion 
around a large plaza. The plaza is located on an open area high on the hill and 
at the very center of the above-mentioned residential aggregations. Given that 
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these groups are divided by natural topography, they suggest discrete units 
(groups of households); thus, it appears that these units shared a large plaza as 
a common public space. However, no single group was significantly larger or 
more impressive than any other, suggesting relatively equal ranking among the 
groups that participated in public events at the central plaza.
On the piedmont, the arrangement varies somewhat, and groupings are not 
as evident, but again clusters are divided by natural drainages (figure 4.6). In 
this section of the site, some residences and corrales are arranged in groups 
of two or three. Spatial proximity to other residences is high, so the pattern is 
more clustered than on the highest portion of Santa María. A mound associ-
ated with a plaza and/or large corrales repeats in various places on the pied-
mont. Mounds have few to no artifacts on the surface, but fragments of ritual 
vessels (braseros, sahumadors, etc.) are found in association with these struc-
tures; thus I interpret these features as civic-ceremonial architecture. Mounds 
may also function to separate residential groups or create independent resi-
dential groups. In one case, we recorded a large corral and other residences 
associated with a mound and a small open plaza (figure 4.6). The mound and 
the plaza do not have any associated artifacts that indicate a nonresidential 
function, whereas the large corral and the surrounding residential architecture 
display a high density of domestic debris such as manos, metates, comals, and 
jars. On a different hillside, a large corral or platform is directly associated 
with a mound, and a “double U” shaped structure that may have functioned as 
a public space (figure 4.6). Finally, in another section, a large corral is associ-
ated with one of these “double U” structures.
Thus, the entire site displays multiple clusters of equally ranked civic-cere-
monial and residential architecture, indicating distinct units based on spatial 
breaks between clusters. The ancient settlement at Etzatlán suggests variation 
on this pattern where there is not a single settlement focus and instead people 
lived in multiple separate clusters of settlement distributed along the piedmont. 
However, this pattern may be similar to Santa María in that these distinct 
groups or sites may be equivalent to the clusters. In addition, all large Postclassic 
sites feature debris patterns that suggest the presence of public architecture, a 
pattern not seen at smaller sites. Besides the three-mound group mentioned 
above, there are two large open plazas surrounded by residences, resulting in 
small groups of structures analogous to neighborhoods. Further down on the 
piedmont, the spatial structure of architectural arrangements follows a similar 
pattern; houses are situated in groups of various sizes where large corral struc-
tures were recorded, some of which are grouped around patios and yet others 
were constructed on terraces in the sloping terrain. Thus, it appears that the site 
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consists of unranked and relatively architecturally similar neighbors character-
ized by a group of one or a few large houses, small houses, and public spaces.
Spatial Distribution of Artifacts
Our field methods did not implement systematic, controlled collection 
points of a specific size, but our survey methodology was systematic. We made 
Figure 4.6. Three sections of Santa María, showing various residential groups: piedmont. 
COMPLEXIT Y WITHOU T CENTRALIZATION: CORPORATE POWER IN POSTCLASSIC JALISCO 99
collections in specific features and in small artifact concentrations within the 
site in order to have better control over chronological components and over 
intrasite artifact distributions. Collections included only diagnostic artifacts 
such as rims, decorated vessel bodies, and figurine fragments. In the absence 
of diagnostics, and where ceramic densities were too low, we collected undeco-
rated sherds and dated them based on paste attributes. Hence, although a sta-
tistical sampling method was not implemented, some generalizations on the 
distribution of artifacts for the entire survey region and within Santa María as 
well can be made based on these collections.
Differences in the quality of artifacts in a spatial dimension are one way to 
identify possible variations in wealth and status. Artifacts, especially ceramic 
artifacts that display high amounts of labor investment (Feinman et al. 1981; 
Garraty 2000; Hagstrum 1988) and specialized goods that require complex tech-
nologies or secret procedures, can be used as proxies to study differential access 
to wealth within and among sites. Differential distributions of these goods 
within settlements as well as among sites (Fargher et al. 2010; Heredia Espinoza 
2007; Kowalewski et al. 2008; Uriarte Torres 2011) can effectively identify the 
degree of difference in access patterns to a diversity of goods and resources as 
well as to possible discrete functional spaces, and they shed light on the variety 
of strategies used by individuals or groups.
Postclassic diagnostic ceramics can be reduced, but not limited to, three main 
forms according to their frequency in our collections: jars, molcajetes, and tablets 
(figure 4.7a, b, c, respectively). Jars vary in size, but in terms of form they do not 
differ significantly. Typically, they display a distinctive, thickened rim (Beekman 
and Weigand 2000:68–69) and they tend to be painted in red and highly 
burnished, although decoration in red and white vertical bands also occurs. 
Molcajetes are a recurrent form. They are striated on the interior, have sup-
ports, and display diverse decorations (monochrome, bichrome, or polychrome) 
and vary in ceramic fabric texture. Molcajetes are very common and they do 
not seem to be limited to domestic contexts, as they have also been identified 
in interments (Glassow 1967; Smith Marquez and Herrejón Villicaña 2004). 
Finally, tablets are flat and rectangular with raking or striations on the upper 
surface; their function is unknown. They do not show wear patterns and, given 
their shape, they were not used for food serving or food preparation. Again, 
they do not seem to have restricted distribution and they are not confined to a 
specific context. Surprisingly, bowls and plates, among the most common forms 
in other parts of Late Postclassic Mesoamerica (Brumfiel 1987, 1991; Garraty 
2000), occur rarely in the Tequila valleys’ Late Postclassic ceramic assemblage 
(Beekman personal communication 2012; Heredia Espinoza 2011).
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Overall, frequencies in ceramic forms and ceramic types do not show sig-
nificant differences across the surveyed region or in areas within sites, sug-
gesting a highly homogeneous distribution. Two forms dominate the entire 
collection: jars and molcajetes. Together, these two make up 85 percent of the 
entire assemblage. The proportion of jars to molcajetes is 2:1. Other forms that 
head the list, but that occur in significant lower proportions, are comals and, 
still less frequently, bowls/plates.
Competitive and aggrandizing feasting behavior is usually inferred by the 
presence of fancy serving ware and a wide variety of ceramic forms, which 
suggest consumption of diverse and elaborate foods, in a few (elite) house-
holds (Garraty 2000; Levine 2011; Smith et al. 2003:251). Specifically, the ratio 
of jars to bowls (11:1) indicates that serving for aggrandizement and politi-
cal legitimation was not an important pursuit at this time; furthermore there 
is no evidence that bowls were concentrated in high-status residences (e.g., 
in large corrales). Cooking and storage were more important and, in the 
absence of highly decorated or luxury serving forms, the ceramic assemblage 
is more indicative of communal types of food-sharing behavior. Thus, the near 
absence of fancy serving vessels, the lack of diversity in vessel forms, and the 
low frequency of serving vessels, suggests that competitive feasting was lim-
ited. I think that such archaeological patterns indicate that cognitive codes 
downplayed the importance of personal wealth aggrandizement and gifting 
as a pathway to political power. This pattern fits with the ideological focus on 
Tezcatlipoca and his cult, mentioned above.
Moreover, two ceramic types dominate the assemblage: Atemajac and 
Huistla that together represent over 93 percent of the entire Late Postclassic 
collection. Both types are ubiquitous and represent the bulk of the domes-
tic pottery in all households. Furthermore, these types do not show high 
amounts of labor investment in decoration, but the Atemajac type tends to 
Figure 4.7. Late Postclassic ceramic diagnostic forms: (a) Atemajac jars; (b) Huistla 
molcajetes; and (c) tablets. 
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be well burnished. Various pastes were used in the production of these two 
types, but on average pastes seem midway between a fine and a coarse clay 
(Beekman and Weigand 2000:68), suggesting the use of piedmont clays with 
little additional labor investment (e.g., they did not levigate and carefully 
temper clays). Accordingly, Atemajac vessels for the most part are plain, but 
examples of polychromes appear in small quantities. On the other hand some 
Huistla type vessels may have fine pastes and bichrome or polychrome decora-
tion (Nance 2013:104–107), indicating the presence of some more finely made 
dishes. However, in the survey the highly decorated sherds do not constitute 
a large enough sample to be significant, and they were not disproportionately 
concentrated in and around large corrales.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the ceramic evidence. First, there 
are no major differences in types, suggesting a collective form of material cul-
ture and perhaps the presence of exchange mechanisms that cross-cut political 
boundaries, such as a regional market system (tiangues are mentioned for sev-
eral towns in Coria 1937). The similarity in local types with limited decoration 
also indicates a lack of competitive behavior such as in feasting events, and it 
also concurs with the presence of markets. The limited ceramic forms indicate 
standardized food-consumption patterns and again no major differences that 
may indicate considerable distinctions in behavior (consumption and wealth). 
Finally, the data described above show that big residential units (e.g., cor-
rales) did not monopolize access to better and fancier pottery or consume 
significantly larger amounts of pottery, especially serving vessels, than more 
modest households. The architectural clusters attest to a greater investment in 
architecture, but not in portable wealth.
sequentiAL HierArCHies, CommunAL rituALs, AnD 
egALitAriAn iDeoLogies: A summAry of tHe eViDenCe
At the regional scale, the spatial distribution of sites indicates a fragmented 
political landscape, with small-scale, relatively autonomous polities divided 
by shatter zones. Each polity apparently consisted of a dominant center sur-
rounded by lower settlement tiers. Each center was internally organized around 
multiple semiautonomous and unranked residential groups or neighborhoods. 
Each neighborhood seems to have focused on a small plaza and to have shared 
access to a large central plaza at the center of the site. Thus, the heterarchical 
organization of residential groups gives the impression that they were inte-
grated through mechanisms analogous to sequential hierarchies and not simul-
taneous hierarchies. Each residential group in turn had its own civic-ceremonial 
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architecture, where important public ceremonies may have taken place, yet they 
shared a common plaza accessible to all residents of the site.
Consistent with a sequential strategy, evidence indicates that corporate 
ideologies downplayed the importance of personal wealth accumulation and 
networks of power. These corporate ideologies were personified in the worship 
of Tezcatlipoca and the adoption of his cult, which are evidenced in figures 
and ethnohistoric documents (in Weigand 2013:28). Furthermore, these cor-
porate ideologies were materialized in artifact inventories, especially ceramics, 
which were highly homogeneous within sites and across the region. Moreover, 
elaborate serving vessels comparable to Tlaxcallan polychromes or Aztec III 
Black-on-Orange occur only rarely in the artifact assemblage and were not 
disproportionately concentrated in large corrales. Given the political situation 
in the Late Postclassic, the societies occupying the Tequila valleys adopted 
corporate strategies and a corporate cognitive code that provided for the effec-
tive mobilization of the population for defense against attacks from outside 
forces (e.g., Tarascans), but limited the degree to which warrior-leaders could 
monopolize material and ideological resources for their personal aggrandize-
ment and power (see Earle, chapter 14, this volume).
ConCLusions
The introduction of dual-processual theory into archaeological theory has 
opened a wide door for the explanation of the evolution of societies along 
multiple paths toward complexity. Research in Jalisco has benefited from 
these new insights and is already producing important evidence for the coex-
istence of diverse political strategies at certain points in time (e.g., Beekman 
2008; Beekman, chapter 3, this volume). Whereas information was limited 
in the recent past, we now have assembled an important corpus of data that 
is throwing additional light onto the ways people organized themselves in 
the Tequila valleys during the late prehispanic era. Here, I have made a first 
attempt to characterize the Late Postclassic political organization through 
regional and intrasite spatial organization, architecture, and portable mate-
rial culture. Rather than simply fitting these societies into known societal 
types or political forms elsewhere in Mesoamerica, I ventured to think about 
how these different ethnic groups organized effectively without centralizing 
power into a single polity or lineage in response to military threats from the 
Tarascans and the Caxcanes. The information available indicates an empha-
sis on differences in organizational strategies, implying an alternative path-
way to complexity. In this case, sequential hierarchies proved a useful tool for 
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disentangling these strategies, which combined corporate political strategies 
and collective action to achieve complexity without centralization. In addition 
to providing an alternative model for a more egalitarian political structure, 
sequential hierarchies enrich corporate theory because they help operational-
ize this theory for archaeological research.
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Central Precinct Plaza 
Replication and Corporate 
Groups in Mesoamerica
Barbara L. Stark
In a series of pivotal contributions concerning Meso-
american urbanism and political organization, Richard 
Blanton (e.g., Blanton 1978; 1998a; Blanton et al. 1993; 
Blanton et al. 1996; Blanton and Fargher 2008) high-
lighted organizational diversity in early states. He 
and colleagues have called attention to the roles of 
corporate groups in governance and the influence of 
subjects from the perspective of collective action. In 
an argument for important corporate groups signaled 
by central plaza layouts in south-central Veracruz, I 
offer a somewhat different perspective concerning 
the relationships between the influential concepts of 
exclusionary versus corporate power strategies pre-
sented by Blanton et al. (1996). My analysis suggests 
that cycling of dominant principles, which they pro-
posed, while it may occur, must be understood against 
a backdrop in which governments commonly occupy 
a middle ground of competing principles. Subversion 
of dominant power strategies likely is part of ongoing 
power tensions but does not always shift the dominant 
emphasis or establish a dominant one.
A convergence of settlement pattern and architec-
tural research focuses on the layouts of central precincts 
in ancient Mesoamerican centers, where both build-
ings and the spaces among them can be highly indica-
tive of the social and cultural order. Opportunities for 
analysis of such layouts have increased with detailed 
mapping of settlements, but comparative analysis 
remains spotty. In this chapter, I evaluate persistent, 
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highly repetitive arrangements, focusing on a layout in south-central Veracruz 
(figure 5.1), which I suggest expresses shared power involving both dynasties 
and corporate groups, and I compare this layout with others in Mesoamerica 
that have a large sample of central precincts mapped.
There are myriad reasons not to expect highly consistent, repeated center lay-
outs. The built environment both shapes human actions and is created by them 
(Rapoport 1990), a recursive relationship similar to the general theoretical 
posture of structuration (Giddens 1984). The built environment is flexible, and 
the architecture of centers is cumulative and remodeled over time. Established 
forms may persist despite changing significance and activities. Even when 
buildings and spaces emulate prestigious places, the particular interpretations 
may be highly selective according to the agenda of the persons involved in 
planning and execution (Ashmore and Sabloff 2002). Physical constraints 
of locations affect execution of layouts. Prestige competition may encourage 
leaders to innovate within architectural and design traditions to create more 
magnificent or distinctive layouts. Across polities and through centuries, there 
is ample room for the design, construction, and remodeling processes to vary 
Figure 5.1. South-central Veracruz within Mesoamerica, with selected sites and regions. 
(The Teuchitlan tradition, located west of the map area, is not shown.) 
CENTRAL PRECINCT PLAZA REPLICATION AND CORPORATE GROUPS IN MESOAMERICA 107
within general canons. “Agency,” the capacity of diverse people to act accord-
ing to variation in goals, values, means, and circumstances, allows variation 
within a shared cultural background.
Consequently, center layouts often express a degree of patterning, yet lack 
identical or extremely similar arrangements—exactly the situation commonly 
encountered in Mesoamerica. Likewise, variations in ancient Roman urban-
ism, analyzed by MacDonald (1986:5–31) through the concept of “urban arma-
ture,” show a basic arrangement of streets with the central forum, yet consider-
able variation in the placements of other key civic buildings. Highly repetitive 
layouts that persist across polities and through time are unexpected. Granted, 
assessment of patterning is complex, requiring attention to variables, mea-
surement, and different scales of analysis, an endeavor that will require much 
future work with the settlements discussed here.
The monumental construction in south-central Veracruz is almost entirely 
earthen, and the archaeological remains are today mounds, likely substruc-
tures of vanished buildings. Daneels (2011) has documented the use of adobe 
blocks in south-central Veracruz monumental constructions; perishable wat-
tle and daub or pole and thatch could have been used in some instances, also. 
Stone is not locally available. The mounds have been subjected to agriculture 
and sometimes other damage. The central precincts discussed have been con-
tour mapped, showing the general conformation of the structures and their 
positions. These conditions of preservation preclude consideration of styles 
of façades, which would require excavation. My focus is on the main monu-
mental plazas at these complexes, but the larger centers may have a number 
of additional structures. Monumental palace platforms are acropolis-like, an 
important form seldom located on the main plaza, which will figure in the 
discussion of some plaza variants and their timing.
Two elements of planning are distinguished by Smith (2007:7): (1) coor-
dination among central buildings and spaces (comprising traits of arrange-
ment of buildings, formality and monumentality of layout, orthogonality or 
other forms of geometric order, access, and visibility) and (2) standardization 
among centers (comprising traits of architectural inventory, layout, orientation, 
and metrology). He saw these variables as ordinal, but this scaling is not yet 
operationalized. My comparisons utilize the arrangement of buildings and, 
among centers, the architectural inventory and layout. The central precincts 
have noteworthy formality and monumentality, along with geometric plaza 
groupings. I do not address access, visibility, or metrology.
The Classic period (AD 300–900) center layouts for south-central Veracruz 
score high in both coordination and standardization. Their pattern is so 
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Figure 5.2. The secondary center of La Mixtequilla (the same name is applied to the 
region). A monumental platform, not shown, is nearby to the northwest. 
frequently repeated that Daneels (2002:174–177) termed it the “Standard Plan.” 
I focus on the plaza group of the Standard Plan, a roughly square plaza with a 
conical mound opposite a ball court, with the other sides of the plaza occupied 
by two (sometimes one) elongated lateral mounds (figure 5.2); the Standard 
Plan contains additional structures near the plaza, including monumental 
palatial platforms that seldom front the plaza. Standard Plan monumental 
complexes are the foci of settlements with dispersed residential occupation 
(Stark and Ossa 2007).
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This chapter addresses why the Standard Plan Plaza Group (SPPG) was 
highly consistent up and down the settlement hierarchy and across inde-
pendent polities in south-central Veracruz, as well as throughout the Classic 
period. Variants occur, mainly in terms of the original definition that accom-
modates one or two lateral mounds or with omission of one element (usually 
the ballcourt). This degree of consistency appears to be the exception rather 
than the rule in Mesoamerica, but it is part of an apparent continuum in con-
sistency of layouts.
Despite characterizing the SPPG as highly repetitious, I analyze the occur-
rences of variants to better understand the social and political context. I argue 
that highly consistent layouts and inventories point toward multiple social 
interests realizing their roles through central precincts. I do not suggest that 
representation in the central precinct is a political microcosm (De Montmollín 
1995:119–122), however, because I do not assume that all social or political seg-
ments are represented. The central precincts considered here contribute infor-
mation about corporate groups and shared power (see also Beekman, chapter 3, 
this volume; Heredia Espinoza, chapter 4, this volume).
CentrAL PreCinCt LAyouts: 
ComPArisons Among regions
To establish the SPPG at the high end of a continuum of consistency, I dis-
cuss selected Mesoamerican reports, emphasizing those with multiple centers 
with central precinct maps, essential for detecting consistency. In the Classic-
period southern Maya lowlands, Ashmore and Sabloff (2002, 2003) proposed 
underlying cosmological directional principles and political emulation of major 
sites to account for the arrangements of buildings and plaza groups, but these 
patterns are enacted in a varied fashion, partly due to long histories of many 
sites. The cosmological implications have been disputed (M. E. Smith 2003a, 
2005). Ashmore and Sabloff focused their discussion on nine centers but cite 
additional cases. Categories of buildings are repeated in Maya centers, along 
with certain subsidiary plaza groups, as well as a degree of cardinality, but the 
overall arrangements of buildings and groups vary considerably among centers.
In Chiapas in the Upper Grijalva Valley, De Montmollín (1995:125–135) 
notes 31 Classic Maya centers with the “Tenam Rosario Plaza Format,” and 
he recognizes varying degrees of similarity. The 14 centers most closely repre-
senting the plaza format have three pyramids plus a ballcourt surrounding the 
plaza. Orthogonality and exact placement of structures vary. Elongated “range” 
structures are present at some plazas, also. The overall amount of variation is 
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akin to the variation in a smaller sample for four Aztec-period settlements in 
Morelos in Central Mexico. There, Smith (2008:87–89) argues for a repeated 
arrangement of buildings around a central plaza following the “Tula plaza 
plan,” an instance of emulation of a historically significant capital. In these 
examples, particular kinds of buildings and some placements recur, such as 
a major pyramid on the east side of the main plaza, but other buildings vary 
(e.g., two of the four examples have ballcourts, two of the four examples have 
T-shaped buildings on the south side of the plaza), and some sites have rows 
of other structures. Consequently, a plan is recognizable but not enacted in a 
highly standardized fashion.
The Quiché and Cakchiquel areas of the western Guatemalan highlands 
exhibit moderate coordination and standardization in Postclassic-period 
plaza groups. The central plazas are dominated by a temple mound (some-
times two or more of them) and partly framed by one or more elongated 
mounds (substructures) supporting long buildings (with multiple rooms 
and benches along the back wall in many cases); usually a ballcourt is pres-
ent, and sometimes one or more small altars are preserved in the plaza (Fox 
1978; Wallace 1977). Large sites may exhibit multiple plazas as well as palaces. 
Positioning of plaza groups varies considerably, in part reflecting topographic 
constraints on ridgetops. Among Fox’s (1978) compendium of 43 mapped cen-
ters, 30 exhibit plazas with the temple(s) and elongated mound(s).1 Fox (1978) 
discusses regional and temporal variants within this corpus, along with emu-
lation of capitals. Despite the variations in placement of structures and in the 
number of temples, the plaza units at different sites are relatively consistent in 
their inventory and arrangement.
Quiché and Cakchiquel elongated mounds are interpreted as “council 
houses” or “community houses” that were foci of lineages with varying stat-
ure (Fox 1978). A considerable body of ethnohistoric data attests to the lin-
eage structure and ruling houses of Quiché, Mam, Ixil, Cakchiquel, and other 
language groups in the Guatemalan highlands, several of which eventually 
fell under Quiché rule (Carmack 1973, 1981; Fox 1978, 1987; Nance et al. 2003; 
Wallace 1977). Elaborate palaces were associated with the local ruling families, 
while elongated structures likely provided varying functions, with some that 
fronted the main plazas likely supporting mainly assembly and civic activi-
ties, perhaps with some residential roles, but with other long structures likely 
mainly residential. The repeated long structures appear to be manifestations 
of the patrilineages prominent in these polities. The Quiché and Cakchiquel 
ethnohistoric data play an important role in linking a fairly consistent form of 
central precinct and a particular elongated building form with an important 
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corporate element in political life. The Quiché and Cakchiquel information 
provides a key warrant for interpreting repeated elongate buildings as linked 
to corporate groups in Mesoamerican architectural traditions. Other examples 
may represent different groups than patrilineages, however. Dual organization 
is a possibility for south-central Veracruz.
Compared to the Guatemalan highlands, even greater coordination and 
standardization in layouts is evident in the Teuchitlan tradition during the 
Late Formative to Early Classic periods in Jalisco (Beekman, chapter 3, this 
volume; Weigand 1996, 2000). Sites in this tradition display a distinctive pat-
tern of circular elements. Around a central structure, a raised circular patio is 
framed by a circular banquette supporting a series of platforms and buildings. 
Often other circular groups are contiguous or nearby but not in a set juxtapo-
sition. The sizes of the circular units vary, as does the central element (altar or 
pyramidal platform), but the general layout is highly consistent. Sites differ in 
their number of circular units according to the settlement hierarchy. The ban-
quettes with multiple platforms atop are argued to reflect a corporate empha-
sis in governance (Beekman 2008; see also Beekman, chapter 3, this volume), 
and palaces that might signal a ruling dynasty are absent. Maps are available 
for 30 of the Teuchitlan sites (Ohnersorgen and Varien 1996).
Thus, we see a range in Mesoamerica from more tenuously manifested lay-
out principles (Classic Maya) to more consistent ones (Postclassic Quiché-
Cakchiquel plaza plans) to highly consistent ones (Late Formative/Early 
Classic Teuchitlan). In this array, the last two instances show marked standard-
ization in buildings and layouts in central precincts, and Guatemalan highland 
ethnohistory records strong patrilineage corporate group organization. The 
SPPG in south-central Veracruz are more coordinated and standardized than 
most cases discussed, matched or exceeded only by the Teuchitlan tradition.
To examine the SPPG, I stress that buildings are created and renovated 
for particular purposes by particular sets of people. Buildings may serve a 
broad range of the society but very differentially. To unlock the reasons for a 
repetitive pattern, we need to consider the possible roles of buildings and their 
sponsorship or designated users. While such information may be sketchy for 
south-central Veracruz and partly dependent on extrapolation from regions 
with ethnohistoric and epigraphic data, such information may point us toward 
a better understanding of south-central Veracruz centers. In particular, I argue 
that the repetitive plaza layout reflects a balancing of different social inter-
ests and activities expressed in a culturally recognized template. During the 
Classic period, south-central Veracruz was not obviously disrupted by con-
quest or emulation of foreign capitals, maintaining an independent trajectory 
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of change. Thus, the SPPG was not dislodged by external factors nor based 
upon them. Nevertheless, the Late Classic period (AD 600–900) witnessed 
changes in the proportions of variants of the SPPG and an increase in the 
numbers of palatial platforms, both of which point to some erosion of corpo-
rate emphasis.
Background for the Gulf Lowlands
The central and southern Gulf lowlands comprise several regions geomor-
phologically and culturally. During the Classic period, the SPPG is one of 
a “family” of repeated layouts at centers. The SPPG is particularly character-
istic in south-central Veracruz. In southern Veracruz, the Long Plaza Plan 
(Domínguez Covarrubias 2001; Killion and Urcid 2001; Urcid and Killion 
2008) is alternatively labeled the Villa Alta Quadripartite Arrangement 
(Borstein 2001, 2005; see Lunagómez 2011 for additional plaza groups in south-
ern Veracruz). These plazas had a dominant conical mound and elongated dual 
laterals—sufficiently elongated that the plaza is distinctly rectangular in con-
trast to the square tendency of the SPPG. Ballcourts do not occur at the end 
of the plaza opposite the conical mound, but, instead, parallel the plaza, using 
the back of a lateral as one of the flanking mounds for the court. Opposite the 
conical mound is another smaller conical mound, which may link to the next 
plaza in a linear “chain” of long plazas of diminishing proportions. Whereas 
the SPPG spans the Classic period, the Long Plaza Plan appears to be mainly 
a Late Classic phenomenon.
At the western margin of the Tuxtla Mountains, prior to the Classic period 
but continuing during the Early Classic (AD 300–600), Tres Zapotes exhib-
its the Tres Zapotes Plaza Group (Pool 2008) in which a conical mound is 
accompanied by an elongated or slightly elongated mound. The plaza may 
contain a small adoratorio, and the end of the plaza opposite the dominant 
conical mound usually has another conical mound. No ballcourts are associ-
ated with the Tres Zapotes Plaza Group. Tres Zapotes has four widely spaced 
repetitions of this plaza group, which Pool (2008) ascribes to factionalism. The 
laterals are presumed to be headquarters of factions, as some exhibit residen-
tial midden debris, but are thought also to play some administrative roles.
Classic-period Tres Zapotes has historical roots in the Formative Olmec 
era, and Olmec stone monuments at Tres Zapotes include colossal “portrait” 
heads, suggesting a society with both corporate and exclusionary principles 
in governance. Pool (2008:147) suggested the Tres Zapotes Plaza Group was 
also employed at other sites in the vicinity, such as El Mesón, confirmed by 
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Loughlin’s (2012:244) research. Although the Tres Zapotes Plaza Group does 
not occur at other smaller monumental centers in El Mesón’s vicinity, other 
examples in the Tres Zapotes vicinity are likely (Pool 2008:147). Because of 
its long Formative history, Tres Zapotes provides a possible antecedent for 
some aspects of the SPPG. An apogee of Tres Zapotes in size and activity 
occurred during the Late Formative period (Hueyapan phase, 400 BC–AD 1). 
La Venta, with a Middle to Late Formative span, also has been suggested 
as a partial antecendent for the SPPG (Stark 2007:58–59), due to the two 
long parallel mounds arranged north of the main conical mound (which do 
not form a ballcourt). The primary point is that conical and elongated lateral 
mound plaza arrangements have a long history in Veracruz, and more than 
one regional tradition exists. Longitudinal and comparative data point to a 
mix of corporate and exclusionary principles, the latter emphasizing personal 
leadership and clientage networks (Blanton et al. 1996).
I examine SPPG data primarily from a survey by Daneels (2002) along 
the lower Cotaxtla River and from my adjacent project in the western lower 
Papaloapan basin, along the lower Blanco, Guerengo, and Tlalixcoyan rivers 
(Stark 1999, 2003), an area sometimes referred to as the Mixtequilla (also the 
local name for the municipio of Ignacio de la Llave and of a monumental 
center nearby; figure 5.2). My underlying method is systematic comparison 
of plaza groups in multiple centers, not focusing on the layout of a single 
center. For example, all the capitals recorded in my survey have some unique 
features that set them apart. The Early Classic capital of Cerro de las Mesas 
is unlike the later capitals in the Mixtequilla in its agglomerative tendency, 
with multiple SPPGs and other buildings, such as monumental palace plat-
forms (Stark 2003). The paired, adjacent Late Classic complexes of Ajitos 
and Pitos on the paleodunes likewise are unlike other capitals in south-
central Veracruz. Capitals are particularly prone to idiosyncratic character-
istics in part because they incorporate more structures and groups than the 
Standard Plan, and, as noted, they may be subject to innovation to achieve 
greater distinction. For many lower-order centers, a single SPPG dominates 
the central precinct.
The Standard Plan was defined by Daneels (2002:174–181) to include a coni-
cal mound (probably pyramidal) at one end of an approximately square plaza 
(figure 5.2) also framed by two elongate lateral mounds facing each other (but 
sometimes only one). Opposite the conical mound at the other end of the 
plaza, a ballcourt is formed by two parallel, closely spaced flanking mounds 
demarcating a game court. In Daneels’s definition, the ballcourt axis matched 
the plaza axis bisecting the conical mound; however, rarely, ballcourts are 
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transverse to the plaza axis in the data discussed here, which constitutes a 
variant. A rectangular monumental platform is nearby in Daneels’s original 
definition, and some platforms have a conical mound on them. Monumental 
platforms likely supported a palatial residence (Daneels 2002:188–192; Stark 
1999:209), as confirmed at La Joya along the lower Cotaxtla (Daneels 2008a, 
2011). Elite or royal residences may take other forms than monumental plat-
forms, such as a mound with an attached terrace, or, at lesser centers, a monu-
mental platform may be less imposing to the point that its status is debatable. 
Variation in the Standard Plan as a whole is an important topic, but not the 
focus here. In this study, I concentrate on SPPGs.
In terms of arrangements, formality, monumentality, orthogonality, and 
access, the SPPGs are highly planned. The SPPG is a formal geometric arrange-
ment, and, at the higher-order centers, many of the mounds are monumen-
tal; however, at lower-order centers, the structures are more modest. Access 
between buildings makes the plazas relatively open.
In the Cotaxtla survey, 32 SPPGs were mapped, including variants (Daneels 
2002:181–183), two in a single complex. In the Mixtequilla, 41 SPPGs were 
mapped including variants, five of them in complexes with two or more 
SPPGs. Variants are of interest because they may disclose the circumstances 
in which a degree of deviation from a prevalent pattern occurred. Included in 
the counts are instances of possible ballcourts, where a mound of the appropri-
ate size is located in the ballcourt position but disturbance (mainly plowing) 
has erased any surface evidence of the two flanking mounds of the court. The 
possible functions of the component SPPG buildings are a starting point for 
explaining the prevalence of the layout.
Structures and their Functions in the 
Standard Plan Plaza Group
Conical Mounds
In keeping with general Mesoamerican analogies, steep conical mounds 
likely were pyramidal platforms for temples with ritual functions conducted 
by a few people but witnessed by large assemblies in the plaza.
Ballcourts
SPPG ballcourts have not been excavated, and we have no information 
about caches or other ritual associations; we lack associated imagery, such as 
accompanies some Tajín ballcourts (Ladrón de Guevara 1999), and we do not 
know if ballgames were occasions for public feasts, as argued for Honduras 
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(Fox et al. 1996). In terms of general Mesoamerican practices, the ballgame 
was multifaceted, with cosmic, competitive, social, and recreational func-
tions (summarized in Stark 2012). Lines of sight and the number of people 
who could have directly watched the ballgame reveal that ball-game viewing 
involved social distinctions, as many fewer people could witness a game com-
pared to those who could be accommodated in a plaza to witness ceremonies 
atop adjacent platforms and pyramids (Stark 2012).
Lateral Mounds
The functions of the lateral mounds are the most enigmatic among the cen-
tral plaza structures. The elongated lateral mounds may have supported adobe 
or perishable multiroom structures that may have served particular corporate 
social groups in the society, possibly in some form of dual organization. If 
so, the typical inequality in height of the laterals suggests the possibility of 
ranked groups. Moieties are one possibility.
Some Maya elongated platforms with multiroom structures have been pro-
posed as council houses, that is, structures used by some corporate entity(s) 
related to civic activities (Cheek 2003; De Montmollín 1995:66; Fash et al. 
1992; Stomper 1996, 2001). This proposition is akin to the possible corporate 
group role of elongated Quiché or Cakchiquel platforms, interpreted as coun-
cil houses for segmentary lineage affairs (Fox 1987; Wallace 1977). Corporate 
or council functions may involve periodic or continuous residence by some 
participants, and activities could include training and feasting. By way of 
comparison, at Tres Zapotes, Veracruz, Pool (2008) excavated domestic refuse 
behind three of the long structures in Tres Zapotes Plaza Groups and sug-
gests these mounds were elite residences possibly also with administrative or 
ceremonial roles.
Could at least one lateral have had a royal administrative role? The likely 
presence of royals in government can be inferred both from monumental carv-
ings at Cerro de las Mesas (Miller 1991; Stirling 1943) and from the occurrence 
of the monumental palatial platforms that represent substantial investments 
of labor. These palaces likely had multiple roles, including royal residence, stor-
age, rituals, and some audience functions, perhaps also some crafts. However, 
the palaces do not commonly front on the Standard Plan Plaza, and use of 
laterals for activities related to royal governance therefore remains dubious. 
Royal representation is unlikely at all levels of the settlement hierarchy in 
which SPPGs occurred. Where monumental palatial platforms are closely 
associated, however, it is likely that a local noble family or a member of a royal 
line held sway.
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Daneels (2002:179) proposed a role in astronomical rituals for laterals (or 
buildings on them), with solstitial sightings from one side across a line of sight 
transecting the edges of the opposite structure, similar to “E Groups” in the 
Maya lowlands. However, the use of E-Groups for solar seasonal observations 
is now thought unlikely in most cases, although seasonal rituals may have been 
important at the groups (Aimers and Rice 2006). In Daneels’s interpretation, 
all SPPG structures likely had ritual roles. Nevertheless, I consider a corporate 
or governance role more likely for laterals because of the considerable variation 
in the azimuths of plaza “facings”—the axial direction bisecting the conical and 
the plaza midline and looking from the conical mound toward the other end 
of the plaza. Figure 5.3 shows facing percents by cardinal quadrants, using 34 
measurements for SPPG facings for the Cotaxtla survey, 37 for the Mixtequilla, 
and 21 for Hueyapan Long Plaza Plans (Domínguez Covarrubias 2001). The 
Cotaxtla SPPGs have facings northward or southward much more frequently 
than the Mixtequilla SPPGs, which favor eastward or westward, as does the 
Hueyapan area. For solstitial observations an appropriate north-south align-
ment of the SPPG and the laterals is requisite. Thus, a solar observatory or 
related symbolic role for laterals as proposed by Daneels is more feasible for the 
Cotaxtla area, but even there it does not account for all the layouts.2
Summary
The SPPG clearly includes key buildings associated with ritual events at 
the main temple or at the ballgame, but laterals may have been used by cor-
porate groups, possibly ones involved in civil administration, supplementing 
the administrative roles of major palatial platforms placed nearby. The regu-
lar presence of laterals around the main plaza assembly space attests to their 
importance. At larger centers additional mounds and other plaza groups may 
have provided administrative or ritual functions as well (see Daneels 2002:186). 
Single laterals could have been used on a rotational basis by corporate seg-
ments or by a single council; single laterals suggest less corporate representa-
tion than dual laterals, however.
Explaining the Standard Plan
To posit particular functions for mounds in the SPPG does not address why 
the SPPG is frequently repeated at different settlement levels, across multiple 
polities, and over many centuries, with minor variations that maintain much 
of the same format. Several interpretations could explain the consistency and 
are not mutually exclusive.
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Figure 5.3. Summary of 
facings (azimuth starting 
from main conical mound 
and bisecting the plaza) of 
SPPGs and Long Plaza 
Plans based on data from 
three surveys. 
Ruler or Government Control
The highest political authorities command resources and may engineer the 
design of buildings and their arrangement in centers. Such efforts are particu-
larly likely if they lead to display and glorification of a ruler’s power and of 
sacred precepts. Conceivably, then, the SPPG testified to rulers’ power, with 
insistence on conformity in several levels in the settlement hierarchy. The AD 
1573 edicts of Phillip II concerning the central plaza, streets, and associated 
buildings in the founding of Spanish towns in the New World are an unusual 
example of a top-down process that met with some success (Crouch et al. 
1982). Apart from the central plaza and streets opening onto it, however, other 
buildings were left relatively flexible in their positioning (Crouch et al. 1982), 
with a church to be near the central plaza, civil buildings facing the plaza, and 
porticos for merchant activities. In fact, Roman Catholic churches were usu-
ally placed facing the plaza or alongside it (facing an access street), and they 
represent a separate corporate organization from the Spanish Crown. The 
Spanish edict did not result in the degree of standardization shown by the 
SPPG, but the position of churches suggests a role for a powerful corporate 
entity assuring itself a prominent plaza position.
The small states of Classic-period south-central Veracruz were not, so far as 
we can discern, expansionist militaristic states. Thus the resources and power 
to despotically mold settlements to a single plan do not seem adequate to the 
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task. Among the many demands on state resources and efforts for maintenance 
of elite power, meddling in the layouts of third-order settlements or neighbor-
hood complexes, for example, does not seem a pressing concern. We confront 
a problem in explaining why multiple rulers used the same plan and enforced 
it up and down the settlement hierarchy across centuries in the Mixtequilla 
and the neighboring lower Cotaxtla region (see Daneels 2011 concerning La 
Joya settlement hierarchy).
Emulation could create a combined top-down and bottom-up effect, with 
people in different community levels striving to repeat a prestigious pattern 
to which leaders adhered. At capitals, some types of elaboration or innovation 
occurred, yet we do not see replication of capital innovations in lower-order 
settlements, which cleaved instead to the SPPG layout. Emulation leaves 
considerable room for local interpretation and seems unlikely to achieve the 
degree of repetition across polities and over centuries that we see in the SPPG, 
for which most variation is minor and consists of whether one or two laterals 
are present. Partial SPPGs keep to the same plan but omit either the conical 
mound or the ballcourt (though they may be present elsewhere in the monu-
mental core).
Cultural and Social Values and Symbols
One might argue that south-central Veracruz was subject to extensive, 
active communication and sharing of cultural and social values expressed 
in the SPPG. We see that both the highest echelons of society and com-
moners in small communities expressed the same design for central precincts 
because the SPPG appears at first-, second-, and several third-ranked centers. 
Extensive communication and sharing of ideas across south-central Veracruz 
is documented not only in settlement patterns but also in ceramics (Daneels 
1997; Stark 2001). Possibly the frequency of ballcourts (Daneels 2008b) and 
periodic marketplaces (Stark and Ossa 2010), in addition to a ritual calen-
dar of observances, fomented an unusual degree of visiting by people among 
centers. Daneels (2008b) argued that ballgames performed a key integrat-
ing function in south-central Veracruz, as the courts were widely distributed. 
Active communication would be abetted by a standard layout so that visitors 
were well acquainted with the facilities and practices at centers across south-
central Veracruz.
We have little concrete information concerning symbolism of centers that 
might be shared. Perhaps the pyramid represented access to a celestial realm, 
with the ballcourt at the other end of the plaza for ritual events involving 
descent to the underworld (e.g., Taladoire 1981:545, 548). The space between, 
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with one or two laterals and a plaza, could represent the domain of regular 
human activities in civic, political, and economic life (cf. Beekman, chapter 3, 
this volume).
Despite considerable promise, an explanation based on a shared template 
is unsatisfactory taken alone because a template may have existed without 
precluding considerable interpretive license, as is evident in the comparative 
societies discussed. Also, each building had particular functions, and build-
ings differentially served elements of the society, such as the ballgame in 
formal courts serving higher-status persons (Stark 2012), or lateral mounds 
possibly serving particular corporate or civic groups. South-central Veracruz 
society was hierarchical, with different interests and values among classes 
and communities, at least to some extent, which could yield considerable 
deviation.
Shared Power
I propose that in addition to a context of communication and emulation, 
the SPPG Group construction was likely related to more widespread social 
action than simply rulers’ dictates or nearly slavish adherence to a shared con-
cept for centers. The use of laterals by ranked, dual corporate groups would 
create a broader interest in construction and maintenance of the SPPG. If 
the laterals imply a corporate element in civic affairs, despite the presence 
of royal families, SPPG centers would exhibit a degree of collective action 
or “voice” (e.g., Blanton and Fargher 2008; Levi 1988)—that is, “bottom-up” 
efforts to consistently engineer architectural forms that represented diverse 
vested interests.
I suggest that the repetitive character of the SPPG reflects checks and 
balances among key social segments (e.g., royals and corporate groups), a 
dynamic tension that recreated the culturally accepted presentation of a cen-
ter because doing so afforded an avenue for expression of shared power. The 
economic context of south-central Veracruz provides insight into a basis for 
shared power. Stark et al. (1998) noted that the region is suited to cotton 
production as well as sustaining reliable agriculture. Whorls and sewing gear 
attest to cotton production and processing. Cotton production and process-
ing require both land and labor. Thus, important land-holding elites, royals, 
and commoners might have enjoyed exchange advantages trading cotton and 
cloth to areas that could not produce them, as well as social display advan-
tages (fine cotton garments).
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Testing the Shared-Power Interpretation 
Using Variants of the Standard Plan
To test the idea of shared power versus top-down control, I examine the 
occurrences of variations in the SPPGs to see if they are linked to innova-
tions by central powers at the top of the settlement hierarchy or, instead, 
prove to be more characteristic of lower-level settlements that did not have 
to maintain a strict conformity (or lacked some of the resources—or permis-
sions—necessary to create all the SPPG repertoire). In the examination of 
the relationship to the settlement hierarchy, I show that single lateral variants 
initially were associated more with lower-order settlements, a pattern not 
compatible with strong top-down conformity. I also show that the incidence 
of variants overall is higher in the Mixtequilla area than the lower Cotaxtla, 
so the realm that underwent unification in the Early Classic period did not 
demonstrate greater conformity, calling into question top-down processes as 
a basis to account for conformity. As an outgrowth of examining variants in 
relation to the settlement hierarchy, I detect that later in the Classic period, 
variants implying a decreased corporate role (single laterals) became increas-
ingly associated with the upper part of the settlement hierarchy, suggesting 
shifts in power relationships.
Some sources of variation (table 5.1; figure 5.4) include the initial defini-
tion allowing one or two laterals. Other variation involves rare instances 
in which the ballcourt is transverse to the main plaza axis bisecting the 
conical mound. A different kind of variation is introduced by some arrange-
ments that are “partial” because one ingredient is left out, either the coni-
cal mound or the ballcourt, usually the latter. In addition, in a single case 
(figure 5.4, Variant D), the two elongated laterals do not face each other 
but are placed instead at right angles, and the ballcourt is absent (making 
it debatable whether this case is usefully considered as an SPPG variant). A 
different variant was defined for the Cotaxtla area, discussed further below. 
I first examine settlement associations for one versus two laterals, which I 
argue does not support a top-down process of conformity. I next describe 
the partial SPPGs and then consider the contexts of partial SPPG and rare 
transverse ballcourts, which also do not support an explanation based solely 
on top-down conformity.
Single and Dual Laterals
The Standard Plan definition allows one or two lateral platforms. This 
variation is politically significant if the lateral structures represent corporate 
groups with civic functions.3 Note also that with a single lateral, access to 
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Table 5.1. Counts of Standard Plan Plaza Groups (SPPG), partial Standard Plan 
Plaza Groups (Partial SPPG), and a Cotaxtla Standard Plan variant in Cotaxtla 
and Mixtequilla survey data. Possible ballcourts are counted as having the common 

















Cotaxtla Survey 5 1 15 1 0 0
















Cotaxtla Survey 0 5 0 0 5 32
Mixtequilla Survey 10 2 1 2 0 41
Note: Among the Cotaxtla variants, one complex, 87 (Mata Naranjo Sur), would otherwise be 
classified as partial SPPG-B1.
the plaza is more open, with a lower overall investment in construction. We 
can ask if the single laterals correlate with a particular part of the settle-
ment hierarchy to assess top-down versus bottom-up variation or if some 
other factor is at work, such as change over time or geographic variation. 
Mixtequilla data show that the single laterals initially had mainly a lower 
position in the administrative hierarchy during the Early Classic period, 
but not in the Late Classic. Eventually during the Late Classic period, an 
increased frequency of single laterals in several parts of the region suggests 
a diminished but not extinguished role for the corporate groups or councils 
they possibly represent.
The Cotaxtla survey has 6 single laterals among 32 SPPGs (19%), and the 
Mixtequilla has 20 single laterals among 41 SPPGs (49%, partial SPPGs are 
included). Greater prevalence of single laterals in the Mixtequilla likely reflects 
more variation in the degree to which corporate groups played key roles in 
centers. In particular, the Early Classic unification of the Mixtequilla under 
Cerro de las Mesas means that the region that experienced the most developed 
central authority had more variation, undermining the idea that royal edicts 
ensured central precinct conformity. In the Late Classic, the Mixtequilla, like 
the lower Cotaxtla throughout the Classic period, was divided among several 
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Figure 5.4. Mixtequilla survey: SPPG variants. 
smaller polities. In a section that considers all types of variants, not just single 
versus double laterals, I return to this point.
Mixtequilla temporal analyses show that some of the higher incidence of 
variants is due to the single lateral becoming more common during the Late 
Classic period (table 5.2).
In the Mixtequilla by time periods, 5 complexes are Early Classic, while 12 
are Late Classic, and 5 occur in both periods. The only top-ranked center dur-
ing the Early Classic period is Cerro de las Mesas, with an extensive central 
precinct that includes 6 subsidiary SPPGs or partial SPPGs; among these, 
only one partial complex has a single lateral. During the Early Classic period, 
9 lower-level centers have single laterals. In contrast, during the Late Classic 
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Table 5.2. Monumental complexes or subsidiary segments with single laterals, according 
to Mixtequilla settlement rank. For this table, possible ballcourts are assumed to follow 
the dominant axis.
Period Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4
Early 
Classic
Cerro de las Mesas, at 







      Coyote, SPPG-1.b  




















Zapotal, SPPG-1.a   Lobato, subsid-




  Nopiloa, PSPPG-B1   Pinchones North, 
PSPPG-B1
 
      Tuzales? 
PSPPG-B1
 
  Nacaste-Patarata, main 
complex Tio Perciliano, 
SPPG-1a, and 4 





period, three capitals have a single lateral in their primary plaza along with 14 
in lower-order settlements or in parts of settlements (e.g., Nacaste-Patarata). 
Single laterals are particularly common in the Guerengo area, in the interfluve 
between the Guerengo and Blanco rivers, and in the mangrove swamp. Thus, 
there are subregional and Late Classic emphases.4
Concomitantly, Mixtequilla data show a Late Classic proliferation of mon-
umental palatial platforms, which points to the expansion and entrenchment 
of elites, probably large landholders. If single laterals represent an erosion of 
dual corporate group representation in civic centers, then the proliferation of 
high-ranking families with palatial residences may have come at the expense 
of wider corporate representation.
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Overview of Partial Standard Plan Plaza Groups
This section describes partial SPPGs, which then figure in settlement analy-
sis in the next section. Two circumstances apply. A few occurrences are at 
primary or secondary centers in which the missing component is present else-
where. For example, two partial SPPGs at Early Classic Cerro de las Mesas 
lack the conical mound, but these plaza groups are in the immediate vicin-
ity of the north part of the central precinct where four conical mounds are 
positioned closely around interlinked plazas (Stark 2003). The Late Classic 
Nacastle-Patarata settlement in a mangrove swamp provides a different exam-
ple (Stark 2003). Partial SPPGs at subsidiary neighborhood groups lack a 
ballcourt, but the central complex, Tio Perciliano, has a ballcourt. In both of 
these capitals, partial SPPGs are part of subsidiary segments of construction. 
In contrast, partial SPPGs in many lower-order settlements do not have the 
“missing” structure supplied elsewhere in the same settlement (table 5.3).
Daneels defined a different Cotaxtla variant. She observed five instances 
in which a monumental palatial platform faced a plaza with a ballcourt; with 
one exception the courts are not at the opposite end of the plaza but alongside 
the plaza. Elongated lateral mounds are not present except in one case. In the 
Mixtequilla variants, laterals are always present.
Mixtequilla survey registered two complexes similar to those recognized by 
Daneels. Both are within the Late Classic Nopiloa settlement. Complex 6309 
is near the Nopiloa central precinct and forms a subsidiary part of that center. 
Complex 6309 has a monumental palatial platform and a quite small ballcourt 
adjacent to a small plaza, with a few additional low mounds. This Late Classic 
phenomenon resembles the appropriation of architectural prerogatives of the 
center by an elite family or perhaps a collateral royal, a process of delegation of 
privileges noted also at the Maya site of Copán during the Late Classic period 
(Fash 1991:160–172; Fash et al. 1992). The Nopiloa central plaza presents a partial 
SPPG-B1 with a single lateral mound and a massive palace located where the 
ballcourt normally would appear; instead, the ballcourt is alongside the plaza. 
In this example of partial SPPG B1, an additional low conical mound is posi-
tioned in place of the second lateral. All of the variants encountered by Daneels 
are on the paleodunes, and all but one date to the Middle or Late Classic 
period, as does Nopiloa. Some are in close proximity to other SPPG complexes 
and one, complex 87, is likely part of the Mata Naranjo center. Consequently, I 
regard these Cotaxtla variants as distinct from Mixtequilla SPPG variants, but 
some may be parts of settlements, such as occurred at Nopiloa.5
The partial SPPG variants in the Mixtequilla that occur in parts of settle-
ments or lower-order settlements show that laterals appear even if a ballcourt 
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or conical mound does not, and they constitute one of the most pervasive 
architectural structures. Apparently, the smaller neighborhoods or communi-
ties invested in corporate civic activity, even if their circumstances were more 
restrictive in resources or privileges.
Settlement Contexts of Standard Plan Variants
The Cotaxtla and Mixtequilla surveys differ in the proportions and nature 
of variants, which further casts doubt on a top-down imposition of the repli-
cated format. For my purposes, it is useful to focus on the percent of variants 
in relation to total SPPGs, rather than to all monumental complexes in the 
two regions (e.g., isolated palatial platforms); on this score Cotaxtla has 12 
variants among 32 SPPGs (38%), while the Mixtequilla has 21 variants among 
41 SPPGs (51%.) These figures count instances of transverse ball courts, partial 
SPPGs, and Cotaxtla variants (table 5.1). The presence of one or two laterals is 
not tallied as a variant in this analysis. These statistics show less variation from 
SPPG principles in the Cotaxtla area than in the Mixtequilla.
These two adjacent regions have relevant organizational differences because 
the Mixtequilla includes Cerro de las Mesas, the largest monumental complex 
Table 5.3. Distribution of partial SPPGs in the Mixtequilla settlement hierarchy.
Partial SPPG Variants Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3
A1a no conical part of Cerro de las Mesas, 
EC, conicals elsewhere
   
A2a no conical part of Cerro de las Mesas, 
EC, conicals elsewhere
   
B1 no ballcourt 
opposite conical
Nopiloa, LC (ballcourt at 
side of plaza); four seg-
ments of Nacaste-Patarata 
(Palma Real, Nacastle, San 
Juan, Patarata East), LC, 










LC ?; Nuevo 
Porvenir West, 
LC; Loma de 
los Pinchones, 
LC
B2 no ballcourt 
opposite conical
Zapotal South, part of 
Cerro de las Mesas, EC
Salto Norte, EC 
and LC
 
C no ballcourt, two 
conicals
  Palmas Cuatas, 
EC and LC
 
D no ballcourt, 
laterals form “L”








Note: EC, Early Classic; LC, Late Classic
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recorded in either region, and one with several carved-stone monuments 
and probably six ballcourts. During the Early Classic period it appears to 
have been the capital of the western lower Papaloapan basin or most of it. 
In contrast, the Cotaxtla area includes multiple independent polities during 
that time (Daneels 2002). In the Late Classic period, the Cerro de las Mesas 
realm dissolved into at least four separate smaller polities. Thus, in the lower 
Cotaxtla, with more independent polities, there is less SPPG variation than in 
the Mixtequilla, despite the fact that independent polities imply more sepa-
rate bases of political action that could have led to variation in center layouts.
Despite the Mixtequilla’s Early Classic unification followed by a breakup, 
partial SPPGs do not appear to be confined to the Early or Late Classic 
period, with five during the Early Classic and eight during the Late Classic at 
secondary and tertiary centers (table 5.3). Some of the partial SPPG centers 
appear to have been active during both the Early and Late Classic periods. 
(For partial SPPGs that are segments of centers, the results are similar, with 
three partial SPPGs within Early Classic Cerro de las Mesas, and four within 
Late Classic Tio Perciliano.)
To summarize, conformity to the SPPG is higher when polities are both 
more numerous and smaller, as we see in the Cotaxtla region, with variants 
becoming more noticeable during the Middle and Late Classic periods on the 
paleodunes. In contrast, when a dominant capital integrated a larger area—
Early Classic Cerro de las Mesas—there was a higher frequency of partial 
SPPGs; however, that larger polity later broke apart during the Late Classic 
period, and the number of partial SPPGs remained similar. Because of the 
high level of conformity in the Cotaxtla region, with no instance of extensive 
integration into a single polity, it is difficult to argue that conformity was 
imposed by a powerful central authority. Instead, a combination of shared cul-
tural values and the interests of multiple social segments (both rulers and cor-
porate groups) is more promising as an explanation of the repetitive SPPGs. 
In general, greater deviations (partial SPPGs) are more likely at lower-order 
centers in the Mixtequilla or within a capital where the “missing” facilities 
are present elsewhere. A top-down push toward conformity, if applied, did 
not penetrate the settlement hierarchy very effectively compared to the lower 
Cotaxtla region.
summAry AnD DisCussion
The SPPG in south-central Veracruz presents a striking phenomenon with 
high coordination and standardization of structures. The surprisingly repetitive 
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nature of the SPPG, with a modest incidence of relatively minor variants, sug-
gests that recurrent considerations by multiple groups were brought to bear 
on the erection of platforms and on activities conducted at centers. A likely 
prominent role for corporate groups in these settlements points to a broader 
basis of authority and power than solely the royal line. If so, the extent of 
alluvial farmlands, reliable rainfall, and climatic conditions favorable to cot-
ton production may have involved weaker clientage and more broad-based 
wealth generation than in many regions of Mesoamerica (Stark et al. 1998). 
The Early Classic period saw settlement growth eastward in the delta of the 
Río Blanco and thus at least partially represents a time of expansion of people 
and landholdings instead of their consolidation into fewer hands. Such pat-
terns would be consistent with Blanton and Fargher’s (2008) observation that 
higher collectivity or more corporate forms of governing are associated with 
internal revenues (that is to say revenues provided by a broad constituency of 
taxpayers). Conversely, the Late Classic period likely witnessed more contrast 
between wealthy residential groups and commoner households and more con-
solidation of wealth (likely land holdings) in fewer hands, with diminished 
corporate group representation in civic affairs. Possibly revenues shifted to 
more external sources or to sources directly controlled by the governing elite, 
which could be more readily used to exclude corporate groups from participat-
ing in political decision-making and to increase conspicuous consumption by 
royal lineages (see Blanton and Fargher 2008). Thus, despite marked continu-
ity in use of the SPPGs in south-central Veracruz, there is intriguing variation 
over time.
Other Mesoamerican instances of repeated layouts in public centers at vary-
ing hierarchical levels also point to counterbalancing between corporate and 
ruling governmental power. The Postclassic Quiché and Cakchiquel highland 
centers, with temples and long council structures as well as palaces, are a case 
in point. To a lesser extent, the popol na or council buildings of the Classic low-
land Maya point in the same direction, but lack the prominence of laterals in 
the SPPG and of elongated structures in the Guatemalan highlands. Instead, 
lowland Maya royal power is conspicuously displayed.
The Teuchitlan tradition in Jalisco displays even more consistency in layouts. 
In contrast to the south-central Veracruz situation, there are no indications 
of royal lineages and palatial residences (Beekman, chapter 3, this volume). 
The settlements contain banquette constructions representing multiple groups, 
not a dual organization such as south-central Veracruz may have had. The 
south-central Veracruz plans embody a tension not so much between many 
near equals as between one or two corporate groups and royal or other socially 
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dominant leadership. In both Teuchitlan and south-central Veracruz the per-
vasive adherence to a central plaza plan, with scant variation, suggests a wider 
participation in the construction and use of civic and religious facilities than 
royal dynasties alone. A degree of “bottom up” contributions to centers was 
likely part of a balancing of corporate and exclusionary powers.
Increasingly Mesoamerican research is documenting variety in political sys-
tems. In Postclassic Tlaxcallan, for example, Fargher, Heredia Espinoza, and 
Blanton (2011) argue for a nonroyal, more egalitarian political form with coun-
cils. The site lacks any central plaza and precinct (a precinct removed from the 
settlement is suggested as a meeting location), and the settlement has numer-
ous neighborhood plazas and residential terraces, only modest temple mounds, 
and no palaces (Fargher et al. 2011). Both Postclassic Tlaxcallan and Classic 
Teuchitlan are exceptional for Mesoamerica in their lack of obvious palaces 
(see also Heredia Espinoza, chapter 4, this volume). I suggest a common situ-
ation is a “tug-of-war” or counterbalancing among powerful social segments 
involving both corporate and exclusionary principles (in the terminology of 
Blanton et al. 1996). The long-lived SPPGs attest to endurance for a political 
formation in which different interests interacted and likely competed. Blanton 
et al. (1996:2) saw either exclusionary or corporate political strategies tending 
to be dominant, and they suggested cycling between dominant principles. Six 
hundred years of the SPPG (and its earlier precedents at Tres Zapotes and 
possibly La Venta) raise doubts about necessary cycling between these prin-
ciples or a tendency of one or the other to dominate, but see Fargher (chapter 
15, this volume) for examples of shifts in predominate governing principles.
The extremes in which we see either corporate or exclusionary principles 
emphasized in Mesoamerica should help us better understand a “more 
populated” middle ground with mixed emphases. The middle ground seems 
remarkably resilient in south-central Veracruz, even though the Late Classic 
period shows some decline in corporate emphasis (single laterals) along with 
a proliferation of palaces. If earlier Olmec times in the Gulf lowlands exem-
plified a “cult of the ruler” (Grove and Gillespie 1984), and a strong role for 
exclusionary patronage, the Olmec La Venta layout opens the door to addi-
tional factors in governance, provided the elongated laterals there had similar 
functions to those proposed for Tres Zapotes and the SPPG sites. A profu-
sion of leader or dynastic displays and claims should not obscure the pos-
sibility that other social interests were strong in governance (even if ancient 
rulers would have liked for art displays to convince people otherwise). For the 
Classic period in south-central Veracruz, resilience of the middle ground was 
likely powered by the interests of landed elites, perhaps kin-linked “houses” 
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( Joyce and Gillespie 2000) versus “the Crown” as well as by alliances between 
commoners and elite factions.
Because the south-central Veracruz cultural patterns were truncated at the 
end of the Classic period, eventually replaced by those of intrusive highland-
linked groups (Stark 2008), we cannot determine if the proposed long-lived 
balancing act in civic principles would have endured or undergone contin-
ued change toward more exclusionary emphases. In any case, highly repeti-
tive planned arrangements in central precincts form an important variant in 
Mesoamerican urbanism. I suggest that Teuchitlan, Quiché-Cakchiquel, and 
the Veracruz SPPGs all point to ways in which corporate groups constrained 
architectural variation to bolster their civic roles.
Although the focus in this chapter has been whether corporate groups may 
have played important roles in governance in south-central Veracruz, this 
issue falls within broader concerns of how different “agents” and groups of 
them contribute to the diversity and history of complex societies. Blanton and 
Fargher (2008) show that a range of collective action emphases yields govern-
mental variability in ancient states. Fargher (chapter 15, this volume) docu-
ments an association of more marked corporate power with stronger indica-
tions of collective action. My analysis shows considerable durability for what 
I argue is a representation of corporate interests combined with dynastic rul-
ers. The longevity of both elements could indicate that wider engagement of 
the population in governance and provisioning of public goods yields greater 
durability in governmental forms (cf. Blanton 2010); alternatively, a degree of 
balancing of power principles may contribute to durability by checking gov-
ernmental excesses. These possible temporal issues, raised by my research and 
other chapters in this volume (e.g., Beekman, chapter 3, this volume), remain 
an avenue for future research. Research provoked by Richard Blanton’s atten-
tion to multiple governmental forms and processes, including a diversity of 
agents, will contribute to research directions far into the future.
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notes
 1. I set aside 11 sites that lack this pattern or that are so destroyed that the layout is 
not clear, plus two sites for which the elongated mound is also rather wide.
 2. In all three surveys cardinality is important for centers, but variable. To evalu-
ate cardinality, I calculated the percent of facings within 5 degrees (plus or minus) of 
a cardinal direction, which allows for some measurement error. For Cotaxtla SPPGs, 
50% fall within these cardinal intervals, for the Mixtequilla, 44%, and for the Hueya-
pan area, 24%. Cardinality has an astronomical link, but may reflect a concept of world 
directions rather than an interest in charting seasonal progressions.
 3. The presence of a single lateral is tricky to interpret because the dual laterals 
are almost always unequal in height, and the “missing” lateral may have existed in the 
form of a multiroom structure at ground level, unmarked by a supporting platform. 
Although this possibility would accommodate a dual organization, for the moment 
I treat the instances of a single lateral mound as just that. Single laterals also could 
represent an interruption in construction so that a second lateral was never built, but 
the temporal and contextual data suggest the single laterals are patterned in their 
occurrences, not haphazard interruptions.
 4. The minor variant of a transverse ballcourt is scarce in both subregions, but 
slightly more common in the Mixtequilla, mainly found in lower-order centers. Of the 
four Mixtequilla transverse ballcourts, three are at secondary or tertiary centers. One 
possible example at Cerro de las Mesas, a primary center, remains uncertain due to 
plowing effects.
 5. Too complex to address in this chapter is the possible variation in how settle-




Featherwork as a 
Commodity Complex 




Recently Richard Blanton, Lane Fargher, and Verenice 
Heredia Espinosa wrote a seminal piece on Mesoamer-
ican commodities and their economic lives (Blanton 
et al. 2005). Phrasing their formulation as “a goods-
based approach to world-systems,” they analyzed the 
economic dimensions, dynamics and contexts of five 
important commodities: obsidian, salt, cacao, cotton 
cloth, and pottery. For each of these commodities, they 
addressed penetrating questions concerning labor and 
time allocation bottlenecks, relationships between the 
good and dynamic distribution systems, the good’s 
impact on secondary industries or markets, and broader 
impacts of increased production of the commodity 
(ibid.:262). I find their empirical treatment of these 
commodity issues especially attractive.
Their approach and these questions have stimu-
lated the formulation of this chapter, which focuses 
on the luxury craft of featherwork. Building on the 
goods-based approach, I examine the complex produc-
tion, distribution, and consumption lives of the sev-
eral different types of featherwork in the Aztec world. 
Practical considerations root this discussion firmly in 
the Late Postclassic, although Blanton and his col-
leagues spend considerable time and energy on issues 
of change. Another time.
Much as Blanton, Fargher, and Heredia Espinosa 
selected a small sample of goods for their study, I limit 
my discussion here to just one constellation of com-
plex manufactured products: various types of feathered 
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adornments (luxuries, and “key commodities” in M. E. Smith 2003c). These 
types of objects had complicated production histories: their manufacture 
depended on the acquisition of a relatively wide range of raw materials from 
varied ecological regions, the use of a variety of tools, the application of highly 
specialized knowledge and techniques, and appropriate and effective orga-
nizational arrangements. The fashioning of these objects required that spe-
cific materials and human skills converge at the same time and place, some of 
the materials deriving from distant and specialized regions. How was all this 
orchestrated, with a reasonable degree of predictability?
CommoDities in AzteC-PerioD mesoAmeriCA
Aztec times in Mesoamerica were materially exuberant times. Households 
of all types and scales required and acquired utilitarian objects ranging from 
cookware to weaving implements to brooms to hoes, and there were more 
households, and more people, in Late Postclassic times than during any other 
time in Mesoamerican prehistory. There was also an upsurge in the produc-
tion and use of status-linked luxuries, often referred to as “prestige goods.” 
Shimmering tropical feathers, bright jewels, and shining gold ornaments 
bedecked gods and nobles alike, proclaiming their exalted status. Warriors 
entered battle adorned with symbolically laden feathered devices and cos-
tumes. State religious ceremonies, exhibiting a special flamboyance, claimed 
their share of luxurious materials and objects. In the prestige arena, a con-
sumer-oriented and status-conscious elite enjoyed fairly restricted use of cer-
tain luxury objects made from materials such as fine jadeite and turquoise, 
precious metals (gold and silver), glamorous tropical feathers, jaguar skins, 
cotton, and cacao. That said, the designation of all luxuries as prestige goods 
is not entirely applicable to the highly commercialized Aztec world: some 
high-grade materials and the splendid objects produced from them also made 
their way into other levels of society, leading to an increased demand beyond 
royal feasting, noble fashion, battle displays, and periodic rituals.1 As “bulk 
luxuries,” goods such as fine salt, green obsidian, cacao, and decorated clothing 
(Blanton et al. 2005) traveled long distances and enjoyed considerable popu-
larity despite their relatively high values.
There apparently was quite a bit of wiggle room in Aztec-period consum-
erism. A royal household needed brooms, baskets, and graters as much as a 
farmer—indeed, probably many more. Women in all types of households 
produced cotton cloth—therefore cotton fibers and the textiles woven from 
them were present virtually everywhere. Jade(ite), bronze, and other imported 
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luxuries have been found in humble as well as elite contexts, “indicating that 
commoners and elites had ready access to valuable goods,” as found in excava-
tions in Late Postclassic sites in Morelos (M. E. Smith 2003c:250). Nonetheless, 
elite households enjoyed greater quantities of these types of goods. In addition, 
there is some suspicion that drinking cacao may not have been an exclusively 
noble perquisite—a sixteenth-century colonial document from Tlaxcallan 
refers to uppity native commoners dumping “watered-down” cacao on the 
ground when offered such a beverage by native nobles of the time. In this case 
the commoners had begun to gain some wealth through their production of 
cochineal and, in the eyes of the local nobles, were becoming altogether too 
pretentious and haughty (Lockhart et al. 1986). The disdain with which the 
newly prosperous commoners treated the thin cacao suggests the possibility 
that they may have consumed diluted cacao in the past, but that they felt that 
their increased wealth now placed them above this.2
All of this goes to say that the lines of social status, materially defined, 
were somewhat blurry among the Late Postclassic Aztecs. But only some-
what blurry. Social positions were unquestionably hierarchical and political 
power was well entrenched in the hands of a small number of individuals. 
Distinctions in social station were accentuated, indeed announced, by highly 
visible displays—especially the wearing of ornate clothing and adornments 
that carried specific symbolic meanings. For example, only rulers and high-
ranking noblemen (perhaps only judges) wore turquoise diadems as sym-
bols of power, and only achieved warriors were entitled to wear specifically 
designed martial attire in battle and rituals (Berdan 2012, 2014). The imported 
luxuries encountered archaeologically in commoner households (see M. E. 
Smith 2003b) were expensive, but not so symbolically charged.
It has been suggested that the presence of valuable goods up and down 
the social scale is indicative of an active and pervasive marketplace exchange 
system (see Hirth 1998; Smith 1998). We know that these materials and goods 
were available in marketplaces, and this would be a convenient and customary 
avenue through which both noble and commoner families, for a price, could 
obtain goods beyond their basic necessities. It was the most widespread means 
by which raw materials and finished goods, as commodities, moved from 
region to region, community to community, and hand to hand. These move-
ments were effected by individual producers/retailers and regional traders, and 
also by long-distance professional merchants (pochteca), who specialized in 
trading relatively high-value/low-bulk commodities such as precious feathers 
and decorated cotton cloth. These professional merchants served their rulers 
directly by embarking on trading expeditions on their behalf, moving fancy 
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goods across considerable distances and establishing or cementing diplomatic 
relations with foreign polities.
But long-distance trade and markets were not the only avenues and venues 
for the distribution of goods, whether precious or ordinary, costly or cheap. 
There was the well-documented tribute/taxation system imposed by con-
quering city-states on their subjects, and, in its largest manifestation, by the 
Aztec empire on its vanquished polities. Imperial tribute was demanded in 
food staples, utilitarian goods, and precious raw materials and manufactured 
objects; payments were expected on a preset schedule (usually quarterly, semi-
annually, and annually), or delivered on demand for the celebration of special 
events such as a royal coronation or funeral (Berdan 1986, 1992). In contrast 
to the products and goods moving through the marketplace system, tributes 
were delivered directly to city-state or imperial rulers for distribution accord-
ing to established rules and, to a large extent, at their discretion. Rulers were 
expected to be generous. At specified monthly ceremonies they distributed 
food to their commoners from their palatial coffers, and at other ceremonies 
they bestowed glorious honors, such as feathered costumes and devices, on 
courageous warriors (see Berdan 2014:260–268). Tributes would have been 
available to supply these foods and regalia at least to some extent. In general, 
a great deal of tribute income was directed to the maintenance of the ruler’s 
extravagant lifestyle, military expansion, trading expeditions, and the estab-
lishment of alliances (Berdan 2005).
Markets, long-distance trade, and tribute provided the most pervasive con-
texts for the movements of goods through the Aztec world. But there was also 
elite exchange, most notably through extravagant feasting whereby very fancy 
goods were gifted from ruler to ruler, or noble to noble, to cement friendly 
political relations (or, in some cases, to intimidate by flamboyance). One par-
ticularly well-documented case involved the dedication of the Mexica great 
temple in Tenochtitlan in 1487. The Mexica ruler Ahuitzotl invited powerful 
rulers (friends and foes) to this extraordinary ceremony. As host, Ahuitzotl 
offered his august guests extravagant gifts of elegant clothing, exquisite jew-
elry (golden diadems and leg ornaments, and lip plugs, nose plugs and ear 
plugs of gold and precious gems), finely made weapons and shields, jaguar and 
puma skins, and sandals (Durán 1994:340). These material luxuries unabash-
edly proclaimed the extent of control that Ahuitzotl exercised over his impe-
rial domain: Ahuitzotl reminded his guests, especially his enemy-guests, 
that “These presents . . . are won by the strength and valor of our powerful 
arm,” astonishing them with the magnitude of his wealth and power (Durán 
1994:340). High-level events such as this moved specific gifted luxuries across 
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regions: Ahuitzotl’s awe-struck guests took their luxurious gifts home to be 
admired, used, and perhaps emulated in their own lands. On the flip side, 
there is the case of the Chichimec ruler of the city-state of Cuauhtitlan, con-
quered by the Mexica. When the Mexica ruler offered him gifts consisting of 
the costume and insignia of a Mexica warrior in reward for his loyalty, this 
stalwart ruler flatly refused. Instead, he preferred and accepted gifts symbolic 
of his own Chichimec heritage (Hodge 1984:60).
With these commercial and political exchange systems in mind, how did 
the materials necessary for the manufacture of feathered adornments move 
from their places of origin to arrive in the hands of skilled artisans? What 
were the manufacturing requirements? And then, how did the finished prod-
ucts end up in the hands of appropriate consumers?
tHe CAse of feAtHereD ADornments
We can easily speak of feathered adornments as luxuries in the Aztec world. 
For the most part they ended up in the hands and houses of the aristocracy, 
they announced the achievements of courageous warriors, and they decorated 
the sanctuaries and idols of the many deities. In such settings and on such per-
sons and gods, these objects carried considerable social, political, and religious 
importance. But this does not mean that they were economically superfluous. 
Indeed, objects such as these not only reflected changing social and political 
dynamics, they also stimulated production and exchanges in their own and 
ancillary areas of the economy. Secondary industries such as woodworking, 
glue-making, hide-curing, twine-making, and blade-production gained from 
flourishing production of these fine luxury objects, which required these mate-
rials. Luxuries were prominent in many marketplaces; the great Tlatelolco mar-
ket of course comes to mind. As another example, the market at Tepeacac on 
the eastern imperial borderlands was expressly ordered by its Aztec conquer-
ors to welcome merchants carrying exotic materials and plying precious wares 
(Durán 1994:159). And long-distance professional merchants made their living 
(and a good living it was) from trading in the most valuable raw materials and 
objects throughout the land. The idea that high-end goods played dynamic 
and significant roles in preindustrial economies is not a novel idea (e.g., see 
Schneider 1977; Blanton and Feinman 1984; Kepecs and Kohl 2003). It is an 
idea worthy of closer examination specifically in the Aztec world, for which 
I have selected this category of expensive, esteemed, and complicated luxuries.
The production, distribution, and consumption of fancy feathered objects are 
particularly well-documented in the ethnohistorical sources. In the Florentine 
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Codex, Sahagún’s native collaborators on the luxury crafts were particularly 
well informed about the featherworking enterprise and may themselves have 
been featherworkers (Sahagún 1950–1982, book 9). This and a wide array of 
other ethnohistorical sources (e.g., Alva Ixtlilxochitl 1965; Anderson et al. 
1976; Berdan and Anawalt 1992; Boone 2000; Durán 1971, 1994; Quiñones 
Keber 1995) frequently mention the presence of feathers in markets, trad-
ing expeditions, and tribute, and their use in social, political, and ceremonial 
events. Unfortunately, to date no featherworking workshop has been uncov-
ered archaeologically, and only seven preconquest Aztec/Mixtec featherwork 
objects sit in museums today.3
There were two types of featherworkers: those who worked at palaces 
for royal or noble patrons and those who worked independently and lived 
in exclusive calpolli or urban neighborhoods. The most notable of these lat-
ter were from the calpolli of Amantlan—such was their fame that all fine 
featherworkers became known as amanteca. I propose that the basic units of 
production for fine featherworking were households, especially among the 
independent featherworkers and probably among those attached to palaces.
Featherworkers produced ornate objects in three ways: (1) feathers were tied 
together into long, flowing objects such as back devices, headdresses, feathered 
bracelets, fans, and banners; (2) small feathers were glued to solid backings 
to produce intricate mosaics such as shields; and (3) feathers were spun and 
woven into textiles. At the present time there is nothing to indicate that indi-
vidual households specialized in just one type of featherworking; conversely, 
there is nothing to indicate that they did not so specialize. Each of these pro-
cesses required somewhat different materials, tools, and skills, although there 
was considerable overlap. I give some weight to that overlap, and for the pres-
ent discussion I assume that any given featherworking household was capable 
of producing, and did produce, all three types of feathered objects.
Acquisition of Raw Materials
Raw materials required for the production of exquisite feathered objects are 
listed in table 6.1. They included both costly and inexpensive materials and 
relatively inexpensive tools.
The most expensive materials required in any featherworking enterprise 
were the feathers—especially the shimmering, colorful, “exotic” ones. These 
feathers were attached to tropical birds such as scarlet macaws, lovely cotingas, 
roseate spoonbills, blue honeycreepers, troupials, several types of parrots, and 
of course the resplendent quetzal. Hummingbirds and their iridescent feathers, 
Table 6.1. Raw materials used in the manufacture of feathered adornments








costly feathers tied, mosaics, textiles x x x
“ordinary” feathers tied, mosaics, textiles x    
Textilesa tied x x x
cloth: cottonb textiles x x x
cloth: maguey textiles x x  
animal hidesc tied, mosaics x x  
paperd tied, mosaics x x  
cotton threade textiles      
maguey twine tied x    
woodf tied, mosaics x    
continued on next page
a Textiles have been identified on “Moctezuma’s” headdress, seemingly woven of different materials 
and in different patterns (Moreno Guzmán and Korn 2012: 73).
b Both cotton and maguey cloth were already manufactured, not raw materials. Their production 
required raw cotton or maguey fibers, spindles, spindle whorls, looms (wooden pieces and fibers 
for the backstrap), and picks. The production of cloth was the domain of women; in theory at 
least, all women were expected to spin and weave cloth. A featherworking household would 
contain one or more such women.
c These are seen on “Moctezuma’s” headdress, although the animal used is not known (Moreno 
Guzmán and Korn 2012: 73). Deer skins were paid in tribute by Tepeacac and jaguar skins by 
Xoconochco (Berdan and Anawalt 1992, vol. 3: folios 42r, 47r). “Cured leather” appears in Sa-
hagún’s market list (Sahagún 1950–1982, book 8:68).
d Two types of paper have been identified on “Moctezuma’s” headdress (Moreno Guzmán and 
Korn 2012:73). Amatl (amate) and maguey paper were both used in the manufacture of feather 
mosaics. Both are mentioned as present in the Tlatelolco marketplace (see Sahagún 1950–1982, 
book 10:78).
e Cotton thread was most likely used to attach feathers to cotton cloth or to interweave the feath-
ers with threads. We do not know if maguey thread was used in a similar manner with maguey 
cloth. Maguey fiber, but not cotton thread, is mentioned as present in the Tlatelolco marketplace 
(Sahagún 1950–1982, book 8:68).
f Wood was found in markets, and beams, planks, and pillars were given in tribute (Berdan and 
Anawalt 1992, vol. 3: folio 32r). But the wood pieces required for backings (mosaics) or supports 
(tied objects) were none of this sort. A possible reference to the types of woods used here is “fine 
wood for carving” paid from one province in the present-day state of Guerrero (Berdan 1986:127). 
I suspect that the carpenters or woodcutters listed in Sahagún (1950–1982, book 10:81) could have 
provided the featherworkers with their necessary pieces. Also, Cortés (1928:87) mentions that 
“wood of all kinds and in all stages of preparation” were available in the Tlatelolco marketplace.
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Table 6.1—continued








thin reedsg mosaics x    
stout canesh tied x    
cutting boardsi tied, mosaics, textiles x    
knives (obsidian?) tied, mosaics, textiles x    
dyes j tied, mosaics, textiles x x  
glues tied, mosaics x    
bone blades mosaics      
maguey leaves mosaics      
spindles/whorls textiles      
loom partsk textiles      
baskets tied, mosaics, textiles x    
bowls/pots mosaics, textiles x x  
also popular, were found widely throughout Mesoamerica; some were migra-
tory and would have been available seasonally. To reach the centers of Aztec 
power in the central Mexican highlands, most of these feathers needed to be 
transported long distances on foot or by canoe where possible. They arrived 
primarily through three of the exchange mechanisms already mentioned: mar-
kets, long-distance trade, and tribute.
g Reeds are mentioned as possessed by the reed mat seller in the Tlatelolco marketplace (Sahagún 
1950–1982, book 10:86).
h While a market presence of stout canes is not mentioned specifically in the sources, stout-
cane carrying baskets are—the seller of stout cane carrying baskets also wove them (Sahagún 
1950–1982, book 10:86).
i According to Sahagún (1950–1982, book 9:90), these boards, on which feathers were cut, were 
made of ahuehuetl (bald cypress) wood.
j The Aztecs used a wide array of dyes—at this point it is not clear which dyes were used in color-
ing feathers, although Sahagún (1950–1982, book 9:95) mentions zacatlaxcalli, a yellow climbing 
plant. Many dyes were present in the Tlatelolco marketplace, and some dyes (especially cochineal 
and yellow ochre) were paid in tribute to Tenochtitlan (see Berdan 1986:127–129).
k The backstrap loom is essentially a bundle of sticks with straps attached at each end, the part 
encircling the weaver’s back being interwoven cordage. These elements may have been found in 
the marketplace, but the loom as a whole may have been the weaver’s own construction—it is a 
rather personal implement.
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Well-heeled merchants offered fine feathers for sale in the Tlatelolco 
marketplace, and precious feathers were available in other regional mar-
ketplaces such as Tepeacac and Coaixtlahuacan (Berdan et al. 1996; Durán 
1994:159, 182). Some of these long-distance merchants carried bundles and 
bunches of costly feathers from regions south of the Aztec imperial bound-
aries, essentially engaging in foreign trade (see figure 6.1). Some apparently 
also carried the birds themselves, as seen in the Codex Fejérváry-Mayer 
(León-Portilla 1985).
Costly feathers were delivered in tribute, on an annual basis, to the imperial 
capitals. These included bunches of quetzal feathers and probably handfuls4 of 
roseate spoonbill, lovely cotinga, green or Pacific parakeet, and Montezuma 
oropendula (Berdan and Anawalt 1992, vol. 2:102–104, 110–111, 112–114, 116–118, 
122–124). The feathers delivered in tribute would have been appropriate to the 
manufacture of tied and mosaic objects. In addition, the province of Tochpan 
paid an annual tribute of 20 bags of small white feathers, used to “trim” cloaks 
(Berdan and Anawalt 1992, vol. 4:108). Helpfully, Alva Ixtlilxochitl (1965, 2:197) 
tells us that the Gulf coastal province of Tzicoac (a neighbor of Tochpan) paid 
tribute in 20 bags of white feathers with which they made cloth. Both of these 
Figure 6.1. Merchants’ feather merchandise. (Drawing by Jennifer B. Lozano.) 
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descriptions strongly suggest that these feathers were intended to be spun into 
textiles, and white down feathers are also mentioned by Sahagún (1950–1982, 
book 9:97) as elements in tied-feather adornments. Therefore, feathers for 
all three types of feathered productions were available through one or more 
exchange avenues: in markets on daily, weekly (5-day), or 20-day bases; in the 
caravans of long-distance merchants; and through the annual arrival of trib-
utes from distant provinces.5
Other feathers, less than exotic, were locally available and widely used in the 
featherworking enterprise. “Ordinary” feathers such as those of ducks, crows, 
turkeys, and local/migratory waterbirds were used as underlayers in feather 
mosaics and as feathered objects in their own right. For instance, the Codex 
Mendoza distinguishes warrior costumes fashioned of “ordinary” feathers 
from those manufactured of “precious” feathers (Berdan and Anawalt 1992, vol. 
4). Some of the less-expensive feathers may have included those from turkeys 
and crows (Sahagún 1993:270, 271, 274, 275). Rulers went about in cloaks made 
from duck feathers, and noblewomen similarly wore tunics (huipilli) of duck 
feathers (Sahagún 1950–1982, book 8:24, 47), the lowly duck perhaps not being 
so lowly after all.6 The “feather seller” in the Tlatelolco marketplace reportedly 
owned the birds herself, plucking the small back and breast feathers of turkeys, 
geese, and ducks; she split and spun these tiny feathers into nice even threads 
with a spindle (Sahagún 1950–1982, book 10:92). These cozy threads could have 
been available in that marketplace all year long, the turkeys and ducks omni-
present in the Basin of Mexico setting.
Beyond their possible use in some warrior costumes, “ordinary” feathers 
do not appear in the tribute lists, nor do they seem to have interested the 
long-distance merchants. Feather artisans working with such feathers would 
have relied on the marketplaces for their supplies, with the one possible 
exception of the little white feathers paid by the provinces of Tochpan and 
Tzicoac (see above).
Other materials required in the manufacture of costly feathered adorn-
ments were maguey twine, knives, wood, baskets, animal hides, paper, glues, 
textiles, baskets, and possibly dyes for the tied objects; maguey leaves, knives, 
glues, bone blades or picks, dyes, paper, wood, ceramic vats/bowls, and bas-
kets for the mosaics; and cloth, cotton and/or maguey thread, knives, spin-
dles and spindle whorls, twine, baskets, a loom, and possibly dyes for the 
feathered textiles (see table 6.1). Any given household, whether working 
independently or attached to an elite palace, would have had little difficulty 
obtaining these materials through marketplace channels. At the very least, 
almost all of them are recorded for the Tlatelolco marketplace; it is not 
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known to what extent other marketplaces might have had occasional or reg-
ular deficiencies in these materials. Very little arrived through tribute (most 
notably paper, bowls, cloth, and possibly the right kinds of dyes), so even 
the palace-attached artisans would have depended on marketplace vendors 
on a regular basis. The only materials not mentioned for the Tlatelolco mar-
ketplace are the maguey leaves and bone blades or picks used by the mosaic 
artisans; and the spindles/whorls, cotton thread, and loom parts needed to 
produce feathered textiles. Thin reeds and stout canes were probably avail-
able in the marketplace as part of the wares sold by the mat and basket ven-
dors, respectively (Sahagún 1950–1982, book 10:86). Maguey, reeds, and canes 
were widely available in the highlands of central Mexico and could have 
been obtained informally. Bone blades or picks could have been acquired 
and regularly renewed from a recent meal: glyphs associated with feather-
working images in the Florentine Codex (Sahagún 1950–1982, book 9:ill. 90) 
suggest that these were shin bones—although exactly whose shin is meant is 
not clear. Spinning was a household activity everywhere so the cotton thread 
would have been spun in-house. The sources of the spindles and their whorls 
has not been clearly established: the spindles are sticks and could have been 
simply fashioned by household members or been available in the market-
places along with other wood products. Some spindles may have been made 
of bone (see McCafferty and McCafferty 2000). Ceramic whorls may well 
have graced marketplaces, but our reports of marketplace inventories largely 
derive from Spanish male (nonweaver) sources—these individuals may not 
have been able to identify such implements and therefore failed to men-
tion them. Sahagún’s informants would have certainly recognized them, but 
nonetheless did not mention them.
These listings of materials derive from ethnohistoric sources and inspec-
tions of existing featherwork pieces. Detailed examinations of these objects 
have been especially enlightening since some materials not mentioned in the 
documents appear on these pieces. For example, on “Motecuhzoma’s” head-
dress, a quintessential tied object, paper and cotton backings are present, along 
with glues used to secure some of the feathers (Moreno Guzmán and Korn 
2012). The coyote shield, a mosaic, required twine to attach the many gold 
pieces. And the shield in Mexico City, another mosaic, is decorated with ani-
mal skins and embellished with dangling maguey fiber tassels; its backing 
consists of thin reeds tied together with maguey or cotton threads (Rueda 
Smithers 2009:108). So, for instance, if a featherworking household focused 
on mosaics, it still would have required supplies of twine; if the household 
worked mainly on tied objects, it still would have needed to stock glues, paper, 
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and cloth. With all of this overlap of materials, it is entirely possible, even 
likely that the production output of featherworking households encompassed 
most if not the full range of featherworking activities.
In addition to the materials listed in table 6.1, ornate feathered adornments 
also frequently incorporated other costly materials such as gold and precious 
stones. The inventories of objects sent from Mexico to Spain in the early six-
teenth century attest to these additions: for example, “three shields, one the 
field green with some serpents of gold and blue in the center; the other, the 
field green with the head of an owl in the middle; the other, the field red with 
some fancy work of gold” and a “feather-piece, the center blue with stone 
mosaic-work, with other colored feathers, the border of green feathers, and 
lined with a tiger-skin” (Saville 1920:62, 72). Of the extant feathered objects 
in museums today, two especially exhibit the addition of gold ornaments: the 
coyote shield and “Motecuhzoma’s” headdress, both in Vienna. Their distinc-
tive and integral incorporation into the objects’ designs strongly suggest that 
either the featherworkers themselves attached the gold pieces, or they worked 
in close collaboration with goldworkers (see below).
Tools and Procedures
For all the glamour and ornateness of these feathered adornments, the tool 
kit that produced them was singularly simple. Sharp knives, probably obsid-
ian, trimmed feathers with an exquisite purity of line, and split tiny feathers 
for spinning. Maguey twines attached feathers to backings which sometimes 
were themselves networks of maguey twine (Moreno Guzmán and Korn 2012). 
Glues applied to feathers were derived from various orchid roots and pseu-
dobulbs, and from beeswax (see Berdan 2007; Filloy Nadal, Solís Olguín, and 
Navarijo 2006). Flat maguey leaves, ahuehuetl wooden boards, and bone picks 
were used primarily in mosaic manufacture: the maguey leaves as a surface for 
preparing proper backings,7 the wooden boards as feather-cutting surfaces, and 
the bone picks as an essential tool in straightening and aligning already-glued 
feathers. Baskets contained, constrained, and organized sometimes-unruly 
masses of feathers, and ceramic bowls and pots of different sizes were used 
in the preparation of mosaics. And spun feathers required the use of spindles/
whorls and looms for the production of feathered textiles. With the possible 
exception of ultra-small spindles/whorls, these latter tools were women’s essen-
tial equipment for the production of cloth generally and would have been found 
in any and all households regardless of social status, occupation, or residence.
To read Sahagún’s (1950–1982, book 9:96–97) account, one might conclude 
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that the fashioning of tied feather objects was fairly straightforward. Briefly, 
a frame was constructed and strengthened (with cloth and/or paper, perhaps). 
Quetzal feathers were laid out on the frame, their bases reinforced with pieces 
of cane. These feathers, neatly lined up, were bound together with maguey 
fiber nooses, shaken out to straighten them, and sewn to the frame. The same 
procedure was followed with other types of feathers (such as troupial or rose-
ate spoonbill, and eagle down) to complete the device (Sahagún 1950–1982, 
book 9:96–97). However, if “Motecuhzoma’s” headdress is considered, there 
was more to the process than that reported by Sahagún’s informants. This 
headdress also exhibits glued feathers, a network of maguey fiber netting to 
which feathers were lashed, and animal hide. The object was further embel-
lished with numerous round and half-moon gold pieces tied to the backings 
(Moreno Guzmán and Korn 2012).
Another set of procedures involved the protracted and painstaking process 
of producing feather mosaics. The creation of these elegant objects entailed 
several stages and operations, some of them necessarily sequential, some 
ongoing, and some on-call. The most detailed account of these procedures is 
provided by Sahagún’s native associates (Sahagún 1950–1982, book 9:93–96). 
First, a scribe was enlisted (hired?) to draw the desired pattern. The feather-
workers then carefully prepared a backing of wood or reeds, painted designs, 
glue-reinforced cotton, and paper supports. Thin strips of black and other col-
ored feathers were glued to the backing to provide outlines or borders.8 Layers 
of inexpensive and expensive feathers were then applied, the ordinary feathers 
providing a bed for the costly ones. The bottom-most layer consisted of glue-
hardened feathers (feathers dipped entirely in glue) whose colors matched the 
costly feathers to be placed on top of them. The expensive, precious feathers 
were then arranged and glued on top of the glue-hardened ones to finish the 
object. Examination of existing feathered mosaics reveals that pattern seg-
ments were often cut out separately and added to the whole design somewhat 
in the manner of a jigsaw puzzle, probably by a master artisan. For example, 
this is the case with the coyote shield, with its numerous pieces of blue feath-
ers bordered in gold. On this object, the gold pieces were carefully folded 
under, and the underside parts were then sewn to the backing. During this 
entire process, the carefully selected feathers were repeatedly laid out in trial 
designs, matched or replaced, trimmed as necessary, arranged, rearranged, and 
rearranged again until the master artisan was satisfied. Painstaking workman-
ship was a hallmark of this enterprise at every stage of manufacture. It was also 
complex: the fashioning of feathered mosaics involved sequential activities, 
each stage depending on the prior completion of other stages. But there were 
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also ongoing activities which could be undertaken at any time, especially the 
trimming and dying of feathers. Still other activities, notably the making of 
glues, were sporadic and situational, essentially on-call.9
The third manner of manufacturing feathered adornments was the add-
ing of feathers to cloth, reportedly by spinning. Sahagún (1950–1982, book 
10:92) identifies the marketplace feather seller as not only an owner of birds 
but also a spinner of feathers. He also describes women’s spinning and weav-
ing duties, using “shallow” spindle whorls for spinning feathers (1950–1982, 
book 8:49); McCafferty and McCafferty (2000:47) suggest that some small 
spindle whorls unearthed in Cholula may have been used for spinning feath-
ers. No feathered textiles exist from precolumbian times, but a colonial piece 
from Mexico is highly suggestive of these production techniques. This object, 
in the Cooper-Hewitt Design Museum, Smithsonian Institution, is com-
posed of cotton warp yarns and two types of weft yarns: “The unusual white 
yarn consists of downy feathers and cotton spun together in a two-ply yarn” 
and the other variously colored yarns were “composed of a very fine animal 
hair.” The feathers have been identified as goose, and the animal hair as rab-
bit (Phipps and Commoner 2006:486). Particularly interesting is the fact that 
downy feathers and cotton thread were spun together, which would make the 
spinning of feathers a manageable task. The use of white downy feathers in 
this type of operation is consistent with the other descriptions of white down 
already discussed.
The Production Process: Labor Needs and Arrangements
Luxury-feather artisans worked in three separate recorded contexts. As tec-
pan amanteca, they resided at the ruler’s palace and created the feathered capes 
for the god Huitzilopochtli. These were intricately fashioned of quetzal, hum-
mingbird, and blue cotinga feathers (Sahagún 1950–1982, book 9:91). Durán 
(1971:73 and plate 3) describes this god’s green feathered headdress and feath-
ered cape embellished with gold. His shield featured five tufts of white feath-
ers and a border of yellow feathers (also see Sahagún 1950–1982, book 12:52–53). 
Yellow feathers and white down were given in tribute by conquered provinces, 
although hummingbird feathers were not. The production of these adorn-
ments would have been the domain of the tecpan amanteca, and would have 
required all of the featherworking skills: tying, mosaic-making, and textile 
production. These featherworkers also made other exquisite feathered objects 
that were bestowed on guests as royal gifts. Among them were probably the 
“three loads of cloaks of rich feather work” presented by Motecuhzoma to each 
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of Cortés’s captains (Díaz del Castillo 1963:221). Sahagún (1950–1982, book 
9:91) emphasizes that at least by the time of Motecuhzoma Xoxoyotzin, the 
ruler settled these featherworkers at his palace, providing them with a house 
(centetl calli) of their own. There must have been several of these artisans, as the 
good friar goes on to say that those of “Tenochtitlan and Tlatelolco mingled 
with one another.” The meaning of centetl calli is unclear. Were all the feather-
working artisans housed in a single dwelling or, more likely, in rooms around 
a single patio workspace? Were these complete households with husbands, 
wives, and children (as I suspect)? Or was each artisan family housed in its 
own house in or near the palace? Or perhaps what was meant was the totocalli 
(bird house), an aviary with an array of captive birds including eagles, quetzals, 
parrots, ducks, and other waterbirds (Díaz del Castillo 1963:228–229); it con-
tained designated workspace for artisans including featherworkers, goldsmiths, 
wood carvers, and stone mosaic-makers (Sahagún 1950–1982, book 8:45). The 
proximity of these several crafts would have provided an enhanced degree of 
overall productive collaboration and efficiency.
Other types of featherworkers, calpixcan amanteca, apparently also lived at 
the palace and created the finery of the ruler when he danced. This included 
quetzal-feather headdresses, fans, and banners (some embellished with gold); 
a feather arm band with gold; and a headdress of red spoonbill and quetzal 
feathers with gold (Sahagún 1950–1982, book 8:27–28). These featherworkers 
had access to Motecuhzoma’s storehouse—they could use materials obtained 
through tribute or other royal means, and each object they made was stored 
and guarded in the ruler’s storehouse (Sahagún 1950–1982, book 9:91). Their 
association with the palace and its resources suggests that their labor relations 
probably resembled those of the tecpan amanteca.
It has already been observed that women, bird-owners, spun feathers in 
the marketplace. These were probably commoner women. In addition, we 
have indications that women attached to the royal palace (who could be 
either commoners or nobles) engaged in weaving feathered textiles. Bernal 
Díaz del Castillo (1963:230), in speaking of Motecuhzoma’s palace, mentions 
that women there produced “a huge quantity of fine robes with very elabo-
rate feather designs.” This same observer states that “chieftains’ daughters” and 
“daughters of other dignitaries,” housed near the Templo Mayor in Tenochtitlan, 
wore robes “entirely of featherwork.” They may have woven these garments 
themselves, a suspicion supported by Sahagún (1950–1982, book 8:49) when 
he speaks of women spinning feathers while entertained by hunchbacks and 
dwarfs who sang and played music for them.10 It is difficult to conceive of 
commoner women being so entertained.
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Other luxury featherworkers, called calla amanteca, worked more inde-
pendently in specialized calpolli, or neighborhoods, producing feathered 
objects and adornments for sale in the marketplace. This is recorded for 
Tenochtitlan/Tlatelolco, and it is likely that similar arrangements, both pala-
tial and private, occurred in other city-states. It is not clear how much the 
calpolli was involved in the portioning of jobs, for example, or the regulation 
of standards, or the training of neophytes. The independent featherworkers 
would have obtained their precious feathers and other materials from the 
neighboring pochteca merchants (at least in Tlatelolco) or in the bustling 
marketplaces (see table 6.1).
As was usual for most Aztec specializations, featherworking parents 
taught their children the skills of their trade. Girls were expected to develop 
a keen eye for feather color variations, and boys served as apprentices, one of 
their duties being the making of glues. But once again, things may not be as 
clear-cut as they seem. Did all sons of featherworkers become featherwork-
ers themselves? Perhaps not, as some could be dedicated to schooling in a 
priestly school or calmecac; while this education was intended to instill lofty 
artisanal values, it might nonetheless lead to a different life-path altogether 
(Sahagún 1950–1982, book 9:88; Durand-Forest 1994:173). And then, were 
the only apprentices necessarily sons of featherworkers? Might a feather-
working father send his son to apprentice with another featherworker? We 
do not have definitive answers to these questions, although one might sus-
pect that for the most part these specialized households and calpolli tended 
to be fairly insular and focus on training their own progeny to perpetu-
ate the craft and protect their accumulated resources (including specialized 
knowledge and skills).
Descriptions of featherworking procedures, touched on above, indicate that 
the manufacture of any feathered item required a complex interplay of sepa-
rate but related activities. Ongoing tasks, performed by girls and women, con-
sisted of selecting, dyeing and trimming feathers in preparation for their use. 
Sequential tasks, performed by the master artisan but also surely by various 
associates, included commissioning the design, preparing the several types of 
backings, creating the many design pieces, and arranging the different layers 
of feathers. On-call tasks, especially the making of glues by apprentice boys, 
were sporadic and situational, dependent on the immediate needs of those 
assembling the feathered piece. All of this suggests a household division and 
coordination of labor drawing on men and women, boys and girls. Some of the 
activities, especially those performed by women, could be readily interspersed 
with other household duties. Most if not all of these activities undoubtedly 
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took place out-of-doors in a patio setting, where there was sufficient space and 
the emerging piece could be judged in the light in which it would be admired. 
However, inclement conditions such as rain and wind may have periodically 
disrupted these daily activities.
Not all featherworking took place in-house: cooperation extended beyond 
the household. Much as scribes provided designs for the feathered pieces, the 
featherworkers made designs for the gold workers; these latter artisans “join 
with [and] are instructed by the feather workers,” their collaboration com-
ing as no surprise, given the nature of the multimaterial objects produced 
(Sahagún 1950–1982, book 9:76).
Such a household system may have worked well for the independent feath-
erworkers, but was it the only possible form of organization to get the job 
done? The documentary passages describing palace artisans suggest a single 
“house” for several artisans but say nothing about the division of labor within 
that “house.” It is my sense that when the settlement of artisans at a palace is 
mentioned, it refers to the entire household work force. It may well be that the 
“house” at the palace, like the totocalli, was large indeed, with many individual 
rooms, a large patio working area, and ready access to the raw materials of 
the trade. Also like the totocalli, it may be that different types of artisans were 
housed together in this manner, making their necessary interactions relatively 
easy and convenient.
It may have been that several feather artisans worked on a single piece 
simultaneously. Speaking of featherworking in the Colonial period, Juan de 
Torquemada (1969) wrote that
if there are twenty artisans, they all make an image together, and dividing 
among themselves the figure of the image, into so many parts, however many 
there are, each [artisan] takes his piece to make it at his house, and afterwards 
each one returns with it [the finished piece], and they all join together, and in 
this way the perfect and completed image results, as if one artisan had done the 
work. (1969, vol. III: 210; translation and brackets, FB)
With so much continuity in this craft from precolumbian times on into 
the Spanish colonial world, it is interesting to entertain the idea that this 
might have been a strategy used in Aztec times. It assumes the action of 
some centralized commissioning “agent,” whether a king, a noble, an over-
arching calpolli authority, or a respected master featherworker. The results of 
this system can be seen in a sixteenth-century colonial feathered triptych at 
the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City. The three segments of 
this religious piece were clearly executed by three different featherworkers: 
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the difficult, detailed, and meticulous work in the central section was prob-
ably completed by an accomplished master featherworker, and the artisan 
of the left panel was more proficient than his colleague on the right. Each 
of these artisans also had slightly different ways of executing similar motifs, 
and the finished item is not quite as ideally perfect as Torquemada describes. 
It is intriguing to consider that the many different pieces of the precolum-
bian coyote shield could have been doled out in such a fashion—in this case, 
Torquemada would have been proud of their perfect harmony. The consistent 
colors, orderly directions of the feathers, and homogeneous feather and gold 
sizes all point to uniform training and a high degree of quality control over 
the work of all of the participants.
tHe Bigger PiCture
I have been emboldened to undertake this study of Aztec-period feather-
working by the framework proposed by Richard Blanton and his colleagues 
in their goods-based approach (2005). That framework is fleshed out by four 
questions that are designed to clarify the role of commodities in their broader 
economic, social, political, and religious milieu. Where do those questions 
lead us in the matter of Aztec-Period featherworking?
1.  The presence and impact of labor and time allocation bottlenecks: Bottlenecks in 
the featherworking industry could derive primarily from labor imbalances 
and resource availability, as well as varying consumer demand. All of 
these potential problems were relatively easily addressed in the Late 
Postclassic Aztec world. Featherworking households required trained 
labor of appropriate age and gender composition. One can imagine 
any given household, during its “usual” life cycle, lacking either male or 
female children, or sufficiently available or trained adults of either gender. 
Nonetheless, strategies were available to offset possible imbalances: 
households could be enlarged (as joint or compound families), and 
children could be apprenticed to a neighboring master featherworker. 
Both possibilities are suggested in the documentary record. Guild-like 
arrangements among the independent featherworkers, and the grouping of 
featherworkers and other luxury artisans in palaces, offered opportunities 
for shared labor among the artisan households.
   Availability of raw materials, especially costly tropical feathers, 
was an ever-present issue with the featherworkers. Those working in 
royal palaces had access to the ruler’s tribute stores and, at least in 
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the case of the Tenochtitlan ruler, a well-stocked aviary. Independent 
featherworkers relied on long-distant merchants, their neighbors, for 
supplies of exotic feathers. Both types of featherworkers could draw on 
markets for their supplies. Yet none of these sources was flawless. For 
the palace featherworkers, a rebellion in a tribute-paying province or a 
miscalculation (or misappropriation) on the part of a tribute collector or 
overseer could affect supplies of essential feathers. For the independent 
feather artisans, a merchant caravan might be ambushed in distant lands 
(a not uncommon occurrence), or the merchants may have returned from 
their long and perilous journeys with inadequate supplies. Ubiquitous 
markets with their wide range of commodities may well have offset some 
of these possible issues. Other materials used regularly in the manufacture 
of feathered objects were readily obtained in the many marketplaces 
throughout the imperial domain.
   In addition, featherworkers relied on consumers who needed, could 
afford, and were allowed to acquire their fancy array. Some consumers 
purchased their featherwork in the marketplaces, while others, rulers and 
other high-ranking nobles, were directly supplied from attached artisans. 
Some consumers received feathered adornments as gifts or rewards 
(Berdan 2014:260–268). Inasmuch as a ruler supported the activities and 
success of his city-state, he would have provided any necessary colorful 
array from his storehouse to enhance his polity’s image and status; this 
finery was stocked from tribute payments and in-house production. 
Consumer demand would have fluctuated with the regular or spontaneous 
occurrences of political, military and ceremonial activities, which benefited 
from the flamboyant display of feathered adornments.
2. Relationships between the commodity and dynamic distribution systems: 
Precious feathers and other materials and tools used in featherworking 
all moved variously through tribute, trade, and market channels (see 
table 6.1). A relatively small amount of the featherworkers’ production 
needs were supplied through either tribute (for palace featherworkers) 
or long-distance merchants. Principal among these materials were 
the costly feathers native to regions distant from the imperial capitals. 
Nonetheless, quantities of these feathers also appeared in marketplaces 
throughout the realm, as did the many additional materials and tools of 
the featherworkers’ trade. These included such mundane (but essential) 
objects as maguey twine, obsidian blades, glues, dyes, and baskets. Going 
full circle, some featherworkers took advantage of the great Tlatelolco 
market to sell their finished feathered objects there. The increasing 
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commercialization of the Late Postclassic economy paralleled the 
increasing demand of luxuries, including featherwork, among noble 
consumers. Marketplaces were especially prominent in filling the 
featherworkers’ material needs, and also provided at least some of them 
with promising outlets for their labors.
3.  The good’s impact on secondary industries or markets: The complex 
featherwork production system drew on a large variety of producers and 
served a demanding cadre of consumers. Relatively low-status households 
manufactured many necessary components of the featherworking 
enterprise: obsidian blades, wooden boards and backings, glues, dyes, 
animal hides, paper, twine, baskets, and bowls were produced in part 
or in full throughout the imperial realm by households on part-time or 
full-time bases. Some of this production may have engaged households 
as intermittent crafting and/or multicrafting activities (Hirth 2009), 
and served the featherworkers and others as secondary industries. Such 
households could boost their income by selling these materials and 
objects in the many marketplaces throughout the realm. The output of 
these households would have served more than just the featherworkers, 
since most of these materials and objects were used in many industries, 
and demand in the markets may well have been quite brisk. These 
materials and objects hold up well. Although a few of them (such as 
some glues and dyestuffs) responded to seasonal rhythms, they were also 
eminently storable—seasonal variations in availability would not be an 
issue with these adjuncts to the featherworking industry. And it perhaps 
is a testimony to the vitality of the market system that a crucial high-
end industry such as featherworking came to depend on marketplace 
availability of so many essential materials and tools.
4. Broader impacts of increased production of the commodity: With increasing 
numbers of nobles came increasing demands for sumptuous display objects. 
Among the finest, most extravagant of these, were objects made with feath-
ers. Blanton and his colleagues speak of the “solidification of aesthetic labor” 
whereby decoration comes to take precedence over form to give meaning 
to objects, and that this process was more common in the Late Postclas-
sic than in earlier periods (Blanton et al. 2005:280). It is worth noting that 
the color, texture, vibrancy, and variation of feathers provide a particularly 
attractive and effective medium to achieve such embellishments and convey 
detailed, socially charged meanings.
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Throughout this discussion I have taken the position that the production 
of luxurious feathered objects took place in the context of individual house-
holds. This position is supported by documentary evidence for the craft’s 
labor requirements and the style of training used in the profession. But we 
have seen that other slightly variable styles of production, in palace settings, 
may have offered enhanced conditions for the efficient and masterful produc-
tion of at least some of these complex objects: the palace setting provided a 
stage for the collaboration of a variety of interdependent artisans, and these 
artisans enjoyed access to the palace’s (or city-state’s, or empire’s) tribute 
stores. As the empire expanded into areas of luxury commodity availability 
(especially lowlands), more and more fancy feathers became available to the 
palace featherworkers.
This leads us to a final consideration. While much exquisite featherwork 
was produced in the Basin of Mexico, in city-states central to imperial expan-
sion and commercial enterprises, much was not. Featherworking was a deep-
seated craft throughout the Aztec imperial domain and beyond; feather-
adorned Aztec warriors met similar warriors on distant battlefields, tired and 
dusty merchants encountered exquisite featherwork in “foreign” lands, and a 
bewildering array of feathers and feathered objects appeared in market after 
market throughout the realm. Many manufactured feathered items, largely 
in the form of headgear, back devices, warrior costumes, and shields entered 
Tenochtitlan through tribute. These facts indicate that such objects were 
being produced widely and that access to the necessary productive materi-
als as well as the skills to manufacture them was well established in broad 
geographic regions. This is highlighted by the example of imperial tribute in 
quetzal feathers and quetzal feather devices: the feathers were derived from 
a few restricted areas, while the fancy devices were demanded from polities 
throughout the empire where they were probably manufactured (figures 6.2 
and 6.3). In addition, their demand in tribute by the imperial powers suggests 
a need that might not have been sufficiently met by local artisans. In the end, 
we are left to wonder just what the lofty and demanding Mexica, Acolhua, and 
other Basin of Mexico nobility thought of the featherwork arriving from the 
provinces. After all, as Richard Blanton, Lane Fargher, and Verenice Heredia 
Espinosa so cogently say, the Aztec elite displayed “little evidence of consumer 
reticence” (2005:280), and undoubtedly set high standards for their personal, 
stately, and godly adornments.
Figure 6.2. Aztec tribute demands in quetzal feathers. (Drawing by 
Jennifer B. Lozano.) 
Figure 6.3. Aztec tribute demands in quetzal-feathered devices. (Drawing by 
Jennifer B. Lozano.) 
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notes
 1. Michael Smith (2003c:123) distinguishes the different roles of luxuries in com-
mercialized economies and prestige-goods economies. In the former, acquisition of 
fine goods was open to all consumers (who could afford them) with few status restric-
tions; in the latter, the production, distribution, and consumption of exotic goods were 
controlled by and restricted to elites.
 2. If cacao were indeed available to commoners in preconquest times, the watering 
down may have been an economic as much as a social response: with less wealth, com-
moners could make their supplies of cacao go further, sacrificing richness.
 3. There are two in Mexico City (a mosaic shield and a mosaic disk), two in Stuttgart 
(two mosaic shields), and three in Vienna (a mosaic shield, a headdress, and a fan). Some 
questions have been raised about precolumbian origins for the disk in Mexico City and 
the fan in Vienna. However, I believe that both of them derived from pre-Spanish times.
 4. These are glossed as handfuls in the Codex Mendoza but just as feathers in the 
Matrícula de Tributos. I used to prefer the interpretation that these came in units 
of 8,000 feathers (from Tochtepec and Xoconochco provinces), but now am more 
inclined to think of these as the very small, soft feathers from the necks, backs, and 
breasts of the birds, in which case deliveries by handfuls would make more sense. These 
are the types of feathers used in fashioning feather mosaics.
 5. Tributes reportedly arrived on a quarterly, semiannual, or annual basis. With the 
possible exception of distant Xoconochco, feathers were always paid annually.
 6. Sahagún (1950–1982, book 10:92) mentions domestic and wild ducks (probably 
Muscovy ducks, nonmigratory avians), and Peru ducks.
 7. Carded cotton (thin as a “cobweb”) was stiffened with glue, the procedure taking 
place on the maguey leaf. Experiments have revealed that the glue does not stick to 
the maguey leaf, and the stiffened cotton piece peels off easily (Laboratory for Ancient 
Materials Analysis, California State University San Bernardino).
 8. Sahagún (1950–1982, book 9:95) identifies the black outline feathers as those of 
the grackle. From even a short distance, these borders are so finely executed that they 
appear to be painted.
 9. Sahagún (1950–1982, book 9:97) additionally describes the manufacture of small 
animals from wood, dried maize stalks or paper, glue, cotton, and feathers. Rivero 
Weber and Feest (2012:48) offer the intriguing suggestion that these figures may have 
been toys made for sale in colonial Mexican markets.





Classic Maya Marketplaces 
and Exchanges
Examining Market 




Mounting evidence indicates that large, Classic Maya 
Peten capitals such as Tikal and Calakmul supported 
permanent marketplaces (Carrasco Vargas, Vázquez 
López, and Martin 2009; Jones 1996; Masson and 
Freidel 2012) and smaller provincial centers in the 
upper Belize River valley (Cap 2011; Keller 2006) may 
have sustained periodic markets as well. Nonetheless, 
archaeological signatures for marketplaces and com-
modity exchanges continue to be difficult to find 
across the lowlands (Shaw 2012). To understand why 
this might be the case, I used Richard Blanton’s ideas 
that link the relationships between interest groups to 
organizational aspects of states. Like Blanton, I suggest 
that rulers promoted the development of marketplaces 
as a means of consolidating authority, generating taxes, 
and stimulating craft production. In the Classic Maya 
case, embedded sociopolitical interactions between 
market participants led to underdeveloped commercial 
market systems, especially in provincial centers where 
polities were small in scale and politically bounded. 
The small size of market zones and volatile relations 
between Maya kingdoms resulted in fluctuating supply 
and demand of commodities, dampening investments 
in permanent market infrastructure and allowing inter-
est groups to manipulate exchange values.
A key assumption here is that the degree to which 
ancient market economies conform to archaeological 
expectations for marketplace development and mar-
ket exchanges is conditioned not only by the primary 
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economic forces of supply and demand, but also by the nature of sociopolitical 
interactions among interest groups who have a stake in markets. Combined, eco-
nomic and sociopolitical forces affect the scale of competition within market sys-
tems and govern the outcome of market exchanges and commodity distributions.
This perspective is informed by Blanton and Fargher’s recent research into the 
role of collective action in state formation and market development (Blanton 
and Fargher 2008, 2010). They suggest that organizational aspects of states can 
be understood based on “outcomes of bargains struck between those in power 
and non-ruling groups” (Blanton and Fargher 2010:211). In situations where 
interest groups maintain considerable resources and authority, rulers or other 
key decision-makers negotiate equitably with them on matters of public goods 
and services; in contrast, when interest groups are endowed with few resources, 
leaders hold the upper hand in political decision-making. These negotiations 
directly affect rulers’ decisions to invest in infrastructure and administrative 
institutions to guard them, as well as to conform to social contracts, moral 
codes, and norms concerning personal accessibility and reciprocal obligations, 
including redistribution of goods provided to the state by taxpayers.
In their comparative study of 30 states, Blanton and Fargher (2008, 2010) 
found support for the theoretical expectations of collective action theory, but 
more to the point of this chapter, they present positive statistical correlations 
between market development and three societal factors: degree of collective 
action, scale of agricultural intensification, and size of population and urban-
ization. They postulate that markets provide alternative sources of incomes 
that allow commoners to specialize in the production or sale of goods and 
break away from patrimonial control over land and resources, while rulers 
benefit by leveling taxes on marketplace exchanges. Households located in 
prime agricultural areas tend to specialize in the production of staples, a pat-
tern that may explain the correlation between agricultural intensification 
and markets. Markets also are positively correlated with the polity size and 
urbanization. Population growth and aggregation into centers may increase 
the potential consumer base, especially among non-food-producing urbanites, 
making specialist production in craft goods and food more feasible.
Based on these studies, it can be predicted that many large ancient poli-
ties with dense urban centers were more likely than smaller polities to have 
supported market economies, unless small-polity leaders encouraged market 
exchange and the consumer base was relatively large. Part of the problem 
for the development of markets in smaller polities is generating sufficient 
supply, demand, and price information for transactions to become predict-
able (Garraty 2010:7). These requirements can be met in open geopolitical 
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landscapes that accommodate the movement of market participants includ-
ing merchants and local sellers and buyers. In politically fragmented land-
scapes, markets may develop but transactions are limited to people embedded 
in existing social relationships. Blanton (2013:25) calls these types of markets 
“restricted” because they replicate existing social structures and exchange rela-
tions within the polity. As such, market transactions resemble reciprocal gift 
exchanges more so than commodity transactions, and elites are prone to med-
dle in market development. In more open geopolitical environments, buyers 
and sellers are free to engage in atomized economic transactions, especially 
between merchants strangers (Granovetter 1985). Geopolitical and societal 
factors therefore shape market forces and must be taken into account when 
modeling ancient market systems and marketplace exchanges.
Four approaches—configurational, contextual, spatial, and distributional—
provide independent and complementary lines of evidence for identifying 
marketplaces and market exchange in ancient societies (table 7.1).
A configurational approach focuses on identifying marketplaces directly 
from infrastructural features, while contextual, spatial, and distributional 
approaches focus on the indirect effects of marketplace exchanges. Kenneth 
Hirth’s (1998) distributional approach is particularly useful because it provides 
archaeological correlates for identifying exchange modes from the perspective 
of household and settlement provisioning (table 7.2).
The major tenet of Hirth’s model is that, in markets, individuals may buy 
and sell basic commodities regardless of their social rank because provision-
ing networks operate independently of sociopolitical relationships. One line 
of evidence that supports unfettered exchange in Mesoamerican markets is 
ethnohistoric accounts that document the fact that the majority of individ-
ual sellers were producer-sellers unregulated by authorities (Hirth 1998:455). 
These kinds of highly competitive marketplace exchanges can be identified 
archaeologically as homogeneous household artifact assemblages in terms of 
sources and quantities of commodities. Once commodities enter competitive 
marketplaces, their exchange values are determined by the forces of supply 
and demand, which conventionally refers to the behavior of buyers and sell-
ers who engage in strictly commercial transactions. Where there are many 
buyers and sellers, none of them, on their own, can affect market prices. This 
self-regulating behavior, commonly referred to by economists as the “invis-
ible hand of the marketplace,” keeps the value of commodities competitively 
priced once a product or service has been on the market for a long time and 
there are many substitutes or sources for the product. Although purchasing 
power should affect, at least to some extent, the distribution of high-value 
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goods in low-status households, the disparity between elite and common 
household assemblages should be negligible in comparison to the outcome of 
other exchanges modes (Hirth 1998:456).
Late Postclassic Mesoamerican markets were highly competitive, but I 
contend that most ancient marketplaces were not, due to the limitations of 
transportation, communication, and influence of sociopolitical forces on par-
ticipants (also see Garraty 2010:7). Interest groups can easily manipulate the 
consumption of goods, especially if goods communicate information concern-
ing social affiliations or political position (Appadurai 1986:31). Sumptuary laws 
limit use of symbols of royal office, but more common symbols of ethnic, clan, 
or other sociopolitical affiliations are also subject to regulation through more 
informal social mechanisms. Further, market participants can engage in formal 
price setting to encourage consumption by artificially holding down exchange 
values or control consumption by limiting supply and inflating exchange 
Table 7.1. Archaeological correlates for approaches to market systems (after Hirth 1998)
configurational Indices of spatial and architectural features of market behavior include 
presence of centrally located plazas, market infrastructure, transporta-
tion arteries, administrative precincts, and large walled compounds.
contextual Indices of cultural features required for large-scale provisioning of 
commodities including urbanization and full-time specialists.
spatial Indices of regional distribution of commodities or marketplaces 
including fall-off curves of commodities reflecting distance from 
production source to market centers and the arrangement of sites 
predicted by central-place theory.
distributional Indices of commodity provisioning based on the differential distribu-
tion of commodities across households, especially long-distance com-
modities of obsidian goods and imported ceramics.
Table 7.2. Outcomes for Hirth’s distributional model of exchange modes
reciprocity Dyadic exchanges result in low volume, small spheres of exchange, and 
heterogeneity in household consumption that reflect different social 
networks and procurement patterns. Household production results in 
less-standardized commodities.
redistribution Centralized circulation of commodities results in significant differences 
in commodities across statuses and multiple, parallel circuits of exchange.
market Nonhierarchical provisioning results in homogeneous assemblages across 
households and statuses in a community. Specializations increase scale, 
segmentation, and efficiencies of production, including standardization.
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values (Block and Evans 2005:509). Trade goods are especially prone to price 
fixing, fluctuations in supply, and monopolization because middlemen are few 
in number and travel across polities is perilous without political connections.
Locally made items are not exempt from manipulation of exchange values 
because their supply and demand are affected by embedded social relations 
between producers and sellers. When producers and consumers negotiate 
directly for commodities, pricing includes consideration of personal social rela-
tionships and notions of fairness, especially in economies typified by numer-
ous small-scale producers, sellers, and buyers operating with limited means 
(Mintz 1961). In small-scale markets, people who buy and sell are often on 
friendly terms and attempt to sustain regular business dealings by establishing 
long-term reciprocal relationships (Mintz 1961:55). In offering and accepting 
concessions on commodity prices, sellers acquire a group of steady customers 
and good customers get lower prices. In marketplaces where middlemen vend 
wares, rather than the artisans who make them, sellers have more autonomy 
in setting the exchange value of the commodity (Dilley 2005). Nonetheless, 
price concessions develop when sellers have relatively large stocks of goods 
(Mintz 1961:58).
Market competition therefore should be considered as a scale that ranges 
from strong to weak based on the number and social embeddedness of buyers 
and sellers. The scale of competition directly affects exchange values, which 
ultimately conditions the distribution of commodities in households. Blanton’s 
comments on the varied nature of ancient market economies are salient here.
Hirth’s finding that imported pottery and obsidian were available to house-
holds of varying socioeconomic status, evidently through market purchase, is 
an important one, but I am worried that other researchers not finding the same 
patterns in their distributional data will infer from it an absence of markets. The 
particular circumstances found at Epiclassic Xochilcalco may make it unusually 
well suited to the kinds of analysis Hirth emphasizes; other market situations 
maybe more complex and less easy to decipher. (Blanton 1998b:464, comment 
on Hirth 1998)
In order to understand why Classic Maya market economies are not easy 
to decipher, I investigate marketplaces and commodities to explore the forces 
that shaped them. I start with an application of Blanton and Fargher’s col-
lective action theory to the Classic Maya lowlands to examine the predicted 
degree of state involvement in marketplaces and then compare this model to 
the actual evidence for marketplaces, including that from the upper Belize 
River valley at the sites of Xunantunich, Actuncan, and Buenavista del Cayo 
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(referenced simply as Buenavista below). For data concerning commodities, I 
present the distribution of local pottery types across Late Classic households 
at Xunantunich and diachronic shifts in access to obsidian through time at 
Actuncan. The uneven distribution of obsidian and some, but not all, types of 
local pottery documents manipulation of exchange values within a moderately 
competitive but restricted market system.
CLAssiC mAyA PoLities, mArkets, AnD CommoDities
Classic Maya Polities and Collective Actions
Xunantunich, Actuncan, and Buenavista sit on the Mopan River only a few 
kilometers from each other near the western border of Belize (figure 7.1). At 
times, these sites were volatile members of a larger multipolity network cen-
tered at Naranjo, an expansionistic Peten capital located less than 20 km to 
the west. The degree to which Mopan River centers differed economically and 
politically from larger lowland Maya capitals, therefore, had more to do with 
scale and setting than cultural practices.
One of the most pervasive characteristics of Maya politics is the cyclical 
nature of political power (Marcus 1993). These cycles occurred at regional scales 
when strong capitals incorporated provinces into a multipolity state and at local 
scales when provincial capitals subsumed hinterlands into their political sphere 
of influence. As the power of capitals waned, previously subordinate groups 
regained their independence forming more decentralized polities or autono-
mous centers. While marriage alliances and war were the two most common 
strategies for incorporating centers into political networks, wars between Tikal 
and Calakmul and their allies (including Naranjo) escalated in the Late Classic 
period (Martin and Grube 2008), as did raiding. In this political milieu, polity 
boundaries and loyalties were never settled and almost always contested.
These dynamic cycles can be seen within Mopan River centers at the regional 
and local scale. Actuncan was the political center of the upper Belize River 
valley in the Terminal Formative (or Preclassic) period (100 BC–AD 250) as 
evidenced by many hallmarks of early civic construction, including a triadic 
pyramid group, an E-Group, and a ballcourt (Mixter et al. 2013). Buenavista 
and Xunantunich overshadowed Actuncan during the Late Classic period 
(AD 600–780), when leaders at both sites initiated new civic construction 
projects and competed for influence over minor centers located between them 
in the countryside (LeCount and Yaeger 2010). By the early eighth century, 
Xunantunich, with the aid of its Naranjo overlords, became the provincial 
capital of the valley, surpassing Buenavista in the scale and elaboration of 
MARKET COMPETITION AS A FACTOR FOR UNDERSTANDING COMMODIT Y DISTRIBU TIONS 161
its monumental architecture (LeCount and Yaeger 2010). During this time, 
Actuncan, and possibly Buenavista, were subsumed within the Xunantunich 
polity. At Actuncan, an ancient palace was remodeled befitting a vassal noble 
(Mixter et al. 2013), while at Buenavista settlement clusters appear to have 
become increasingly complex with the addition of administrative buildings 
that may represent the imposition of a new level of bureaucracy (Yaeger et al. 
2010:165–167). However, Xunantunich’s control over sites in the upper Belize 
River valley lasted only a short time. In the eighth century, textual references 
on Xunantunich Panel 2 refer to “flint and shield” events undertaken by the 
site’s ruler and allies at an undisclosed location within the Mopan region 
(Helmke et al. 2010: 103). These skirmishes appear to be harbingers of events 
that led to the desecratory termination of Xunantunich’s palace in the Late 
Classic period (Yaeger 2010). By the Terminal Classic period (AD 780–1000), 
claims of authority were increasingly made by neighboring centers. None of 
these sites, however, regained lasting authority.
Figure 7.1. Location of select archaeological sites in the eastern periphery of the Maya 
lowlands. 
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At the apogee of their political power, Xunantunich, Actuncan, and Buenavista 
were relatively mid-sized centers in comparison to Tikal and Calakmul, the 
two largest superpowers in the Maya lowlands (figure 7.2). Arlen and Diane 
Chase suggest large Classic Maya polities were approximately 8,000 km2 
in size with hierarchically ordered centers, the largest of which contained 
upwards of 150,000 people (Chase and Chase 1996:805). In contrast, Jason 
Yaeger (2003:131) estimates that fewer than 1,600 people lived within 1 km of 
Xunantunich in the Late Classic period, a number that is slightly smaller than 
that estimated for Actuncan and Buenavista populations. During their reigns 
as paramount capitals, each may have controlled a fairly small hinterland, no 
larger than 20 km in diameter. Site hierarchies in the region contain three 
kinds of sites—paramount center, major center, and minor centers—indica-
tive of their classification as city-states (Webster 1997) or secondary states 
(Marcus 2003).
It is not surprising to find that Classic Maya states are rather low on the 
collective action scale. Based on Blanton and Fargher’s (2008:tables 7-1, 8-1, 
9-1) measurable variables for states without extensive ethnohistoric texts, 
small states consistently rank lower than large empires in the degree to which 
they engage in (1) building public goods such as transportation infrastructure 
and water control, (2) bureaucratization, or more specifically the nature of 
officeholder recruitment, and (3) moral responsibility, or more specifically the 
nature of ideological resources and standards of living. Classic Maya states 
built a moderate amount of state-supported infrastructure within centers, but 
their investment in public works outside them is more limited. For example, 
elaborate road systems (sacbeob) at Caracol, Calakmul, and Coba link large 
Figure 7.2. The civic centers of (left) Xunantunich, (middle) Actuncan, and (right) 
Buenavista del Cayo, Belize. 
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civic plazas with residential groups at the peripheries of centers (Shaw 2001); 
however, in a survey of Maya roads, Justine Shaw (2001) found that only 9 out 
of 190 road segments connect separate sites together. A similar pattern can be 
seen in water-control features. Almost all Classic cities maintained centralized 
reservoir systems near the largest civic architecture, and in some cities, such 
as Tikal, centralized water systems recharged residential tanks (Scarborough 
2003). But it is difficult to assess the degree to which the state sponsored 
the construction of waterholes, raised fields, and other water systems found 
throughout the hinterland. These features could have been built by commoners 
alone or during the Formative period when large-scale state project directed 
toward the public good appear to have been more common. The nature of 
officeholder recruitment also indicates that Classic Maya “bureaucratic” insti-
tutions were mechanisms that protected the interests of royal dynasties more 
than public interests. Epigraphic studies document that Maya polities were 
governed by a line of rulers who bore the title of “divine lord,” or k’uhul ajaw 
in Classic Mayan (Martin and Grube 2008:17). The rule of kings in Maya 
society was absolute, combining control over symbolic systems, such as writ-
ing and religious rites, with their regulation of economic resources (McAnany 
2004). Their position at the top of the sociopolitical pyramid is evidenced by 
their splendid, elevated lifestyles in palace acropoli. As the Late Classic period 
progressed, kings increasingly privatized and segregated their lives from the 
rest of Maya society (LeCount 2001; Robin 2003b).
Provincial polities may not have engaged in exclusionary and hierarchical 
relations to the same degree as large Classic Peten polities, but it is difficult 
to assign them higher ranks on the collective action scale. At Xunantunich, 
Panel 2 contains a full emblem glyph including phonetic complements and 
a main sign toponym translated as “divine mountainous place lord” (Helmke 
et al. 2010:106). This title, as well as the construction of a Peten-style royal 
compound, indicates that Xunantunich’s Late Classic ruler participated 
in the same sociopolitical kingship system as that found in larger lowland 
sites (Yaeger 2010). Evidence of state-funded public works designed to pro-
vide access to critical resources outside political centers is present but limited. 
Although a short segment of road runs between Xunantunich and Actuncan 
(Keller 2006), many of the agricultural terraces and aguadas were likely built 
by local communities without state intervention (Wyatt 2008).
Given the nature of Maya collective action, market participation is pre-
dicted to be limited in scale and scope. Volatile relations between provincial 
centers in the upper Belize River valley and large Peten states may have pre-
vented safe passage of market participants across political boundaries. If so, 
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the size of the consumer base was relatively small, especially in provincial 
polities, dampening supply and demand for local goods and restricting the 
influx of regional and long-distance trade goods, especially obsidian, jade, 
and marine shell. During times of greater regional consolidation such con-
straints would have been lifted, and markets would have flourished. During 
the mid-eighth century, when Xunantunich was briefly incorporated into the 
Naranjo state, the larger site’s influence over the region would have opened up 
travel across previously contested ground. Nonetheless, given shifting politics, 
long-distance traders would have found traveling across political boundar-
ies within the lowlands unpredictable, making the flow of imported goods 
from highland Guatemala and Mexico reliant on negotiations with a series 
of Maya kings or other principals. Maya kings, therefore, had greater access 
to imported items than intermediary buyers or lithic specialists; they could 
have made those items available in administered solar markets or through 
redistribution. Under these circumstances, exchange values of imports were 
susceptible to price fixing to expand commercial activities or to restrict the 
imports for political purposes.
Classic Maya Markets
Physical evidence of Maya marketplaces has been found at 10 ancient 
Maya capitals, including the Classic sites of Tikal, Yaxha, Calakmul, Coba, 
and Chunchucmil (Masson and Freidel 2012; Shaw 2012). In these large sites, 
marketplaces were located in nodal plazas that contained stall-like alignments 
or arcades. The configurational indices for these Classic Maya marketplaces 
compare favorably with other Mesoamerican markets.
At Teotihuacan, the Great Compound marketplace, located at the junc-
tion of axial causeways near the Ciudadela, was a large rectangular com-
pound surrounded by raised platforms that could have supported workshops 
(Millon 1973). Likewise, the centrally located Tlatelolco marketplace in Aztec 
Tenochtitlan featured a square plaza surrounded by long arcade-like struc-
tures with portals and limited entryways (Feldman 1978). Inside, sectors of the 
plaza were devoted to the selling of particular commodities and administra-
tors oversaw market activities from small ancillary platforms. At the Maya 
capital of Tikal, Grant Jones (1996:86–87) suggests that the East Plaza dis-
plays similar marketplace characteristics, including the plaza’s location in the 
principal ceremonial area near the junction of sacbeob and the presence of a 
large double-gallery compound that contains arcade-like structures, stalls, and 
ancillary platforms. Calakmul (Carrasco Vargas, Vázquez López, and Martin 
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2009) and sites in southeastern Peten (Houston and Inomata 2009:252) have 
similar architectural arrangements near the junctions of sacbeob. Calamkul’s 
Chiik Nahb complex is particularly noteworthy, not only because of its linear 
arrangements of low, long structures within a large rectangular compound, but 
for the murals painted on the exterior walls of Structure 1 near the center of 
the complex. The murals depict groups of ordinary people, some of whom 
are engaged in preparing and dispensing foodstuffs and other commodities. 
Hieroglyphs that accompany the scenes describe individuals using an agen-
tive term, aj, followed by the name of a particular commodity, for instance 
maize-gruel person, salt person, or clay-vessel person (Carrasco Vargas, 
Vázquez López, and Martin 2009:19248). While these commodities may have 
been exchanged at festivals or public feasts, Kerry Hull (2010:251) notes that 
vendors at modern highland marketplaces are similarly referred to in Ch’orti’ 
Mayan by the type of item they sold.
Ancient Mesoamerican markets also were located in multiuse plazas and 
vendors sold from temporary stalls, similar to modern Mesoamerican periodic 
markets today. To test for the presence of ancient open-air market activities at 
Chunchumil in Yucatan, Bruce Dahlin and colleagues (2007) systematically 
sampled soils from the modern Antigua, Guatemala, marketplace to estab-
lish chemical signatures for ancient marketplace activities. At Antigua, they 
found that the spatial distribution of extractable phosphorus (P) and zinc (Zn) 
mapped onto areas of vegetable and fruit vendors, food service, and food-
preparation areas. Highly elevated levels of extractable P and Zn also were 
found in the central portion of Chunchucmil’s plaza parallel to a sacbe and 
rows of small rock alignments suspected to be market stalls, supporting their 
interpretation of an ancient open air marketplace in a multiuse plaza. Chase 
and Chase (1987:52) also suggest that unrestricted, centrally located plazas at 
Caracol were the locations of marketplaces based on low rubble features sus-
pected to have been vendor stalls.
In the upper Belize River valley, Xunantunich and Buenavista provide 
architectural, artifactual, and chemical data consistent with open marketplaces 
located in multiuse plazas. At Xunantunich, Angela Keller (2006:388) sug-
gests that the Lost Plaza, located north of Sacbe II and east of Ballcourt 1, 
may have been a Late Classic marketplace bounded on the west side by low 
linear features. Here, excavations revealed higher than expected frequencies of 
chert debris and tools, obsidian debitage and blades, and spindle whorls that 
Keller (2006:389, 615) infers are the remains of point-of-sale finishing of craft 
goods by artisan-vendors. Similar patterns have been found at Buenavista’s 
East Plaza, a large plaza flanked by pyramids at the endpoint of two sacbeob 
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(Cap 2011). There, Bernadette Cap found evidence of wattle-and-daub struc-
tures and two low platforms built atop the Late Classic plaza. Like Keller’s 
discoveries at Xunantunich, Cap’s (2011:248) plaza excavations revealed in situ 
lithic production associated with the final stages of chert biface shaping and 
resharpening and obsidian blade production. Strong spatial correlations in 
ceramic sherd and soil phosphorous concentrations indicated that food, likely 
held in pots, was sold in specific marketplace locales.
Given the stark contrasts in investments in permanent marketplace infra-
structure between large capitals and smaller centers, market systems and 
the kinds of exchanges that took place within them varied greatly across 
the Maya lowlands. As Leah Minc (2006:83) points out, “different market 
systems create very different contexts for production, exchange, and con-
sumption according to the structure and scale of their regional organization.” 
The scale of exchange interactions, the amount of commodity flows between 
market centers of the same size and those at different levels of the settle-
ment hierarchy, and the political geography of the landscape all factor into 
the organization of market systems (Minc 2006; Smith 1976a:314–5). Minc 
(2006) characterizes Carol Smith’s (1976b) four different market system 
models—administered solar, noncentralized network, dendritic, and com-
plex interlocking—using the dimensions of scale, networking, hierarchy, and 
political congruence. For the ancient Maya, solar markets are considered a 
good fit for Classic Maya market systems in provincial polities, although 
more complex hierarchical systems may have existed in large Maya capitals. 
Local markets where commoners exchanged basic goods and pilgrimage 
market fairs tied to calendrical events also may have operated periodically 
within the larger system (Masson and Freidel 2012:461; Scarborough and 
Valdez 2009).
Solar market systems consist of a market center serviced by small subsid-
iary markets located within a single political entity. Each solar market sys-
tem is self-sufficient and independent of the other because they “appear to be 
the result of the dominance of political forces over economic forces” (Smith 
1974:177). The administrative capitals of political kingdoms are the economic 
hub of the greater community and exert strong controls over the movement of 
producers and consumers (Smith 1974:176–177). Local goods move from pro-
duction sources outside the center to the central marketplace where they are 
exchanged, with little or no goods flow across political boundaries. Therefore, 
households sharing a market zone have similar distributions of basic craft 
goods, whereas households belonging to a different polity have functionally 
similar yet stylistically distinct items (Minc 2006:84).
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These markets were more likely administered by elites because they were 
closed and bounded systems (Smith 1976a, 1976b), in which market exchange 
is restricted, in Blanton’s terms, to buyers and sellers who are socially embed-
ded in hierarchical relationships. Long-distance imports were prone to control 
by elites because leaders provided safe entry into politically contested territory 
to traders. If interpolity commerce rests in the hands of elites, then elites are 
free to use long-distance commodities as “network capital” and commoners 
are constrained in their access to them (Blanton 2013:25–26). Although com-
moners may negotiate locally made items for fair market value because buyers 
and sellers are not strangers, they are at risk to challenge the price of long-
distance distance goods when market adjudication is in the hands of power-
ful interest groups. These sociopolitical factors condition the exchange value 
of goods and result in uneven distributions of high-value commodities that 
diverge from expectations for highly competitive market economies. Data to 
support this idea are presented below.
Classic Maya Marketplace Exchanges and Commodities
Marketplace exchange may best be understood by examining basic com-
modities likely exchanged in large quantities in marketplaces. The inter-
changeability of some high-value commodities, such as jade, cloth, and 
marine shells, to satisfy reciprocal exchanges and tribute obligations, as well as 
function as market currencies, presents problems for models that presuppose 
dominant exchange modes (Masson and Freidel 2012:460). Given the scope 
of this essay, I concentrate on two high-demand commodities—local ceramics 
and imported obsidian—to explore their exchange values and, ultimately, their 
household distributions in upper Belize River valley sites.
At large Maya lowland capitals, there is good evidence to suggest that 
ceramics were made available through marketplace exchanges in the Late 
Classic period. At Tikal, access to simply decorated polychrome serving ves-
sels and plainly finished utilitarian vessels appear to have similar distributions 
across households (Fry 1980), a pattern also found at Copan (Beaudry 1984), 
Palenque (Rands and Bishop 1980), and centers in the Petexbatun region 
(Foias and Bishop 1997). Compositional studies of locally made ceramics indi-
cate that, although Maya capitals may not have been the loci of production 
of most paste groups, capitals were the hubs of regional exchange systems 
that regulated periodic markets in rural communities. In the Palenque region, 
distance-decay curves of four paste groups indicate that the center had the 
most diverse paste groups, while sites further afield had fewer groups (Rands 
168 LISA J. LECOUNT
and Bishop 1980). Nonetheless, hinterland sites have similar proportions of 
those paste groups found at the center indicating that hinterland sites par-
ticipated in intraregional exchange of ceramics. Further, the distribution of 
the local paste groups coincides with that of the site’s emblem glyph suggest-
ing a politically bounded exchange system. In a more recent compositional 
study, Antonia Foias and Ronald Bishop found similar patterns at sites in the 
Petexbatun region (Foias and Bishop 2007). Hinterland sites exhibited rela-
tively homogeneous clusters of compositional groups, indicative of local pro-
duction of monochrome and polychrome pots, but they also contained high 
frequencies of compositional groups from other sites in the regions, indicative 
of interregional exchange. Like the exchange system at Tikal, the Petexbatun 
capitals of Aguateca and Dos Pilas had the most diverse assemblages, indicat-
ing that exchange was centered on larger centers rather than smaller ones.
Of the three study sites in the upper Belize River valley, the most systematic 
ceramic data come from the site of Xunantunich. There, plain and mono-
chrome pottery make up slightly more than 75 percent of the total assemblage 
and are found in relatively equivalent frequencies within elite and commoner 
household assemblages as expected if they had been sold in a marketplace 
(LeCount 1999; LeCount et al. 2002). Krista Garcia’s (2008) petrographic 
study of the two most common types and forms (Cayo Unslipped jars and 
Mount Maloney Black bowls) from Xunantunich, Actuncan, and the nearby 
community of San Lorenzo found that these types were made in four paste 
recipes during all phases of the Late and Terminal Classic period, lending 
evidence to suggest that they were fabricated in the same, highly stable house-
hold- or community-scale workshops. Her analysis of stylistic and formal 
attributes also found a high degree of standardization in formal attributes, 
including rim diameter and vessel wall thickness, another pattern expected of 
pottery made by specialists in quantities for sale in a market. Monochrome 
slipped types, such as Mount Maloney Black, Garbutt Creek Red, and Rubber 
Camp Brown, are also found concentrated in regionally discreet areas that 
correlate with provincial capitals (LeCount 2010). These data indicate that 
utilitarian pottery was widely exchanged but politically bounded, as predicted 
by a solar marketplace model.
These patterns, however, are not borne out in the distribution of high-value 
polychrome volcanic ash ware types. There are two groups of ash ware: the 
Chunhuitz Orange Group, which contains polychrome types, and Belize Red 
Group, which contains monochrome slipped types. Both were made predomi-
nately as serving vessels, and both make up about 11 percent of the total Late 
Classic Xunantunich ceramic assemblage (LeCount et al. 2002). Xunantunich 
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elite contexts have significantly higher statistical frequencies of Chunhuitz 
Orange types than commoner contexts at nearby communities such as San 
Lorenzo (LeCount 1999) and Chan (Kosakowsky 2012), where these types 
make up between four and two percent of the total assemblage. Interestingly, 
Belize Red Group frequencies are roughly similar across elite and commoner 
household assemblages. Previously, I have suggested that cost was a factor in 
the distribution of ash ware polychrome ceramics (LeCount 1999). In general, 
pottery made from volcanic ash would have been more costly for families in 
the upper Belize River valley than similar calcite tempered wares, given the 
scarcity of volcanic ash temper versus more widely available calcite tempers. 
Detailed stylistic analyses also indicate costly differences in production tech-
niques of the two groups. Chunhuitz Orange types are far less standardized, 
more stylistically diverse, and required more production steps than the stan-
dardized forms and styles seen in the Belize Red Group (Chase and Chase 
2012; LeCount 1996). Higher production costs may have translated into higher 
exchange values for Chunhuitz Orange types compared to Belize Red types, 
thereby limiting access to certain ash ware types for those at the lower rungs of 
the socioeconomic ladder. Although decorated types may have been redistrib-
uted or exchanged reciprocally through kin relations, their presence in even 
the most humble homes indicates that they were widely available in markets. 
In marketplaces, sellers could have negotiated a range of exchange values on 
pottery vessels based on production costs, resulting in the differential distribu-
tion of types by socioeconomic status.
Obsidian, imported from highland Guatemala and Mexico, was in high 
demand as fine cutting tools, projectile points, and esoteric cache objects by 
lowland Maya populations. The sources of obsidian available to Maya centers 
depended on trade relations, politics, and exchange modes that shifted over 
time. According to Geoffrey Braswell (2010:135; Braswell and Glascock 2011), 
Tikal controlled interregional trade in the lowlands, preventing rivals such 
as Calakmul from receiving large quantities of obsidian during the Classic 
period. Within the Tikal polity, the abundant nature and widespread distribu-
tion of obsidian supports either a network or administered solar market sys-
tem (Braswell 2010; Moholy-Nagy 2003, 2008). At Copan, Braswell (2010:136) 
suggests obsidian was both redistributed by elites and exchanged in solar 
markets. There, urban elites obtained higher frequencies of black Guatemalan 
and Honduran obsidian than rural households, and royalty received rare and 
highly prized green Mexican obsidian, which they redistributed to lesser 
members of the nobility (Aoyama 1999). Evidence of production, in the form 
of cores, is only found in elite contexts, indicating that they controlled the 
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production and distribution of blades. However, Ixtepeque obsidian, which 
comes from a source 80 km away from the center, is ubiquitous in house-
holds, lending evidence to suggest that this kind of obsidian was more widely 
available within the Copan polity, possibly through a market system (Braswell 
2010:136). Yet rulers residing in the Copan Principal Group had far greater 
amounts of Ixtepeque obsidian than elite and common households (Aoyama 
2011:42). Given the differential access to different sources of obsidian, Braswell 
(2010:136) suggests that “elites rather than the forces of supply and demand 
monitored the value of and access to obsidian.” The value of each kind of 
obsidian was based on procurement costs, use, and esthetic qualities, much 
like ash ware pottery types within the Xunantunich polity.
In the upper Belize River valley, access to obsidian was orders of magnitude 
smaller than that found in Copan or Tikal. At Actuncan, Sara Shults (2012) 
reports on the distribution of 594 obsidian pieces, an amount similar to that 
found at Xunantunich (Keller 2006:530), but far below the tens of thousands 
of pieces found at Copan (Aoyama 1999, 2011) or millions found at Tikal 
(Moholy-Nagy 2003, 2008). Shults utilizes a diachronic approach to under-
standing consumption of obsidian because, based on Hirth’s model, the his-
torical development of markets should homogenize the distribution of obsid-
ian across households through time. By charting the obsidian-to-sherd weight 
ratios within elite and nonelite households over Formative (or Preclassic) and 
Classic periods (figure 7.3), she found that before the Late Classic period, elites 
and commoners appear to have had relatively equal access to obsidian, but by 
the Terminal Classic period elite households had as much as three times more 
obsidian by weight than did common households. But similar to patterns at 
Copan, obsidian is found in all Actuncan contexts, albeit in varying quantities, 
indicating that households had relatively open access to the amounts of obsid-
ian they required for daily activities and, possibly, craft specialties (Masson 
and Freidel 2012:468–471).
At Actuncan, obsidian is overwhelming recovered as small processed blade-
lets. The mean cutting edge to mass ratio for blades is 7.84, with a mean width 
of 10.58 mm and mean thickness of 2.74 mm, indicating that blades were 
being consumed highly efficiently (Shults 2012:72). Prismatic blades from 
which these bladelets derive do not appear to have been produced in work-
shops at Actuncan. Besides the impromptu production loci in the plazas of 
Xunantunich and Buenavista, only one obsidian workshop has been found in 
the region (Hintzman 2000). Therefore, both the consumption and produc-
tion data indicate that obsidian arrived in the upper Belize River valley in 
relatively limited quantities through interregional exchanges.
MARKET COMPETITION AS A FACTOR FOR UNDERSTANDING COMMODIT Y DISTRIBU TIONS 171
Obsidian from the highlands reached the upper Belize River valley either 
from Caribbean or overland trade routes. El Chayal obsidian arriving from 
overland trade would have flowed through Tikal, whose kings negotiated 
access to obsidian with subordinates at low-level centers or permitted mer-
chants to travel and exchange obsidian across its borders. Ixtepeque and pos-
sibly some El Chayal obsidian would have made its way up the Belize River 
from the Caribbean coast through exchange relations between trade partners 
or long-distance traders. Mexican green obsidian is very rare at Actuncan, and 
although it too is found in both elite and commoner households, elites had 
more than commoners. The percentages of these sources vary over time, with 
Ixtepeque becoming more common in the Terminal Classic period, but access 
to each source by elite and common households remained similar over time 
(Shults 2012:91).
These data indicate that long-distance exchange of obsidian was likely over-
seen by elites throughout the Formative (or Preclassic) and Classic sequence 
in the upper Belize River valley. At Actuncan, blades were likely available in 
local markets at least by the Late Classic period, if not much earlier, but rulers 
likely reserved some obsidian for redistribution to loyal supporters. The great 
disparity in the distribution of obsidian by household status in the Terminal 
Classic period may have as much to do with changing consumption patterns 
as exchange relationships. Struggles between Xunantunich’s paramount rulers 
Figure 7.3. Obsidian-to-sherd ratio over time in elite and commoner contexts. (Graph 
from Sara C. Shults 2012:table 5.4.) 
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and Actuncan’s nonroyal elites for power may have concentrated obsidian in 
nonroyal elite households where it was used for termination rituals, veneration 
practices, or production of items requiring fine cutting, such as featherwork 
(Berdan, chapter 6, this volume).
ConCLusions
Multiple lines of evidence indicate the existence of Classic Maya market 
systems. Based on Blanton and Fargher’s collective action scales, the cultural 
conditions required for large-scale markets were rather weakly developed 
during the Classic period. Although a survey of the configurational evidence 
for marketplaces supports their existence in some large Maya capitals includ-
ing Tikal, Calakmul, and Chunchucmil, as well as provincial centers such as 
Xunantunich and Buenavista in the upper Belize River valley, the distribu-
tional data for high-value goods indicates that marketplace exchanges were 
not highly competitive except at Tikal. Based on these data, it is unlikely 
that the forces of supply and demand were the sole mechanisms operating 
in Classic Maya markets. Like Blanton and Fargher’s (2010) conclusions that 
the development of markets was the result of multiple factors, the evidence 
presented here illustrates how indices for marketplace exchange also must 
account for the scale of competition and the embedded sociopolitical rela-
tionships between interest groups. This is especially critical in politically frag-
mented regions, where market transactions are “plagued with uncertainty and 
opportunism” (Blanton 2013:25–26). For example, in restricted markets, com-
moditization of goods is restricted to locally made items, while long-distance 
items are used as network capital by elites.
In the upper Belize River valley, polities were relatively small, regionally 
bounded, and fiercely independent except during a short interval in the Late 
Classic period when they were incorporated into the Naranjo state. At that 
time, markets flourished at Xunantunich and Buenavista, where vendors sold 
goods out of temporary stalls situated in multiuse plazas. However, the dis-
tributional evidence for fully commercialized goods is mixed. Locally made 
plain and monochrome pottery types are found evenly distributed across 
households indicating that they were sold in marketplaces, but ash ware types, 
although present in nearly all households, are more variable in quantity. This 
pattern indicates that ash ware vessels were also sold in markets, but their 
exchange value was fixed using a sliding scale based on production and, pos-
sibly, transportation costs. On the other hand, the distribution of obsidian, 
while ubiquitous, is more than three times more common in elite households 
MARKET COMPETITION AS A FACTOR FOR UNDERSTANDING COMMODIT Y DISTRIBU TIONS 173
than commoner households. This pattern indicates that obsidian blades were 
made available through both elite-administered solar marketplaces, where 
their exchange value was fixed at a high rate, and centralized redistribution, in 
which elites received more blades than commoners.
The obsidian data from the upper Belize River valley do not support the 
dual-economy model in which luxury items circulated in a separate exchange 
sphere from ordinary goods; rather, it lends evidence to suggest that long-
distance trade goods were available in markets, at a price, and through redistri-
bution. Classic Maya commodities, such as obsidian, cloth, and decorated pot-
tery, circulated within articulated, not separate exchange modes—reciprocity, 
tribute, and markets—where they were assessed along a continuum of value 
(Masson and Freidel 2012:458). Future research on investigating how exchange 
values were established for commodities will greatly enhance our understand-
ing of market economies in Classic Maya society.
Acknowledgments. I would like to thank Lane Fargher and Verenice Heredia 
Espinoza for the opportunity to participate in this volume. The ideas presented 
here grew out of many conversations with colleagues—Angela Keller, Jason 
Yaeger, Bernadette Cap, John Blitz, and Steve Kosiba—and my graduate stu-
dents—Krista Garcia and Sara Shults. I also appreciate the comments of two 
anonymous reviewers who pointed me in the direction of Richard Blanton’s 
work on restricted marketplaces. Borislava Simova, Bernadette Cap, and 
David Mixter were instrumental in producing the illustrations. Data from the 
Actuncan Archaeological Project were gathered with support from a National 
Science Foundation grant (BSC-0923747) and University of Alabama College 








Enduring Nations and 
Emergent States
Rulership, Subjecthood, and 
Power in Early Scandinavia
T. L. Thurston
nAtion, stAte, AnD Power
Until recently, the archaeological study of past socio-
political organization was characterized by a search for 
the origins and rise of elites, whose quest for power 
could be characterized as seeking ever-increasing 
capacity for coercive force. This scholarly preoccupa-
tion with power as autocracy or oligarchy created a 
failure to recognize other forms of authority—more 
symmetrical distributions of power or nonelite self-
governance—even when they were relatively apparent. 
Over the course of the mid- to late twentieth century, 
this led to the overall mischaracterization of all power 
as asymmetrical power, from its advent within small-
scale communities to its expression in politically com-
plex societies, ancient and modern (Thurston 2010). 
While the power of coercive force is amply evident in 
the recent and distant past, it is only one type of instru-
ment within a spectrum of organizational potentialities 
recognized by contemporary social theorists. At worst, 
most archaeological theorists long denied the existence 
of politically complex societies with egalitarian ideolo-
gies; at best they have displayed indifference or doubt 
that alternative power structures can be detected and 
studied. As with all orphan domains there have been 
notable exceptions, among the most important the 
work of Richard Blanton and his distinguished coau-
thors, through the initial innovation of dual-processual 
theory (Blanton et al. 1996) and the subsequent devel-
opment and application of collective action theory 
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to historical and archaeological data sets (Blanton and Fargher 2008, 2009, 
2011, 2012; Fargher and Blanton 2007; Fargher et al. 2010; Fargher, Heredia 
Espinoza, and Blanton 2011).
It is not easy to find archaeological cases highlighting the power of a non-
elite majority, but a useful instantiation of subjecthood and rulership within 
such a system is the subject of this case study, an example found among the 
array of ancient North Atlantic nations. By “nation,” I mean a group with 
historically evolved or socially constructed shared ethnic identity; in northern 
Europe these sometimes can be documented as coherent entities for as much 
as a millennium. Over time, these enduring nations were absorbed by emer-
gent states, political constructs whose authors sought overarching legal juris-
diction over defined geographic territories and control of large-scale politi-
cal economies, based on enforceable obligations for taxation and labor. Such 
states usually display their own socially constructed identities, often pluralistic, 
frequently manifest through a politicized conquest mythos of state origins.
The case study below focuses on a sequence in which the early Svear state, 
expanding outward from central Sweden between the tenth and sixteenth cen-
turies AD, incorporated a region to the south, the Småland Plateau, an envi-
ronmentally marginal upland: high, cold, rocky, and heavily wooded (figure 
8.1). Plateau dwellers lived in a group of small neighboring polities (kingdoms 
or chiefdoms), had a strongly pastoral economy, and formed tightly knit kin 
and community groups for cooperative labor, using slash and burn to create 
artificial clearings for habitation, pasture, and “garden” cultivation in densely 
forested uplands. The case study reveals that the negotiation of power between 
nation and state was often violent, yet ultimately led to the formation of a 
corporate, or collective, state.
Traditional Archaeological Narratives of the State
Older yet still pervasive archaeological models of state formation (e.g., 
Flannery 1972; Trigger 1974; Webster 1975) tacitly imply or actively proclaim 
the notion that increasing political complexity is always associated with an 
elaboration of hierarchy, and always associated with increasing centralization 
and displays of status and legitimation. This view of state origins (i.e., Knapp 
1993; Roscoe 1993) has more recently been challenged (Blanton et al. 1996; 
Blanton and Fargher 2008, 2009, 2011; Crumley 1995, 2003; Fargher et al. 2010; 
Fargher, Heredia Espinoza, and Blanton 2011; Feinman 2001; Feinman et al. 
2000; Pauketat 2007; Thurston 2001, 2010; Yoffee 2005) by the proposal of 
alternative organizing principles.
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The case study presented here focuses on late prehistoric through early his-
toric Sweden. As in many world regions, beginning in the 1980s, attempts 
were made to force Scandinavia’s late prehistoric societies into a the tradi-
tional “elite hierarchy” model, in which virtually every complex society world-
wide was interpreted as harboring centralizing elites on a steady trajectory 
of attaining more and more power over subjects, who were never explicitly 
described but implicitly presumed to have given up traditional practices and 
privileges when faced with variously hypothesized forms of elite “legitimation.” 
For Scandinavia, while a culture historic framework persisted, materialist-
influenced, processualist interpretations were embraced by some (Hedeager 
1992; Parker Pearson 1984; Randsborg 1980) and changes in burial treatment, 
property, and implied social organization were all seen as representing move-
ment toward “progressively unequal social relations” (Parker Pearson 1984:69).
While there is little doubt that the region’s extant nations, their peoples and 
resources, were compromised by expanding and broadening states, historical 
and archaeological approaches to this process have long been dominated by 
narratives presenting an exclusively top-down perspective, interpreting the 
record as a trail of “events” initiated by “great men” or families. Acknowledging 
the role of such elites, yet adding to it a bottom-up viewpoint, balances our 
understanding of such sequences. The inevitability of ever-increasing inequal-
ity through time is also questionable for Scandinavia—understandable yet 
fraught with oversimplification. The region presents a productive case for the 
Figure 8.1. The Småland Plateau. 
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application of collective action theory, as Scandinavia’s protohistoric and early 
historic sociopolitical systems are generally well understood, facilitating the 
development of more appropriate perspectives.
Historical Narratives of Modernity: How to Build a State
Rojas (2005) has discussed the changing historical outlook on the politi-
cal and economic development of the modern nation-state of Sweden, where 
recent debate is intellectually situated in studies of the creation and breakdown 
of the “Swedish Model” industrialized welfare state, with a high standard of 
living and a caretaker mentalité. Rojas, along with a small number of revisionist 
historians, notes that there is a traditional historic narrative that stresses indi-
vidual historic “personalities” and “discontinuities” within this history. These 
discontinuities include especially the purportedly abrupt nineteenth-century 
industrialization of a formerly impoverished agrarian state, and the “sudden” 
invention of a unique type of balanced engagement between government and 
the governed. The notion of Folkhemmet, “the people’s home,” as a metaphor 
for the Swedish state, is frequently tied to the pre- and post-WWII attempt 
to create a bridge between communism and capitalism through a modern wel-
fare society (Rojas 2005:7). From this perspective, it is often asserted that this 
structure was the invention of sociologists during the mid- to late twentieth 
century, as a social experiment that lacked any basis in reality and was thus 
malaise-ridden and overdue for collapse by the end of the twentieth century 
(e.g., Enzensberger 1982; Wolfe 1989). Over the last few decades, this narrative 
has been challenged by the perspective that the “new model” state was far from 
the invention of mid-century sociopolitical engineers, or nineteenth-century 
industrialists, but “the result of a centuries-long historical evolution with no 
European counterpart” (Enzensberger 1982). New analyses that attempt to 
follow the state’s trajectory much further back in time examine social tradi-
tions, practice, and structuration, and emphasize continuities:
Folkhemmet certainly drew ideological strength from modern industrial utopias. 
However it was based as deeply on the egalitarian and solidaristic ideals of the 
rural estates, the paternalistic order of the old mining and manufacturing com-
munity known as the bruk, and on the idiosyncratic relationship between rulers 
and the ruled which lay deep in Sweden’s history. (Rojas 2005:7–8)
In this newer model, long-term ethnic homogeneity, the strength of the 
state itself, industrial growth, and technology, all stretching back well into 
the medieval era, were critical to the twentieth-century Folkhemmet, and it 
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was only the ensuing forces of “immigration, globalisation, prolonged eco-
nomic stagnation and the information revolution [that] have undermined 
them” (Rojas 2005:8). With the exception of economic troubles, these forces 
were largely embraced and tackled head-on by the Swedes, who are attempt-
ing, with varied success, to adapt their sociopolitical structure to these new 
conditions.
Rojas begins his exploration in the fourteenth century, with the so-called 
Swedish Magna Carta, or Charter of Liberties, and the creation of the Riksdag, 
a parliament where municipalities and districts had a representative voice in 
the governing of the state. In the Riksdag, not only nobles but also peasants 
were present to witness the king’s pledge to obey the law and refrain from 
excessive taxation. It continued through that century when Sweden, Denmark, 
and Norway were unified through a negotiated century-long settlement called 
the Kalmar Union, created by the Danish-born Margareta Valdemarsdotter, 
and governed by her from 1387 to 1412. This is admirable for a historic view, as 
such views are so often plagued by shallow time-depths and poor understand-
ing of the nature of social structure, human agency, continuity, and change, 
and is even more remarkable for Rojas, who is not a formally trained medi-
evalist, but a Chilean immigrant to Sweden and political economist serving as 
a member of that self-same Riksdag at the time of this publication.
Rethinking Traditional Narratives
The period in Sweden’s history identified by Rojas, and the historians he 
relies upon (e.g., Österberg 1993), as critical in the creation of the Swedish 
model begins in 1319 with the Charter of Liberties. A socially situated archae-
ology tells us that the majority of ancient and modern secondary states are cre-
ated from a unification of autonomous entities. Some consolidate by passing 
from alliances, through “consent” or negotiated hegemony (Gramsci 1971) and 
into a centralized polity with relative ease.
Superficially, then, 1319 seems a good place to seek Sweden’s political origins: 
an era of negotiated hegemony. But other states begin as unrelated polities 
or loose confederacies that undergo integration not through consent but via 
“power” or “force” (Chomsky 2003; Scott 1989, 1990). In fact, Sweden emerged 
from an expansionist conquest sequence and postconflict reorganization more 
than 300 years earlier than the fourteenth-century period identified as critical, 
and it was a process that was torturous for all parties.
The historian Österberg (1993) states that a lack of regional elites and the 
presence of “ethnic homogeneity” enabled the Swedish state to develop rapidly; 
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here I believe she errs significantly. The strength and perceived autonomy of 
regional elites and the marked ethnic differences between the Svear and the 
local authors of eventual rebellion against increasing absolutism are precisely 
what led to the restoration of the corporate ideology that appears to have origi-
nated in the Iron Age and stretches forward to the Folkhemmet.
Rojas notes that throughout Sweden’s sociopolitical development, a “com-
mon link is the tension between freedom and submission that runs clearly 
across 500 years of Swedish history” (2005:10). This is insightful, yet the time 
frame must be extended to at least approximately 1,000 years. If we push the 
origin of this “freedom/submission” tension back to its real beginnings, we 
find it in the later prehistoric era, before Sweden’s unification, and its earliest 
portion studied through archaeologically-framed research.
tHeorizing Power in A HigH-ConfLiCt soCiet y
Courses of political unification often produce sets of unequal power rela-
tions within emergent states, when inside their borders they subordinate 
groups with irreconcilable cultural institutions, religious differences, or eth-
nic identities, as well as incompatible economies. Such amalgamations often 
lead to the formation of “high-conflict” societies (Ross 2007) that can experi-
ence instability and internal unrest from the legacies left by expedient colo-
nial borders and opportunistic but short-sighted political decisions. Prior to 
forced unification, such disparate, self-identified groups frequently have coex-
isted in relative peace, yet as the state begins to enact itself, implementation 
of ill-considered or purposefully divisive economic or political policies pits 
them against each other, and hostilities with both material and ideological 
origins can last for centuries. Frontiers that previously divided once-autono-
mous regions often fade slowly, or not at all—in some cases becoming more 
cemented, as borders can simply divide people and territories, but can also 
“initiate or accelerate the identification or construction of collective identi-
ties both in the past and in contemporary societies” (Klusáková and Ellis 
2006:xiii). During Sweden’s initial unification, a number of dissimilar groups 
were brought under a single government, drawing preunification societies into 
conflict with a centralizing polity that expected them to fall into line as others 
already had (Thurston 2015). The polities at issue here were not “tribal” enti-
ties, as are frequently the object of study in conquest sequences, they were 
kingdoms, organized in more egalitarian yet politically complex modes. This 
created tensions equal to but different than those that developed between 
so-called tribes and states (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992). The clash in early 
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Sweden, between two kinds of complex political systems, both in terms of 
their structure and their ideology, is especially interesting.
Most archaeologists working on the topic of states and their development 
over the last few decades remember the puzzling nature of the “differently 
organized” society or state (Thurston 2010) and the endless debates sur-
rounding them. Were they states? Were they actually differently organized? 
Could they be divergent and still be states? Were we just missing some-
thing that would reveal them to fall within the normative expectations of 
the times? When the dual-processual theory of Blanton et al. (1996) was first 
published, many researchers working with the remnants of differently orga-
nized states welcomed it, as it explicitly dealt with the possibility that state 
structures and modes could vary significantly, and that ideologically egali-
tarian complex political systems were present in significant numbers in the 
past. Praised for its ability to model atypical systems, the theory proposed 
an infinite variety of political modes stretching between the corporate and 
the network ends of a continuum. A purely network strategy was hypoth-
esized to be dominated by elites with monopolies on power, supported by 
creating a network of relationships with other elites, and advertised their 
status with all the trappings of wealth and/or prestige. At the other end lie 
societies where power is devolved away from rulers toward a more equitable 
distribution among groups or institutions within society. Such societies are 
characterized by less elite power, or at least less emphasis on its appearance, 
display, and manifestation, often with institutions that encourage some level 
of popular power from below.
Blanton et al. (1996) further posited that most societies are in a constant 
state of tension between these poles as various groups or interests within soci-
ety constantly pull its characteristics and ever-evolving traditions toward one 
side or the other in a tug of war. In this way, envisioning as it did a reshaping 
and reforming of the “normal” state in a continual negotiation, it resonated 
with the reexamination of state formation by scholars of the 1990s who were 
trying to rewrite parts of the archaeological theoretical corpus through the 
structuration theory of Giddens (1984), the heterarchy concept introduced 
into archaeology by Crumley (1994), and the resurrection of older ideas in 
new forms: the house society of Levi-Strauss as reinterpreted by Joyce and 
Gillespie (2000), and the hegemony concept, both the original “consent” 
model of Gramsci (1971) and the resistance model of Scott (1990). In this way, 
at a critical time in the development of political theories on state formation 
in archaeology, dual-processual theory permitted some convergence between 
more traditional materialist and processualist views and the increasingly 
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theoretical interpretations influenced by the postmodern turn. It did so by 
allowing that ordinary people, using their agency from below, can wield con-
siderable power through their evolving practice; that societies with absolutist 
and shared power structures can both exist; and that both types of principles 
can coexist simultaneously within the same society, and that they can shift 
over time.
In order to understand the mechanisms that might trigger such shifts, 
using dual-processual theory as a starting point, Blanton and Fargher (2008, 
2009) developed collective action theory to more deeply investigate these 
issues. The mechanisms within ideologically egalitarian states, as well as 
their counterparts with more absolutist ideologies, are also key to under-
standing the high-conflict state, and I specifically call these “ideologies” 
because they are not always realities. As noted in both dual-processual and 
collective action theories, rulers and subjects often are out of step with their 
understanding of each other. Heads of state may imagine that they have 
much more power than they actually do; conversely, so may an autonomous 
and self-governing subculture overestimate its own ability to hold off a state 
army. On the other hand, farmers may imagine they have little power when 
they have enormous collective capacity for fomenting change. These mis-
matched perceptions may result in long periods of stasis where such assump-
tions are untested, or in episodes or extended periods of intense and violent 
conflict, as ordinary people may go underground or defy authority, may con-
form to or confront authority. The state may despise its own populace, or 
fear them, or both. The fact that the lower classes are excoriated, ridiculed, 
mocked, or diminished in ruling transcripts is well understood by historians 
and historical ethnographers as an indication not only of conflict but of 
dread (Scott 1990).
In developing collective action theory, the authors move from theorizing 
a continuum between differently characterized states (autocratic/absolutist 
networks vs. corporate/collective forms) to investigating the infrastructural 
qualities that render them into the entities that display such characteristics. 
Using premodern yet historical states as a proxy for prehistoric or nonliter-
ate cultures, historical clues to a more grounded view of the past are found in 
the records of law courts, property dispositions, and economic transactions 
that give us a sense of how such forms might “look” in terms of pattern-
ing, material culture, and archaeologically discernible (or theorizable) social 
processes.
Central to many disputes within high-conflict states is the public percep-
tion of elite demands: too many obligations for labor, service, and taxation, 
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which diminish the citizens’ abilities to work on their own behalf, allocate 
time to their own convenience, and make the most of their skills to stave off 
poverty or hardship. In addition, a state’s mandate that its people conform to 
a preferred set of legal constructs and ceremonial obligations that favor state 
actors and conventions can clash with traditional local values.
The Bureaucratized State
Blanton and Fargher (2008, 2009) propose, supported by extensive quan-
tified analysis of premodern states, that the most effective way a govern-
ment can assert its authority is to build organizational structures that 
accommodate voice, distribute public goods, and uphold just and fair taxa-
tion. This is accomplished through what Blanton and Fargher call bureau-
cratization, a process that creates effective infrastructural power for the state, 
rather than giving its rulers heavy-handed personal or network-style power. 
Infrastructural power has the incidental effect of limiting elite ability to 
coerce or command with impunity (see also Fargher, chapter 15, this volume; 
Mann 1986; Weber 1947).
Taxation
Without deference to formal Marxist theories of political economy, it is 
the case that all states must acquire the means of funding their own activities, 
operations, and the maintenance of their leadership. This political economy 
can take many different shapes and forms. Some income may stem from raid-
ing or appropriation of war plunder. In others, corvée labor may be used to 
see that the citizenry produces a yield of consumables or trade items for the 
sole benefit of the state, or directly labors with bodies and minds in civic 
activities in service to the state—labor that may be materially uncompensated. 
Many states, however, either supplement or replace such asset- and income-
generating strategies with the collection of specific tribute or taxes from free 
taxpayers. There are different methods for collecting such revenue, some more 
successful than others.
To some, the notion that fairness is more efficient than autocracy may seem 
counterintuitive. After all, tyrants, despots, and absolutists are the most pow-
erful and successful at appropriating the wealth of the taxpayer, are they not? 
Through their extensive cross-cultural analysis, Blanton and Fargher show 
that in reality, the answer is actually no. Rather, such regimes create motives 
for taxpayers to resist them, by cheating the collector, hiding assets, hiding 
themselves to avoid detection, or engaging in outright rebellion.
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Thus, while it might be assumed that success in revenue collection is mea-
sured by the amount of tax money or tribute a state manages to collect, this 
is only a part of the picture. The collection should also be easy—in other 
words, rulers should avoid extraordinary efforts to support tax collecting 
personnel, and the method of collection should not lead to dissent, which 
must be dealt with, or disturbances like protests and uprisings, which are 
expensive to control, and which ultimately may destabilize and overthrow 
the state—all counterproductive strategies. The costs of collecting revenue 
already reduced by tax evasion, and of putting down symbolic and/or violent 
protests by unwilling taxpayers, result in less efficient use and lower total 
income for the state.
Public Goods
Ostensibly, assets collected for funding a political economy also support the 
provision of public goods. These services to the public such as law and order, 
defense, maintenance of physical infrastructure, and in some states, efforts 
toward social welfare, all have their costs. Conversely, if taxpayers see the offer 
of public goods, they much more willingly pay the tax, tithe, or tribute. Public 
goods ease or enhance their way of life and livelihood, and also provide some 
degree of confidence that they will have recourse against the abuses of petty 
bureaucrats or systemic unfairness through a legal system or a grievance pro-
cess. Providing these assurances eases revenue collection and requires far less 
expenditure of labor and funds on the part of the state.
Voice
Voice entails a forum in which grievances can be aired, local/state obliga-
tions can be negotiated, and policies can be challenged. It can be, for example, 
in the form of large public meetings or smaller audiences with authorities, 
formal legal challenges to perceived violation of precedent or tradition, or the 
ability to cast a vote. The mere presence of such institutions goes a long way 
toward reducing conflict and violence between the state and its constituents.
We may see various scenarios play out either through direct detection of 
the process, such as an assembly place or structure serving as a legal forum, 
or law-related activities (specific to the region discussed here: Iversen 2013, 
Oosthuizen 2013, Riisøy 2013, Smith 2013), or perhaps only by the resulting 
form of society—revealed through the materiality of large-scale spatiotem-
poral patterns, and the organization and composition of landscapes, sites, and 
households that archaeologists are skilled at revealing.
RULERSHIP, SUBJECTHOOD, AND POWER IN EARLY SCANDINAVIA 187
Rationales of Resistance and Rebellion
Where states do not bureaucratize in an effective manner—by offering voice, 
public goods, and fair tax collection—collective action theory predicts that 
free taxpayers will evade tax collection, migrate or relocate to avoid surveil-
lance and physical appropriation of their goods or money, organize protests 
against perceived unfair practices, or violently rebel. The quantitative analysis 
of premodern states indicates that the theory has great predictive power. Does 
this also mean that detection of such practices and actions can be indicators of 
poor bureaucratization and its inherent conditions?
Blanton and Fargher (2009:134) note that “the form taken by a state depends 
in large part on the outcome of bargains struck between those in positions 
of state authority . . . and non-ruling groups, especially taxpayers.” We eas-
ily recognize this negotiation and the implicit agency of nonelites when we 
think of famous examples of “power from below”—those such as Wat Tyler’s 
fourteenth-century English Peasants’ Revolt, or the French Revolution, or 
any number of disruptive, violent, and sometimes failed, sometimes successful 
uprisings in historic and current times. Yet when we contemplate prehistoric 
or largely unrecorded protohistoric periods, our ability to predict—or even 
imagine—the unseen, undocumented common people of our study areas, we 
seem far less likely to concede that they had the will, agency, and power to 
organize and take action. For those of us explicitly studying the relationship 
between rulers and subjects through time, and the development of each state’s 
unique set of compromises around “power,” collective action theory gives us 
theoretical access to the groups, classes, or factions below the ruling class.
Egalitarian (and Other) Ideologies in Late Prehistoric Europe
Because the emergence of European Iron Age political systems is a repeated 
cycle of balance between power from above and power from below, our under-
standing of this era has benefited inordinately from all theories, past and cur-
rent, that deal with varied and alternative sociopolitical organization. The Iron 
Age is an era variously described as illustrating the “Germanic mode of pro-
duction” within a Marxian framework (Gilman 1995; Hunt and Gilman 1998), 
as being heterarchic (Crumley 1995; Kristiansen and Larsson 2005; Wailes 
1995), and as producing “corporate” polities within the “corporate/network” 
continuum (Bentley and Shennan 2003; Thurston 2001, 2009, 2010) or without 
reference to a specific theory, a kind of ideologically egalitarian, checked and 
balanced system ( James 1999, 2000; Collis 1997; Hill 1989, 1993). A tradition 
of deemphasized status and class differentiation was intermittently impacted 
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by the aspirations of self-promoting elites who used “personal prestige, wealth, 
power accumulation, aggrandizement, highly individualized leadership . . . 
long-distance exchange, exotic wealth, princely burials, and . . . status craft 
goods” (Feinman et al. 2000) to advance their fortunes. Collective action the-
ory is the most recent and sophisticated effort to characterize and situate the 
social, political, and economic conditions inherent in such frameworks where 
institutional hierarchies are not necessarily centralized, increasing political 
powers are not always marked by consolidated control, and ordinary people 
can figure prominently in political development and sociopolitical ideation.
This case study begins in prehistory and progresses to a protohistoric time 
when a partial elite transcript is available—a historic record not very detailed, 
yet indicative of the concerns of rulers. The record of subjecthood, of what it 
was like to be an ordinary person under the rule of the state, is found only in 
what James Scott calls the hidden transcript—an oblique indication of the 
“peasant problem” as inscribed in elite complaints, the creation and enactment 
of laws around “peasant trouble,” and actions taken by the state to exploit, sup-
press, or control them (Scott 1990, 1998). Few of these, if any, are written by 
or described through the perspective of the lower or middle levels of society, 
yet the indicated state of affairs, the balance of power, is usually not as elites 
describe for themselves and each other. Elite-inscribed records must always 
be read with the understanding that they present an instrumentalized version 
of events and processes (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992, Scott 1989, 1990, 1998; 
Sewell 2005). Only at the end of the study era do we finally have a clearer 
direct transcript of nonelite issues and concerns.
The Svear State: A High-Conflict Society in the 
Throes of Organizational Transition
Before the development of the Svear state over the course of the Iron Age, 
Bronze Age society in northern Europe (1700–500 BC) exhibited clear dis-
tinctions between elite and commoner in both material wealth and symbolic 
status: large houses, cattle sheds, monumental grave mounds, distinctive long-
distance and local wealth items, and restricted access to metals and weap-
ons characterized high-status individuals. Across northern Europe, including 
Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia, the period closed at around 500 BC with 
a general collapse of visible elite culture, often interpreted as not simply fail-
ure but outright rejection of sharply differentiating organizing principles, fol-
lowed by an era of social and political flattening, the Early (pre-Roman) Iron 
Age, marked by the disappearance of obvious status markers, large impressive 
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dwellings, and monumental tombs with “wealthy” goods (Giles 2007; Hodos 
2006; Kristiansen 1994; 1999; Morris 1999; Oubiña 2003; Thurston 2009, 2010).
If material culture alone is considered, one would think that leadership 
itself had vanished. When dual-processual theory was first introduced in the 
1990s, one of the first applications was to such contexts, using their newfound 
ability to postulate forms of organization different than those rooted in neo-
evolutionary ideas. It was suddenly possible to argue that leaders did in fact 
still exist, but that they had shifted from network-style status aggrandizers 
to corporate-style status deemphasizers as society took a more egalitarian-
minded turn. As noted, other theories important in this reinterpretation were 
house society theory (Beck 2007; Chesson 2003) and the heterarchy concept 
(Crumley 1995, 2003, 2005).
The conclusion that a major sociopolitical shift occurred during the Bronze 
Age/Iron Age transition, or perhaps that this underlying shift was a large part 
of what caused the visible material transition (Thurston 2010), is supported by 
evidence from the historic record. As the Iron Age progressed and contact was 
established between the Mediterranean and western/northern European peo-
ples, literate Romans and Greeks such as Julius Caesar, Cassius Dio, Diodorus 
Siculus, Pliny, Strabo, Tacitus, and many others described “primitive democ-
racies” in the Celtic- and Germanic-speaking spheres of the late centuries 
BC and early centuries AD. Further textual data from the post-Roman era is 
found in Continental authors such as Jordanes and Procopius.
The persistence of such sociopolitical traditions is discernible in the archae-
ological record throughout the course of the Iron Age, most strongly in the 
early Iron Age but continuing into the later Iron Age and the so-called Viking 
Age despite the redevelopment of more visible and more powerful rulers. 
Archaeological evidence for this more collective and heterarchical system is 
seen in an egalitarian or transegalitarian material culture, reduced stratifica-
tion in sociopolitical and settlement indicators, more egalitarian burial rites 
(Axboe 1999; Barrett et al. 2000; Earle and Kristiansen 2010; Kristiansen 2005; 
Smith 2004), and the appearance of assembly-places seen through textual 
records, place names, and archaeological evidence (Smith 2004; Sanmark and 
Semple 2008; Semple and Sanmark 2013). These reveal an Early Iron Age 
society with invisible leadership, developing slowly into those dominated by a 
political-military elite, yet with strong and sophisticated leveling mechanisms: 
“checks and balances” from below.
Some social codes and behaviors observed by the Romans continued, albeit 
in shifting form, in the intervening centuries when there are no textual records, 
only to emerge again in the documentary sources when literate traditions were 
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adopted at the introduction of Christianity around AD 1000. These include 
the heterarchic Iron Age sociopolitical organization frequently discussed by 
archaeologists (Bondarenki and Nemirovskiy 2007; Crumley 1995, 2003, 2005; 
González-Ruibal 2006; James 1999; Moore and Armada 2011; Thurston 2009, 
2010) with its “stand-alone” power structures: legislative, warrior, and religious. 
Military leaders required support from an assembly, and leaders and followers 
had reciprocal obligations: a warlord sustained his fighters (Christophersen 
1982; Lindow 1976; Vestergaard 1979), but their support evaporated if they per-
ceived arrogance or avarice (Thurston 2010). Allies elected a paramount to lead 
collectively against outside threats (Wells 1999:57), but refusal to relinquish 
power led to sanctioned overthrow or assassination. As clarified by collective 
action theory (Blanton and Fargher 2008, 2009; Fargher and Blanton 2007), 
the attempt to layer a “strong” form of rulership atop a long-time corporate 
society can inadvertently lead to the rise of a state with many internal conflicts.
After a more corporate, socially egalitarian, and status-flattened beginning, 
over time a slow return of more network-style traditions can be traced in the 
heartland of the later Svear rulers during the so-called Vendel period (ca. AD 
550/570 to 790/800), directly preceding the Viking Age. For example, slight 
status distinctions in central Swedish inhumation and cremation traditions, 
with pits and small earth heaps or within modest boat-shaped stone settings, 
developed after AD 550 into more differentiated forms (Ljungkvist 2008). New 
burial rites include monumental burial mounds of imposing height and over 
20 m in diameter, incorporating a central cairn with whole-animal sacrifices 
and rich, rare material culture. In the Svear heartland, at and around Gamla 
Uppsala, the protohistoric and historic seat of the Svear dynasty, are three high 
(ca. 10 m) burial mounds constructed in the mid-sixth through early seventh 
centuries, dwarfing earlier structures; several others lie in nearby regions.
Yet it is notable that while some elites constructed such monuments, others 
adhered to the more traditional burial context, a continuation of the smaller 
mounds and ship settings of the past, some cremated and some inhumed. 
Ljungkvist (2008) notes that osteological and artifactual analysis of both types 
of burials—new and traditional forms—show that the number and types of 
animals sacrificed and the grave offerings were identical, indicating that fami-
lies of the same sociopolitical and/or economic class were selecting different 
rituals. This may signal that a newly emerging group, or a splinter group of 
elites, adopted a more symbolically uneven presentation, emphasizing indi-
vidual status with unprecedented monumental construction and eventually an 
increasingly wealthy material culture, reflecting a more divided, uneven, and 
asymmetrical reality.
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By the end of the seventh and eighth centuries AD, not one but two poli-
ties existed: the Svear and Götar kingdoms, documented archaeologically 
and through mythopoetic texts. These saga entities emerge as real political 
entities in the early historic era. Significant archaeological work has targeted 
the emergence of the Svear “core” near Stockholm in the Mälar valley, but 
scholars are only now focusing on the origins of Götaland, which consisted 
of Västergötland and Östergötland (figure 8.2). At the Skänninge site, milita-
ristically symbolized elites of the early first millennium AD kept compounds 
near cult-places whose names link them to a götar people. Nearby gravefields 
at Högby show social stratification developing between the first and fifth 
centuries AD, culminating in several “levels” of elites with warrior trappings 
(Helander and Zetterlund 1998; Kaliff 2003). Late Iron Age rulers, sharing 
power with religious specialists and a public assembly, may have emerged 
through interactions between important families in Väster- and Östergötland.
Just south of Östergötland, lies what is today called Småland. This area was 
not initially part of Götaland, rather its borders contained several small-scale 
political units. Småland literally means the “small lands”: 12 independent socio-
political aggregates (figure 8.2), some mentioned as “peoples” in Jordanes’s eth-
nohistoric Getica of around AD 550 (Mierow 1908). This is reflected in differ-
ent runestone and mortuary styles following still-extant boundaries between 
Småland’s härads, administrative units whose borders lie along yet earlier ones. 
Although there is no textual documentation, historians often assume that 
Småland’s polities were consistently allied with the Götar, and in their fight to 
resist Svear domination, the outcome of continuing autonomy suggests that 
this is plausible.
Ethnohistoric traditions describe hostility and warfare between Svear and 
Götar, with eventual Svear domination, claimed to have begun with “conquest” 
around AD 1000. Yet Svear claims of “unification” at AD 1000 are improbable. 
Swedish historians (Sigurðsson 2006) admit ignorance of how or when unifi-
cation began or proceeded. In light of the work of Blanton and his coauthors, 
unification, rather than comprising an “event,” likely was attempted earlier 
and proceeded longer.
From the tenth century on, Scandinavian legal codes were transcribed to 
written texts, from oral traditions in which a lawspeaker recited in public to 
ensure fairness and adherence to the code, leading to historically recorded 
protests against radical interpolations that increased the ruler’s power and 
decreased the rights of sub-elites and common people (Brink 2002, 2003, 2004). 
By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the ting/thing, or assembly, where leaders 
and later kings were voted in by those eligible to cast a lot, became less electoral 
Figure 8.2. Sweden in the eleventh–twelfth centuries, showing the major regions 
(Norrland, Svealand, and Götaland-Småland) and the “small lands” of Småland. 
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and more oriented toward “approval” of heirs, and the selection of eligible men 
from a large group of hopefuls was replaced by royal patrimony via brothers, 
then sons. Urban and rural elite-run courts eventually superseded local assem-
bly places (Myrberg 2008; Sanmark 2009; Sanmark and Semple 2008).
The drama that played out between the Smålanders and their ostensible 
kings has usually been cast in traditional historic terms, identifying individual 
people or small groups of “aristocrats” as the primary agents of conflict and 
change. It can alternately be seen as a struggle between two forms of political 
organization, older more egalitarian forms, and newer attempts at hierarchic, 
centralized organization, over an entire millennium, as the Iron Age system 
suppressed quick changes, leading to long periods of tacit or active resistance 
against attempted unification through “creeping” centralizing change, followed 
by short, violent struggles when rulers challenged tradition, often unsuccess-
fully. To understand Småland’s incorporation into Sweden and its role in state 
formation, we must primarily use archaeology and its allied disciplines to 
reveal prestate conditions and later courses of change.
Change in Economic and Political Landscapes
The Svear and Götar kingdoms developed out of heterarchic Iron Age soci-
eties, where we understand that the infrastructural elements called bureaucra-
tization were well established. As they grew less collective and more network-
oriented during the later Iron Age, other regional polities did not necessarily 
follow suit; many retained a strongly collective nature. During the long stretch 
of time when the increasingly network-style Svear polity began to conquer 
and incorporate its neighbors, there were many continuities but also numerous 
shifts in the organization of the cultural landscape. Some landscape changes 
are local byproducts of other decisions, while “institutional landscape changes” 
are planned or encouraged components of political and economic strategies, 
or responses to broadly experienced demands or opportunities.
Småland is often characterized as marginal and impoverished, but this is 
largely based on the perception that wealth lies in cereal agricultural produc-
tion. The Swedish state saw many profitable and productive possibilities on 
the Plateau. A border region, Småland was the launching pad for Swedish 
military expeditions against Denmark. Military musters, while drawing from 
across the state, unequally availed themselves of local manpower. Husbandry 
provided meat and dairy, horses, wool and leather with regular and military 
uses, and was also taxable. Large iron deposits destined for use in weaponry lay 
in ore-rich hills and in malm (bog-iron) found in ubiquitous lakes and swamps. 
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Forest industries included iron-smelting with blast furnaces fueled by charcoal, 
manufactured in large charcoaling pits. Tar manufacture was vital to rapidly 
expanding royal navies.
While the Svear rulers desired the Plateau dwellers’ products and tax rev-
enue, obtaining them was much more difficult. It first required some level 
of territorial control, which during the state’s coalescence was fictional—the 
state had no formal presence there before the twelfth century. To collect rev-
enue in an area where little direct control is exercised and the population is 
spread across a landscape that is well-suited to concealment, collective action 
theory would suggest that the best way to facilitate state economic policies 
would be to construct a vigorously bureaucratized infrastructure.
Was bureaucratization the Svear strategy? The official transcript of the 
medieval era indicates that tax evasion was rampant and state mandates were 
more often protested or ignored than followed. Farmers frequently murdered 
tax collectors and other officials, seen in the legal records of “blood money” 
paid to acquit them of these crimes, as was possible under the laws of the era. 
There were tax rebellions and uprisings. Complaints were made about the hid-
ing of assets and the difficulties of prosecuting lawbreakers scattered through 
the deep and dark forests—tactics that might be rational and expected behav-
iors in the face of network-style lack of bureaucratization. This trend contin-
ued, and escalated over the next few centuries.
It might be inferred from both the textual and archaeological records that 
rather than building bureaucratic infrastructure, the Svear state strategy 
appears to have taken the path of building a physical infrastructure for the 
installation of top-down, authoritarian power. In a region where no towns or 
cities were previously known, centers were established from which authority 
was exercised. Around 1140, a royal castle was constructed on Visingsö island 
in Lake Vättern in the heart of the Plateau region, marking the Swedish king’s 
authority. Visingsö—not the Svear homeland—became the primary royal res-
idence for the next two centuries; it was not a temporary local residence.
A local Iron Age marketplace had long operated at the confluence of the 
June river and southern Lake Vättern, but in 1282, the state founded a market 
town, Jönköping nearby, superseding the traditional hub, and soon installed a 
large garrison. Access south along river roads enabled trade and moved armies 
downstream to attack the Danes, but also brought them north, and the city 
was torched and plundered several times, deeply embroiling Småland in war-
fare in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries.
The Swedish Crown forbade trade between the two states, and commer-
cial activity across the border, a centuries or even millennia-old tradition, was 
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rendered illegal, leading to the Smålander’s refusal to recognize the Swedish-
Danish border at Småland’s southern edge (Andrén 2000). The niche of 
“forest- dweller” extended from Småland far into the Danish territory of Scania, 
and allegiance to either state and respect for a largely arbitrary border was 
far weaker than bonds between forester-pastoralists on either side. During 
the many Danish-Swedish wars, “farmer’s peace treaties” were enacted. These 
bondefred were formal written agreements to continue trade, and provide 
mutual warning against incursions of troops from their own homelands. Actual 
collusions are documented for both sides (Andrén 2000:317–318; Cederholm 
2007). Eventually during the sixteenth century, the “magnate” Brahe lineage 
controlled the region, building castles like royalty on the mainland and on 
Visingsö. In the sixteenth century, Catholicism, still cherished by the uplanders, 
was forcibly replaced with the Lutheran Protestantism adopted by the Svear.
DisCussion
Traditionally, in Sweden, the bonde or free farmer had voice in government, 
but not because power was devolved by enlightened or merely clever rulers, 
and not because of any state-initiated institutions designed for smoothing the 
collection of taxes and the orderly control of society. Rather, it was because at 
the time the state emerged, the free farmer was the state. As noted above, the 
heterarchical nature of both prestate and early-state Scandinavia, left two-
thirds of the governance of society in the hands of nonrulers, or conversely, 
two-thirds of society that were nonmilitary elites, ruled together, through 
representation, with their war leaders. While small, private-retinue armies 
of 200–300 full-time soldiers were kept by rulers, the actual armies of the 
day were simply levies of farmers and other free men. The kingdoms were 
divided into administrative units called härads/herreds (Swedish/Danish) or 
“hundreds”—referring to the number of men, with a proper complement of 
ships, that was owed to the king in times of war. The ruler would call a levy 
and the hundred-man would arrive at a levy-place led by local elites. Similarly, 
the assemblies where local and national leaders were elected or acclaimed, saw 
the participation of all free men, also rallied and led by local leaders. Until AD 
1000–1100, the “yea or nay” was real, in the sense that rival candidates for king 
were put in or voted out of the job by the votes of ordinary citizens, organized 
of course by those with influence in the community.
Changes in this system occurred in the manner of a punctuated equilib-
rium over the course of the Iron Age, including the early medieval Viking 
Age or long Iron Age, with long periods of relatively imperceptible change 
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interspersed with violent eruptions of reorganization. Changes included the 
transcription of oral law to written, and often subtly altered documents, and 
the true election of kings by the commons became more aptly described as 
acclamation or acceptance. The longstanding claims by the commons that 
kings could tax citizens no more than earlier rulers had taxed their ances-
tors were met by challenges from above in the eleventh century. Flatlanders 
fought these trends but eventually were forced to accept many changes 
(Thurston 2001). This was not always the case for the more territorially seg-
regated uplanders.
The Småland pastoralists shared Scandinavia’s strongly egalitarian, anti-
authoritarian ideology and, unlike more accessible populations, were mostly 
self-governing, even after incorporation into the body of the state.
Collective action theory postulates that if a state is to impose and collect 
taxes in an orderly manner, without inviting protest or social upheaval, it must 
first bureaucratize. The principals—rulers and their immediate proxies—must 
develop a set of rules, laws, codes, and expectations for how its agents—in 
Sweden, a force of royal sheriffs, bailiffs, and fief-holders—carried out state 
imperatives among the populace. In many instances the commons had the 
ability to properly monitor and rein in agents who were abusers, and to address 
public concerns (Blanton and Fargher 2009:141). In many parts of Sweden by 
the fifteenth century, representatives of the various farming districts appeared 
directly before the king to make a public record of their demands or claims. 
Yet in Småland, because of its late and more unwilling incorporation into 
the state, appeals were less direct: they were carried out in local or regional 
venues as if the state had never enacted itself (Cederholm 2007). In many 
ways, Småland, between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries, continued to be 
a separate nation not only in the eyes of the Smålanders but in the perception 
of the Crown.
When the centralizing agricultural state proclaimed its broad new powers, 
it came into irreconcilable conflict with tightly knit forest pastoralists who 
adhered to ancient apparatuses of egalitarianism and who were poorly inte-
grated into any extant protections. In Småland, the system was limited to 
officially sanctioned tax farming by ruthless royal officials, compounded by 
the fact that these agents imposed additional taxes and dues on their own, 
without any central authority, and used brutal tactics to collect them. Since 
the Smålanders brought their issues only before local courts and not directly 
to the king, the situation would grow dire. That conflicts arose is not surprising 
(Blanton and Fargher 2008, 2009). Småland’s identity as a set of autonomous 
“kingdoms” within a larger state outlasted the unification era: Småland long 
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represented the yardstick by which Swedish kings could measure the integra-
tion of their state. It often became necessary to make an example of them.
Livelihood and Dwelling in a Time of Subjugation
In addition to examining the building of state urban and military infra-
structure, as noted above, a program of landscape archaeology has examined 
local responses to these processes. Of the 12 “small lands,” two have been 
studied—Tveta and Vista—which border Lake Vättern and Visingsö Island 
with its royal seat (figure 8.2). Both were coherent political and administrative 
units in prestate and state times. I have conducted archaeological research 
in four settlement districts (figure 8.3) that exhibit coherence and continu-
ity, because they represent contexts at “ground zero” to royal authority, and 
then at ever-increasing distances from central state authorities: the island of 
Visingsö, where the Swedish monarchs made their full-time permanent home; 
the nearby and unusually (for the Plateau) agriculturally rich Skärstad Valley; 
the more distant, smaller Bredestad Valley; and the iron-rich region south of 
Jönköping town, the Södravätterbygden. These four locales likely had differ-
ent relationships and obligations to the state, thus differentially reflecting its 
impacts. All contain sites dating prior to, during, and after state formation 
and expansion. This work is ongoing, but some preliminary conclusions may 
be drawn.
Livelihood
The study of complex land-use history and shifting labor organization can 
aid understanding of Småland’s development. It is clear from the juxtaposi-
tion of finds at upland archaeological sites that one of the main strategies used 
by the inhabitants was “occupational pluralism”—the constant combining and 
shifting of resources, processing technologies, and land/labor rights and strat-
egies. McCann (2000:486) notes that:
occupational pluralism represents a strategy for family survival in a marginal 
world of work. It is a response to those situations in which no single activity 
provides an adequate income to meet family needs. To this end, contributors 
to the family’s economic welfare might follow a number of seasonal activi-
ties—some subsistence, some that earn cash—as they try to gain a modicum of 
well-being.
While McCann goes on to say that in the current day and age, this often 
fails, leading to the disintegration of families and communities, in Sweden’s 
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Figure 8.3. Four study blocks with varying proximity to the royal establishment on 
Visingsö Island. 
uplands it was a centuries-old way of life that was successful, and is still suc-
cessful, even in current times. On the Plateau, it long comprised livestock 
raising combined with small-scale cultivation, charcoaling, iron production, 
woodworking, tar-manufacture, and arboriculture.
There are also proxy data for changes in workforce organization, labor-
intensive strategies historically interrelated with proximity and kinship among 
pastoralists (Fratkin 1989; Grandin et al. 1991). Enormous stone heaps from 
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clearance, accomplished with svedjeburk, or slash and burn, thickly dot even 
tiny clearings, some formed into long, high field boundaries that stretch off 
into the forest or crest over hilltops. They have been dated by OSL and car-
bon-14 to waves coinciding with the 1000s–1100s, the 1100s–1200s, and the 
1300s–1600s periods (Häggström 2004). Montelius (1953:42) noted that nine-
teenth-century svedjebruk “required so much labour that a single farm could 
hardly undertake the clearing . . . Felling was a heavy job, but most hands were 
needed . . . to prevent the fire from spreading . . .Several farms—ten or so—
joined together in a common clearing [in addition to] individual clearings.” In 
the 1600s and probably earlier, formal “associations” of 2–4 large households 
(Vestbö-Franzén 2005) of about 10 persons each ( Jansson and Kristensson 
2004) cooperatively swiddened, planted, and later herded and grazed the fal-
low, also cooperatively. Some sites reveal the creation of terraces, not for crop-
ping but simply to create a platform for daily activities on terrain impossible 
to otherwise build upon.
The pastoral labor pool was increased through household cooperation, “bor-
rowing children,” or hiring workers (Sieff 1997) to facilitate herding, milking, 
and foddering; well, byre, and corral construction; animal droving and market-
ing; and cultivation. Interherded species require different grazing and water-
ing regimes, thus their own habitual “tenders” (Arhem et al. 1981; Coppock et 
al. 1986; Cossins and Upton 1988; Fratkin and Smith 1994).
The study of production technologies reveals whether skilled, unskilled, or 
mixed labor was used. Iron production requires skill plus hard labor; charcoal-
ing and tarring, less skill. Changing economies may point to changing work-
forces. In the well-studied Bergslagen north of Småland, blast-furnace opera-
tions, similar to those of slightly later date in Småland, are found beginning 
around 1150, where iron and steel were produced in well-documented peasant 
cooperatives (Florén et al. 2003:78), exemplified at the archaeological sites of 
Lapphyttan and Vinarhyttan. Metal production at increasingly higher levels 
was of utmost import to the Crown, and the legal status of the “free miners” 
was outlined in special legislation from the king, acknowledging and regu-
lating the cooperative nature of organization by granting industrial charters 
and forbidding a blast furnace from being jointly owned by more than eight 
households, while individual smiths were responsible for the quality of iron 
that they themselves decarburized (Gordon and Reynolds 1986; Magnusson 
1984, 2002, 2009). Finds at Lapphytten are consistent, revealing exactly eight 
twelfth-century refining hearths in the immediate vicinity of the smelting 
operation (Magnusson 1984:61). This traditional collective ownership, which 
had both communal and individual attributes, continued forward through 
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the medieval era, exemplified in the fourteenth-century Kopparberg charter, 
indicating that shares of the mine were proportional to ownership of smelters 
(Rydberg 1979).
Thus, archaeological and paleoecological data tell us that cooperative orga-
nization and occupational pluralism continued to be the main strategy for the 
forest farmers of Småland during their contested unification with the Svear 
state. The economic impact of the state, direct or indirect, may be seen in the 
intensification of agropastoralism and forest industries through the series of 
colonization waves into ever-higher and more difficult terrain. Pollen, animal 
bones, and settlement remains tell of behavioral changes, but only indirectly 
of social transformations.
Dwelling
Across much of Scandinavia, recognizable settlement foundation waves are 
sometimes broadly apparent, to the point where they are almost assumed. In 
Småland, these waves and phases of organizational and demographic response 
are somewhat unique, and must be seen in the face of changing conditions. 
Toponym studies, correlated with thousands of archaeological investiga-
tions, are a reliable general indicator of site foundation eras in Scandinavia 
(Agertz 2000; Brink 1984, 1990). Villages still extant today were recorded by 
the 1200s–1300s in cadastral registers, as were those abandoned after recording. 
The place name (Brink 1984, 1990) denotes the foundation of the archaeo-
logical “original” settlement, usually within sight of the historic (modern) vil-
lage locale. These sites, including those abandoned prior to recording with no 
modern analogues, are found through soil chemical and pedestrian survey.
There were several expansions before the Svear conquest, similar to broad 
changes across Scandinavia usually interpreted as small foundation waves rep-
resenting slow population growth in a region without much available farm-
land for expanding extant villages. In general, these correspond to Roman Iron 
Age sites (AD 1–400), Migration-era or post-Roman sites (AD 400–550), the 
Vendel period (AD 550–800), and the Viking Age (AD 800–1050).
While it is important to understand the pan-regional generalities of these 
settlement waves, it is also important to note that Småland differs significantly. 
Across Scandinavia, a huge wave of “hamlet foundations” is linked to tax 
increases around AD 1000–1100 as multiple states emerged, many interpreted 
as “planned” settlements. These small villages of several farms share the place 
name suffix –torp, sometimes abbreviated to arp/up, meaning “new settlement 
dependent on an older settlement.” In Småland it is a distinct but unusually 
patterned phase; among the four study blocks it occurs significantly only on 
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Visingsö island, and may correlate with the twelfth-century establishment of 
the royal residence on Visingsö rather than the late Viking Age. Indications 
are that few were founded further afield, which may show the era’s meager 
extent of state power or lack of obedience to state will.
Place names unique to the region are plentiful. Highly dispersed one- or 
two-farm sites with the suffix -hult form a large colonization, mostly of the 
1200s, coinciding with the establishment of Jönköping. A wave of similar sites 
ending in -ryd appears to have begun largely in the 1300s. Hult and ryd mean 
“artificial clearing” and are more apparent and very numerous in the upland 
valleys and dense forest areas far from the royal island and town; they contin-
ued to be founded through the 1500s. The Black Death impacted the region in 
the later fourteenth century, but a new expansion beginning around 1500, seen 
especially in the dating of field-clearance cairns, may correlate with the rise of 
Swedish-Danish warfare and military supply needs, as well as the introduc-
tion of the Brahe family’s direct local rule in the region.
The difficulty of enforcing tax collection, labor obligations, and new 
unpopular religious practices (here, the introduction of Lutheranism) in 
dispersed settlements has been noted by archaeologists, historians, and 
ethnographers in many global contexts. Examples include Scott’s (2009) 
well-known examination of the evasive strategies of the hidden, dispersed 
peoples of upland Southeast Asia; the practices of colonial-era Maya, about 
whom the Spanish complained frequently (Farriss 1985:218); similarly early 
Spanish-colonial frustrations in Tiwanaku (Bandy and Janusek 2005); and 
countless others.
Dwelling, livelihood, and change
As frequently inferred by archaeologists, foundation waves of many small, 
dispersed sites additionally suggest intensification and increased efficiency, a 
degree of autonomy, egalitarian principles of land tenure, and perhaps attempts 
at concealment (Drennan 1988; Emerson 1997; Peterson and Drennan 2005), 
despite the move into higher and higher valleys with ever-worsening condi-
tions for the pastoral agroeconomy. This view is borne out in numerous ethno-
graphic studies (Bentley 1990; Blarel et al. 1992; Hassane 2001; Netting 1989; 
Tan et al. 2006; Udo 1965).
Each successive wave of these later upland expansions pioneered into higher 
and higher elevations, from 200 masl, to 250, to 300, to 350 and higher—from 
valleys with soil to those with almost no cover over bedrock—more hidden 
but also more difficult to occupy and cultivate (figure 8.4). While pioneers 
may have been practicing forestry-related commercial activities, they were 
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also carving out their daily subsistence, which would have been much more 
difficult at high elevations than in the lower-lying upland valleys.
The relative magnitude and distribution of such pioneering suggests mod-
erate to significant intensification. Areas close to the royal residence had 
planned torps, perhaps established by decree for direct royal support, account-
ing for some of this expansion. However, hult and ryd, names almost unknown 
outside Småland, suggest that the major push came from perhaps a local 
movement from “below.” In some areas, such as the Södravätterbygden south 
of Jönköping town, close to the Taberg iron-ore region, such settlement inten-
sification was surely related to industrial production: wood and charcoal are 
proxies for the production of iron and tar, and dateable charcoaling features 
show sharp increases in number and size through time.
Figure 8.4. Detail of Skärstad-Ölmstad Valley showing changing landscape use from the 
Iron Age to the Medieval period. 
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“tHey DefenDeD tHeir rigHts”
Blanton and Fargher assert that states should effectively offer voice, public 
goods, and fair tax-collection procedures to taxpayers in order to avoid con-
flicts, implying—in the neutral tone of theoretical language—that a “rational 
state” should see the benefits of such arrangements. They do, however, care-
fully call such a system of government a “sociocultural construction” (Blanton 
and Fargher 2009:141), which for this case study must be strongly emphasized. 
The phrase, “They Defended Their Rights,” is translated from the work of 
Cederholm (2007), a contemporary Swedish historian, who makes especial 
note of the fact that the system of collective government long preceded the 
state in Sweden, and it was not the rulers who offered it, but the farmers 
who demanded they adhere to it. Despite the more negotiated conditions 
elsewhere in Sweden, the Swedish Crown effectively continued to treat the 
Smålanders as a conquered territory with clearly separate origins, perhaps 
because the Smålanders themselves in some ways insisted on it.
Blanton and Fargher define resources drawn from outside the state as “exter-
nal revenues”; it is possible that Småland, conquered yet still in early modern 
(and recent) times oft-conceptualized as remaining apart, was treated as an 
external revenue source. Most conflicts between the fifteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, between rulers and subjects, were over the outrageously high cost of 
war, and the taxes and other burdens related to it. Since Småland was on the 
border, it was unduly impacted by violence, burning and laying waste, rape of 
women and girls, the extraction of resources, and calls for mustering soldiers 
from local settlements. It is possible that the rest of Sweden benefited from 
the Crown’s treatment of Småland as a colony of sorts rather than a province 
to which appropriate governance should apply. The Smålanders, through their 
extreme reluctance to participate in the state and their inward-turned politi-
cal stance, may have exacerbated this. Given the brutal nature of tax collec-
tion, and the lack of recourse enjoyed by other regions through direct lines of 
communication with the Crown, tax evasion, rule-breaking, and strategies of 
concealment from state surveillance are predicted by collective action theory 
as rational responses to an oppressive state.
In an entirely prehistoric context it might be difficult to prove that out-
comes were as violent as we know they were, but archaeologists should not 
fear suggesting such courses. While it is plausible that the expansion waves 
and their marginal locales simply show extreme pressure from the state to 
pay higher taxes, the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries also record the most 
conflicts over tax evasion. A sequence fraught with tension concluded in a 
dramatic cascade of events that cemented, rather than ended, the place of 
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the corporate tradition and its practice of shared governance and collective 
action.
After King Gustav Vasa raised taxes sharply, banned cross-border trade with 
Denmark, and banished rurally cherished Catholicism in 1542 (Cederholm 
2007; Hallenberg et al. 2008; Katajala 2004), Niels Dacke, an impoverished 
local sub-elite who had already paid blood money for killing a sheriff over the 
heinous practices associated with tax collection, appears in historic texts as a 
general, riding in command of a farmer army against the state. Dacke’s rebel-
lion (Dackefejden) spread throughout southern Sweden and along the Danish 
border, and Vasa’s army of foreign mercenaries was massacred by crossbow-
armed farmers in the dark forests and steep, rocky terrain, where their military 
tactics were useless. Vasa, who was himself put in power by an earlier farmer 
army, signed a peace treaty with Dacke, who raised the ban on trade, low-
ered taxes, and restored the Catholic church, according to local desires. When 
Vasa broke the treaty and the commoner’s forces were decimated, Dacke was 
wounded, outlawed, and died on the border of Småland and Denmark in 1543, 
and his family was executed shortly after.
Despite the ultimate failure of the historic figure, Dacke, the corporate mode 
of governance fared far better than the rebel leader. After the Dackefejden, 
Vasa stepped back from the taxation practices that had inspired the Smålanders’ 
rebellion and paid special attention to their complaints. He and his descen-
dants deferred frequently to the farmers who brought issues before the Crown, 
to ensure the security of the throne (Hallenberg et al. 2008). One might say 
that while the Smålanders may have been paying more tax than their ances-
tors, their final expansions and intensifications may have been ones that were 
of little direct benefit to the state. In other words, later kings of Sweden began 
providing access to the collective and reciprocal structures found elsewhere 
in Sweden, which had been modified from Iron Age practices and continued 
in an Early Modern form. This was what the Smålanders had agitated for, 
and the reason they initiated violent conflict. While the upland farmers had 
to accept the less powerful version of “voice,” the state also accepted a lower 
level of taxation and control—a final negotiated reciprocal arrangement that 
in many ways follows a continuous thread to the present.
ConCLusions: retHeorizing A “CementeD” reCorD
Kingship, over the course of the study period, was emerging from a heter-
archical and weak structure, developed during the more corporate, collectively 
oriented Iron Age, in which rulers were elected and had more limited power. 
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After AD 1200, and especially during the 1300s–1400s, there were attempts to 
create legislation to increase royal power at the expense of the aristocracy and 
the commons, often using certain tax exemptions for the upper classes, which 
encouraged nobility to coopt local producers. In the 1500s, modeling their 
aspirations on the political and economic power of continental kingship, there 
was a push toward absolutism.
Blanton and Fargher have argued that bureaucratization—the building 
of organizational structures providing or accommodating voice, distribut-
ing public goods, and collecting taxes justly and fairly—is necessary if rulers 
determine that they must collect, or increase the volume of, revenue. In the 
absence of these institutions, the theory postulates that people will migrate, 
evade tax collection, organize demonstrations, or rebel.
The Småland case study offers insight into these processes. The small king-
doms or chiefdoms were already politically complex in the Iron Age, displaying 
a strongly corporate structure that provided voice in the form of the assembly, 
public goods in the form of the reciprocal obligations between chiefs/kings 
and their supporters, and fair and just collection that was apparent in the vol-
untary nature of tribute given for their support. The social code that permitted 
warriors to abandon an unpopular warlord and seek out another, and the abil-
ity to overthrow or assassinate overbearing leaders, was a leveling mechanism 
insuring the perpetuation of the system.
As the centralizing Swedish state moved into Småland and attempted to 
collect taxes, there was no process of bargaining or negotiating with the locals 
to accommodate their Iron Age traditions and achieve their cooperation by 
offering them voice or benefit of public goods. Instead, hired ruffians and tax 
farmers were used to oppress the populace and coerce tax collection. From 
the cross-cultural perspective of Blanton and Fargher’s work, such tactics are 
weak and lacking in infrastructural power. A ruler may claim absolute powers, 
but fail to produce results when the commoners are in revolt and his own tax 
collectors are violently abusing local people and robbing the state by imposing 
personal taxes that are still collected in the name of the king, thus blacken-
ing the reputation of the ruler as trustworthy. It was not until the products of 
the Plateau became vital to state objectives that rulers realized how much the 
revenue was needed, and how weak the state’s power in the region actually was. 
The Smålanders on the other hand, as predicted by collective action theory, 
acted rationally by evading taxes, migrating away from royal surveillance, and 
eventually fomenting uprisings. The defeated state responded by shifting from 
coercion to strategies for achieving cooperation, which lie at the roots of mod-
ern democracy in Sweden.
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These phenomena were not unique to central Sweden but were endemic 
in all Scandinavian regions where similar Iron Age traditions preceded the 
Medieval state. In the ninth and tenth centuries, Norwegian chieftains fled to 
Iceland, which became a republic in AD 930, pointedly having no inherently 
hereditary leadership, about which the sagas said, “only the law is king.” To 
the south, as Scania was incorporated into Denmark, protests and eventually 
tax rebellions in the eleventh and twelfth centuries were aimed at overturning 
changes instituted by the new, broader powers of kings, and in Denmark itself, 
an eleventh-century tax rebellion resulted in the ruler’s death (Thurston 2001). 
Later rulers met the same fate over perceived unfairness and mistreatment 
of the populace, banishment of sub-elites who challenge their authority, and 
especially over taxation. Royal dynasties were pressing for more powers, but 
those invested in the older system strongly resisted.
The remarkable corpus of theory espoused by Blanton and his coauthors 
help us to understand the roles of both rulership and subjecthood along the 
continuum of government as a dynamic, recursive process, the materiality of 
which can be studied archaeologically, and the parallel social aspects newly 




The Bakitara (Banyoro) 
of Uganda and Collective 
Action Theory
Peter Robertshaw
In recent years Rich Blanton, his colleagues, and his 
students have championed collective action theory as 
a theoretical framework for the investigation of the 
development and workings of state-level societies in 
which they emphasize the agency of subalterns, politi-
cal cooperation, and checks on despotic leadership. 
This is an alternative to neoevolutionary perspectives 
that focus on the strategies by which emergent elites 
acquire and legitimize power so that they can exer-
cise authority over their subjects. In a sense, collective 
action theory is a bottom-up approach to understand-
ing state formation that examines how power is nego-
tiated between rulers and subjects and argues that in 
many states elite power is constrained by the populace 
at large. Borrowed from political science (Olson 1965; 
Levi 1981, 1988), collective action theory (Blanton and 
Fargher 2008) supersedes the concepts of network and 
corporate power strategies formulated by Rich and 
colleagues in their “dual-processual” theory for the 
evolution of Mesoamerican civilization (Blanton et al. 
1996; see also Blanton 1998a). Recently Rich and Lane 
Fargher have completed an ambitious cross-cultural 
evaluation of the importance of collective action in the 
formation of premodern states (Blanton and Fargher 
2008). Their results “support the contention that state 
formation is a process involving rational social action 
on the part of taxpayers as well as rulers” (Blanton and 
Fargher 2008:252). The data from which this conclusion 
is reached are a sample of 30 states from various parts 
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of the world and several time periods. As it turned out, the state that scored 
the lowest on the authors’ measures of the importance of collective action in 
the workings of the state, and hence that could be deemed the most despotic 
of the 30 states, is the one referred to in the book as that of the Bakitara, who 
reside in western Uganda (figure 9.1). Thus, I have the dubious distinction 
of being an archaeologist who studies what was arguably one of the world’s 
most despotic premodern states. This state is more commonly referred to as 
Bunyoro but Blanton and Fargher’s use of the term, Bakitara, is understand-
able because they derived much of their data from the ethnography of John 
Roscoe (1923). However, Roscoe himself had little justification for using this 
term (Sutton 1993:39), whose origin and etymology is unknown but is some-
times applied in the form “Kitara” or “Bunyoro-Kitara” to a broad geographi-
cal region encompassing both the nineteenth-century kingdom of Bunyoro 
and its probable antecedents. If this is not confusing enough, it must be noted 
that in Bantu languages, such as the one spoken by the people of Bunyoro, 
noun prefixes are employed. Thus, the people of the country of Bunyoro are 
the Banyoro (alternatively, Abanyoro; singular: Munyoro), who speak a lan-
guage called Runyoro. However, when used as an adjective, the noun prefix is 
normally dropped: for example, Nyoro kingship.
My initial gut reaction to the designation of Bunyoro as the most despotic 
of premodern states was one of skepticism, perhaps because I did not want to 
be associated, even intellectually, with a despotic state. However, while one 
might quibble about minor details of Blanton and Fargher’s interpretation 
and subsequent scoring of the ethnographic data on the Banyoro in compiling 
their “collective action measures,” a point or two here or there would not alter 
the basic conclusion that nineteenth-century Bunyoro was in some sense a 
despotic state, this despite the fact that the literal translation of “Banyoro” is 
“freedmen.” I suspect that most present-day Banyoro, at least those of a royalist 
persuasion, would object to the term “despotic state,” viewing the authority of 
the king and his court in more benign terms, but for the moment I can think 
of no suitable synonym.
In this chapter, I plan to do several things: first, I will shed light on the 
workings of the nineteenth-century Nyoro state to determine how such a 
state was able to function without exercising undue coercion on its populace 
and indeed with the apparent consent of its taxpayers. I will discuss both the 
external revenues that fueled the economy in the nineteenth century and the 
other revenues that seem to have had a deeper history, one that promoted 
greater negotiation of authority between the king and his people. Second, 
I will explore the role of ritual activities in the negotiation of the tensions 
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between state and community. This exploration raises the question of whether 
the king’s subjects might exercise the option of shifting their allegiances else-
where. Thus, my third topic will be an examination of the topic of mobility, 
which in turn leads to consideration of how rulers and ruled may have sought 
to assemble “wealth-in-people” (Guyer 1993). Fourth, with the constraints 
of archaeological data in mind, I will explain how the materiality of Nyoro 
kingship was entangled with both power strategies and collective action that 
negotiated the tension between the state and the people. Fifth, I will revisit 
Figure 9.1. The approximate location of the kingdom of Bunyoro in the nineteenth 
century and of sites mentioned in the text. 
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the process of state formation in Bunyoro. While the nineteenth-century state 
was despotic and derived much of its wealth from external revenues, the same 
cannot necessarily be said of earlier centuries, so a diachronic perspective may 
shed light on the dynamic balance of power between rulers and ruled.
In previous essays (Robertshaw 1999a, 2003), I applied the dual-processual 
theory of state formation (Blanton et al. 1996) to Bunyoro; here I reevaluate 
some of the archaeological evidence that I used to argue for a chronological 
separation of exclusionary and corporate power strategies, arguing instead that 
both strategies may have operated simultaneously as the tension between the 
state and the people was negotiated. Finally, my conclusion will very briefly 
consider one implication of my discussion that may serve to illustrate the 
value of applying collective action theory to African prehistory and vice versa.
tHe nyoro stAte in tHe nineteentH Century
In Blanton and Fargher’s cross-cultural survey, low scores on the measure-
ments of collective action correlated with an economic emphasis on exter-
nal revenues. Such external revenues, they argue, would be favored by rulers 
because they would then be less economically reliant upon taxes (tribute) gar-
nished from their subjects. As a result of this, rulers would be less beholden 
to their subjects and could in principle maintain a stronger grip on power, 
assuming that bureaucratic/infrastructural means existed by which rulers 
could exercise their authority (Blanton and Fargher 2008:252–254). Roscoe’s 
(1923) ethnography of the Banyoro was the source of most of Blanton and 
Fargher’s data; this ethnography was based on several weeks of interviews at 
the royal court during the early period of British colonialism and is written in 
the past tense suggesting that, more often than not, Roscoe’s informants were 
remembering the halcyon days of the late nineteenth century under their great 
and last independent ruler, Kabarega (Kabalega). The same is broadly true of 
Beattie’s (1971) ethnography of the Nyoro kingdom based on field research in 
the 1950s.
Taken together these ethnographies reveal a highly despotic and increas-
ingly centralized kingdom in the nineteenth century, during the course of 
which external revenues derived from exports became ever more important 
(see also Doyle 2006:51–52), so much so that the trade in ivory and guns was a 
royal prerogative. Indeed, permission to hunt elephants was granted only to a 
class of professional hunters controlled by the king (omukama) and the popu-
lace was forbidden to trade in ivory on pain of death (Uzoigwe 1972:446, 451). 
All markets, of which there were many throughout the kingdom, belonged 
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to the king, who appointed abahoza, a term translated as “political agents/
tax collectors,” to oversee them and ensure that revenue flowed to the king; 
even some wives of the king were abahoza (Uzoigwe 1972:450). Moreover, in 
Kabarega’s reign there were four different markets in the neighborhood of 
the palace (ibid.). Much wealth was also derived from the export of slaves in 
the nineteenth century; foreign slave merchants supported Kabarega’s bid for 
power in the war of succession following the preceding king’s death (Steinhart 
1977:32).
Kabarega is also credited with military reforms that created a standing 
army with companies (barusura) of soldiers who were often under the leader-
ship of foreign mercenaries appointed directly by the king. These companies 
were stationed throughout the kingdom and indeed expanded the kingdom 
through conquest, gaining their livelihood by plunder (Steinhart 1977:21–22). 
Thus, Kabarega instituted a potent source of authority that was mostly inde-
pendent of the populace and cut across existing class and clan loyalties, further 
centralizing royal power and expanding his ability to exercise royal authority 
across the kingdom.
However, while it is clear that external revenues became increasingly signifi-
cant for Bunyoro’s economy over the course of the nineteenth century and that 
royal control of these revenues, together with the barusura, promoted highly 
centralized authority, such revenues seem at first to have been supplemental 
to internal revenues. As Beattie (1971:139) remarked, “Everybody should give 
to the king.” Much, if not most, internal revenue derived from the king’s per-
sonal delegation of authority not only to territorial chiefs but also to people 
in more lowly political posts. “All subordinate political authority in Bunyoro 
was held, and was seen to be held, as the direct gift of the king himself, and 
at his pleasure” (Beattie 1971:147). “The grant of a chiefship by the Mukama 
[king] was essentially the bestowal of rights over a particular territory and 
the people in it . . . to be given an ‘estate’ was to be granted political authority 
over it” (Beattie 1960:37). It is possible that the appointment of chiefs was a 
practice either established or formalized by Kabarega, as one Nyoro historian 
has noted that Kabarega changed chiefships from hereditary to appointive 
(Kihumuro-Apuuli 1994:62).
From their subjects, chiefs received tribute in food, beer, and labor, much 
of which was passed to the king, who also received ivory, animals, and iron 
from his chiefs (Beattie 1971:130, 166). Similarly, the king frequently toured his 
kingdom, exacting food and labor from the areas he visited. Furthermore, all 
the women in the country belonged, at least in theory, to the king, who did 
not marry, since the king could not occupy the subordinate status of being 
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somebody’s son-in-law; Beattie (1971:143) surmises that kings had “scores, if 
not hundreds” of royal wives, noting that Kabarega is credited with fathering 
140 children.
As with the ethnographic observations on external revenues, it is probable 
that these observations on internal revenues1 also derive from the nineteenth 
century, but it seems reasonable to assume that these internal revenues had 
deeper historical roots. Such an assumption is perhaps supported by ethno-
graphic data on the ways in which the king was obliged to reciprocate by giv-
ing generously to his people. Collective action theory would certainly encour-
age us to predict that, with less external revenue, the king would need to offer 
more in return to his taxpayers (Blanton and Fargher 2008:252–254), so the 
Nyoro ethnographic observations of the king’s “generosity” may well reflect 
an earlier time.
The king was expected to give generous gifts to individuals and to spon-
sor great public feasts. This was reflected in some of the king’s official titles, 
including Mwebingwa, “he to whom people run for help when in need” 
(Beattie 1971:141). Indeed, the king seems to have been a pivotal figure in orga-
nizing famine relief (Doyle 2006:31), while he is also credited with ensuring 
that traditional medical practitioners were distributed across the kingdom and 
seconded when necessary to areas of disease outbreaks (Doyle 2006:32). The 
king’s gifts were not all strictly utilitarian; his delegation of power carried 
with it a delegation or sharing of ritual authority or potency termed mahano 
(Beattie 1971:117–118). Moreover, the king was symbolically identified with his 
country, requiring him to stay healthy, maintain a state of ritual purity, and 
perform daily rituals for the good of the country (Beattie 1959, 1971:105–107). 
Kabarega himself also seems to have used the threat of attack by the neighbor-
ing kingdom of Buganda as a means to appeal for national unity and reconcili-
ation (Kihumuro-Apuuli 1994:66).
The fact that the king both received tribute (tax) from his people and 
provided them with gifts, feasts, famine relief, and ritual support, as well as 
military protection, draws attention to the negotiation of power and author-
ity between rulers and ruled that is integral to the workings of collective 
action. It also illustrates the essential tension between the populace’s desire 
for autonomy and their need for state-supported security that the historian 
Jan Vansina (1990:232) has argued lies at the heart of all politics in equato-
rial Africa (see also Doyle 2006:15). This tension or duality is recognized by 
the Banyoro themselves, who have reported that kingship and government 
stand in opposition to a set of terms expressive of community-based loyalties. 
Indeed, the Nyoro term for “government,” bulemi, incorporates both the idea 
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of “ruling” and oppressive “weight,” bulemezi (Beattie 1971:6–7). Furthermore, 
the king was regarded as the “ruler or master, not the father of his people” 
(Beattie 1971:104), the king’s lineage having been “chosen long ago to rule 
us,” as recounted in testimony given to Beattie (1971:100). Inequality is per-
vasive in Bunyoro, as expressed in the proverb, “people are [only] equal in the 
grave” (Beattie 1971:7). It will come as no surprise to find then that the tension 
between state and community is evident also in the panoply of rituals associ-
ated with the kingship.
Royal Rituals
On the basis of collective action theory it has been predicted that more 
collective polities would be characterized by rituals associated with rulership 
that might serve to build trust between rulers and ruled (Blanton and Fargher 
2008:203). However, rather than attempting to fathom the role of ritual per 
se in the negotiation of collective action, Blanton and Fargher (2008:206) 
attempted to measure the extent to which there was public monitoring of 
the behavior of rulers, as well as the extent to which rulers controlled “ideo-
logical resources” and could use these resources to render themselves in some 
sense sacred and, therefore, not bound by the same rules as ordinary folk. 
Presumably the performance of rituals in very public settings would permit 
public scrutiny of both the ruler’s lifestyle and his commitment to the collec-
tive (Blanton and Fargher 2008:22, 203; Golden and Scherer 2013:402). The 
opposite, however, might not be true of more despotic states; certainly one 
would expect rituals to reinforce royal authority but there would seem to be 
no a priori reason for assuming that such rituals would be preferentially per-
formed in private rather than in public settings. Private rituals could presum-
ably contribute to the mystique of power, excluding commoners from sources 
of creative power, but carefully orchestrated public spectacles might equally 
well serve to reinforce the legitimacy of royal power (see also Fleisher and 
Wynne-Jones 2010). However, we may also ask how the rituals themselves, not 
just their setting and performance, served to negotiate power. However, before 
I embark on an examination of Nyoro rituals of kingship, it should be noted 
that a distinction between the king as a political and economic agent versus 
the king as a nexus of state rituals is, if not entirely arbitrary, a distinction that 
may well be lost on the Banyoro themselves, since instrumental power, power 
that controls people’s actions, and creative power, the power that manipulates 
and invents forms of meaning (Schoenbrun 1999:139), are interdependent (see 
Robertshaw 2010).
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A review of the literature, primarily the writings of Beattie (1959, 1971: chap-
ter 5), on rituals of Nyoro kingship reveals that the tension between ruler and 
ruled to which I have already drawn the reader’s attention is present too in 
the panoply of rituals, a conclusion that gives credence to Beattie’s assertion 
that “ritual and ceremonial clustered about the Nyoro kingship because it 
was the centre of secular power, rather than the other way about” (Beattie 
1971:107–108). The king’s right to rule was founded upon myth and history but 
confirmed by the coronation ceremonies performed when a new king claimed 
the throne—an event frequently preceded by a civil war among rival princes, 
which in turn served to remind people that peace was only possible with a 
king firmly in control of the state. The coronation ceremonies took place at 
a temporary royal enclosure; an initial purification ceremony was reported as 
being witnessed by “crowds of people” (Roscoe 1923:128), while later when the 
king sat on his throne, “crowds of the chiefs and better class people pressed 
forward, wishing him long life and congratulating him” (Roscoe 1923:130). At 
his accession, the king was also admonished to rule wisely and justly, and 
made to swear not to frighten his nation and to help without distinction both 
rich and poor (Beattie 1959:141, 1971:117). Thus, some of the ritual surrounding 
the king’s coronation appears to have been conducted in public and involved 
an attempt to curtail any tendency toward autocracy. In addition, even those 
parts of the coronation ceremonies that took place in relative seclusion in 
the palace were attended by various servants and assistants, who often held 
honorary titles; perhaps more important, each appears to have represented a 
particular clan (K.W. 1937). However, other parts of the coronation stressed 
the king’s right to rule and his ownership of the means of violence, notably the 
handing over to him of artifacts, including a spear, a bow and quiver, a dagger, 
and a stick. He also struck a hammer on an anvil to signify that he was both 
the head of all the blacksmiths and he himself like a hammer (Beattie 1959:140; 
1971:112; K.W. 1937:296).
Once installed on the throne, many of the rituals of kingship were part and 
parcel of the king’s daily life (K.W. 1937:298–299; Roscoe 1923:91–107); these 
rituals were required of the king for him to maintain his state of ritual purity, 
as was appropriate given his symbolic identification with the state. The rituals 
included food taboos and several daily ceremonies involving cattle and milking. 
Similarly the king remained in relative seclusion for most of the monthly new 
moon ceremony and the annual ceremony in which he blessed the country 
(Roscoe 1923:107–112). These activities all took place within the royal enclosure 
(kikali), a complex of several functionally specific buildings, access to most of 
which was strictly controlled (Roscoe 1923:73–86). Thus, much royal ritual took 
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place in seclusion, an observation that perhaps accords with the fact that the 
king was considered to be separate from and superior to everybody else; he 
was always addressed in the third person and a special vocabulary existed for 
his person and his activities. The king also possessed considerable royal regalia 
(K.W. 1935:160; 1936:77, 1937). Therefore, it appears that after the king had been 
crowned, most royal ritual took place away from the public gaze and could 
perhaps be interpreted within the framework of exclusionary power strategies 
(Blanton et al. 1996), despite the fact that some of these activities were com-
monly considered, at least by Roscoe’s informants at the court, to have been 
undertaken in order to bless the country and its people (Roscoe 1923:93).
Despite the privacy of the regular royal rituals, the king was apparently 
required to appease the populace after he had ruled the kingdom for nine 
years, nine being regarded as a very auspicious number by Banyoro. This 
seems to have been a remarkable ceremony or set of ceremonies, at least for 
Western sensibilities. Accounts of the ceremony vary (see Beattie 1971:113–
114; Nyakatura 1973:205–207), but central to it was an oath of peace sworn by 
the king in which he pledged, inter alia, not to become angry, not to punish 
his people, not to kill anyone, not to wage war, and not to be ungenerous. 
However, what is striking about this ceremony was the massive amount of 
human sacrifice that either accompanied it or followed it. According to Fisher 
(1911:130–131), the wife of an early colonial missionary, the sacrifices included 
30,000 cattle and 200 princes, the latter killed by being thrown into a large 
furnace, as well as a royal servant who was sacrificed instead of the king. In 
Bikunya’s account the king and two others climbed into a pit which was then 
filled up to their necks with human blood from victims sacrificed next to the 
pit. Once the blood in the pit reached the right level, the king had to climb 
on top of all the corpses and repeat the oath of peace (Bikunya 1927:52, cited 
by Beattie 1971:113–114). Nyakatura’s account is less gruesome but nevertheless 
speaks of the execution of large numbers of people, including numerous royal 
servants (Nyakatura 1973:205). As Beattie (1971:114) remarked, we cannot be 
sure that these rites were ever performed; they certainly were not witnessed by 
any of the authors of the accounts and probably not by any of their informants 
either. However, this does not detract from the fact that such a ceremony was 
widely believed to have existed and that the oath of peace was accompanied 
by a requirement, at least according to Bikunya and Nyakatura, that the king 
relinquish his authority to the senior members of his government.
It is tempting to view this remarkable ceremony as symptomatic of the 
tension between kingship and populace, with the king being required, albeit 
at a very auspicious moment of his reign, to publicly recognize his duties 
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to his people, perhaps even to relinquish his authority. An analogous public 
ceremony, the Orun festival, took place among the Yoruba of West Africa, 
at which the gods decided whether or not to let the king continue to rule 
(Blanton and Fargher 2008:208; Trigger 2003:510–511). However, it is the scale 
of the human (and animal) sacrifice that accompanied the oath of peace that 
draws attention to the importance of the Nyoro ceremony. The clearly drawn 
connection between kingship and human sacrifice evident in this ceremony 
is also present in some other African states, including Yoruba and Buganda 
(as noted by Blanton and Fargher 2008:208, 213), and spectacularly so in the 
royal burials at Kerma in the ancient kingdom of Kush (Bonnet 1990, 1992). 
This can be interpreted as a reminder of the importance of “wealth-in-people” 
as the sine qua non of success in politics in many parts of Africa (see below), 
with the destruction of this wealth through sacrifice being the ultimate state-
ment of royal power. One might think that such an awe-inspiring destruction 
of wealth would serve to reinforce the Nyoro king’s authority, not encourage 
him to give it up. Perhaps the dual nature of the Nyoro ceremony served to 
stress the power and importance of the kingship and the state, while remind-
ing the king that he himself could be replaced. Be that as it may, our account 
of Nyoro royal rituals serves to highlight the tensions between the king and 
the populace. It may also suggest that for long periods of time the balance 
of power seemed to lie with the state, as expressed in the daily, monthly, and 
annual rites that were conducted in the confines of the royal enclosure, mostly 
hidden from public scrutiny. Nevertheless, at long intervals the king’s subjects 
may have had the opportunity either to curb the authority of the king or at 
least to remind him that his authority could rightfully be challenged.
Mobility and the Composition of Wealth-in-People
Of course, there may have been other avenues by which some of the popu-
lace might challenge the king’s authority, including allying themselves with 
princes at the borders of the kingdom who chose, albeit at their peril, to spurn 
the king and establish independent polities. People may also have chosen 
to emigrate, but we have very little information on this practice other than 
Buchanan’s study of clan traditions that focused on immigration rather than 
emigration (Buchanan 1974). However, some idea of how mobility worked in 
practice within Bunyoro is provided by a study of village composition under-
taken in 1966 (Charsley 1970). The village under study, located on the periph-
ery of the former Nyoro kingdom, was said to “possess an air of stability and 
permanence” that was in fact “illusory” because half of the households in the 
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village had moved there since 1960, though the total size of the village had 
not increased. Mobility was made feasible by an abundance of available agri-
cultural land, presumably a reflection of low population densities, that was 
neither bought nor sold, as well as by an ethos of good neighborliness (Beattie 
1960:61–66). Why did households move? Sometimes there were economic 
incentives, such as escaping from the crop predations of elephants or moving 
close to a new arterial road. Sometimes people left an area where they did not 
get along with their neighbors or felt threatened in some way, perhaps by sor-
cery or vague spiritual forces (Charsley 1970:17). Where did they move? People 
mostly relocated to places where they had relatives, agnates or affines, from 
whom they might expect to receive friendship and support. However, some 
individuals attracted many more migrants than did others. These individuals 
shared a higher social standing than most that was derived from one or more 
sources: the traditional political system, particularly ties to the king; kinship as 
the head of a large family; and, finally, modern economic and occupational sta-
tus. Furthermore, these individuals tended to be firmly and historically rooted 
in their communities (Charsley 1970).
Charsley’s study serves to remind us of the concept of wealth-in-people, 
which was first developed in the context of studies of African politics as a 
counterargument to the emphasis placed on material wealth as a basis for 
legitimizing power (Guyer 1993). As Vansina (1990:251) remarked in reference 
to a broad swathe of societies in equatorial Africa, “Wherever possible, wealth 
in goods was still converted into followers.” People who were able to attract 
others to their community not only gained access to labor, the reproduction 
of labor, and the products of that labor, but they could also assemble people 
with varied knowledge across a broad range of topics, not simply specialized 
technological expertise. Leaders were able to bring together and mobilize dif-
ferent bodies of knowledge in a process that has been referred to as knowledge 
“composition” rather than simply “accumulation,” a perhaps subtle but impor-
tant distinction (Guyer and Belinga 1995).
Thinking about wealth-in-people and knowledge composition in the 
context of both collective action theory and the particular case of Bunyoro 
encourages the suggestion that knowledge possession combined with ease of 
mobility could provide individuals with considerable flexibility in terms of 
where to place their loyalties, a decision that would seem likely to have been 
made by the individual and his close kin rather than by any collective. Several 
or many individuals could in theory choose to settle with a leader who might 
provide an alternative source of authority to that of the state. Such leadership 
might be based on authority that ultimately derived from possession of some 
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form of creative power. Indeed, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and 
probably in earlier times too, there were shrine sites at various places within 
the Nyoro kingdom whose guardians seem to have derived their authority 
from sources of creative power and whose ritual functions commonly invoked 
the spirits to bless people with fertility. The guardians of individual shrines 
were often members of particular clans and the authority of these guardians 
was acknowledged by the Nyoro kings (Robertshaw 2010).
The king and the state also attracted followers and sought to “compose” 
bodies of knowledge. Indeed, it seems probable that the king and his palace 
would generally have been the most desirable destination for migrants, pro-
vided that they could call upon preexisting connections with kin, affines, or 
even friends at the capital. The state’s competence in composing knowledge 
and attracting followers is evident from the very numerous specialized offices, 
duties, and occupations, most with titles, that existed at the court. Moreover, 
each position was usually occupied by a member of a particular clan, thus per-
haps ensuring representation at the capital from a wide range of constituencies. 
The functions and duties of many of these royal retainers revolved around the 
performance of ritual acts that served to maintain the king’s state of ritual 
purity (Roscoe 1923). Thus, the state, too, seems to have harnessed creative 
power to build its wealth-in-people. Moreover, the king, at least perhaps in 
the nineteenth century, seems to have been sufficiently successful at attracting 
followers, despite the competition from the communities centered on shrine 
sites, that he needed to offer relatively little in terms of concessions, such as 
public goods or shared authority, to his people.
The Materiality of Nyoro Kingship
The attraction of followers and the harnessing of creative power were inti-
mately bound together with a material component. The materiality of Nyoro 
kingship illustrated once more the tension between the state and local com-
munities. Regalia are frequently mentioned in the ethnographic and historical 
literature of Bunyoro as being intimately entangled with royal authority. For 
example, when Rukidi, the first king of the Bito dynasty, to which Kabalega 
also belonged, came to power, he sent for the regalia left behind by the pre-
vious, Cwezi dynasty. The messenger sent by Rukidi carried one of the two 
drums that were part of this regalia to the new capital, while the other drum 
was said to have followed of its own accord. Moreover, when Rukidi beat the 
great drum at his accession, it made a suitably impressive noise, proving that 
Rukidi was not an imposter (Fisher 1911:120; see also Beattie 1971:53–54). Thus, 
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the behavior of the regalia validated Rukidi’s claim to the throne. In similar 
vein, if the king was too ill to carry out his duties, he would be represented by 
the royal spear, which had its own name (Roscoe 1923:118). The list of regalia 
is impressively long (K.W. 1935:160, 1936:77 for what may be only a partial list; 
see also Nyakatura 1973:181–185, 188–190) and an impression of the pervasive-
ness of the regalia can be obtained from a visit nowadays to Kabalega’s tomb. 
As mentioned earlier, some of the regalia, such as spears and knives, symbol-
ized the king’s coercive authority but the regalia as a whole was by no means 
under the sole possession of the king; clearly the regalia also spoke to what 
Blanton and Fargher have termed “principal control” (see also Blanton 1998a; 
Levi 1988). Numerous individuals had named positions involving regalia, from 
a “head regalia-man” (Mujaguzi) to persons with very specific tasks, such as 
the man who looked after the king’s personal drum. Many of these and other 
offices were linked to particular clans (Beattie 1971:124). Beattie (1971:125) 
explicitly recognized that the myriad duties of the specialized establishment 
of the palace, including the regalia,
served as a means of integrating the kingship with the Nyoro people as a 
whole. For it involved a great many different individuals and . . . several differ-
ent categories of individuals, in a common interest in the palace, and so in the 
kingship itself. All of Bunyoro’s traditional craft specializations were represented, 
as also were a considerable number of Bunyoro’s numerous clans. This last point 
is of particular importance, for the clan system, as the focus of local rather than 
nationwide loyalties, may be regarded as having stood, at least in traditional times, 
in some measure of opposition to the kingship. The vesting of particular palace 
offices in particular clans went some way to negate this opposition, by integrating 
the clan system with the palace organization, and so with the kingship.
However, as Lane Fargher (personal communication, 2012) has noted, it 
is not clear from this description whether clans were corporately organized. 
Did the clan membership appoint or recommend one of their number for 
the particular palace office vested in their clan, or was the individual chosen 
by the king, at whose whim he may then have served? The available literature 
offers no clear answer to this question, despite the frequency with which the 
assertion is repeated that particular offices were hereditary within particu-
lar clans. What seems more certain is that the shrine sites scattered through 
the kingdom (see above) were “intimately connected with particular clans” 
(Buchanan 1974:228) and that the “tensions inherent in this development of 
priestly power worked as a check to limit the power of the Mukama [king]” 
(ibid.:227). Moreover, the Nyoro proverb, “The Mukama rules the people, but 
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the clan rules the land” also indicates that, at least prior to Kabarega’s usurping 
of the right to appoint chiefs, the clans mitigated the king’s power beyond the 
capital (see also Uzoigwe 2013:22).
While the regalia served to legitimize royal authority while simultaneously 
negotiating that authority with the clans at the palace, other items of material 
culture were part and parcel of both the assumption and delegation of royal 
authority in other economic and political spheres. In particular, during the 
coronation ceremonies, a man said to represent foreigners presents the king 
with an elephant tusk and two copper bracelets (K.W. 1937:293), which may 
be interpreted as signifying the king’s control of the ivory trade and of the 
import of copper, the wearing of which appears to be associated with high 
status.2 Although this connection has not yet been investigated, it is perhaps 
supported by the observation that members of the king’s clan who were clearly 
related to the king could claim from him a brass ankle-ring (Beattie 1971:99). 
When the king delegated political authority, he also conferred both its associ-
ated spiritual power (mahano) and artifacts that signified that authority, nota-
bly crowns, spears, and knives (Beattie 1971:102, 118). Finally, when visited by 
foreign dignitaries, the king gave gifts of salt and iron hoes, the two most 
valuable commodities produced in his country.
If the regalia and other artifacts of the Nyoro kingdom played a role in 
negotiating the tension between state and populace, the palace itself seems 
to have served first and foremost as an agent of exclusionary power strate-
gies. The royal enclosure (kikali) was always located in such a way that it was 
highly visible, in addition to being by far the largest in the country. The six-
foot-high fence of elephant grass surrounding the royal enclosure was said 
to have a circumference of about two miles and enclose perhaps hundreds 
of buildings. Prominent among these was the court-house (kaluzika), which 
incorporated the throne-room (hamulyango), reported as being often 40 yards 
across and 80 feet high at its apex. However, it was not just the size of the 
enclosure and buildings that impressed; the whole complex of royal houses 
and rooms was governed by a plethora of rules and restrictions to access that 
served to highlight the king’s power. Only the king, it appears, could enter 
every room through every door, though daily rituals even prescribed where 
the king should be within the palace at set times in order to maintain his 
ritual purity (Roscoe 1923:73–86; Nyakatura 1973:202–204). Moreover, the 
plan of the royal enclosure (Roscoe 1923:86–87) shows numerous fences and 
screens that restricted both the access to and the visibility of many houses and 
courtyards (see the Kuba kingdom of central Africa for a comparable example 
[Vansina 1978a:137]). It would be intriguing to discover whether the massive 
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royal enclosure described by Roscoe, which must have entailed the efforts of 
a large labor force, was only a nineteenth-century phenomenon financed pri-
marily by external revenues or whether it was also typical of palaces in earlier 
times. It is also worth bearing in mind that every new king built a new capital 
and that the capital may have been relocated on several occasions during each 
reign (Roscoe 1923:73–74). As yet none of the capital sites of the kings of the 
Bito dynasty has been explored archaeologically, though the general locations 
of several of them are known (see Nyakatura 1973).
Bunyoro Before tHe nineteentH Century: 
tHe ArCHAeoLogiCAL eViDenCe
I have argued in this chapter that the despotic nature of the Nyoro state in 
the nineteenth century, reflected in the scores on the collective action measures 
devised by Blanton and Fargher (2008), was the product of a historical moment 
in which the state took full advantage of its position toward the periphery of 
an economically booming world system to generate substantial external rev-
enues and consolidate royal power and authority, a point on which Blanton 
and Fargher (2008:46) concur. However, the kingdom already possessed a well-
established system of generating revenues that was inevitably entangled within a 
dynamic negotiation of power and authority between the state and the populace. 
This negotiation took place in a variety of arenas, of which I have highlighted 
here the composition of ritual, wealth-in-people, and materiality.
Of course, negotiations over power and authority began long before the 
Nyoro state was formed. In earlier publications, I proposed that it was a shortage 
of people, particularly a shortage of female labor, that was the engine of efforts 
toward political centralization in Bunyoro in the early second millennium AD 
(Robertshaw 1999a, 1999b, 2003). This proposal rested on the premise that pre-
colonial African kingdoms and chiefdoms exhibited low population densities, in 
contrast to the high population densities commonly encountered among aceph-
alous societies (Shipton 1984). I argued, following the ideas of Rich Blanton and 
colleagues (1996), that emerging leaders used exclusionary power strategies to 
accumulate and compose wealth-in-people. By about the mid-fifteenth cen-
tury, there had emerged several larger polities wherein corporate power strate-
gies, based on staple finance, became instrumental in the construction of large 
earthworks at several sites (Robertshaw 2001, 2002). These earthworks appear to 
have been abandoned around the end of the seventeenth century, with a con-
comitant shift to the kind of peripatetic Nyoro capitals recorded in later eth-
nographies; a shift that might reasonably be associated with the establishment 
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of the Bito dynasty (Robertshaw 1999a:60; 2003:163) and that must also be con-
sidered within the context of climate change (Robertshaw and Taylor 2000; 
Robertshaw et al. 2004; Lejju et al. 2005).
This reconstruction can now perhaps be profitably revisited in the light of 
insights provided by collective action theory. The evidence for exclusionary 
power strategies, prior to the fifteenth century, comprises the monopoly of 
prestige goods, notably ornaments of glass beads and metal, perhaps especially 
copper; the real or symbolic control of iron production; and the harnessing 
of creative power, as reflected perhaps in the initial occupation of shrine sites 
such as Mubende Hill (Lanning 1966; Robertshaw 1994:108). On reflection I 
may have given too much interpretive weight to the relatively rare discover-
ies of glass beads and metal ornaments, particularly in light of the fact that 
at Munsa they are mostly associated with female, sometimes juvenile, human 
skeletons (Robertshaw, Murphy, and Ambrose 2012), which either calls into 
question their status as prestige goods or prompts us to reconsider the age and 
gender distribution of elite power. However, the sample of burials, particularly 
of men, from this period is small and hence injects a note of caution, while the 
occurrence of these ornaments at several major sites reasserts their importance. 
When it comes to the shrine sites, however, these could equally be seen as the 
harnessing of creative power as a form of collective action rather than as an 
exclusionary elite strategy, since they may not have been under elite control, as 
indeed I have argued for the use of these sites in later times (Robertshaw 2010). 
Finally for this period, the question of the control of iron production merits 
further study, particularly since Iles (2010) has drawn attention to the varia-
tion that existed in iron-working technology style across the Kitara region, 
including the probable introduction, tentatively dated to the fifteenth century, 
of new technology involving the use of an additional manganese-rich ore in 
smelting. Iles’s results suggest, at least to me, that elite control of iron produc-
tion could only have been symbolic, as was described ethnographically.
While we need more fieldwork to generate new archaeological data and 
hence to shed light on the power strategies of the early centuries of the second 
millennium, it is perhaps easier to infer the existence of tension in the negotia-
tion of power and authority between rulers and populace from consideration 
of the earthworks of the mid-millennium. Previously, I interpreted the earth-
works at Munsa as monuments that “not only expressed group solidarity in 
material form but also encircled and metaphorically captured the power and 
legitimacy of earlier elites” (Robertshaw 2003:161).
However, rather than seeing the earthworks solely as the product of corpo-
rate power strategies funded by agricultural surpluses collected from taxpayers, 
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as I did previously, they can also be seen as materializing the essential tension 
between rulers and populace. On the one hand, the very long outer trenches at 
this and other sites indicate collective action, in a very real sense, likely aimed 
at keeping elephants out of agricultural fields (Robertshaw 2001); on the other 
hand, the symbolism of the innermost trench and what lay within its circumfer-
ence may be reinterpreted in terms of my earlier discussion of the Nyoro palace 
and could be seen as a place of seclusion, likely the locus of royal rituals, sepa-
rating rulers from ruled while also drawing attention to itself through its central 
location on a hill. This perspective aligns well with the oral tradition recorded 
in the 1950s describing the death of Munsa’s ruler, Kateboha, who was killed 
by his people after they had employed subterfuge to gain access to this inner 
sanctum. Kateboha is said to have built the earthworks to protect himself, his 
property, and his daughter from the populace, for whom he was a hard taskmas-
ter, requiring them to cultivate the land and executing any man who slacked off 
(Lanning 1959; see also Robertshaw 2001:28). The abandonment of the earth-
works, probably around the end of the seventeenth century, seems to have ush-
ered in a suite of changes that resulted in the establishment of the Nyoro state, 
aspects of which were explored earlier in this chapter. Unfortunately there is a 
dearth of archaeological evidence for this crucial period.
ConCLusion
In this chapter, I have argued that the highly despotic nature of the Nyoro 
state in the nineteenth century was a product of a historical moment in which 
external revenues fueled the economy. The importance of internal revenues 
in earlier centuries probably provided a stronger basis for the negotiation of 
power between the king and the populace than existed in the nineteenth cen-
tury. However, even for the nineteenth century evidence indicates an essential 
tension between rulers and ruled. While this tension was notably expressed 
in ritual, it was also both materialized and negotiated in regalia and in the 
location and architecture of the royal enclosure. My brief examination of the 
archaeological evidence for earlier centuries suggests that Munsa and other 
earthworks represent a material expression of the tension between royal 
authority and collective action.
While the balance of power between state and populace varied over time, 
in part at least as a result of the relative economic importance of internal and 
external revenues, the fact that collective action was still employed when state 
power was at its peak in Bunyoro suggests that the negotiation of authority 
may have been a dynamic process in all states. Therefore, it seems equally 
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improbable that either total state power or its opposite, a victory of collective 
action, could have held sway, at least for more than a brief historical moment. 
If that is indeed the case, then perhaps we should challenge claims of the exis-
tence of states without rulers, such as that of the Inland Niger Delta (IND), 
in which heterarchy has metaphorically vanquished hierarchy (e.g., McIntosh 
2005:189). It has become a widely accepted tenet of African archaeology that the 
IND represents complexity without hierarchy (e.g., LaViolette and Fleisher 
2005:333–336). While my analysis of Bunyoro may offer theoretical challenge 
to the heterarchical IND, recent field research in Mali has provided a model 
of state-generated landscapes, manifest in later times, that may explain both 
why hierarchical states could have easily been overlooked and why trading 
cities like Jenné-Jeno and Dia show little or no evidence of state organization 
(MacDonald and Camara 2012). Looking beyond Africa, I am struck by the 
similarities between the Nyoro state under Kabarega’s despotic, albeit perhaps 
beneficent, rule in the nineteenth century and the political structure found in 
the Mixteca Alta region of Oaxaca, Mexico, during the Postclassic (Fargher, 
Heredia Espinoza, and Blanton 2011:317ff.). Such comparisons reinforce the 
fact that the analytical tools engendered by collective action theory and allied 
concepts have much to offer in our efforts to elucidate past political systems.
notes
 1. In this chapter I have contrasted “external” revenues, where wealth was derived 
from the profits of exporting ivory and slaves, with “internal” revenues raised from 
within the kingdom—for example, in the form of food and labor. However, Blanton 
and Fargher’s (2008) definitions of these terms are subtler and rather different. They 
consider “internal” revenues to be those “collected by the state from free constituents or 
taxpayers,” while “external” revenues are “sources owned and/or controlled directly by 
the state,” including landed estates and control of “serf-like laborers” (Fargher, Heredia 
Espinoza, and Blanton 309). The application of these definitions to the Nyoro case is 
difficult: on the one hand, the existence of chiefly rights over people suggests that the 
revenues from these estates are “external”; on the other hand, the very term “Banyoro” 
means “freedmen” and peasants were not serfs in the sense of being bound to the 
estates on which they lived. Mobility was apparently always an option. Given these 
contradictions, I have chosen here to use “internal” to describe revenues raised from 
within the kingdom, while recognizing that others may wish to reclassify them as 
“external.”
 2. K.W. offers a different interpretation, noting that the king touches these items, 




Cognitive Codes and 
Collective Action at 
Mari and the Indus
Rita Wright
The revival of cross-cultural and comparative studies 
is providing new explanatory frameworks for under-
standing the varied dimensions of power in early states 
worldwide. Richard Blanton (1998a) and his colleagues 
(Blanton et al. 1996) have been at the forefront of intro-
ducing alternative pathways to complexity that now are 
accepted as basic to theory-building. In this chapter, I 
discuss limitations to power in two early states based 
upon the concepts of a cognitive code and collective 
action (Blanton and Fargher 2008): the Near Eastern 
kingdom of Mari (Fleming 2004) and the Indus civi-
lization in South Asia (Wright 2010). The evidence 
from Mari is based on the royal correspondence of 
King Zimri-Lim comprising 3,000 letters from a pal-
ace archive that were translated and analyzed by Daniel 
Fleming (2004). The Indus evidence is almost exclu-
sively from material remains (Wright 2010).
introDuCtion
The cross-cultural and comparative study of early 
civilizations has a long history in studies of Old World 
states. The two most influential contributors are V. 
Gordon Childe (1934, 1951, 1964), a prehistorian, and 
Henri Frankfort (1956), a Near Eastern archaeologist 
and Egyptologist, both of whom focused on the exclu-
sionary nature of early states. Largely based on studies 
of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, Childe considered 
the means by which rulers extracted food surpluses as 
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an overriding factor in their centralized political economy. Frankfort, on the 
other hand, claimed that Mesopotamian and Egyptian ideologies were the 
principal bases for the dominance of its leaders.
While current research continues to be influenced by these early works, 
there has been mounting evidence that their interpretations of the Egyptian 
and Mesopotamian states need revision. Bruce Trigger’s (2003) comparative 
and cross-cultural studies of seven early states, selected for study based on 
strong archaeological evidence and written sources either in the form of local 
texts or ethnohistoric accounts, involved a close analysis of kingship among 
other factors. His studies demonstrated that the work of kings was often 
mediated by self-governing associations and councils composed of important 
lineages and other interest groups. Similar doubts about the centralization of 
power at the hands of leaders in a broad range of societies in the New and 
Old Worlds (Nichols and Charlton 1997) complement his research. In addi-
tion, Susan and Roderick McIntosh’s research at Jenne-jeno in the Middle 
Niger (AD 400–1100) has provided evidence for a self-organized commu-
nity in which multiple authorities existed, none of which monopolized power 
(R. McIntosh 2005). In fact, a range of societies in the African examples 
provided by Susan McIntosh indicate that kings had relatively weak control 
(S. K. McIntosh 1999). In another study, Elizabeth Stone and Paul Zimansky 
used spatial distributions to demonstrate that southern Mesopotamian soci-
eties were “populous, entrepreneurial,” based on a dispersed pattern of settle-
ment at Mashkan-shapir in which administrative, residential, and production 
areas were “both independent and connected to the public sector” (Stone and 
Zimansky 2004; Stone 2007:219).
The McIntoshes, Stone, and Zimansky drew on theoretical models intro-
duced by archaeologists in their attempts to refine understanding of the com-
plexity of leadership and power in early states. Carol Crumley introduced 
the concept of “heterarchy,” which she defined as “the relation of elements 
to one another when they are unranked or when they possess the potential 
for being ranked in a number of different ways” (Crumley 1995:3). Even in 
the most despotic states, local hierarchies and “nodes of social power” can 
be complementary or potentially conflictive (Brumfiel 1992; Brumfiel and 
Fox 1994; Janusek 2008:30). Heterarchy and hierarchy, therefore, can coexist 
(Crumley 1995; Feinman and Marcus 1998), as in the case of mediating bodies 
like the councils known in Mesopotamia ( Jacobsen 1943). The self-organized 
landscape that the McIntoshes describe for the Middle Niger included settle-
ments with different functions that were not hierarchically but heterarchically 
ordered in flexible power relations
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Blanton’s dual-processual theory and subsequent publications have not been 
widely cited in Old World studies. In this essay, I review the ways in which 
the concepts of cognitive code and collective action have been employed in 
explaining the limitations to power in the interpretation of corporate strate-
gies by Daniel Fleming (2004) in the case of the Mari and in my research on 
the Indus civilization (Wright 2014). The theory posits two forms of power, 
one that is exclusionary (network), in which leaders monopolize sources of 
power, and a corporate strategy, in which decisions are shared among groups 
within the society. According to Blanton, limitations to power are the result of 
a symbolic cognitive base in which symbols, such as ritual sanctification, limit 
the exercise of power (Blanton 1998a:152). The Mesopotamian citizens that 
held offices and acted as mediators in setting limits to exclusionary power are 
prime examples ( Jacobsen 1943).
In their discussions of collective action, Blanton and Fargher (2008) have 
added new dimensions to the concept of cognitive codes that are of specific 
relevance to the present chapter. They suggest that cultural codes may be less 
“influential” in societies in which the dimensions of the world order are more 
secular (2008:293). This interpretation more closely follows Fleming’s research 
on the Mari and mine on the Indus civilization. As I demonstrate below, among 
the Mari and the Indus collective action in some segments of society was based 
on an ideology that was born out of a cognitive code embedded in longstanding 
social and political orders. This factor, and others to be discussed in the follow-
ing, has important implications for basic questions regarding premodern and 
modern political processes and pathways to complexity in the Mari and Indus.
tHe kingDom of mAri
The site of Tell Hariri (ancient Mari) is located in present-day Syria near 
the Middle Euphrates as the river bends west and north (see figure 10.1 for 
the location of Mari at the bend in the Euphrates). It was settled for the first 
time in the twenty-eighth century BCE (Fleming 2004, 6:n. 11). When it was 
a fully developed state, it extended over 100 ha and was rebuilt and destroyed 
on several occasions. By the mid-third millennium, it was contemporary with 
several polities, including Ebla, ancient Nagar (Tell Brak in the Khabur Basin) 
and Akkadian and Ur III states in southern Mesopotamia. The city was aban-
doned with the conquest of King Hammurabi at around 1761 BCE.
The evidence for systems of rule described here are from texts that fall 
within a 13-year period during the reign of Zimri-Lim, a “tribal king” and 
“master of a major city center” at Mari (Fleming 2004:1, 2). What distinguished 
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Zimri-Lim’s rulership was a longstanding system in which decision-making 
was based on negotiations among tribal groups and collective and exclusion-
ary ruling bodies that acted interdependently (Fleming 2004:19). The sustain-
ability of a longstanding agropastoral component in Mari’s political economy 
was pivotal to the state’s exclusionary and corporate structure.
At least by the mid-third millennium, the tell was an enclosed mound 
comprising palaces and temples that were residential and administrative. 
Positioned midway between southern Mesopotamia and polities to its north 
and east, the site’s location is considered by its current excavator, Jean-Claude 
Margueron (cited in Fleming’s [2004] text), to be ideal for the control of com-
mercial river traffic and the movement of goods among trading partners in 
several polities, especially the shipment of wood to southern Mesopotamia. 
Although its location on the Middle Euphrates offered an invaluable water 
source for agriculture and pastoralism, the valley was not sufficiently wide 
Figure 10.1. Archaeological sites in northern and southern Mesopotamia. (Drawn by 
Tom McClellan.) 
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to sustain large-scale farming and major populations, and the nearby steppe 
was too arid for dry farming (Porter 2012). According to textual sources and 
archaeological evidence, the people at Mari engaged in a mixed economy that 
was carried out by sedentary and mobile populations that were linked by kin-
ship ties. Mobile pastoralists were dispersed spatially, but their symbiosis with 
sedentary societies served an ideology in which, although physically apart, 
they were “conceptually together” (Porter 2012:13).
It is in this sense that Zimri-Lim’s rulership among his tribal group, the 
Sim’alites, differed from his predecessors and the traditional forms of rule 
carried out in other states in northern and southern Mesopotamian (e.g., at 
Ebla and by the Akkadian or Ur III kings, and of course Hammurabi) that are 
often cited as models for exclusionary power (though see my earlier discussion 
of the research of Stone and Zimansky).
The Mari State: Rethinking Pastoralism, 
Ethnography, and Prehistory
Before describing the details of Zimri-Lim’s reign, it is necessary to review 
some of the issues that have excluded pastoralism from anthropological views 
of state leadership. New evidence based on comparative studies has challenged 
evolutionary models that marginalized pastoralist societies. Evolutionary 
stage typologies consigned tribes to a position in between bands and chief-
doms (e.g., Fried 1967, 1975; Service 1975). In archaeology, pastoralists often 
were conceived as one step ahead of hunters and gatherers, thus falling out 
of evolutionary paradigms when plants were domesticated (but see Hole 1991, 
2000; Zagarell 1989).
Agropastoralism was a latecomer in discussions of sedentary peoples since it 
often was associated with fully formed states. Unlike agriculturalists, pastoral-
ists were thought to be untethered from the landscape and to be organized in 
egalitarian societies. These views of pastoralists are being turned around based 
on re-re-evaluations of ethnographic and prehistoric research, offering a per-
spective from many Old World contexts in which pastoralists are more closely 
aligned with agriculturalists and mixed economies (Frachetti 2008a, b; Hanks 
2010; Linduff and Rubinson 2008; Honeychurch and Amartuvshin 2007; Kohl 
2009; Porter 2000, 2012; Rogers 2012; Salzman 1972, 2002; Szuchman 2009) 
than previously acknowledged. In addition, Anne Porter’s evidence for social 
differences in burial contexts at Tell Banat challenges older views that pas-
toral organization precluded “differences in wealth that lead to social strati-
fication” and separated them from class-based societies (Porter 2000, 2012). 
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Finally, these studies demonstrate that pastoralism is not a unitary concept. 
Daniel Rogers suggests that anthropologists need to alter their perspectives by 
looking outward from centers (adopting “a decentralized vantage point”) and 
viewing mobility as a central concept (Rogers 2012:9).
These views set the stage for Fleming’s interpretation of Mari leadership 
under Zimri-Lim’s reign and its tribal confederation. Using texts that contain 
almost day-to-day accounts of decision-making, his book predates much of 
the recent analyses of tribe/state relations, with the exception of the works 
of Anne Porter. He draws on Blanton and his colleagues, whose researches 
are cited throughout his interpretation of the Mari texts. His description of 
the Mari state provides a detailed analysis of the political structure in the 
millennium that preceded the rise of Zimri-Lim as its king and contributed 
to state organization during his reign. I provide here a sketch of his findings 
and synthesis of a wealth of nuanced levels of organization existing during 
Zimri-Lim’s reign.
Table 10.1 outlines the structure of the state and some critical points regard-
ing how it operated.
During the reign of Zimri-Lim political power was bifurcated so that the 
king was at the head of the core people and the groups dominated as outsid-
ers. Both were mutually dependent sedentary and mobile populations, each of 
which had a separate social structure with different roles for their leaders. The 
Sim’alites, the core people, were tribally affiliated with Zimri-Lim. Although 
they consisted of more than five divisions (perhaps aligned with herding 
groups), these divisions had lost all political function in his relations with 
this tribal constituency. The king dealt with a broad-based body politic that 
functioned in a corporate mode in which he consulted with “elders” who were 
not attached to specific units. Whether they met at a hamlet, village, city, or 
specific center is inconsequential, as the main point is that it was a “collective 
expression” of the population acting as a “body of people” (Fleming 2004:170).
In distinction, the king’s rule of the three elements defined as “outsiders” 
was palace based. Although Yaminite populations extended far beyond the 
territories dominated by Zimri-Lim, he maintained supremacy over them 
mainly through their concentrated settlement in the district governed from 
Terqa. Each of the five tribes of the Yaminites had a king that ruled individual 
towns but followed a power structure in which there were no domains in 
which Zimri-Lim’s authority could be refused (Fleming 2004:166).
It is this “independence” of mind and collective “ideology” born out of the 
management of access to grazing as “whole communities” that was at the heart 
of a cognitive code practiced between the king and the Sim’alites. Although 
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administrative correspondence regarding sheep makes references to shearing, 
there are few concerns for breeding and management. The texts also do not 
include references to grazing rights, restrictions on the use of land, or specif-
ics of their location. The king did not own all land and pastoralists appear to 
have grazed and moved their flocks without restraint (Fleming 2004:167). It 
is this ideology of consensus building among the Sim’alites that embodies 
the corporate code, which Fleming believes provided the mutually benefi-
cial counterpart to the state’s exclusionary structure in his relations with the 
Yaminites. These restrictions on Zimri-Lim’s exclusionary power make it a 
perfect example of the dual-processual model.
Ideology in this case was deeply embedded in the fabric of the social and 
political order that served as an obstacle to exclusionary power in Zimri-Lim’s 
relations with the Sim’alites. I turn now to a similar cognitive code and collec-
tive action in my discussion of the Indus civilization.
tHe inDus CiViLizAtion
The concepts of cognitive code and collective action are of equal interest in 
understanding structures of power in the Indus civilization. For the Indus, I 
concentrate on its community infrastructure as a framework from which to 
observe the nonexclusionary aspects of its political economy (see figure 10.2 
for the location of the Indus civilization and sites referred to in this chapter). 
This example focuses almost exclusively on the civilization’s material culture. 
Unlike Mari, the Harappans did not have lengthy texts that recorded activi-
ties, much less the day-to-day activities of the sort in Zimri-Lim’s archive. 
Inscriptions are found on stamp seals and small “tablets” or etchings on pots 
in which only a few signs are recorded (Meadow and Kenoyer 2000). A 
Table 10.1. Mari: a collective of plural leadership
Zimri-Lim as King
(defined by Mari as his capital city and “Hana” = Sim’alite tribe as his people)
*
The Bin-u Sim’al (Sim’alites) as core people
*
Groups dominated as outsiders:
1. Four districts with 
governors, including 
Mari itself.
2. Vassal kingdoms 
(mainly north of the 
Khabur)
3. Bin-u Yamina tribe 
(Yaminites), ruled Terqa 
district and governor
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Figure 10.2. Locations of Indus civilization sites. 
signboard with 12 inscriptions was found at the entrance to one of its cities 
and may indicate fairly widespread literacy, but for the present, we can only 
speculate, since Indus inscriptions have not been deciphered.
In Collective Action in the Formation of Pre-Modern States Blanton and 
Fargher used macroregional clustering of 30 states to identify “shared aspects 
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of the cultural and social histories of state formation” (2008:3). Of relevance 
to this discussion is a cognitive code for South Asia that they trace in a five-
phase sequence that begins with the Indus civilization and ends with the 
Mughal Empire. Taking into account the region’s broad geographical scale 
and regional and cultural diversity, they focus on polities “that were based 
on Hindu and Buddhist political theory and culture” (Blanton and Fargher 
2008:60). Using a published interpretation of the Indus civilization, they 
describe it as “corporately organized,” one that lacked “a ruler cult,” and that 
possessed “an egalitarian ethic” and “comparatively limited wealth differen-
tiation” (Blanton and Fargher 2008:62). They rely on a widely cited paper by 
Daniel Miller (1985a), in which he outlined a long cycling of “egalitarian and 
more centralized forms” based on Vedic Hinduism and Buddhism and their 
“distinct theories of rulership,” as the cognitive code that was in place in early 
and subsequent phases in the history of South Asia that ended at around 300 
BCE. They are uncertain whether the Indus represented an “initiating phase” 
of “collective orientation” similar to what is known from the later South Asian 
states and a second urbanism in South Asia (Blanton and Fargher 2008). I 
find this interpretation problematic in view of the limited archaeological evi-
dence with which to establish continuity between the Indus civilization and 
phases one and two (Wright 2010:325, chapter 11). While I am in agreement 
that the Indus political economy employed a corporate strategy and collective 
action, the cycling model that links the Indus civilization to Hindu Buddhist 
ideologies proposed by D. Miller (1985a) cannot be supported by the existing 
evidence, and I offer a different perspective.
In chapter 12, “Collective Action and Political Evolution,” in Collective Action 
in the Formation of Pre-Modern States, Blanton and Fargher (2008) point to 
selected features (apart from the phased recycling referred to in the preceding 
paragraph) of the Indus that argue for collective action. They include its planned 
cities, population numbers that reached 50,000 and “vast communal grain stor-
age facilities” (Wheeler 1968; Blanton and Fargher 2008:291). Although there 
are other features that argue for collective action, such as the extensive public 
amenities at Indus centers and at some rural settlements (Wright 2010), my 
focus here is on collective action among craft producers and merchants.
The Indus Civilization: Geography, Urbanism, and Ecologies
Working toward that end, I provide a brief background to the varied geog-
raphy of the Indus in order to update important misconceptions about this 
civilization. The discovery of the urban centers of Harappa and Mohenjo-daro 
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in Pakistan in the 1930s has left a lasting impression that settlements were 
located solely on the rivers of the Indus valley. The subsequent discovery of large 
numbers of Indus settlements in northwest India as well as on the Ghaggar-
Hakra River in India and Pakistan, and two major centers at Rakhighari and 
Ganweriwala, have received less attention (figure 10.2). The Ghaggar flowed 
into Pakistan from India, where its name changes to the Hakra, a river that 
flowed into the lower Indus and as far as the Arabian Sea. These rivers along 
with the Indus placed the city of Mohenjo-daro in an ideal location between 
two hydrographic systems. A fifth center at Dholavira is in Gujarat, not on a 
river at all and may have been a port city.
Not surprisingly, the ecology is varied when the totality of the civiliza-
tion is considered, so we should expect significant differences in organization. 
Studies at Harappa (Weber 2003) have identified an agropastoral, double-
cropping system, while in the south in Gujarat, pastoral practices and cultiva-
tion of crops differed. There, proximity to the sea and port locations opened to 
a wider world and intercultural trade with contemporary societies throughout 
the Greater Near East (Wright 2010:215ff.).
Finally, in many early accounts the civilization was described as homo-
geneous, but recent research has revealed regional differences in city plans, 
settlement patterns, and the pace of urbanization (Wright 2010:126ff., 81ff.).
Indus Heterarchy/Hierarchy, Cognitive 
Models, and Collective Action
V. Gordon Childe’s interpretations on the early Indus state were based on 
intellectual trends of the day and were not so different from what Blanton 
argues against. As discussed earlier, Childe paid little regard for the economic 
and social infrastructure of early states, such as Stone and Zimansky’s (2004) 
documentation of spatial arrangements reflective of independent specialists 
in Mesopotamia. In distinction, Childe assigned control of production and 
distribution to centralized leaders and overlooked restrictions on exclusionary 
power in the form of independent specialists and collective action.
In the Indus, recent research on craft production and its specialized tech-
nologies and spatial distributions suggests that the variability observed by 
Stone and Zimansky followed similar patterns (Wright 2010:145ff.). I draw 
on the production of ceramics and seals, their uses and distribution. During 
the peak of urbanism, Indus production was intensified (new products, large 
numbers of producers and output); diversified (products, new skills, and uses), 
and specialized (divisions of labor and distribution of resources), and objects 
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were produced for internal and external distribution. Artisans worked in large 
and small-scale workshops. Some were independent of the state while others 
may have been state controlled. They produced mundane and prestige goods 
from locally available materials and from distant resources.
Extensive studies of craft producers have been undertaken at Harappa, one 
of the main Indus centers (Wright 2010:chapters 6 and 7). The production of 
ceramic vessels and stoneware bangles required related skills in which clay was 
processed, shaped, and fired but in unique ways. Locally available clays were 
used for both, but they were refined and standardized differently, according to 
the desired end product. The production of vessels required substantial trim-
ming, mixing of pigments for paints and slips, and firing in two- chambered 
kilns (Wright 1989, 2010:152–166), while stoneware bangle production involved 
several steps in reshaping by grooving or cutting forms shaped on the potter’s 
wheel. In a final step, they were fired in airtight containers to provide optimal 
control of atmospheric conditions and to attain higher temperatures than in 
vessel production (Vidale 2000:92). Many bangles bore Indus signs as if pro-
duced for individuals, or were possibly inscribed with a name.
The independent, noncentralized organization of vessel production is based 
on contextual data from the excavations at Harappa. A ceramic workshop in 
the city was associated with a mudbrick wall believed to be part of a residen-
tial building. During the urban period, potters built a large two-chambered 
kiln replacing a small pit kiln that had been built in a previous period. We 
interpreted the presence of the two kilns as evidence for an early pre-urban 
era of small-scale production and the later intensification of production in the 
urban period (Wright 1991, 2010:187). This time capsule of social change dem-
onstrated continuity among specialist producers in which a craft was handed 
down over several generations. Although there were changes in the produc-
tion process over several hundred years of producing ceramic objects, their 
decisions about timing, technologies, and social arrangements were organized 
without any apparent control from groups outside of their production units.
In early ethnographies, ceramic production was often described as “a labor 
intensive and time-consuming” craft in which production was limited (Foster 
1995:100) and economic yields were low. Because ceramics were thought to be 
produced by a single individual, the “potter,” their organization had little to 
offer in shaping society, an assumption partially based on misplaced census 
reports in which a single entry designated the name of the “potter” (Miller 
1985b). In fact, as subsequent research has demonstrated, pottery production 
more often requires a cooperative network of craft workers who perform 
various tasks that cannot be accomplished by a single producer and that are 
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essential to the final product. They work together in tightly organized groups 
in which decision-making requires consensus building and collective action to 
succeed (Coburn 2011; Kramer 1997; Wright 1991).
The organization of the stoneware bangle industry differed. Situated out-
side of a residential area within a walled enclosure at the city of Mohenjo-
daro, it fits the exclusionary model often associated with specialized forms 
of ceramic production that are highly standardized and controlled. Perhaps 
because stoneware bangle production was an innovation associated with the 
urban period, it has been interpreted as an “industrial craft under administra-
tive control” (Vidale 1989:178). According to a neutron activation analysis of 
a sample of bangles from several sites, their production appears to have been 
limited to Mohenjo-daro and Harappa and controlled by a restricted group 
(Blackman and Vidale 1992).
My second example, the production and use of seals, has a long history in 
the greater Near East and South Asia. Conceptually, seals and sealings are 
related to what Dennis Frenez and Maurizio Tosi refer to as a “Transcultural 
Administrative Sealing System” in which objects were sealed for storage pur-
poses and safe-keeping, a practice known from the sixth to fifth millennia 
BCE (Frenez and Tosi 2005). By the third millennium, the shapes of seals 
signified their culture of origin; for example circular seals were from groups in 
Arabia, while Indus seals were square. The latter were produced from steatite 
and engraved with large mammals, small stands, and Indus script (Franke-Vogt 
1989). At Indus sites, seals are present in great numbers and widely distributed 
at small and large settlements, in households, public buildings, and workshops.
Based on contextual data—stylistic and technological studies—Indus seals 
are associated with trade and merchants (Frenez and Tosi 2005). At the small 
site of Chanhu-daro, a seal workshop was separated from other craft production. 
Among the production debris associated with the seals, there were net weights, 
a standard of measurement associated with exchange systems and merchant 
activities (Mackay 1943). In another study, an analysis of the stylistic elements of 
seal iconography, Paul Rissman (1988) identified features that were sufficiently 
distinctive that he was able to identify the work of regional artisans. He referred 
to them as “schools” of producers who were organized in guild-like structures, 
possibly within the context of a family group (Rissman 1988), a finding that 
complements identifiable stylistic variations found in other studies (Vidale 
2005). Close analyses of technological features have identified Indus production 
techniques that vary regionally (Green 2016) and interregionally (Pittman 2013).
Textual evidence for contemporary merchants who traveled abroad and 
are known from Mesopotamian texts complement these interpretations. In 
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Mesopotamia, merchant and artisan groups were organized into professional 
communities, often linked through family ties (Garfinkle 2002), many of 
which were independent of the state. Merchants are known to have trav-
eled to Mesopotamia, as attested by the words of an Akkadian king (ca. 2350 
BCE) who boasted of having seafaring traders from Meluhha (interpreted as 
the Indus civilization) in his harbor. In a subsequent period (Ur III, ca. 2000 
BCE), other texts record a “village of traveling merchants” from Meluhha in 
the village of Guabba in Mesopotamia (Vermaak 2008). These Meluhhans 
had become acculturated, as evidenced by their Sumerian names (Parpola 
et al. 1977:145), suggesting that generations of Meluhhans had traveled to 
Mesopotamia and became acculturated over a period of several hundred years.
Our best examples of regional variation in Indus seal iconography and tech-
nology and traveling merchants unattached to a central authority come from a 
recent study by Steffen Laursen (2010). His research is based on the discovery 
of round seals on the Arabian Peninsula in Bahrain. Although round seals are 
common on the Arabian Peninsula, Laursen believes that the technology of 
seal production was spread by entrepreneurs from the Indus who transmitted 
a technological package comprising sealing, writing, and weight technologies. 
Sometime around 2100 BCE these “breakaway” entrepreneurs established a 
hybrid form of the technology in Bahrain (Laursen 2010) and by 2050 BCE 
they were acculturated, much like the traveling merchants in Guabba. Based 
on the analyses of the sequence order of Indus signs (Parpola 1994), Laursen 
notes that among the 28 seals he researched, only three have sequences that 
parallel those found on Indus inscriptions. Others included signs with the 
double image of an inscription, which is not true to the normal order of inscrip-
tions produced in the Indus. Further, in another group of seals from Failaka, 
Mesopotamia, and Iran, inscribed twin images and improperly ordered script 
have also been discovered. Laursen describes the signs as “pseudo-inscriptions” 
designed to convey a strong message of autonomy (Laursen 2010:36).
These “errors” are typical of altered forms of writing when contact occurs 
over long periods of time and a language becomes pigeonized. They are clear 
signs of the development of new forms that are not true to the original lan-
guages but that are understood by persons engaged in transactions from dif-
ferent language groups. Possibly the seals belonged to a merchant of Indus 
origin who lived in Mesopotamia or the Gulf and who either adopted a local 
language or refashioned his own into a version of the original, signaling a dif-
ference from the Indus script that is consistent with the examples of collective 
action carried out by the merchants who produced and used the seals.
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ConCLusions
In a recent work, Blanton looks at the marketplace and argues against ear-
lier antimarket thinking in substantivist debates and the idea that the com-
mercialized West was “unique in human experience” (Blanton 2013:23). His 
views on marketplaces, which he discusses in great detail, are closely aligned 
with the interpretations offered here with respect to collective action among 
pastoralists, craft producers, and merchants at Mari and the Indus. Like mar-
ketplaces, pastoralists, craft producers, and merchants carved out social spaces 
that shaped institutions, social relationships, and domains, establishing ties of 
sufficient political and economic import that they limited exclusionary rule. 
The evidence from the Indus and Mari provides a compelling example of the 
efficacy of the corporate model and offers a structure for understanding col-
lective action. Both in Mari and the Indus they were especially useful tools 
with which to model strategies among pastoralists, where a strong, materially 
based ideology, drawn from textual sources, excluded centralization among 
the Sima’lites. In the Indus, the examples of craft production and merchant 
activities, when complemented by textual and modern examples of produc-
ers and merchants, demonstrated the presence of whole communities (guilds, 
occupational specializations) and collective action that predates modern states.
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“We Shape Our Buildings 
and Afterwards Our 
Buildings Shape Us”
Interpreting Architectural 
Evolution in a Sinhalese Village
Deborah Winslow
I take my title from Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s 
address to the House of Commons on October 28, 
1943, in the middle of World War II.1 The House of 
Commons was meeting then in the Lords Chamber; the 
Commons Chamber had been destroyed by German 
incendiary bombs (Parliament 2012). Churchill’s brief 
was to argue for an early rebuilding with two archi-
tectural stipulations. First, the new Chamber should 
retain its traditional oblong shape, eschewing a con-
temporary fad for semicircular form that, he contended, 
undermined the party system. A half-circle encour-
ages mingling but the oblong forces Members to sig-
nal clearly their party allegiance and renders “crossing 
over” an act never to be undertaken without serious 
consideration. Second, the new Chamber should not 
easily accommodate all members and there should be 
no reserved desks. Here his case was that the intimacy 
and crowding of smaller spaces encouraged “episodes 
and great moments” and imparted a sense that, as he 
put it, “great matters are being decided, then and there.” 
Churchill’s purport was that no less than the future 
of British Parliamentary democracy would be shaped 
by how the Members shaped their new Chamber 
(Hansard 1943).
Churchill premised his case on the conviction that 
the material spaces people create have the effect there-
after of molding the lives of their creators. In 1994, 
Richard E. Blanton published an innovative mono-
graph that is grounded in this same estimation. Houses 
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and Households: A Comparative Study is an unusual volume for an archaeolo-
gist but in its grand scope and unconventional methodology it is also clas-
sic Blanton. Just consider the numbers. To produce this comparative study of 
peasant domestic dwellings, Blanton hand coded an incredible 289 variables 
for 324 houses in 26 communities in China, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand, Java, 
India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, 
Egypt, Mexico, and Guatemala. The result is a unique and valuable database 
that enables the systematic, quantitative testing of theoretical propositions 
about houses and households over time and space and at multiple interact-
ing levels of scale. But what most marks this work as a typical Blanton tour 
de force is its methodology. As in his work on world and regional systems 
(Blanton 1976), Blanton appropriates theories and techniques from outside of 
anthropology, retrofits them to new uses, observes the wonders that emerge, 
and then hastens to share these rich and novel possibilities with the rest of us.
teCHnoLogies of CommuniCAtion
Despite its forays far afield, Houses and Households was solidly grounded in 
archaeological objectives. Blanton’s underlying goal was to improve inferences 
about the evolution of the state and its effects on the living standards of ordi-
nary people such as might be derived from excavations of domestic structures. 
To that end, he had recourse to both contemporary ethnographic accounts of 
peasant housing and theories of the built environment, including the work 
of the Polish architect and city planner, Amos Rapoport. Like Churchill, 
Rapoport (1969) contended that houses, whether Houses of Parliament or the 
humble abodes of a peasant village, do far more than merely give shelter. They 
also impinge on human consciousness, they mold the world they contain, and 
they affect the larger world in which they themselves are contained. What 
makes these impingements, moldings, and containments possible, Rapoport 
and Blanton tell us, is that houses impart information; houses are in fact tech-
nologies of communication.
Two architectural communicative modes in particular are critical for 
Blanton’s analysis; he terms these the “canonical” and the “indexical.” Canonical 
communication takes place primarily in the intimate spaces of a house’s inte-
rior and its immediate surrounds. A house’s floor plan, for example, may bring 
people and activities together, may segregate them, or may simply define them. 
These interior delineations act to materially represent and so to reproduce 
the conventional or canonical social order. Indexical communication, on the 
other hand, occurs when a house is seen from outside. From this vantage point, 
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displays of cultural markers, emblems of achievement, and signs of taste dif-
ferentiate and place—or index—the house’s inhabitants within a larger social 
order. In addition, a house’s design invites or discourages the flow of people 
between inside and outside, determining how easily those who dwell within 
mingle with those who do not.
But what makes Blanton’s work especially useful for social scientists is that 
he went beyond these insights to devise and adapt a practical, quantitative 
system for representing these qualitative spatial realities.
BLAnton’s metHoDoLogy
In Blanton’s words his spatial analytics comprise “a methodology, grounded 
in graph theory, that allows me to derive measures of scale, complexity, and 
integration of houses, in a manner facilitating cross-cultural comparison, and 
which could be applied to diachronic comparison” (Blanton 1994:23). This 
methodology, which builds on the ideas of spatial syntax such as those devel-
oped by Hillier and his colleagues (Hillier et al. 1976), begins by taking the 
simple data of a dimensionless floor plan and reducing it to a “planar graph 
consisting of nodes (or vertices) and edges” (Blanton 1994:26). Blanton’s 
graphical representations are dimensionless, incidentally, because surprisingly 
few published ethnographies included measurements. Nonetheless, working 
from the floor plan alone, he derived three useful metrics: scale, integration, 
and complexity.
•  Scale is a measure of size as represented by the number of nodes, or “physi-
cally defined architectural spaces in the residential compound” (ibid.:52). The 
example in figure 11.1 has four nodes—three rooms plus the outside. This 
made it a very small house in Blanton’s sample, which had a mean of 10 
nodes per house, with an impressive high of 19 for the Chinese houses and a 
low of 7 for the South Asian and Mesoamerican ones.
• Integration refers to the degree of linkage among the nodes or number of 
possible routes or circuits between rooms. The same number of rooms can 
be linked in multiple ways. For example, a builder who wants to economize 
but still have several rooms might end up with one of New Orleans’s linear 
“shotgun” houses. Adding in hallways, staging areas, stairs, and courtyards 
increases costs but also affords zones of privacy and functional differentiation. 
Blanton found a simple count of the number of circuits to be the most useful 
measure of integration. The example house of figure 11.1 has a single circuit 
because there is only one possible route to get from one room to another.
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•  Complexity, the third measure, refers to a house’s internal differentiation and 
levels of accessibility. As Blanton points out, a house can have many rooms 
and still be quite simple if all rooms are entered off a central courtyard. 
But if some of the rooms can only be reached by going upstairs and then 
proceeding off a common landing the layout becomes significantly more 
complex, even though the number of rooms is unchanged. Blanton attached 
a numerical value to this variable by counting the number of links separating 
every pair of rooms or nodes, summing them for each room, and then rank 
ordering the sums. A lower rank indicates that a room is more easily reached 
than spaces with higher ranks.
Table 11.1 demonstrates this calculation for the figure 11.1 floor plan. This sim-
ple house has only two hierarchical levels: Room 1 is the most accessible space 
while the other spaces are less accessible, although none more so than another.
Armed with these tools, other data as available, and information about orna-
mentation and other communicative elements, Blanton compared domestic 
architecture across six geographic regions. For example, he found that houses 
in China, Nepal, and parts of the Middle East have more rooms or nodes, 
more differentiated internal circuits, and more complexity of function and 
hierarchical levels than do most houses in Mesoamerica and India (Blanton 
1994:50–75). The peasant houses of China, Nepal, and parts of the Middle 
East also had more elaborate canonical communication—that is, internal 
differentiations that reinforce social distinctions—and greater expression of 
indexical indicators of wealth differences. In contrast, in Mesoamerica and 
in some areas of South Asia, canonical communication—practices designed 
to conserve and reproduce the social order—rested more in the public rituals 
Figure 11.1. Floor plan and its graph. (After Blanton 1994:37.) 
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of well-integrated communities than in the strong intergenerational control 
of private spaces (Blanton 1994:192–193). Blanton’s analysis chapters are rich 
in such observations and insightful interpretations. Houses and Households 
illustrates beautifully the power of controlled cross-cultural comparisons even 
when data are sparse and secondhand.
But what if one’s data are more abundant, the fruit of long-term field 
research and firsthand observation? Then Blanton’s analytical tools equip 
us to discern patterns amidst the inevitable surfeit of ethnographic detail. 
As it turns out, this is a complementary process: the minutiae of daily life 
may at times be distracting trees that blind us to the forest, but they are also 
important guides to the mechanisms that produce the order that Blanton 
helps us to see.
new Houses in wALAngAmA
For me, Houses and Households has particular resonance. Since the mid-1970s, 
I have followed the improving fortunes of a rural Sinhalese community that 
I call Walangama, “Pottery Village,” nestled among the coconut estates that 
dominate the Kurunegala District of central Sri Lanka. Much of the old-
fashioned village I first knew has slowly disappeared over the years, recast by 
a construction wave that has filled Walangama with modern houses quite dif-
ferent in appearance from those they displaced. Blanton’s ideas led me to ask: 
Does this changed architecture mean also changed socio-architectural effects? 
Do the houses communicate as differently as they look?
To begin to think about these questions, I began with the changes I was 
noticing in the social world of the village. The story turned on two kinds of 
events: on the one hand, the great events of globalization, economic structural 
adjustments, and social transformation. And on the other, a young Walangama 
entrepreneur whose pioneering activities effectively inserted the macroeco-
nomic shifts into the local village economy.
Table 11.1. Accessibility ranks of the nodes in figure 11.1 reveal two hierarchical levels.
Room 1 Room 2 Room 3 Outside Sum Rank
1 x 1 1 1 3 1
2 1 x 2 2 5 2
3 1 2 x 2 5 2
+ 1 2 2 x 5 2
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First, the big picture: both Walangama’s economic prosperity and its archi-
tectural transformation were closely linked to changes in their traditional caste 
occupation, pottery making, abetted—perhaps surprisingly—by economic lib-
eralization (Winslow 1996). After the watershed elections of 1977, Sri Lanka 
opened its markets, let its currency float, and invested in industrial infra-
structure to attract foreign businesses to new Free Trade Zones. The govern-
ment also undertook two major public investment initiatives: the Accelerated 
Mahaweli Development Program and a Public Sector Housing Program. The 
Mahaweli Project comprised a series of hydroelectric dams built to provide 
electricity for industry and irrigation for Dry Zone farming (Karunatilake 
1988). The housing initiatives began with the Hundred Thousand Houses 
Program (1978–1983), which granted new houses primarily to the urban poor. 
It was followed by the Million Houses Program (1984–1988), which was tar-
geted more on rural communities (Yap 1994:ch. II). Together, these two pro-
grams absorbed nearly half of all public investment in the 1979–1985 period 
(Athukorala and Jayasuriya 1994:79).
In Walangama, a completely unpredictable but highly productive local-level 
synergy developed between these two initiatives. It came about because of 
the far-reaching vision of a young Walangama man called Sumana Mudalali 
(Sumana-the-Trader). The son of a village coconut trader, Sumana Mudalali 
had gotten to know the Mahaweli area while making his rounds to supply tra-
ditional Walangama pottery to shops and markets. In the early 1980s, he was 
there just as the effects of increased irrigation were beginning to be felt not 
only in agriculture but also in dairy farming. Milk is marketed to Sri Lankans 
primarily as milk powder and as cow’s milk yogurt and buffalo milk curd, much 
of which is sold in disposable clay pots. Crudely made from inferior clay and 
used only once, these pots were not part of Walangama’s traditional repertoire. 
But when Sumana Mudalali saw the truckloads of curd pots arriving from 
Matara on Sri Lanka’s south coast, he realized that Walangama’s much greater 
proximity would give it a competitive advantage. Sumana Mudalali secured 
a contract with a dairy farm and then returned to Walangama to acquire the 
pots he had promised to deliver. But to do so, he first had to recruit potters to 
make them.
One of Sumana Mudalali’s most effective tools for convincing potters to 
risk the new enterprise proved to be the government’s housing construction 
program. The Million Houses Program did not dole out houses directly but 
instead used the rural banking system to make available very low-interest 
loans to income-qualified households. These relatively small loans were to be 
used for house renovation or new construction with the expectation that the 
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receiving households would fill in the gaps with their own labor, materials, and 
funds (Yap 1994:ch. II). Although it appears that the majority of Walangama 
households exceeded the income ceiling, they managed to obtain loans none-
theless. The loans ranged from Rs.1,500 to Rs.7,500, comparable to just a 
few months of potter household income. But Walangama families reported 
spending far more, as much as Rs.100,000. They made up the difference with 
bank loans, savings, and, especially, by taking advances against future pottery 
production first from Sumana Mudalali and then from other village men who 
joined him in the booming business of buying and selling pots for Dry Zone 
dairy farms (Winslow 1996:719). By 1992, this little village of 200 or so house-
holds was turning out around 100,000 handmade curd pots a month; by the 
mid-2000s, with the help of local technological innovations, production was 
ten times that. Consequently, Walangama incomes have been more than able 
to compensate for the spiraling inflation and declining government services 
so typical of economic liberalization, wherever it occurs (Winslow 2003, 2009).
Sumana Mudalali was able to call on real and classificatory kin to begin 
and later to sustain his new business. Almost all Sri Lankans use a Dravidian 
kin-term and marriage system, which encodes a preference for cross-cousin 
marriage. Walangama residents address each other with kin terms almost 
exclusively and frequently refer to their community as “one family,” despite 
an economy firmly grounded in a household-based mode of production. But 
the potters also were motivated by the fact that Sumana Mudalali offered 
them advances both in cash and in bags of cement, loads of lumber, and other 
scarce building materials. In a 1992 interview, Sumana Mudalali laughingly 
described the heaps of construction materials that took over his house and 
yard in those early years. His potter kin repaid him with a steady supply of 
curd pots to fill ever-larger contracts. Other men (and one or two women) 
soon followed Sumana Mudalali’s entrepreneurial lead and curd pot produc-
tion and new houses spread in tandem throughout Walangama.
tAking BLAnton to sri LAnkA: tHe 
fLexiBLe AnD inCLusiVe Pil Gē
In order to understand how the new houses might have shaped as well as 
been shaped by a changed village life, we first need to consider the houses 
they replaced (figure 11.2). I present below (figure 11.2a) the floor plan and 
Blanton graph of an old Walangama house. It was built around 1940, although 
the kitchen, with its woven palm frond walls, would have been replaced many 
times over the years and latrines appeared in the village only in the 1960s. The 
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Figure 11.2a. Walangama pil gē. Built around 1940, this is the oldest extant house in 
Walangama. Due to a property line dispute between brothers, it is soon to be taken down. 
Note the swept front yard (midula), the veranda (istōpu), and the veranda room (istōpu 
cāmara). (Photo: 2013, Deborah Winslow.) 
house is a traditional pil gē, a raised mudbrick structure with plastered walls 
and palm-thatched roof, about 750 square feet (70 m2) in area. The wide front 
veranda (istōpu), facing the midula (swept front yard) and open to passersby, is 
typical of this type of house.
The istōpu serves as an outside foyer, a transitional space between public 
and private that both invites and channels visitors. Passersby first step off the 
public path, walk across the midula and then, with permission, take a seat on 
a mat or chair on the istōpu to talk, rest, escape the sun, and chew a little areca 
nut and betel leaf. Typically, the istōpu is a primarily male space. Unless they 
are strangers or past the age at which they might lend a hand with domestic 
chores, village women are more likely to go around the side of the house to 
sit near more-private domestic areas at the rear than in the public space at the 
front. Interestingly, the istōpu also has a little isolated room, separate from the 
main rooms of the house. This room was used for storing rice, giving birth, and 
for housing overnight guests who were not well enough known to be allowed 
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into the intimacy of the house’s interior. It was also sometimes used to isolate 
girls experiencing the highly polluting status of first menstruation (Winslow 
1980:608). Finally, the istōpu was where particularly important guests, such 
as Buddhist monks or marriage negotiation delegates, were greeted formally 
with bows, foot washing, and betel leaves before being led inside.
Passing through the front door, a visitor enters the sālle. Until the advent of 
television in the 1990s, the sālle was not a space where residents of the house 
sat around casually; it was a reception and sitting room for guests. Within it, 
but as far from the front door as possible, there was an area set aside for eat-
ing at a table, although women and small children more commonly took their 
meals seated on low stools in the kitchen. Today the sālle functions both as a 
reception area and as a family room.
From the sālle, one can access the bedroom and the house’s rear exit, which 
leads to an outdoor space that does not have the public formality of the midula. 
The area right around the back door is used to store water and cooking pots, 
farming implements, and other household necessities. A few steps further and 
one finds the kitchen, a simple structure constructed of woven palm fronds 
whose airy weave allows hearth smoke to escape. Beyond the kitchen, a tiny 
brick structure houses a water-seal latrine. If you explore a Walangama com-
pound a bit further, you may find a small household vegetable garden, a roofed 
platform that serves as a pottery workshop, and a shallow pit kiln for firing pots.
Figure 11.2b. Floor plan of typical Walangama pil gē. 
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Following Blanton, I performed an accessibility rank analysis of this pil gē’s 
rooms: I counted the links between every pair of rooms, summed them, and 
then rank ordered the sums. Five hierarchical levels emerged. I had anticipated 
that the istōpu, the most public space, would have the lowest rank, but it did 
not. The best connected, the most central of all the spaces turned out to be the 
sālle, from which one can most easily access all of the delineated spaces. More 
predictably, the highest ranked and least accessible are the latrine and the 
kitchen, both tucked into the privacy zone at the rear of the house. In between 
are the istōpu (Rank 2), the bedroom (Rank 3), the non-communicating room 
off the istōpu (Rank 4), and the midula (marked “O/F” for Outside Front, also 
Rank 4) (table 11.2).
Blanton alerted us to the importance of the canonical messages communi-
cated by house architecture, the spatial delineations that express and reinforce 
particular, conventional categorizations, separations, and alignments. Overall, 
the pil gē’s architectural canon communicates a sense of a family that lives and 
works together, open to the rest of the village while clearly distinct from it, 
and with a minimum of internal differentiation for either work or social status.
There is first of all a clear but also graduated separation between public and 
private; the house welcomes and shelters even casual visitors, but only as far 
as the istōpu. From that point on, one clearly needs a more formal invitation 
to proceed. While the istōpu is always open, the door into the sālle is closed 
and literally barred when the family retires for the night; its reopening the 
next morning is a public signal that the household is again ready to welcome 
the world. The front doors of elderly villagers are monitored by concerned 
neighbors who will go check for illness or even death if a door fails to open at 
first light. The isolation of the side room directly off the istōpu and outside the 
family threshold is thus quite marked. When the room is occupied by a child 
Table 11.2. Accessibility ranks of an older Walangama house
Space 1 2 3 4 5 6 O/F Sum Rank
1 x 1 2 1 3 3 1 11 2
2 1 x 1 2 2 2 2 10 1
3 2 1 x 3 2 2 3 13 3
4 1 2 3 x 4 4 2 16 4
5 3 2 2 4 x 2 4 17 5
6 3 2 2 4 2 x 4 17 5
O/F 1 2 3 2 4 4 x 16 4
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enduring her first menstruation, the symbolic separation was poignant, on the 
same accessibility level as the midula and out of the house completely.
The pil gē kitchen is not the center of public life as it is in many Western 
homes. Rather, it is hidden and protected, the least accessible space in the 
house except for the latrine. Similarly, the dining area is shielded from casual 
gaze in keeping with the fact that food and its effects are a focus of gen-
eralized concern. Villagers dislike being watched while eating; some believe 
that an envious gaze might attract the attention of demonic forces and illness. 
More positively, the kitchen is said to be the realm of a goddess, Shriakantha, 
who comes at night to check it for cleanliness and to eat the bit of rice left at 
the bottom of the cooking pot just for her.
A pil gē’s canon reveals little concern with individuating differentiations. 
The architecture of the house allows for but does not insist upon separation 
by either gender or age. The kitchen is a place of women’s work but it is not 
forbidden to men. Men may tend to occupy the public space of the istōpu and 
women the private space of the kitchen, but the separation is far from rigid. 
Women are frequently found chatting and playing with children at the front 
of the house while men sit on mats behind, weaving palm frond branches, 
repairing tools, or simply enjoying a cup of tea in the kitchen.
Other sorts of separations, too, are muted. Over the years, this particular 
house was lived in by at least five people and sometimes several more, yet there 
is only a single bedroom. Furthermore, with two doors, one into the sālle and 
the other directly outside, the bedroom is midway in the accessibility rank and 
not particularly private. It could be claimed for privacy when needed, perhaps 
because of illness or to accommodate a newly married couple. But Walangama 
people almost never sleep alone; beds are occupied at night by several women 
and young children while men and older children sleep on floor mats in what-
ever space is convenient.
Thus the pil gē communicates a message of flexibility and togetherness 
rather than separation and rupture. There is a concern for privatizing food 
preparation and consumption without isolating it all together. Only the deep 
impurities of first menstruation and toilets are true zones of separation. Is the 
same true of the new houses? To answer this question we turn now to another 
floor plan and Blanton graph.
CALiforniA st yLe in wALAngAmA
Walangama households undertook their house-building projects in stages. 
Bags of cement and piles of lumber and hardware were purchased piecemeal 
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Figure 11.3a. Walangama California-style house. In Walangama, the style dates from 
about 1990 but this house was built in 2011. Its distinctive feature is the carport-like 
structure that replaces the veranda (istōpu) of older houses. However, the carport is not 
large enough to accommodate a vehicle; instead, it is fitted with chairs and used as an istōpu. 
(Photo: 2013, Deborah Winslow.) 
as funds became available and traders gave advances. A brick foundation 
might grace a yard for months or even years before the house itself went up. 
But over a little more than a decade, bright plastered brick walls, red-tile roofs, 
and cement floors replaced most of the wattle-and-daub or mud-brick-and-
plaster, thatched-roof, and clay-floored structures of earlier times.
Walangama villagers generally favored what some called the “California” 
plan (figure 11.3a), easily distinguishable by a cement-floored carport-like 
space sheltering the area around the front door. The carport replaces the istōpu; 
houses have one or the other, never both. But despite its appearance and the 
fact that it is at ground level, rather than raised like the traditional istōpu, the 
carport normally functions as a space for people, not vehicles. Visitors again 
cross the midula but now linger in the carport where, sheltered by the tile roof 
overhead, they sit on chairs or mats, or perch on the low cement foundation 
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Figure 11.3b. Floor plan of typical California-style house. 
curb that projects into the carport from under the house’s front wall. Figure 
11.3b displays the floor plan and Blanton graph for a California-style house.
From this floor plan we can see that once the visitor passes the novel car-
port, he or she is in familiar territory. The first room encountered is again 
the sālle; there are bedrooms off the sālle; there is an area reserved for eating 
at a table that is only slightly more set apart and is again adjoining the back 
door; and outside the back door are separate structures first for a kitchen 
and further back for a latrine. By the turn of the century, a few houses had 
permanent attached kitchens with a raised platform for fire-fueled cook-
ing. They were furnished much like the separate kitchen sheds with floor 
racks, pots, and spoons hung from the rafters, and mats and low stools on 
the floor where women work. Even in 2008, while many people told me that 
they planned eventually to build an attached kitchen, the separate thatched 
kitchen remained the village norm.
An observant visitor might have noticed that the carport-istōpu does not 
contain the isolation room of the pil gē’s istōpu. Instead, my own experience is 
that the small bedroom at the very back of the house (Room 6 in figure 11.3b), 
which is not reachable directly from the sālle, functions in a similar way: it is 
used for storage, for the sick, and to isolate a newly mature girl (these days, 
women have their babies in the hospital). Of course, these practices are not 
discernible from the floor plan alone but depend on the familiarity gained 
through ethnographic research. However, the floor plan does direct us to the 
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fact that the third bedroom is different than the other two. Once we know that 
this is the new isolation room, the floor plan also highlights the fact that degree 
of isolation has been significantly lessened. The polluting girl is no longer kept 
outside the threshold but remains within the family fold. Interestingly, it is 
said that there once was a time when girls experiencing their first menstrua-
tion would be housed away from the house altogether in a temporary shed 
built in the back yard; the shed would be burned when the isolation period 
was over. In this light, the istōpu room of the pil gē might be seen as an interim 
step, integrating the girl more with her family during this difficult time. The 
back room in the California-style house then becomes a further move in the 
destigmatization of first menstruation, a point that Blanton’s spatial analytics 
helps us to see.
In addition to the back room, the new house has two other bedrooms, allow-
ing potentially for further spatial individualization. However, ethnographic 
observation reveals rooms and beds are not assigned but continue to be shared. 
What the additional room seems to provide is the possibility of a space apart. 
For example, I saw one such room temporarily furnished with a small table, 
desk lamp, and chair to provide a separate workspace for a child studying for 
an important exam.
Having more rooms, this house also has more hierarchical levels (table 11.3), 
seven rather than the five of the old house.
But if we look carefully we can see that the fact of more hierarchical levels 
suggests a difference that is perhaps more apparent than real. The underlying 
template, made perfectly clear to us through Blanton’s method, is remark-
ably similar.
•  The sālle (reception room) is the best-connected space in both houses.
•  The dining area is linked directly to the back door in each house, and while 
it is set apart more in the California house, the separation is not reinforced 
with a door.
•  The istōpu or its equivalent, the carport, is next in accessibility
•  Next in both houses are bedrooms reachable by one link from the sālle.
•  Then come spaces that are two links from the sālle: the isolation room (4) 
and the midula (O/F) in the old house and the back room (6) and the midula 
(O/F) in the new house.
•  Finally, the most isolated rooms in both houses are the kitchen and the 
latrine.
In sum, then, what Blanton’s analysis accomplishes first is to show us objec-
tively that despite the distracting California carport, the fired-brick walls, and 
INTERPRETING ARCHITECTURAL EVOLU TION IN A SINHALESE VILLAGE 253
the red-clay tiled roof, socially significant canonical differences between the 
old houses and the new are few. Both houses communicate flexibility and 
togetherness rather than separation and rupture, a concern for privatizing 
food preparation and consumption, and for keeping latrines hidden. Spatially, 
the most important difference is the relocation of the isolation room from 
outside to inside.
This answers the first of my questions: “Does this changed architecture 
mean also changed socio-architectural effects?” From the perspective of the 
inside of the house, the answer is no, the kinds of changes that Walangama 
residents have introduced may make their houses sturdier and give them a 
changed appearance, but canonically, they have little effect.
But what of the second question: “Do the houses communicate as differ-
ently as they look?” To find out, we must consider indexical as well as canoni-
cal communication: the meaning of houses from the outside.
wHAt Do tHe new Houses meAn?
Externally, Walangama’s new houses seem remarkably similar. Most are 
built to the California plan. A few have a frieze of ducks built into the carport 
trim and some are color washed in pastels rather than brilliant white, but the 
differences are slight. So much so that the most obvious indexical message 
appears to be singularly simple. There either is a new, modern house, or there 
is not; it is a dichotomous variable. A new house tells observers that those who 
live inside are economically stable enough to find the means to complete such 
a major project. In a community that prizes economic self-sufficiency and the 
Table 11.3. Accessibility ranks of a newer Walangama house
Space 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 O/F Sum Rank
1 x 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 1 19 3
2 1 x 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 14 1
3 2 1 x 2 2 3 4 4 3 21 4
4 2 1 2 x 2 3 4 4 3 21 4
5 2 1 2 2 x 1 2 2 3 15 2
6 3 2 3 3 1 x 3 3 4 22 5
7 4 3 4 4 2 3 x 2 5 27 7
8 4 3 4 4 2 3 2 x 5 27 7
O/F 1 2 3 3 3 4 5 5 x 26 6
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ability to rise economically (diyunuwa), this is not an unimportant message. 
But Blanton’s cross-cultural analysis take us further and permits us to consider 
why housing is not used more distinctively in Walangama.
One of Blanton’s findings was a negative correlation between external hous-
ing decoration and a combination variable that he called community integra-
tion (Blanton 1994:133–134). In places with higher levels of interhousehold 
ties and exchanges, where people used a communal cemetery, and where 
there were communal rituals—the three factors comprising his integration 
measure—houses were less likely to be decorated expensively and in ways 
that tried to distinguish one sharply from another. Blanton actually hedged 
this conclusion, citing limitations of his nonrandom sample. But Walangama 
bears out these observations: it is a single-caste community with strong inter-
household ties of kinship and marriage; they do indeed use a communal burial 
ground; and there are significant communal rituals. While household eco-
nomic autonomy is important there also are strong ethics of communal care 
and responsibility (Winslow 2009).
Again drawing on his cross-cultural data, Blanton argued that when elabo-
rate external decoration of houses did occur it constituted a kind of informa-
tion broadcasting in the context of either internal or external social differen-
tiation. Internally, the message was generally one of social boundedness, such 
as when elites seek to distinguish themselves from commoners. Externally, 
elaborate house decoration appeared to be an effort to show off wealth and 
thus exhibit that the residents of the house were worthy of economic and 
other alliances (Blanton 1994:188–189). After a multiple regression analysis, 
Blanton concluded that “external decoration of houses is a complex variable 
that is related both to indexical communication, by way of status anxiety, and 
to a lesser extent, to social boundedness” (ibid.:147). Again, Walangama fits 
these cross-culturally derived observations. There is little internal stratifica-
tion, economic ties with the outside are determined chiefly by caste-based 
occupation, and those ties are mediated more by trader middlemen than 
they are by individual households. The persistent simplicity and uniformity 
of Walangama housing is consistent with Blanton’s cross-cultural results and 
tells us that despite the increase in prosperity, the community has not experi-
enced an increase in internal socioeconomic differentiation (Winslow 2009).
Interestingly, the one apparent departure from Blanton’s predictions actu-
ally serves to confirm the larger point: the sensitivity of the indexical dimen-
sion to social reality. Pottery making is a messy occupation and Walangama 
yards are workspaces, crowded with drying pots, pit kilns, and shelters for 
potter’s wheels. Potters do not leave the house each day for work in a distant 
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field or town. They work at home, moving between work, childcare, and meals, 
from wheel to kitchen to kiln to istōpu; inevitably some of the water, clay, and 
ash of their occupation moves with them. Therefore, while Walangama houses 
are as new and costly as many in neighboring non-potter villages, they do not 
display pristine paint and tidy yards adorned with decorative plants. I have 
visited former Walangama residents after they have relocated to new housing 
colonies. Their houses always stand out as busy sites of industrious labor in 
contrast to the tidy and quiet domesticity of their new neighbors who leave 
home each day to work elsewhere.
Overall, the Blanton graphs provided a new understanding of the fluid and 
integrated nature of Walangama’s instantiation of the Dravidian family system. 
Without them, mere cosmetic differences might have distracted us from impor-
tant similarities between the old and new houses. On a finer scale, they illumi-
nated subtle changes, such as the shift in the isolation room and the increase 
in the number of bedrooms. The methods of Houses and Household revealed 
shades of meaning in the phenomenology of Walangama social life that would 
otherwise remain unnoticed. Blanton himself, speaking, I think, to archaeolo-
gists, concluded that “there has been inadequate attention paid to comparative 
research that would allow us to . . . systematically evaluate our various theoreti-
cal frameworks in the broadest possible sense” (Blanton 1994:185). What taking 
Blanton to Sri Lanka showed me is that it is very much a two-way street: local 
data and generalizing theory are mutually informing. Without paying attention 
to particular trees, we would never understand where the forests came from.
“We shape our buildings and afterwards our buildings shape us,” Churchill 
cautioned his wartime audience as they debated the rebuilding of the House of 
Commons. However, Walangama’s architectural tale, illuminated by Blanton’s 
methods and theory, tells us that the relationship between houses and house-
holds is not so cut-and-dried. It is instead an ongoing process of mutual shap-
ing and being shaped best understood by combining the twin lenses of gener-
alizing theory and local-level ethnography.
PostsCriPt: etHnogrAPHy neVer stAnDs stiLL
In 2013, after completing this essay, I was again in Walangama. There I 
found two new architectural developments. Happily, the first confirms the 
analysis above. California-style carports are being replaced with istōpus, bring-
ing form into consonance with ethnographically observed usage. In contrast, 
the second change may disrupt rather than endorse longstanding social norms. 
Outwardly, it is but a small deviation: a few families have begun construction 
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of modest two-story houses (figure 11.4). Still, with Blanton’s work in mind, 
one wonders. Does this increase in hierarchical levels matter? Does it perhaps 
signal a decrease in community integration, even the beginning of a major 
community transformation? None of the multistory houses had been com-
pleted, so I could not yet know if, as was true in the past, cultural practice 
would mitigate material constraint. But if Blanton has taught us anything, it 
is that if we want to understand the shaping of society, it behooves us to pay 
attention to the shaping of buildings.
note
 1. This essay draws upon research supported by the National Science Foundation 
(NSF), the United States-Sri Lanka Fulbright Commission, the American Institute 
for Sri Lankan Studies, and the University of New Hampshire Center for Interna-
tional Education, all of whose support I gratefully acknowledge. Writing was done 
while serving at NSF. Opinions, findings, or conclusions expressed here are mine alone 
and do not necessarily reflect views of the NSF or any of my other supporters.
Figure 11.4. Walangama two-story house under construction in 2013. Adding a 
second story increases the number of hierarchical levels in the house’s spatial syntax. 







Network Strategy and War
Peter N. Peregrine and 
Carol R. Ember
One of Richard Blanton’s most influential papers is the 
1996 “A Dual-Processual Theory for the Evolution of 
Mesoamerican Civilization.” There, Blanton and col-
leagues argue that there are two basic strategies that 
leaders follow, to varying degrees, to maintain author-
ity: corporate strategy and network (or exclusion-
ary) strategy. Leaders following a corporate strategy 
attempt to build a power base by developing and pro-
moting activities that reinforce the corporate bonds 
tying members of the polity together. A common cor-
porate strategy is, for example, to mobilize goods from 
across a polity for large public rituals or construction 
projects that bring members of the polity together in 
corporate-affirming activities. Leaders following a net-
work strategy attempt to build a power base by control-
ling access to networks of exchange and alliance both 
within and outside the polity. Thus a network strategy 
is one in which leaders attempt to monopolize sources 
of power, while a corporate strategy is one in which 
leaders attempt to share power across different groups 
and sectors of a polity.
The paper has been influential because it provides 
a way of understanding variation in the nature of 
Mesoamerican polities, some of which appear to have 
obvious, self-aggrandizing leaders, and others that 
appear “faceless” despite clear evidence of centralized 
leadership. The value of this perspective has appealed 
to many scholars, and it has been widely applied to 
other prehistoric polities (e.g., Mills 2000; Butler and 
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Welch 2006). Despite its influence, the “dual-processual” paper had two flaws. 
First, it did not adequately clarify that the “dual processes” of political strategy 
formed a continuum rather than two types of political strategy, so that other 
scholars often took them as reflecting cultural “types” rather than as expres-
sions of variation in political strategy (e.g., Yoffee 2005:177–179). Second, the 
paper did not explain how variation along this continuum changed over time.
In recent work the authors of the dual-processual paper have attempted 
to address these flaws by clarifying the idea that the “dual processes” of cor-
porate and network strategies form a continuum from one more inclusive of 
citizen participation in the polity’s political action and decision-making (cor-
porate strategy) to one more exclusive of such participation (network strategy) 
(Blanton and Fargher 2008; Peregrine 2001, 2008). The first author of this 
chapter has also attempted to demonstrate variation on the corporate-network 
continuum over time; to develop an extended multivariate approach to politi-
cal strategy; and to argue that balancing stability and the “cost” of implement-
ing political strategies are one reason that variation occurs (Peregrine 1998, 
2003, 2009, 2012). In this chapter, we suggest that variation on the corporate-
network continuum might be related to socialization for mistrust, unpredict-
able natural disasters, and external warfare (see also Earle, chapter 12, this vol-
ume). And we explore the mechanisms that might underlie these connections.
Ember and Ember (1992a) found that both socialization for mistrust of 
others and unpredictable natural disasters are independent predictors of 
warfare frequency. Peregrine wondered whether xenophobia might be more 
common in network-oriented polities, as leaders might encourage xenopho-
bia to prevent individuals from seeking contact with external polities. While 
socialization for mistrust (a variable coded by Barry and colleagues [1976]) 
is not the same as xenophobia, one might presume that if children are told 
to mistrust others in the community, they might develop more generalized 
mistrust. Using the Embers’ data set, and a measure of the corporate-network 
continuum of political strategy developed by Bramm (2001), Peregrine (2009) 
found evidence to support the idea that network-oriented polities socialized 
for mistrust more frequently than did corporate-oriented societies, and had 
more frequent external war. By “external warfare” the Embers meant warfare 
taking place outside of the culture or linguistic group (Ember and Ember 
1992a, 1992b). This means that one chiefdom, for example, fighting another 
chiefdom within the same linguistic or cultural group would not be consid-
ered an example of external warfare, but one chiefdom fighting another speak-
ing a different language or being part of a different cultural group would be 
considered external warfare.
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Following upon that work, Peregrine also wondered whether, given Ember 
and Ember’s (1992a: 256) argument that “fear of future economic problems 
(rather than current problems) is the major motive for going to war,” the rela-
tionship between warfare and the “fear of future economic problems,” as mea-
sured by the presence of unpredictable natural disasters, might be associated 
with network-oriented polities because of their leaders’ emphases on the con-
trol of external resources. This chapter provides evidence that network political 
strategies are related to unpredictable natural disasters and warfare, but in a 
more complicated way than initially expected.
DAtA AnD metHoDs
The research presented here begins with data coded by Carol R. and Melvin 
Ember for their study of the conditions favoring warfare. The Embers employed 
the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample of 186 societies, which provided them not 
only with a large and relatively well-documented set of cases, but also allowed 
them to use variables coded by other scholars for the same sample (Ember and 
Ember 1992a, 1992b). The Embers coded 43 variables concerning the type and 
intensity of warfare, pacification (pacified societies were not used in their study), 
outcomes of warfare, individual and social aggression, resource problems, and 
sex ratio. The coding method employed two naïve coders. If the coders disagreed 
in their coding of a particular case, they developed a “resolved” score for that 
case. The Embers found that simply using resolved scores yielded weaker results 
than using resolved scores where coders more closely agreed in the first place, 
and so they dropped all cases where reliability was not that strong (reliability 
scores greater than 6). We follow a similar procedure here except that we only 
use the societies in eHRAF World Cultures (http://ehrafworldcultures.yale.edu).
To ensure our data selection and statistical procedures matched the Embers’, 
we first replicated their findings to make sure that the results were still sig-
nificant in our subsample. The Embers employed a carefully selected subset of 
their coded cases in their analyses (dropping island societies, pacified societies, 
and cases with poorer reliability), using only 30 cases in their final analyses. 
Our procedures were slightly different here in that we did not dichotomize 
the natural disasters variable because we wanted to maximize variation. They 
also used a different statistical package (Systat) than we did (SPSS). We found 
that our data and statistical package replicated the Ember’s results satisfacto-
rily (see table 12.2a).1
Once we replicated the Embers’ results, the first author coded five ordinal 
variables, each focused on a separate facet of corporate/network strategy. These 
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five variables were then summed to create an interval scale of corporate/net-
work strategy, with more corporate-oriented polities having lower scale scores 
and more network-oriented polities having higher scale scores. The codebook 
is presented as Appendix 12.A, and the raw data as Appendix 12.B. While the 
first author did the coding by himself, he followed the basic strategy identified 
by the Embers. In their original study they found that cases where the infor-
mation did not allow for a clear score (i.e., where the coders disagreed) added 
“noise” to the data, and they dropped them from their analysis. Following that 
idea, the first author coded only cases where the information implied an obvi-
ous score. Because of this selectivity, and because the first author only coded 
those cases with primary source material available in eHRAF World Cultures, 
only 11 cases are included in the analyses that follow.2
resuLts
First we examine whether unpredictable natural disasters predicts more 
network-oriented polities. The bivariate Pearson r is .544, p < .04, one-tailed, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that network-oriented polities are 
more common where there are conditions of unpredictable natural disasters.3 
Figure 12.1 shows a box plot of the relationship. The second hypothesis is that 
there would be more xenophobia in network-oriented polities. As measured 
indirectly by socialization for trust, the hypothesis is not supported, and for 
reasons we cannot explain (r = .365, p < .27, two-tailed). We know from the 
Embers’ study that unpredictable natural disasters are related to more warfare, 
as is socialization for mistrust (both of them presumed causes of warfare). 
Recall that Peregrine (2009) found that network-oriented polities had more 
external warfare.
How might these variables relate to each other? It seems plausible to 
us that network-oriented leadership may be adopted in situations of crisis. 
Researchers examining the psychology of survival have found that network-
style, authoritarian leadership is common in the early stages of a crisis, and 
their presence often leads to a group successfully overcoming that crisis. As 
explained by Leach (1994:140–141), “The initial leader will usually be authori-
tarian, he will be decisive and will lead by example . . . an authoritarian, mili-
tary style of organization is not only acceptable but may even be welcomed in 
the initial stages of a disaster.” A network-oriented leader, who controls the 
polity unilaterally or with a small cadre of peers, is well-positioned to respond 
quickly and decisively to a crisis. In polities with an ongoing threat of unpre-
dictable natural disasters, such a leader might be desired by the members of 
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the polity, and might be able to maintain power much more readily than a 
leader employing a corporate strategy. Being attacked by others might also 
increase the “crisis mode” of a society. So warfare, particularly external warfare, 
might increase the likelihood of network-oriented societies.
Table 12.1 shows a multiple regression analysis with network-oriented soci-
eties as the dependent variable and unpredictable natural disasters and exter-
nal warfare as independent variables.
The results are not statistically significant, although the beta values sug-
gest that natural and pest disasters is the stronger predictor of network strat-
egy in the model. But we have implied above that a network-oriented polity 
might also deliberately undertake more warfare, particularly external war-
fare, to defend external resources. If this is so, a network-oriented polity not 
only might become more likely with warfare (as we discussed above), but it 
also might increase warfare, particularly external warfare. (This would be a 
feedback loop.) To test this idea, we add the network variable to the Embers’ 
original model that has warfare as the dependent variable (Ember and Ember 
1992b). (The Embers’ model with the societies in eHRAF World Cultures is 
shown in table 12.2a for comparison purposes.)
Figure 12.1. Relationship between network strategy and natural disasters. 
264 PETER N. PEREGRINE AND CAROL R . EMBER
The result shown in table 12.2b suggests that this expectation may be correct.
Not only do all the independent variables have high beta values, but the 
overall model predicting warfare is better when we add network-oriented 
strategy (the multiple R is .82 in table 12.2b compared to the multiple R of 
.52 in table 12.2a). If we make the dependent variable external warfare, the 
Table 12.1. Predictors of network strategy
  Beta Significance
Constant   .181
Natural and Pest Disasters .427 .412
External Warfare Frequency .182 .722
n = 9    
R = .579    
R2 = .336   .239
Table 12.2a. Predictors of overall warfare (Embers’ model)
  Beta Significance
Constant   .000
Socialization for Trust –.407 .022
Natural and Pest Disasters .312 .074
n = 29    
R = .522    
R2 = .272   .016




Socialization for Trust -.563 .049
Natural and Pest Disasters .435 .123
Corporate-Network Scale .411 .167
n = 11    
R = .823    
R2 = .677   .038
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Table 12.3a. Predictors of external warfare
  Beta Significance
Constant   .041
Socialization for Trust -.285 .077
Natural and Pest Disasters .350 .146
n = 25    
R = .472    
R2 = .223   .063
Table 12.3b. Predictors of external warfare
  Beta Significance
Constant   .010
Socialization for Trust -.707 .003
Natural and Pest Disasters .694 .045
Corporate-Network Scale .637 .009
n = 10    
R = .946    
R2 = .895   .002
effect of network polities is even stronger (compare table 12.3a and table 
12.3b), the increase in R is even greater, and all the independent variables are 
statistically significant.4
How can we make sense of this? We suggest the explanation lies in the 
unique conditions of polities in which leaders employ a network strategy. 
Recall that leaders employing a network strategy not only attempt to limit 
the political participation of individuals, but also to restrict access to resources 
and knowledge from outside the polity. Thus natural and pest disasters, which 
result in disruptions to external communication or resources, would have 
a much stronger impact on network-oriented polities than on corporate- 
oriented ones. To better control those external resources, network-strategizing 
leaders might go to war with the external group. Of course, such war could 
take place within a single group, as in the case of peer-chiefdoms given above, 
but it might more often occur with external groups, particularly in states.
At the beginning of this section we suggested that a crisis is likely to push 
toward more authoritarian leadership. But there is a catch. Network strategy 
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is not simply authoritarian, but is based on controlling access to power and 
resources. The authoritarian nature of network strategy might be beneficial in 
the initial stages of a crisis, but what about later? Here, according to Leach 
(1994:140), more corporate-style leadership will be preferred: “The later type 
of leader will be one . . . who will work with the rest and will organize and 
minimize differences amongst the group”; in other words, a corporate-style 
leader. Thus, while a network strategy may work in a crisis mode, it may fail to 
be accepted when situations improve. We argue that the reason that network 
strategy improves the predictive power of the Embers’ model for external war 
is because it is in situations where political leaders both restrict access to polit-
ical authority and use connections to other polities to maintain and legitimate 
their own authority that they might go to war in the face of unpredictable 
natural disasters in order to assure themselves access to those resources upon 
which their authority is based. Furthermore, leaders in network polities are in 
a strong position to initiate a war—they tightly control the population and are 
leaders who function well in a time of crisis. External war may appear an easy 
solution to an immediate or feared resource problem.
ConCLusion
One of the limitations of the dual-processual paper (Blanton et al. 1996) 
was that variation on the corporate-network continuum of political strategies 
was not well explained. We suggested one possible explanation here—that 
network strategies may be adaptations to situations of resource unpredict-
ability. Because of small sample sizes, we only have suggestive evidence to 
support this relationship. But we have better evidence for a more complex 
relationship with a feedback loop such that network-oriented polities them-
selves may create more warfare, particularly external warfare. We suggest that, 
because adding variation in the corporate-network continuum improves the 
predictive power for the Ember’s model of war, network orientation may 
itself be a factor behind increased frequencies of war. We have argued that, 
in conditions of resource uncertainty, leaders employing a network strategy 
might find going to war a good, and easily implemented, solution to a poten-
tial resource shortage.
We realize that our explanation for the increased predictive power that 
accompanies network strategy in our regression model for the frequency of 
war is not entirely satisfying,5 but we hope the reader might overlook this to 
accept a broader point: the corporate-network continuum of political strategy 
that Blanton developed to explain variation in the archaeological signature of 
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Mesoamerican polities has explanatory power far beyond the narrow contexts 
within which it was developed. The idea that political strategy is actively pro-
moted by leaders, and that those strategies impact polities in predictable ways, 
has had profound impact. It represents the best of anthropology’s insights, in 
that it both allows us to understand others and to better understand ourselves 
and the world in which we live (a world in which there are still corporate-
oriented and network-oriented polities, acting in predictable ways). It also 
represents the best of Blanton’s work—strongly theoretical, but also practical, 
allowing for explanation of variation in the past and the present. Whether 
focused on cities, political strategy, or collective action, Blanton has demon-
strated that anthropology has the ability to develop concepts of great explana-
tory power, and we hope our brief contribution to this volume has expanded 
the explanatory power of Blanton’s corporate-network continuum, if only in 
a small way.
notes
 1. If natural disasters were dichotomized as no or rare versus more, the natural 
disasters variable would have a higher beta than socialization for mistrust.
 2. Relying only on cases in eHRAF World Cultures meant that we could not code 
all the cases in the Embers’ sample. We hope to do so in the future. Thus this should 
be taken as a preliminary study.
 3. Natural and pest disasters were recoded into a three-category variable from a 
four-category one for this correlation and the regression shown in table 12.1. The full 
variable was employed in all other analyses.
 4. We must point out that the sample size upon which these analyses were per-
formed is very small, and we must be cautious in interpreting them. However, we feel 
that the results are so strong, and the improvement in the regression model so great, 
that they cannot be ignored, despite the potential problems of such a small sample.
 5. Blanton would refer to our explanation as an example of “rinky-dink theory,” 
replete with “ho-hum hypotheses.”
APPenDix 12.A
Codebook
Column 1: Society Name
Column 2: Standard Cross-Cultural Sample Number
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Column 3: Differentiation among leaders and followers
1. none
2. leaders have some privileges and/or access to resources others do 
not
3. leaders have extensive privileges and access to resources others do 
not, including special housing and sumptuary goods
4. leaders have exclusive privileges and exclusive access to special 
housing, resources, and sumptuary goods
Column 4: Leader identification
1. none
2. leaders are identified by treatment or appearance
3. leaders are identified by recognized symbols of power or special 
behaviors
4. individual aggrandizement and/or cult of leaders
Column 5: Sharing of authority
1. leaders share power extensively with others
2. leaders share power with a large cadre of other leaders
3. leaders share power with a few other leaders
4. leaders exercise exclusive power
Column 6: Emphasis of authority
1. emphasis placed on group solidarity and group survival
2. emphasis shared between group and leader, with greatest impor-
tance given to group survival
3. emphasis shared between group and leader, with greatest impor-
tance given to leader survival
4. emphasis placed on leaders as the embodiment of the group
Column 7: External contacts
1. few or unimportant
2. external contacts are part of leaders’ authority, but not exclusive
3. external contacts are key to leaders’ authority, but not exclusive
4. external contacts are exclusively controlled by leaders
Column 8: Sum of scale items (columns 3–7)
Column 9: Overall warfare frequency (from Ember and Ember 1992b)
Column 10: External warfare frequency (from Ember and Ember 1992b)
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Column 11: Socialization for trust (from Ember and Ember 1992b)




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Nama 
Hottentot 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 18 — 6 2
Hausa 26 4 3 3 3 2 15 16 15 7 4
Masai 34 2 2 1 1 1 7 18 17 5 4
Somali 36 2 2 2 2 2 10 17 16 5 2
Riffians 42 2 2 2 2 1 9 18 17 4 2
Lapps 52 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 7 1
Abkhaz 55 2 1 1 1 2 7 18 17 2 3
Vietnamese 73 4 3 3 4 3 17 18 17 8 4
Koreans 116 4 4 3 3 3 17 18 17 6 2
Klamath 138 2 2 2 2 2 10 16 15 5 2





Framing the Rise and 
Variability of Past 
Complex Societies
Gary M. Feinman and 
Linda M. Nicholas
The most important issue confronting the 
social sciences is the extent to which human 
behavior is shaped by factors that operate 
cross-culturally as opposed to factors that are 
unique to particular cultures. (Trigger 2003:3)
Cooperation, inequality, leadership, and governance 
have long been recognized as fundamental character-
istics of the human career. Understanding the ways in 
which humans forge identities, form socioeconomic 
networks, and establish institutions remain critical 
issues for the human sciences today (Pennisi 2005). 
And yet, as Trigger (2003:3) remarked, we are still 
searching for the appropriate balance between general 
and specific factors (or processes and history) when it 
comes to building our frames to examine the range and 
nature of human behavior. In this chapter we concep-
tualize the issues surrounding the development and 
diversity of large-scale human cooperative formations 
from a perspective that embraces both the critical role 
for comparison and the multiple pathways that human 
historical processes take (e.g., Little 2000).
The causes and consequences related to the forma-
tion of hierarchically organized societies have been seen 
for centuries as key hinge points in the human career 
(Childe 1950; Haas 1982). As the first episodes of these 
transitions to chiefdoms and states occurred before the 
advent of writing, a focus on the rise of hierarchically 
organized societies has long been a core comparative 
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issue for archaeologists (e.g., Adams 1966; Wright 1977a). Many years ago, 
Henry Wright outlined the challenge of this topic (Wright 1977b:215): “The 
construction of research strategies for the investigation of state origins is com-
plicated by two principal factors: the type of explanations required and the 
samples available to test them.” Since that time, we believe we have made 
more progress on building that empirical record than on finding an appropri-
ate conceptual frame (although there remain untold lifetimes more to do on 
the former front as well).
In fact, the last overarching archaeological framework designed explicitly to 
tackle this suite of questions (Flannery 1972) has in large part stood (fostering 
highly productive results) for decades (Brumfiel 1992:551). Yet not surprisingly, 
over many years certain conceptual issues (particularly in regard to consider-
ations of diversity, agency, and scale) have arisen even among those committed 
to explicitly comparative approaches (e.g., Blanton et al. 1996; Blanton and 
Fargher 2008; Brumfiel 1992; Chapman 2003; Earle 1997; Feinman 2012).
From the outset, we stress that we do not present definitive answers here, 
nor is our goal to offer an in-depth review or critique of the broad corpus of 
literature focused on the rise of hierarchically organized societies. Rather, our 
intent is to guide and redirect our framing theory or conceptualizations of 
this question toward comparatively based explanations that aim to understand 
patterns of diversity rather than uniformity. To date, most of the ways that 
archaeologists have looked for generality have not been adequately explana-
tory, widely influential in other disciplinary arenas, or able to achieve broad 
consensus even within our own field. The recent dearth of strong theoreti-
cal explanations for the development of cultural complexity (a point noted 
recently by Jeremy Sabloff [2012:xvii]) encourages those of us interested in 
more general and comparative approaches to consider alternative ways to 
frame this issue.
The critical link between frameworks and scientific advances when we are 
tackling big issues is illustrated through a reading of Ernst Mayr’s (1985:404–
408) provocative history of biological thought. Mayr recounts that despite the 
general accumulation of pertinent biological data, Lamarck’s efforts to under-
stand the complex history of life did not prompt a breakthrough because he 
basically asked the wrong questions. Charles Lyell, in contrast, posed the right 
questions, but he came up with the wrong answers. Charles Darwin, build-
ing on their works, framed the right questions and arrived at answers that we 
now know were more fully explanatory than those of his predecessors, thereby 
advancing disciplinary thought. To put it another way: “Discovery requires an 
aggressive and critical engagement with the status quo” (Gerring 2012:28). Or, 
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as “a brief review of the history of archaeology makes clear . . . advances have 
come less by resolving major questions than by superseding them with better 
questions” (Drennan 1987:320).
Prior frAmeworks for ArCHAeoLogiCAL 
generALizAtion on stAte origins
No one would deny that every historical case of archaic state emergence 
is in certain respects unique (Wright 2009:122) and important to unravel in 
detail, both to address specific historical questions and to provide the living 
and future descendants of those cultural traditions with information concern-
ing their pasts and histories. Yet for centuries, scholars also have looked for 
more general processes or conditions that help explain this suite of evolution-
ary transitions, the differences as well as the parallels (cf., Pauketat 2001).
Some of the first comparative efforts advanced the notion that early civiliza-
tions arose in a specific environment (river valleys) or in response to particular 
prime movers (Wittfogel’s [1957] irrigation management) (e.g., Steward 1955). 
Such attempts neither adequately accounted for the full suite of empirical 
cases nor drew convincing causal chains to explain the relevant societal tran-
sitions or the specific timing of the focal historical developments (Flannery 
1972). Perhaps, over the years, the most cited and discussed of such prime 
movers has been Carneiro’s (1970) circumscription model, which advanced 
population pressure, geographic boundedness or circumscription, and offen-
sive/conquest warfare as a lineal set of triggers that led to state development. 
Over the years, both conceptual limitations and empirical shortcomings of 
this model have been repeatedly outlined (Blanton et al. 1979; Flannery 1972; 
Roscoe 2000). In turn, these critiques have prompted efforts by the author 
(Carneiro 1987, 1988) to broaden the original causal scenario to accommo-
date problematic cases. And yet, despite this tinkering, population pressure 
remains elusive, the envisioned impermeable or circumscribed region remains 
historically more mythic than real (Ofek 2001; Wolf 1982), and the proposed 
empirical link between offensive warfare and the emergence of states has not 
been shown to be universal.
The so-far futile search for a single, specific prime mover or set of uni-
versal conditions that invariably provoked early state development prompted 
a reorientation toward a series of approaches that more explicitly compared 
historical sequences in an effort to define more general properties. For exam-
ple, refining earlier studies by Carneiro (1962, 1968), a recent cross-cultural 
study (Peregrine et al. 2007:77) uses Guttman scaling on 20 cases from the 
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Collection of Archaeology in the Human Relations Area Files to outline 
a broad sequence of cultural change. Basically, their scaling confirms what 
decades of archaeological analyses have already evidenced, that sedentism, 
domestication, and increasing population densities preceded the formation of 
states (cf. Jacobs 1969; Taylor 2012). Yet even this broad-brush scaling does not 
conform with various historical specificities (region to region), such as prece-
dence of sedentary life before agriculture in the Levant, the emergence of vil-
lages and inequality among sedentary foragers in several global areas, and the 
much later use of metal (compared to this scaled sequence) in Mesoamerica.
Another tack has been to look for general, cross-cultural parallels in sequences 
leading up to state development. For example, Yoffee (2005:44) has argued that 
when states arise they tend to be small, ensconced in networks of city-states or 
peer polities. Out of these networks, a large, more dominant polity can eventu-
ally emerge. In sharp contrast, Marcus (1998) has proposed that early states tend 
to be large polities that oversaw expansive territories, and that only later did 
these entities sometimes break down into smaller states. Yet neither of these 
sequences has turned out to be universal when we consider the suite of cases of 
complex society development. In fact, in the two regions where we have inves-
tigated, we see the latter pattern in the Valley of Oaxaca, where one center, first 
San José Mogote and later Monte Albán, seems to have dominated the region 
basically from the outset of sedentary villages (Blanton et al. 1999; Kowalewski 
et al. 1989). Whereas in coastal Shandong (China), several roughly coequal and 
large centers arose and were rather evenly spaced across the landscape, more in 
line with the former model (Feinman et al. 2010; Underhill et al. 2008).
ComPArAtiVe DAtA: DiVersit y ruLes
To date, archaeologists have for the most part looked for uniformities in 
the underlying or initial conditions, commonalities in the processes leading 
to, or the basic properties of, early complex societies. But these efforts have all 
been confounded by seemingly exceptional or nonconforming cases. In a sense, 
this realization should no longer be surprising. Frankly put, the more data 
that scholars collect relevant to the emergence of complex societies across the 
globe, the more variation becomes apparent, and, significantly, that variation 
is not simply associated with elements that might be considered local, histori-
cal, idiosyncratic, or purely culture bound (Earle 1997; Smith 2006:13; Trigger 
2003:660–661).
Several recent studies, for example, have compared multiple archaeological 
sequences of demographic change, village formation, and population nucleation 
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prior to the emergence of states. In one, Bandy (2008) examined 36 cases (in 
two cases, large villages as he defined them never emerged), finding that there 
was significant variation in the time lag between the first sedentary commu-
nities in a region and the advent of large villages in that area (> 300 people 
and 3 ha in size) (figure 13.1a). In some cases, there was little or no lag, while 
in others as many as 4,000 years elapsed. In certain cases one dominant vil-
lage emerged, while in others, multiple large communities arose (figure 13.1b). 
Bandy also isolated eight of his cases where states ultimately developed. For 
each of these eight cases, the initial time lag from the earliest sedentary vil-
lages to large villages was 1,000 years or less (figure 13.2a) (a point that we 
return to), although the lag from the presence of sedentary villages until the 
rise of states was more variable (figure 13.2b), as was the timing from large vil-
lage formation to state development (figure 13.2c).
In an amplification of this analysis, Peterson and Drennan (2012) compared 
11 archaeological sequences, some overlapping with Bandy’s and others not. 
They examined the process from the first sedentary agricultural villages in 
each region (figure 13.3) through the advent of more nucleated centers, again 
finding considerable variation in both the timing of change and the size and 
number of centers that were founded. They also made rough estimates of the 
tax rates per citizen in each context and were surprised when the highest tax 
rates were seemingly being paid in three of those cases in which the central 
settlements were comparatively small and where more hierarchical formations 
did not directly develop (more on this as well).
Fostering this point, Fletcher (2012) has reminded us that the cities associ-
ated with early states were not always compact; sometimes they were dis-
persed. They also vary markedly in size (figure 13.4) and seemingly in their 
basic systems of governance (e.g., Fargher, Heredia Espinoza, and Blanton 
2011; Feinman 2001), with some stressing the focal primacy of individual rul-
ers and others exhibiting less personal glorification and greater indications of 
power-sharing. Michael Smith (2009:28) has noted this diversity in regard to 
early cities, but the same is at least as valid for archaic states. What we need 
are comparative approaches that can accommodate and explain elements of 
diversity in the evolution of human institutions.
BuiLDing tHeory to ACCount for HumAn 
orgAnizAtionAL DiVersit y
Clearly, our focus on the diversity of early states and the processes leading 
up to them is not meant to discourage comparison or the building of theory on 
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Figure 13.1. Time from the first settled agricultural villages in a region to the presence 
of large villages: (a) 34 cases where large villages formed; (b) cases where multiple large 
villages formed versus those where a single village was dominant. (Adapted from Bandy 
2008:figures 2 and 3.) 
a more general level. Rather, it serves to underpin alternative ways to concep-
tualize this complex issue. Since Childe (1950), it has not proven productive to 
search for the unilineal pathway, the uniform proximate cause, or the universal 
set of unvarying properties that can account for early complex societies and 
their diversity. But fortunately, there are conceptual roadmaps for building and 
using cross-culturally applicable constructs to account for human behavioral 
variation (Ellen 2010:399; see also Goldstone 1998; Kiser and Hechter 1991).
Here, we outline four behavioral tenets (table 13.1) that, based on a broad 
reading of literature in the social and behavioral sciences, we see as at the heart 
of future framework construction.
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Figure 13.2. Village formation and state development 
in eight world areas where states ultimately developed: 
(a) time from the first settled agricultural villages to the 
advent of large villages; (b) time from the first settled 
agricultural villages to primary state formation; and 
(c) time from the advent of large villages to primary state 
formation. (Adapted from Bandy 2008:336–337, figures 5 
and 6.) 
Oddly, none of the five principal paradigms (table 13.2) that have been most 
influential in anthropological archaeology over the last 50 to 60 years com-
fortably conforms to all of these tenets, nor, in our opinion, have these extant 
paradigms found just the right balance between accounting for generalities 
and specifics.
Figure 13.3. Sequence from the presence of the first sedentary agricultural villages (the 
beginning of the Neolithic) to the advent of more nucleated centers for 11 archaeological 
cases. (Adapted from Peterson and Drennan 2012:figure 6.14.) 
Figure 13.4. Size of the largest cities in early states. (Data drawn from Blanton et 
al. 1993; Chandler 1987; Culbert et al. 1990; Kowalewski et al. 1989; MacSweeney 2004; 
Modelski 1997, 1999; Morris 2010; Stanish 2010; Underhill et al. 2008; Yoffee 2005.) 
Table 13.1. Human behavior: basic principles
1. The evolutionary legacy of our species has tendencies toward both dominance hierar-
chies and high degrees of sociality with great potentials to cooperate (e.g., Boehm 1993; 
Dubreuil 2010).
2. Agency is universal but also constrained by structure and resources (e.g., Schelling 2006; 
Sewell 2005).
3. Human groupings may be open and permeable to varying degrees, but they rarely are 
entirely closed for lengthy periods (e.g., M. L. Smith 2005; Wolf 1982).
4. Multiscalar perspectives are essential for understanding human groups, as humans 
generally participate simultaneously in networks of varying scales (e.g., Parkinson and 
Galaty 2009; Turchin 2003).
Table 13.2. Theoretical frames on the preindustrial past
Theoretical frame Agency Scalar focus Boundedness




Marxism/Marx-influenced Elite Society, Class (rarely) Potentially open
Sociology (narrow 
Darwinian)
All Individual, Kin Not adequately 
considered
Postprocessual Elite (situational 
for commoners)
Society Mostly closed
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The first three frameworks tend to give inadequate consideration to the 
“whys” and “hows” of human groups, often simply presuming their existence, 
continuity, and closure (e.g., Schortman and Urban 1992:12). Also, these three 
conceptual frameworks tend to afford little, if any, agency to the nonelite, or 
most people, in preindustrial contexts (see Brumfiel 1992; Wright 2009:122).
In contrast, recent postprocessual perspectives do speak of commoner resis-
tance, yet it is largely conceptualized as an ad hoc phenomenon—for example, 
at times of already known societal breakdown or collapse (e.g., Joyce et al. 2001). 
Through this generally circumstantial or situational consideration of agency, 
the opportunity to understand the shift or diversity in the rules and prac-
tices of cooperation is largely lost. Strict sociobiological approaches do ascribe 
agency more broadly, particularly for small groups, but they are reliant on 
narrow definitions of self-interest and have not been able to account convinc-
ingly for large social formations and their diversity (Sterelny 2013). On their 
own, these approaches also fail to account adequately for the role of history 
and its contingencies or path-dependent aspects (Goldstone 1998:836). Clearly, 
we need analytical frames (Blanton et al. 1993; Little 2008:242; Parkinson and 
Galaty 2009) that not only take account of the multiple, scalable, and inter-
linked networks in which humans (past and present) participate but that also 
recognize that human groups and networks rarely have been entirely isolated 
or closed (e.g., Adams and Kasakoff 1975; M. L. Smith 2005).
Although it would be premature to try to outline an encompassing new 
frame here, there are, in our view, appropriate constructs in the broad trans-
disciplinary literature on collective action and cooperation that can serve as a 
foundation. Although much of this theorizing has roots outside anthropology 
and archaeology, such frames are compatible with the four tenets outlined 
earlier. These constructs are intended as an intermediate theoretical frame, in 
the sense of the sociologists Hedström and Swedberg (1996:281): “attention 
is called to an intermediary level of analysis in-between pure description and 
story-telling on the one hand, and universal social laws on the other.” But 
also as defined by Blanton and Fargher (2009:135): “a productive middle path 
between a ‘homo economicus’ perspective of methodological individualism on 
the one hand, and normative determinism, on the other.”
Recent philosophy of the social sciences also has pointed in this direction. 
For example, Mjøset (2009) opines that the social sciences require theories 
that can account for variation and allow for the contingency of history (see also 
Kiser and Pfaff 2010:573), calling for the decoupling of unilineality and unifor-
mity from explanatory power. Similarly, Little (2000:89) advocates “explana-
tions that . . . highlight both the structural factors that govern change and the 
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multiple pathways that change can take.” Such approaches offer a means to 
account for “outcomes on the basis of both social context and individual action” 
so that they are inherently multiscalar (Hechter and Kanazawa 1997:208).
Decades ago in an effort to compare diachronically three ancient Meso-
american civilizations, the senior author and colleagues (Blanton et al. 1993) 
advanced a conceptual frame that bears certain parallels to these approaches 
through a focus on parameters such as societal scale, integration, complex-
ity, and boundedness and the variable relations between them. Frankly, this 
approach gained little traction because we did not fully spell out the expected 
theoretical links between these parameters (but see Kowalewski et al. 1983), 
nor did we give sufficient consideration to human agency, instead concep-
tualizing more at the societal or systemic scale. Fortunately, in the interim, 
advances associated with human collective action, cooperation, and social net-
works have provided a basis for constructing new frames that are specifically 
designed to account for the diversity of complex societies while also being 
underpinned by the four tenets outlined earlier.
CooPerAtion AnD CoLLeCtiVe ACtion
The empirical relationship between group size and organization long has 
been recognized. As Dubreuil (2008:203) has observed: “many things are 
debated about the evolution of human societies, but no bands of 50 individu-
als have ever created a bureaucracy and no society comprising millions of indi-
viduals has remained perfectly egalitarian.” While we explicitly do not wish 
to imply that human cooperation in small groups is “natural,” ever-present, or 
easy, there is an empirical basis to suggest that consistent face-to-face interac-
tion does seem to facilitate it (e.g., Apicella et al. 2012; Fowler and Christakis 
2010). Yet in repeated synchronic, cross-cultural studies, intensely interactive 
groups or communities over several hundred people (Dunbar 2011:table 1) 
generally have some kind of suprahousehold integrative institutions, while 
sedentary populations numbering more than 2,000–3,000 are almost always 
hierarchically organized (Feinman 1995, 1998, 2011) (table 13.3).
Various streams of research tie these new forms of cooperation either to 
mechanisms associated with the sanctioning of free riders (Baldassarri and 
Grossman 2011; Dubreuil 2010:166–170; O’Gorman et al. 2009; West et al. 
2011) and/or human cognitive constraints (Dunbar 1993, 1998; Johnson 1982; 
Kosse 1994); the two are not mutually exclusive (Hooper et al. 2010).
And yet, despite the strength of the correlation between group size and hier-
archical complexity ( Johnson 1982:figure 21.1; see also Bodley 2003; Feinman 
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2011), there is considerable variation when one zooms down to more con-
strained group size ranges. No magic thresholds have been identified; most 
importantly, the kinds of social adjustments made by groups with increas-
ing size are by no means uniform (Adler 1989; Adler and Wilshusen 1990; 
Feinman and Neitzel 1984).
For example, in Bandy’s comparative data, the eight regions where states 
ultimately emerged saw the rise of large villages within a millennium (see 
figure 13.2a), but the subsequent time lag to the rise of states was much more 
variable (see figure 13.2b). Also, there were 12 other regions in which large 
villages arose just as quickly but states did not ultimately develop in the exam-
ined time horizon. So one set of factors (including available resources and 
geographic conditions) may have pushed or pulled humans into large commu-
nities, but once there, the specific cooperative adjustments that the occupants 
of these large communities made played a role in whether and how rapidly (or 
not) those groups established new forms of more hierarchical arrangements or 
states. So path dependence and the organizational/institutional choices taken 
also matter.
In seven of the eight cases where states ultimately arose, multiple large com-
munities were established within 1,000 years (the Valley of Oaxaca is the sole 
exception in that sample with a primate center). And yet, there also were 
11 cases or regions where multiple large communities or peer polities were 
founded within a millennium, but states did not develop. Competition mat-
ters and conceivably even may be necessary, but it alone is not sufficient.
Cooperative arrangements entail social contracts, but the natures of human 
social contracts are variable. This observation is not new, and for years social 
Table 13.3. Organizational thresholds of human groups
Source 150–200 Source 2,000–3,000
Hill and Dunbar (2003) 150 Carneiro (1967) 2,000
Forge (1972) 150 Forge (1972) 2,000
Adler and Wilshusen (1990) ~200 Sinha (1978) 2,000–3,000
    Kosse (1990) 2,000–3,000
    Johnson (1982) 2,400
    Bernard and Killworth (1973) 2,460
    Brown and Podolefsky (1976) 2,500
    Lekson (1985) 2,500
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scientists working from different approaches and disciplines have recognized 
that in human groups, even at comparable levels of vertical complexity, power 
is worn and wielded in distinct manners and that these differences show a 
strong relationship to the ways that the funds or bases of power are procured 
(table 13.4). How rulers amass their resources affects the nature of the social 
contract and leadership. In other words, by definition, leadership is relational, 
albeit in different ways (Ahlquist and Levi 2011:5).
Each of the studies listed in table 13.4 contrasts different modes of leader-
ship that parallel in similar ways the distinct manners in which funds of power 
were amassed. Building on rational choice approaches, the political scientist 
Margaret Levi (1988) outlined a provocative model that endeavors to account 
for these patterns theoretically, while also offering a means for addressing the 
micro-macro problem (e.g., Schelling 2006) that has plagued most archaeo-
logical approaches to state formation. Levi’s model was devised specifically 
to understand the development of states, albeit in more contemporary times. 
Nevertheless, recently, this model has been extended, expanded, and tested 
through application to a large comparative sample of preindustrial states 
(Blanton and Fargher 2008; see also Fargher, Heredia Espinoza, and Blanton 
2011; Kiser and Cai 2003; Kiser and Linton 2002).
The architects of this model propose that more representative or collec-
tive forms of leadership will be found where those with power depend more 
directly on the local populace for their economic underpinnings, whereas 
exclusionary/autocratic rule is more apt to occur where leaders rely less on 
their immediate populace and acquire their funds of power from external 
sources, such as the monitoring of exchange routes, war booty, or the control 
of spot resources (figure 13.5). In the latter cases, leaders exact less from their 
immediate populace and so are freer to afford diminished representation and 
fewer public goods. In large human cooperative arrangements and institutions, 
Table 13.4. Variation in modes of finance and leadership
Autocratic Collective Reference
Finance-based big-man Production-based big-man Strathern (1969)
Individualizing chiefdom Group-oriented chiefdom Renfrew (1974)
Wealth finance Staple finance D’Altroy and Earle (1985)
Predatory rule Quasi-voluntary compliance Levi (1988)
Exclusionary/network Corporate Blanton et al. (1996)
Extractive Inclusive Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
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the more rulers depend directly on their immediate sustaining population for 
their resource support, the more agency and voice that populace is likely to be 
able to assert and the more public goods are apt to be distributed (Blanton and 
Fargher 2008:figure 10.2) (figure 13.6).
Revisiting the Peterson-Drennan sample (see figure 13.3), we see that the 
cases with the highest tax rates were calculated for relatively small polities 
in which the leaders were neither particularly powerful nor ostentatious/self-
aggrandizing. Yet they also note that the higher tax costs were linked to the 
building of public works and common goods, such as defensive features and 
irrigation systems (Peterson and Drennan 2012:123–124). Consequently, in 
accord with the collective action framework, the high-tax case (Pueblo Grande, 
Hohokam) has both an astonishingly large irrigation system and rather collec-
tive forms of leadership/cooperation (see also Ross 2004).
Obviously, this model cannot provide anything close to a complete roadmap 
to understand this aspect of the diversity of complex societies or early states, 
since human institutions, such as states, are complicated, and history does 
matter. Nevertheless, it does present a conceptual and testable basis to under-
stand certain key aspects of the variability in human cooperative institutions. 
And it links that relationship to the quantities and the means through which 
resources are acquired by governing authorities as well as the works and goods 
that are delivered. Here we stress that while such variables as primary produc-
tivity, available technologies, and, particularly, population size factor into the 
kinds and amount of resources these authorities could potentially accumulate, 
critical too are the specific ways in which (and from where) these acquisitions 
occurred. In other words, the nature of cooperative arrangements, institutions, 
and their configurations do matter, and in ways that are potentially explicable.
ADDressing emPiriCAL questions AnD ConunDrums
One measure of a conceptual frame is whether it can help untangle puzzles 
and conundrums that are left unexplained by extant paradigms. For example, 
Figure 13.5. Internal and external sources of funds. (Adapted from Blanton and Fargher 
2008:254–255.) 
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if we briefly compare two prehispanic Mesoamerican state societies during 
the Classic period (ca. AD 200–900), Teotihuacan and the polities of the 
Classic Maya, we face a number of seeming paradoxes (see Feinman 2001; 
Feinman and Nicholas 2011 for fuller treatments of this topic). The urban cen-
ter of Teotihuacan was much larger, with more monumental buildings, and 
was laid out impressively along a grid system. In contrast, even the largest 
Classic Maya cities were smaller, with less monumental structures, lower den-
sities, and seemingly less structured urban layouts. And yet, Maya rulers wore 
their power more ostentatiously, they were buried with highly valued, elabo-
rately crafted goods in special contexts, and they often lived in palaces that 
most archaeologists can agree as to their function. They also had a highly 
developed writing system that in large part relates the life histories and real 
and imagined exploits of named rulers.
In stark contrast, we know the names of no rulers at more monumental 
Teotihuacan. Their writing system was much more basic, leaving few evi-
dences. Murals at the site depict important figures, but they usually are in 
groups, wearing masks, and present no details concerning personal history 
or genealogy (Cowgill 1997:152; Manzanilla 1999:111). Tellingly, if a possible 
Teotihuacano leader is named, it is through Maya epigraphic studies (Martin 
and Grube 2008), although there is debate whether this mention represents an 
individual, office, or military order. Archaeologists cannot agree if the rulers of 
the site lived in a palace (three completely different locales have been proposed) 
(Cowgill 1983; Flannery 1998; Sanders and Evans 2006), and researchers keep 
Figure 13.6. Model of collective action. (Adapted from Blanton and Fargher 2008:figure 
10.2.) 
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tunneling into the largest structures to see if they can find a rich ruler’s tomb 
but so far have come up empty.
From a unilinear scale-complexity perspective, one might think that the 
larger (greater urban scale and density), more monumental polity should 
have more aggrandizing rulers and more highly developed communication 
technologies, but that clearly was not the case. Alternatively, some archaeolo-
gists have traditionally ascribed these differences to culture or ethnicity; the 
Maya were this way and Teotihuacanos were another. Of course, that point is 
valid to a degree, but the later, Postclassic Maya had a different system of rule 
and cooperation (e.g., Chase and Chase 2006), they used writing differently, 
and we have not found the degree of aggrandizement evident for the earlier 
Classic Maya elite.
Clearly, agrarian tribute made up part of the fund of power in both regions, 
but Classic Maya rulers seem to have relied more than their central Mexican 
counterparts on external revenues from the exchange of crafted prestige goods 
and interpersonal networks/elite alliances, and possibly the direct control of 
spot resources (reservoirs) that they centrally constructed to store water at 
several major centers (Lucero et al. 2011). In contrast, reliant on internal rev-
enues, the nonelite population at Teotihuacan may have had greater voice and 
been the recipients of more public works (wide thoroughfares, grid plan lay-
out, large public spaces). Power was more broadly shared, and differentials of 
access and wealth were flatter. Classic Maya rulers were more flamboyant, and 
the disparities of wealth appear to have been more fully expressed.
As a working hypothesis, it seems plausible that most first-generation states, 
at least immediately following their foundations, were underpinned heavily 
by internal resources, namely the agrarian production of the local population, 
and hence, more similar in this respect to Teotihuacan. Once established, early 
state rulers had incentives to provision public goods, such as the construction 
of defensive features, the building of roads, and the coordination of disaster 
relief. Flight and various forms of resistance were consistent options for com-
moners (Van Vugt et al. 2003), and in-migration likely led to potential growth 
in extractable revenues. Governing authorities may have had few incentives to 
rule flamboyantly, despotically, or to pursue offensive wars (Kiser and Linton 
2002), although defense and the sanction of free riders were often central to 
their duties as leaders (e.g., Feinman and Neitzel 1984:table 2.6). Of course, as 
the revenue streams sustaining these polities and the wider worlds in which 
they were situated always shifted, so could extant social contracts.
Alternatively, as argued for the lowland Maya and also the Mycenaean poli-
ties of ancient Greece (Parkinson and Galaty 2007), there are other contexts 
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in which emergent states relied more heavily on external resources. Frequently, 
these states arose in peer polity networks, in which governing authori-
ties monitored and derived a sizable portion of their wealth from trade and 
foreign networks as well as the spoils of war. In such instances, power was 
wielded in comparatively more authoritarian and dynastic ways. Early Egypt, 
where trade networks going north and south yielded key resources, also may 
conform to this pattern (Bard 2000; Köhler 2010:40). Fuller assessment of this 
hypothesis requires better understanding of the economic underpinnings and 
the revenue-generation practices of early states.
Another conundrum is the vexing variance in the previously discussed 
relationship between population size and hierarchical complexity. At smaller 
scales, relatively more collectively organized and tightly interdependent (Curry 
and Dunbar 2011; Johnson 1982) social groups seem to be able to forestall the 
formation of new tiers of hierarchical organization, as degrees of coopera-
tion are high. But at larger scales, more collectively organized groups often 
require greater investments in infrastructure and bureaucracy to maintain and 
facilitate revenue generation and connectivity over space. Hence these more 
representative polities often are associated with larger populations, as noted 
at Teotihuacan and in a sample of historical cases studied by Blanton and 
Fargher (2008:appendix 3) (figure 13.7). Thus some of the variation in the size-
complexity relationship may reflect variance in cooperative social contracts or 
modes of intergroup connectivity (figure 13.8).
Figure 13.7. Relationship between population size, hierarchical complexity, and social 
capital/collective action. (Drawn from data in Blanton and Fargher 2008:appendix 3.) 
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ConCLuDing tHougHts
Roughly 12,000 years ago, humans embarked on new social arrangements, 
but these groupings took variable forms and the historical processes that fol-
lowed were hardly uniform. Understanding the diversity of these social forma-
tions and the alternative historical paths that people took in different regions 
are fundamental elements to understanding why, when, and where complex 
societies emerged in certain settings but not others.
Through its explicit focus on diversity and its ability to account for change, 
the approach outlined here is suited to make greater sense of the complex-
ities of early complex society development. That it also provides a “micro- 
foundation for macro-historical and comparative phenomena” (Levi 1988:8) 
adds to its utility, as the micro-macro problem (e.g., Schelling 2006) rarely has 
even been addressed by comparative approaches in archaeology.
Working from this frame serves to facilitate the building of theoreti-
cal bridges and networks of communication to other disciplines, including 
other theoretical approaches focused on cooperation (e.g., Kohler et al. 2012) 
and social networks (e.g., Curry and Dunbar 2011). If the theoretical frames 
employed to understand the emergence of complex societies were made more 
broadly compatible with approaches employed to explain the diversity of states 
over time and space, we suspect that analytical benefits would be realized. At 
present, our analytical sample and theoretical frames are often constrained by 
longstanding but poorly justified disciplinary divisions, which utilize distinct 
theoretical constructs (Gerring 2012:3–4).
Until recently, surprisingly few systematic analyses or conceptualizations 
have crossed the chasms between classical and anthropological archaeology, 
Figure 13.8. Relationship between population size and increasing complexity for 
collective and autocratic organization. 
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prehistory and history, or the recent and the deeper past. If there are solid rea-
sons to isolate certain cases in time and space from broader analytical samples, 
and at times indeed there may be, then such focused investigations should be 
based on the precise questions being asked rather than on disciplinary inertia 
or ossified theoretical tenets and constructs.
As an example, since all larger human cooperative groups, across time and 
space, were embedded in even wider social networks, we are not convinced 
that it makes analytical sense to isolate at the outset primary or pristine states 
from all others (A. T. Smith 2003:83). The corpus of primary states is inter-
nally variable itself, and perhaps these examples ought be examined in broader 
comparative contexts to help define and understand that diversity (Parkinson 
and Galaty 2007:113).
A recent commentary in the New York Times (Gutting 2012) questioned the 
utility of the social sciences in regard to contemporary political practice and 
policy because, in the view of the author, research in these fields generally is 
not constructed to yield predictive results. Certainly, such perspectives are not 
our overriding concern, nor should we measure our advances simply by this 
yardstick. And yet, it is clearly unfortunate that our societal institutions and 
relevant publics often find it difficult to derive practical insights from our 
discussions drawn from the archives of human histories. In part, the obstacles 
reflect the manner in which we have presented our findings. If we may hazard 
an opinion, there may be benefits and insights if the collective “we” made more 
concerted efforts to frame our concepts and investigations in ways that could 
potentially facilitate and encourage reasoned practical considerations of the 
lessons derived from comparative examinations of the past. The frameworks 
outlined should better position us for just that, while neither ignoring path 
dependence nor the potential diversity of human relations and institutions.
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Corporate and Network 
Strategies, Staple and Wealth 
Finance, and Primary 
and Secondary States
Tim Earle
Rich Blanton is a leader of the second generation of 
processual archaeologists coming out of University of 
Michigan in the 1970s. Building on the approaches of 
Kent Flannery, Jeffrey Parsons, and Henry Wright, we 
believed that social evolution involved systemic change 
in a broad range of social, political, and economic vari-
ables. In the 1980s, just as this cohort of young schol-
ars was coming into its own, a group of “postproces-
sualists” heavily critiqued the first- generation ideas of 
Louis Binford (Earle and Preucel 1987). Their harsh-
est criticisms, perhaps, were directed at its unilinear, 
staged-based formulation of social change. Among 
processualists, Rich showed leadership in his response, 
demonstrating fundamental ways by which to for-
mulate a vital processualism. His insight was to focus 
on process (not typology), which allowed scholars 
to conceptualize the dynamic and variable structural 
arrangements of complex human societies (Blanton et 
al. 1996). For many archaeologists, his work has been 
inspirational.
Rich’s career and mine have parallel intellectual his-
tories. In 1969, I arrived at the University of Michigan, 
and he was one of the first graduate students whom I 
got to know. He had recently returned from fieldwork 
in the Basin of Mexico, and I was fascinated to see how 
his systematic survey of a large region could yield data 
to investigate sociopolitical organization. His work 
was my first lesson on the interdependency between 
good theory and good data. Following in the footsteps 
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of Jeffrey Parsons, with whom Rich had worked in Mexico and whose Basin 
of Mexico data I had analyzed for my master’s paper (Earle 1976), Rich and I 
independently organized large-scale regional projects in Oaxaca, Mexico, and 
the Mantaro, Peru. Rich took on a new region that could be compared to 
Parsons’s surveys in the Basin of Mexico, and I took over Parsons’s Mantaro 
Valley project (D’Altroy and Hastorf 2001). The two of us focused on system-
atic large-scale regional research giving scope to investigate intertwined social, 
political, and economic processes in complex societies.
From this shared beginning, our careers have had at least three parallels. First 
was our mutual involvement with the Society for Economic Anthropology. 
From its beginning in 1981, the SEA has provided a forum for both of us to 
direct our economy-oriented archaeological research toward a general anthro-
pological audience. Each year, the Society meets to consider a particular eco-
nomic theme, and Rich’s participation in its first annual meeting and landmark 
publication helped place archaeology firmly within the subdiscipline of eco-
nomic anthropology (Blanton 1983b). I followed his lead, to become regu-
larly involved in the SEA. Over the years, archaeological participation in the 
SEA has included many of our collaborators and graduate students, helping 
to maintain economic anthropology as a core subdiscipline that integrates 
archaeology, history, cultural, and practice anthropology. Archaeologists in 
the SEA helped keep alive a strongly materialist understanding on long-term 
social history, to which Rich and I have been dedicated.
Second has been our parallel commitment to comparative research. 
Anthro pology has a grand tradition of comparison, searching across cultures 
for common patterns. Rich’s book, Ancient Mesoamerica (Blanton et al. 1981), 
compared the archaeological trajectories of three regions, looking especially at 
broad-scale economic relationships. The success and interest of that volume 
provided a model for my comparative work on three world regions (Earle 
1997) and then on three European regions during the Bronze Age (Earle 
and Kristiansen 2010). In collaboration with Lane Fargher, Rich conducted 
a major cross-cultural study of state societies, published as Collective Action 
in the Formation of the Pre-Modern State (Blanton and Fargher 2008; see also 
Blanton and Fargher 2009; Fargher and Blanton 2007).
Third is our shared focus on understanding the processes of social evolu-
tion. Writing independently with coauthors, our seminal articles “A Dual-
Processual Theory for the Evolution of Mesoamerican Civilization” (Blanton 
et al. 1996) and “Ideology, materialization, and power strategies” (DeMarrais et 
al. 1996) were chosen by Current Anthropology (CA) to be published together. 
Here, Rich developed the distinction between corporate and network 
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strategies as a means by which to organize societies; these alternatives were 
orthogonal to gradations of complexity, suggesting that social evolution had 
alternative forms of structuring. His conception of alternative organizing 
strategies is arguably one of the most influential research directions of the 
past 20 years. Political organizations must be understood in terms of interper-
sonal processes that mix and match strategies of power and cooperation. CA’s 
decision to publish our articles together recognized the processual approach 
that we shared. Subsequently, the corporate-network distinction became cen-
tral to my work (Earle 2002).
What is to be made of our parallel intellectual histories? Perhaps most 
important is to illustrate how scholarship develops. Scholars with a common 
academic background often develop along parallel intellectual lines. The grad-
uate students from Michigan in the 1970s defined shared goals and scholar-
ship focusing on sociopolitical and economic processes to create a distinctive 
social archaeology. Our similarities were reinforced by repeated contact and 
interactions at meetings, by our reading of each other’s papers, and by a com-
mon desire to solve research questions considering the sociopolitical organiza-
tion of complex societies. The peer interactions in scholarship are evident; a 
generation, including Rich, Liz Brumfiel, Dick Drennan, and I, among others, 
followed rather different lines of evidence and interests, but our career paths 
have been intertwined.
To illustrate how Rich and I have interacted, I focus on our shared theo-
retical interest in political economy as the means by which emerging elites 
(or “principals” in Rich’s terminology) mobilized resources to finance their 
operation. My original conception of staple versus wealth finance formed part 
of his distinction between corporate and network strategies. Here, I argue for 
the importance of several additional factors that together created the complex 
pathways for social change. Key factors in the political economy of premodern 
societies were property rights over “bottlenecks,” and warrior complexes that 
served to control resource mobilization. Thus, the specific relationships among 
finance strategies, property rights, and warrior complexes affected the overall 
political-economic continuum from exclusionary to corporate strategies, and 
this complex overlap of variables appears to have been present in all complex 
societies from chiefdoms, through primary/secondary states, to modern states. 
As Lane Fargher commented on a draft of this chapter, where staple finance is 
associated with commoner claims to rights over landscapes (“internal revenues” 
in Blanton and Fargher 2008), a more corporate political economy emerges; in 
contrast, where elites claim personal ownership of productive lands (“external 
revenues” in Blanton and Fargher 2008), they can mobilize staple finance to 
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fund an exclusionary political economy. The same argument can be made for 
wealth finance and claims over bottlenecks. Where high-end goods are fun-
neled into markets and taxed like regular goods, the state does not control 
the bottleneck (internal revenue) and a rather corporate political economy 
should emerge. Conversely, where the state monopolizes the production or 
distribution bottleneck (external revenue), we could expect the construction 
of an exclusionary political economy. Chiefs or kings can deploy warrior spe-
cialists to gain or maintain control over bottlenecks. Conversely, state militias 
or armies in corporate states could be tasked with defense and policing and 
not with dispossessing commoners for the benefit of a ruling class. Here, I 
illustrate how political processes created multiple pathways to complexity that 
resulted in continuous variability across corporate, network, and mixed politi-
cal economies, showing the need to focus on the processes of social evolution 
and not evolutionary typologies.
tHe PoLitiCAL eConomy in PreHistory
“It’s the economy, stupid” is a famous political statement. As a materialist, I 
believe that economic organization and resulting opportunities for productivity 
and control gird the development of alternative political institutions. Working 
with Terry D’Altroy in the 1980s, we formulated a distinction between staple 
and wealth finance as alternative means by which chiefdoms and states could 
mobilize surplus. With the publication of Blanton’s distinction between cor-
porate and network strategies, I could better conceptualize how the nature of 
finance was so critically linked to contrasting political strategies.
Staple and Wealth Finance
In my research in Hawai’i and then Peru, I saw that to understand com-
plex societies required an understanding of how resources were mobilized 
to support ruling institutions (D’Altroy and Earle 1985; Earle and D’Altroy 
1989). Although complex societies develop for a plethora of reasons, an abso-
lute necessity was the mobilization of resources to support new institutions of 
governance and rule. D’Altroy and I defined two alternative means of finance 
(staple and wealth), and, using the Inca Empire, we showed how these strate-
gies were combined. Our original definitions follow:
Staple finance . . . involves obligatory payments in kind to the state of subsistence 
goods such as grains, livestock, and clothing. The staples form accounting units 
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(bushel of wheat or a head of sheep) that have established values. Staples are 
collected by the state as a share of commoner produce, as a specified levy, or as 
produce from land worked with corvée labor.
Wealth finance involves the manufacture and procurement of special products 
(valuable, primitive money, and currency . . .) that are used as a means of pay-
ment. These wealth items often have established values with respect to other 
goods of a similar nature but vary in their convertibility into staples. (D’Altroy 
and Earle 1985:188)
The mobilization and distribution of staples versus wealth as the currency 
for finance were quite different. Staples were collected as rent from land 
owned by elites or their institutions. Because of weight, however, staples could 
not be moved great distances, and so they were used primarily locally. In con-
trast, wealth was mobilized by controlling the production and/or exchange of 
specialty items such as bodily decorations, personal kits (mirrors and razors), 
weapons, and currency. These items could be produced locally, but their value 
depended on rarity often tied to foreign origins. To understand how strategies 
of finance worked, the development and maintenance of these and alternative 
systems of tribute and taxation all rested on the existence of bottlenecks, points 
in the production and distribution chains that could be controlled. Such bot-
tlenecks were highly variable, but not infinitely so, and they derived from a 
number of critical conditions (Earle and Spriggs 2015).
For staple finance, the most important bottleneck was land ownership. As 
originally conceived by David Ricardo (1821), land rent resulted from inten-
sification, which pushed farming into suboptimal lands and required capital 
improvements such as drainage, terracing, and irrigation on prime lands. For 
both the use of poorer land and of improved land, the productivity of land in 
a region would have become sharply differentiated by quality, and the better 
lands could demand a rent because of their higher than average productivity. 
Intensification also created a physical marking in the landscape that allowed 
for the easy division of property. Staple finance was the most basic strategy of 
mobilization in agrarian chiefdoms and states, and land improved by irrigation 
is the clearest example of such engineered landscapes creating the foundation 
for staple finance (Earle and Doyle 2008).
For wealth finance, potential bottlenecks were diverse, but each was subject 
to different problems of control. The most direct was control over wealth pro-
duction by specialists attached to the ruling segment (Earle 1987). This bottle-
neck required a particularly high level of skill so that only a few could pro-
duce the wealth items. The manufacture of bronze swords in northern Europe 
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offers a good example for such a controlled production system (DeMarrais et 
al. 1996; Earle 2004). Alternatively, wealth could be controlled during long-
distance trading. If goods moved by water, for example, elites could own the 
transport vessels. Or chiefs could operate as stationary bandits, positioned 
strategically at choke points on high-volume routes, such as major rivers. 
Friedman and Rowlands (1977; Kristiansen 1998) describe the importance 
of prestige-goods exchange as the basis for social differentiation throughout 
Europe in the Bronze Age. Exchanges of foreign wealth structured relations 
among chiefs, whose status was materialized by these special objects.
To analyze the political economy as a means for institutional finance, the 
researcher must recognize the bottlenecks, how they were created, and how 
they might be circumvented to disrupt monopoly. The obvious question is: how 
were contrasting strategies of finance linked to different social formations?
Corporate versus Network Strategies and 
Political Economy in Pacific Prehistory
Blanton and his colleagues (Blanton et al. 1996) conceptualize corporate 
and network strategies as alternative political strategies to organize societ-
ies, and these structural differences link to various sources of revenues (local 
vs. external) in the political economy. Political strategies could be combined, 
changed, and used by alternative political segments to challenge or support 
each other’s search for power. Their original definitions follow:
In corporate strategies, power is shared across different groups and sectors in 
society in such a way as to inhibit exclusionary [network] strategies. (Blanton et 
al 1996:2)
In network strategies, preeminence is an outcome of the development and 
maintenance of individual-centered exchange relations primarily outside one’s 
local group. (Blanton et al 1996:4)
I expand on Blanton’s recognition of how political differences were linked 
to political economy by looking at the history of chiefdoms in the Pacific. 
Chiefdoms are middle-ranged societies that organize populations in the 
thousands or tens of thousands. Most important is the ability of chiefs to 
exercise central power. The Pacific illustrates vividly how chiefs came to power 
in different ways as they crafted their political strategies of expansion and 
consolidation (Earle and Spriggs 2015). The foundation for Oceanic politi-
cal strategies appears to have rested originally on prestige-good exchange 
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networks as tied to long-distance feats of valor, but, following colonization, 
most island societies became focused on corporate strategies and staple mobi-
lization. With the expansion of the Chinese empire, trade in luxury products 
resulted in the development of “secondary” chiefdoms in the Philippines and 
elsewhere in the extreme western Pacific. The changing opportunities for 
control in the political economies of the Pacific can be seen as highly variable 
and linked to contrasting political strategies involving warrior might and 
religious legitimation.
In the Bismarck Archipelago through the main Solomon Islands off New 
Guinea, a regional culture, called Lapita, emerged sometime after 1400 BP 
(Kirch 1997). Occupying small islands and the coastal fringe of larger islands, 
Lapita maintained a distinctive maritime orientation. They were involved in 
fishing, long-distance exploration, trade (obsidian, axes, ceramics) (Kirch 1991), 
and perhaps raiding (common historically in maritime societies). In conjunc-
tion with linguistic evidence, the archaeological record documents many shell 
valuables and a highly decorated pottery tradition, suggestive of small-scale 
social hierarchies (Green 2002).
Friedman (1981) argued that Lapita was structured by prestige-goods 
exchange, similar to that described for European prehistory. Exemplifying 
social ranking described in the region’s ethnographies, status in Lapita culture 
may have been linked to external ceremonial exchanges of valuables (Kirch 
1991). But what were the potential bottlenecks in the prestige-good system 
that allowed for social differentiation? Where island groups were closely 
spaced, control over trade and interaction would have been problematic. For 
more isolated island groups, like the Trobriand Islanders, however, the bottle-
neck was probably ownership of seagoing craft adequate for successful naviga-
tion across broader expanses of open water (Brunton 1975; Earle 2002; Hayden 
1983). For example, labor crews and specialists supported by a chief ’s resources 
built the elaborate boats used in Kula voyages, and chiefs were their owners 
(Malinowski 1922). Also, the risks of distant expeditions were seen as requiring 
elaborate ritual magic for success, and this magic too was the property of the 
chief. These chiefs were able to dominate trading expeditions, and virtually all 
valuables went through their hands. In highly elaborate ceremonial displays, 
chiefs exchanged shell valuables with elite partners as a means to build pres-
tige. We can imagine that such distant voyaging created a small-scale hierar-
chical structure based both on the special knowledge of ritual and navigation 
and on the ownership of boats. However, I propose that control over canoes 
was a rather weak bottleneck, open to many comers, and, thus, limited the 
degree to which elites could centralize power.
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As part of the broadly networked Lapita society, voyagers explored and col-
onized deep into the Pacific, reaching the islands of Vanuatu, New Caledonia, 
Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa (Irwin 1992). Exploration was purposeful, part of a 
strategy to find new resources and establish new venues for political action. 
Following colonization in the deep Pacific, however, economic opportunities 
changed to include many isolated islands with relatively greater agricultural 
potential (Kirch 2000). Partially because of the distance between the major 
island groups, a network-based trading economy became of much less impor-
tance, except perhaps in some Micronesia island groups and in the Tonga 
archipelago. Alternatively, the opportunities for a highly intensive, staple-
based political economy based on corporate strategies became the core of the 
political economies on the larger islands groups, replacing the earlier network 
strategies on which Lapita ranking was initially based.
Social evolution of Hawaiian chiefdoms provides a vivid example of one of 
the pathways for political development. By the time of Western contact, the 
chiefdoms of several Hawaiian Islands had formed state-like political struc-
tures with territorial divisions for taxation and divine rule to legitimize strong 
central authority (Kirch 2010; Hommon 2013; Earle 2012). Irrigation agricul-
ture was a critical bottleneck in this case (Earle 1980). The intensification of 
the landscape—especially with irrigation, but also with fishponds; banana, 
breadfruit, and coconut groves; and dryland fields—created an engineered 
landscape of walls and spaces that were divided up among chiefs and farmers 
embedded in an overlapping system of property rights (Earle and Doyle 2008). 
Commoners received land on an irrigation system or on other agricultural 
complexes in return for working on plots set aside for the chiefs. The surplus 
generated supported the chiefs, their attached specialists (including land man-
agers, artisans, warriors, and priests), and labor crews for constructing produc-
tive facilities like irrigation systems and fishponds, monuments and roads, and 
work at major ceremonies (Earle 1978). Such an intensified agrarian base sup-
ported the classic corporate structure, providing a particularly clear example 
of how a property system based on an engineered landscape allowed for staple 
mobilization. At the same time, because the irrigation systems were built and 
operated by commoner farmers, one would expect that the commoner could 
claim moral obligations from their chiefs. Here the role of warriors conquer-
ing the land and thus asserting exclusive ownership for the governing para-
mount chief was essential.
Kirch (1994, 2010) argues that the largest and most complex chiefdoms 
developed into states on Maui and the Big Island of Hawai’i, where irrigated 
agriculture was of only secondary importance to dryland farming. These 
PATHWAYS TO POWER 299
less-productive lands created a more dispersed and lower-intensity agri-
cultural base that was more susceptible to failure (Ladefoged et al. 2009). 
Initially, it might seem that such a lower-intensity agricultural base would 
be less likely than an irrigation-based economy to form the footing for state 
polities. The particular outcome, however, appears to have been linked to 
expansionist warfare so often identified as the crucible for state formation 
(e.g., Carneiro 1970). In such situations, warfare, rather than the development 
of a permanently productive infrastructure, served as the dominant means to 
increase surplus extraction. Surplus generated from local staple production 
was used by chiefs to support specialized warriors, who defended the chief, 
asserted rights to surplus from lands, and expanded by conquest the regions 
from which surplus could be mobilized. Where a less-intensive productive 
base existed, warriors thus served to maximize surplus extraction through 
conquest and in the process broke the ownership of local communities. High-
ranking warrior chiefs received local communities as fiefs in return for their 
loyalty to the paramount. Lower-ranked warriors became local land man-
agers (konohiki) and received subsistence land grants, sometimes on newly 
developed irrigation systems (Earle 1978). State-like polities were made by 
warrior conquest as a strategy to maximize surplus extraction when agricul-
tural intensification was costly or inefficient. Basically, warrior might pro-
vided a means to abrogate the corporate contract in cases where the disper-
sion of productive resources made it hard for chiefs to control farmers, who 
produced the surplus for finance.
For a staple finance strategy to work in less-intensive agricultural econo-
mies, warriors created an extensive polity based on physical force with a rather 
“exclusionary” or extractive character that seems to have reversed the typical 
corporate identity of staple-based polities. Thus, as suggested in conversation 
with Fargher, territorial conquest converted an agricultural system closely 
associated with a long history of commoner development into an external rev-
enue source (using Blanton and Fargher’s [2008] terms). Following conquest, 
paramount chiefs were able to treat agricultural lands as personal property. 
As illustrated by the Hawaiian chiefdoms, the elaboration of an ideology of 
divine rule may then have been necessary to institutionalize the larger politi-
cal order. Thus, primary state formation involved a particular hybrid strategy, 
mixing corporate and exclusionary policies stabilized by an elaborate and the-
atrical ideology. Following Kolb’s (1994) analysis of religious monuments, an 
early construction of community heiau (religious shrine) was probably part of 
developing a largely corporate strategy for mobilization, but the progressive 
association of some of these monuments with grand ceremonies involving 
300 TIM EARLE
human sacrifice to the god of war effectively severed this dependent bond 
between chiefs and commoner farmers.
In the extreme western Pacific, a more typical network political strategy 
appears to have emerged. As a China-centric trade sphere expanded after 
1000 BP, the Philippine Islands witnessed the elaboration of chiefdoms 
( Junker 1999). Rather than control over land and its staple productions, chiefs 
depended on, “control over individuals and groups established through the 
construction and maintenance of alliance networks, which fluctuated in size 
and composition over time according to the chief ’s ability to pull individuals 
and groups into his sphere of influence” ( Junker 1990). A local development 
in ranking propelled local chiefs to search out opportunities to funnel spe-
cialty items into the expanding Chinese market. The goal was to obtain valued 
imports (including Chinese ceramics and metal) that provided the media to 
expand an already existing prestige-goods exchange network. Although these 
imports were derived externally, the elaboration of the region’s chiefdoms was 
an internal matter, involving local chiefs controlling the collection of forest 
products for export and the distribution of Chinese imports. Although most 
would call the developments of social ranking in the Philippines a response 
to Chinese contact (thus providing an example of “secondary” chiefdom for-
mation), Junker (1990) makes clear that the Chinese traders provided only 
expanded opportunities for trade in an existing prestige-goods system. Raiding 
also was a critical part of the political process, illustrating highly dynamic 
warrior strategies geared toward directing the movement of prestige goods. 
The driving forces in Filipino political development were regional, as chiefs 
actively sought dominance of prestige-goods exchange with a clear network 
strategy. The existence of this exchange, not the contact with China specifi-
cally, drove social evolution.
Oceanic prehistory and societies illustrate a highly variable mix between 
corporate and network strategies. Chiefdoms arose by developing political 
economies to generate the surplus in staples or wealth to finance their opera-
tions. Chiefdoms were transformed based on available means and opportuni-
ties for bottlenecks in resource production and distribution. This variation was 
further complicated by the active role of warriors in political strategies to con-
trol the political economy. My sense is that the conjunction between political 
economic and warrior strategies might help lay bare the processes energizing 
emerging institutions along alternative pathways. Although not considered 
in detail by Blanton’s original formation, warfare is perhaps a key element 
for understanding how different systems of political economy were linked to 
particular power strategies (see Peregrine and Ember, chapter 12, this volume).
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tHe eVoLution of PrimAry AnD seConDAry stAtes
Like Blanton, I believe that social evolution should be a central topic of 
our discipline, and modern archaeology offers the only systematic opportunity 
to describe the long-term trajectories of change in social evolution. We both 
reject evolutionary typologies as anything more than heuristic devices and 
rather seek to investigate comparatively long-term archaeological sequences 
to discover how common processes resulted in diverse historical developments. 
When we were in graduate school together, a major focus of research was the 
attempt to explain the origin of states.
Definitions of states vary, but several traits seem critical. States represent 
large-scale polities (populations of 100,000s and more) that have diverse eth-
nic, historic, and economic settings ( Johnson and Earle 2000). States and 
empires were social mosaics spread over large areas, often of thousands of 
square kilometers, and an ideology of divine rule provided an essential reli-
gious superstructure, especially in states dependent on the mobilization of 
agricultural surplus generated by local commoners (Kirch 2010). The specific 
characteristics of states were, I believe, less important than the organizational 
challenges and diverse solutions concerning how to organize a large polity. 
To effectively control and manage such populations and territories required 
the development of comprehensive institutions that potentially included a 
mixture of state religions, bureaucracies, military and police force, judicial 
bodies, administered economies of irrigation and trade, road systems, and the 
like. Any premodern state combined some assortment of these institutions, 
although the particular mix varied for historical and processual reasons. Each 
state institution had the common job of coordinating large-scale polities, and 
to accomplish this objective each institution was associated with extensive 
facilities, personnel, equipment, and special ceremonies. The physical real-
ity of such institutions required a means to finance their operations. In this 
regard, archaic states were really almost super chiefdoms, which must have 
elaborated means to finance their expanded reach. States were not simply 
imagined; they were physically manifest by their new institutions supported 
through political economies.
A political economy approach should help us understand the emergence 
and development of states. In their masterful cross-cultural study of states, 
Blanton and Fargher (2008) propose an extension of the original corporate-
network distinction as a means to understand traditional states. They suggest 
that, when the primary revenue sources for a state were locally derived from 
its subjects, the state had to provide acceptable services (the common good) 
to keep their subject populations from resisting tax demands. Alternatively, 
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an external source of revenue for states lessened the dependency of the state 
on its subjects and allowed for a more self-serving leadership. Their argument 
derives from a political science approach that considers how states were artic-
ulated with the world economy. In the terms originally used by Blanton and 
myself, in states emphasizing a corporate strategy, commoners control agricul-
tural production and so maintained more of a collective action ethos. However 
states emphasized more of an exclusionary strategy when rulers claimed these 
same agricultural systems through right of conquest. Alternatively, the depen-
dency on wealth finance was exclusionary, being based on the control over 
high-end wealth objects, but a shift toward taxing traders and export produc-
ers could create what amounts to a local or corporate revenue source.
Using these insights within a political economy approach, I suggest that 
the typological distinction between primary and secondary states must be 
reconsidered. The distinction has long been used rather arbitrarily to suggest 
that studies of the origin of states must focus on examples of primary states 
that developed independently. In contrast, secondary states have been of little 
interest, because their development is seen as an outcome of acculturation (but 
see Price 1978).
The typological distinction should be rethought in terms of processes of 
state formation based on how emerging state institutions were financed either 
internally or externally. Institutions that constitute states “are not exportable” 
(Price 1978:182). States should not be considered as a trait that can diffuse; they 
developed both in isolation and equally in association with other states. All 
chiefly leaders wish to be kings, and the origin of states depended on whether 
would-be sovereigns could develop systems of finance to support state institu-
tions and to exclude rights of the common horde.
The formation of states was made possible by an ability to finance institu-
tions, based either internally on agricultural intensification (staple finance) or 
externally on networks of trade and raiding (wealth finance). As ideal types, I 
believe that primary states were dependent more on local resource mobilization 
and secondary states were dependent more on external resource procurement. 
In fact, these strategies represented a graded mix that shifted opportunistically 
according to operational conditions. Similar to the patterns described for the 
Oceanic chiefdoms, any state was a fluctuating mixture of power strategies.
Primary States
Primary states emerged where no states had existed before and in isola-
tion from all other states. They are, therefore, considered to be an invention 
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of a new political form, for which researchers can investigate causes of their 
origin. The normal list of primary states includes Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, 
China, Mesoamerica, and coastal Peru, and a strong argument can be made to 
include the Hawaiian Islands as another primary state (Hommon 2013; Kirch 
2010). Primary state origins must be studied archaeologically, because they all 
formed either prior to general writing or in regions isolated from societies 
with writing. From an archaeological perspective, the characteristics of states 
and the probable causes for state origins were distinctive to each situation, 
and a general consensus argues that state origins resulted from interacting 
variables (Wright 1977). Although I agree with this statement, I would add 
that primary states all required the sustained and substantial mobilization of 
resources to support their broadly reaching institutions of power and integra-
tion. Although states can be financed in diverse ways, primary states appear to 
have relied first and foremost on corporate strategies, involving the mobiliza-
tion of local staples. Relatively high population and agricultural intensification 
created an engineered landscape (Earle 1978). Perhaps most important were 
situations like Mesopotamia, Peru, and the Hawaiian Islands, where irrigation 
agriculture served as a primary basis of intensification; the contrast in both 
productivity and stability between the wet and the dry effectively caged farm-
ers, creating the bottleneck allowing the mobilization of staples and/or corvée 
labor as an obligatory rent (Childe 1951; Mann 1986).
Primary states appear to have relied heavily on corporate strategies with sta-
ple finance; however, these states additionally developed a military to extend 
power and maximize surplus extraction. Along coastal Peru, the highly pro-
ductive and large-scale irrigation agriculture formed the basis for condensed 
state-like societies that included the Early Intermediate–period Moche and 
Lima states. But these societies operated much like chiefdoms, without strong 
political centralization. I have long felt that the city-states of the Middle 
East or Mesoamerica were variants of chiefdoms, with some incipient insti-
tutional characteristics of states made possible by staple finance from their 
highly productive, irrigation base. Castillo (2007) calls Moche an example of 
an “opportunistic state,” for which central power across a broad region was 
largely ceremonial with little administration superstructure. In the highlands 
of Peru, in contrast, irrigation agriculture was initially of much lesser scale and 
productivity, and this limited staple-based political economy may have cre-
ated a need to expand the polities’ financial base through conquest. Jennings 
(2011) has argued that the Wari polity developed an expansive empire without 
first creating a regional state. Conquest makes states, and the logic may rest 
on the construction of a political economy to suck in new revenue sources 
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across vast areas claimed as the property of the conquering monarch. The local 
agrarian city-states, with their potential collective-action structure, may have 
been superseded by imperial conquest that distanced the ruling institutions 
from their base.
Can you have primary state formation based on trade rather than on staple 
finance and conquest warfare? Theoretically yes, but practically it does not 
appear to have happened often. I am particularly intrigued by ongoing work 
in Micronesia and Tonga that may help resolve our understanding of this issue. 
I feel, however, that what we are dealing with is a definitional problem: emer-
gent states based on external revenue sources may automatically be classified 
as “secondary” states. Chiefdoms may emerge based on peer-polity interac-
tion involving control over regional prestige-goods exchanges (Friedman and 
Rowlands 1977); however, the volume of trade would probably be inadequate 
to support the needed volume to support a state. Conversely, as primary states 
expand into empires, they start to use wealth in increasing volume, creating 
trade systems emanating from their core.
Secondary States
Secondary states emerged within the broader context of existing states, 
especially when chiefdom-scale societies became linked into external flows 
of goods that served as a source for wealth finance. The foundational article is 
“Secondary State Formation: An Explanatory model” (Price 1978). Price envi-
sioned various forms of secondary states.1 Most important was the expansion 
of primary (staple-based) states through conquest and intimidation, trans-
forming local chiefdoms or city-states into revenue-producing polities that 
exported surplus to the dominant imperial state. Her argument seems reason-
able and agrees well with the militaristic role of state expansion from a core 
staple base. Basically, the conquered local polity would have been required 
to redirect its production, often staple based, toward supporting tributary 
demands from the external power.
Expanding imperial states alternatively may have targeted areas for conquest 
where special raw materials or wealth objects were available, and tribute could 
be extracted and moved across the great distances involved in empires with 
relatively little transport cost (D’Altroy and Earle 1985). In Mesoamerica, the 
expanding Classic-period state of Teotihuacan may have targeted regions for 
conquest with particular resources such as cacao and jade (Braswell 2003; Price 
1978:172). The Aztec state subsequently relied on tribute extraction of wealth 
objects, such as textiles and cacao, from conquered city-states (Berdan et al. 
PATHWAYS TO POWER 305
1996). By conquering northwestern Argentina, the Inca Empire targeted a 
region rich in copper that was extracted for the expanding wealth-finance sys-
tem of the empire (Earle 1994). These are examples of conquest. State structures 
were imposed from the outside as a means of direct imperial tribute extraction.
A more important process in “secondary state” formation, however, involved 
a balanced interaction between central states and periphery developments. 
States arise on the edge of core agrarian states in situations where direct con-
trol and intimidation by the central agrarian states were impractical. Local 
lords created political economies based on the control of wealth flows toward 
the core states. The elites in staple-based states, I would argue, increasingly 
wanted to incorporate wealth finance for a more flexible political economy 
(D’Altroy and Earle 1985). The desire for wealth as a store of value and as a 
display of elite distinction that distanced them from the ruled created a heavy 
demand for both special raw materials and prestige goods from the outside. 
As status in the core became based on foreign goods, the corporate depen-
dency of the ruling elites on a local populace lessened, resulting in a more 
class-stratified society, what Blanton refers to as an “exclusionary strategy.”
As a result, networks of exchange in high-end prestige goods and materi-
als such as metals would have radiated out into the periphery. Some attempt 
might well be made by core states to control production and trade through 
imperial conquest, but I believe that such attempts would be both costly and 
risky. More common would have been attempts to establish long-distance 
trading relationships in wealth objects (Stein 1999). This high-end trade then 
offered the peripheral societies the opportunity to control production and 
transport in those wealth objects, and thus allowed the elites in the periphery 
an external source of wealth only weakly tied to underlying staple intensifica-
tion. As illustrated by the region to the north of Mesopotamia, the result was 
an aura of trade-based chiefdoms and states arching above the agrarian states 
in the plain. What Renfrew and Cherry (1986) call “peer polity interaction” 
would appear to exemplify the emergence of complexity based on network 
relationships of wealth exchange that offered foreign resource sources for local 
political economies. Where the movement was extensive and controllable 
through bottlenecks in production or distribution of the wealth, secondary 
state formation could be based on control over these networks in a classic 
exclusionary strategy.
Here the critical article is “Secondary States in Perspective: An Integrated 
Approach to State Formation in the Prehistoric Aegean” (Parkinson and 
Galaty 2007). The authors look closely at the Minoan and Mycenaean states 
that emerged in the Aegean during the Late Bronze Age. Renfrew (1972) had 
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argued that Bronze Age Aegean complexity was autochthonous, resulting 
from local agrarian intensification and the development of regional networks 
of wealth exchange. He stressed the primary (independent) development in 
the Aegean, countering a longstanding belief that European development 
was simply secondary, a result of contacts with an eastern “cradle of civiliza-
tion.” Parkinson and Galaty (2007:table 2) argue too that the development 
of Protopalatial Minoan states resulted from local corporate strategies, but 
that they still represented secondary state formation because of “interaction 
with Mesopotamia.” I don’t like the vagueness of “interaction,” whether used 
by Renfrew or Parkinson and Galaty. State institutions were not exportable; 
instead conditions in the political economy provided the material support for 
new institutional forms that might be modeled on existing forms seen else-
where. The emergence of the state-like structures in the Aegean during the 
Bronze Age was probably based on Minoan and Mycenaean elites being able 
to control key bottlenecks in the networks of trade in metals and other wealth 
goods, and then they would have used foreign ideologies to legitimize institu-
tionalization (Earle 2011).
I question whether the distinction between primary and secondary states 
has real analytical value. Should we reconceive of emerging states as based 
on common processes that mix and match strategies of local and distant 
resource mobilizations in the political economy? Thus a “secondary” (wealth-
financed) state may well be connected to a “primary” (staple-based) state, and 
that connection may result in “borrowings” of both symbols and structures of 
power for state institution building. Processes of finance were the drivers here, 
not the borrowing of ideas. As Renfrew stressed, it is unclear whether the 
Aegean linkage to Mesopotamia and Egypt was determining; rather it may 
simply have been the culmination of control over high-end exchanges that 
had been developing in Europe throughout the Bronze Age and that had as 
a part the connection to the imperial societies to the east. The later Iron Age 
states of the Greeks and Phoenicians were trade-based societies spread across 
the Mediterranean, competing militarily and commercially to develop and 
control trade in high-end items that included pottery, glass, metal, wine, and 
olive oil. Certainly these trading empires were linked into the agrarian states 
that bordered the Mediterranean, but the bulk of trade and wealth gener-
ated was most probably outside of those relationships. The trading empires of 
the Mediterranean were entrepreneurial and decentralized. The trade-based 
source of state revenues derived from external sources, but only through local 
taxation of a class of wealthy traders and estate owners, thus creating effec-
tively a corporate-like strategy.
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To maintain and expand state institutions, elites mobilized resources oppor-
tunistically by staple and wealth finance. According to logistical concerns for 
power at a distance, all states became involved in wealth trade as a highly 
mobile and thus easily centralized means of finance. The ripple effect was to 
create a world of interacting states more or less reliant on administered trade 
in high-end goods. These systems can be described as peer-polity interaction, 
but they appear to me to represent interlinked political economies that cre-
ated rapidly expanding political spheres of action.
ConCLusions
Rich Blanton is a leading member of a cohort of processual archaeolo-
gists focused on complex societies and using a political economy approach 
to understand organizational differences and change. He and his coauthors 
provide the foundational distinction between corporate and network strate-
gies for sociopolitical structuring that helped set the agenda for a generation 
of research. His conception is processual, not typological.
To be able to understand the variation that their distinction represents, I 
emphasize the necessary role of resource mobilization. Different sources of 
revenue supported chiefly and state institutions derived from structured polit-
ical economies, and the ability to channel resource flows from these economies 
into public coffers stems from controlling specific bottlenecks in the systems. 
When seeking to explain the emergence of complex institutions, a corporate 
strategy relied on bottlenecks linked to land tenure. The most dramatic case 
was chiefly or state ownership of irrigation systems, although any condition 
of intensive land use linked to a dominant warrior elite created the ability 
to control local production. A network strategy, in contrast, relied on bottle-
necks linked to control over the production and distribution of prestige goods. 
External flows of goods could be controlled through attached specialization, 
ownership of transport systems (boats, for example), or channeled routes of 
high-volume transport. To a greater or lesser extent, warriors might have 
played a critical role, especially as the scope of political action spread across 
larger distances through conquest and trade. The importance of a warrior elite 
probably was responsible for a more exclusionary basis to rule and may have 
been compensated by increased elaboration of ideologies of divinity. A critical 
step in the development of trade states appears to have been the abandonment 
of direct control over trade and rather the imposition of direct taxes on traders 
and producers that made the sources of revenue essentially local (Blanton and 
Fargher 2008). But that is another story.
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Understanding the contrasting pathways to power must be based on 
understanding mixed strategies of control over the political economy. This 
orientation helps to redirect our attention away from typological distinction 
and toward the comparison of prehistoric sequences and the processes that 
they represent. Such a research strategy changes the nature of archaeologi-
cal research, deemphasizing concerns with origins and diffusion. Institutions 
should not be seen as ideas or technologies that are invented, transferred, 
and inherited. Rather institutions are complicated organizations based on 
dynamic and changing political, social, religious, and economic relationships. 
To understand such organizations, we must focus on the strategies of power 
and finance that cause the formulation, spread, collapse, and reconfiguration 
of structured institutions. The longstanding distinction between primary and 
secondary states can be reconfigured as the contrasting alternative political 
strategies involved in increasing or decreasing centralization of power through 
institutions related to economy, force, and belief. Stratified and centralized 
societies may prove to be quite similar in process, but differentiated by the 
historical opportunities and challenges that characterize a changing political 
economy.
note
 1. Secondary states included those that were subsequent to earlier states (Price 
1978; Parkinson and Galaty 2007). Here the distinctive characteristics involved preex-
isting institutions of power and finance. But institutions cannot simply be inherited; 
they must be sustained materially. To understand “subsequent states,” as I like to call 
them, the same analytical approach should apply: we must understand the processes 
of state governance that rested on institutions of power that required control over 
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In two pathbreaking publications, Blanton and his col-
leagues (Blanton 1998a; Blanton et al. 1996) introduced 
the concept of corporate power strategies as an addi-
tional pathway to complexity. In the original Current 
Anthropology article, they somewhat vaguely defined 
corporate power strategies as the sharing of power 
“across different groups and sectors of society in such a 
way as to inhibit exclusionary strategies” (Blanton et al. 
1996:2). The definition and identification of corporate 
power strategies in complex societies had to be vague 
to some degree precisely because research and theory 
building in neoevolutionism and much postmodern 
theory focused nearly exclusively on elites and their 
despotic strategies (Flannery 1972; Fried 1967; Gilman 
1991; Kristiansen 1991; Patterson 1991; Shanks and Tilley 
1982; Sanders et al. 1976; Service 1975). In his 1998 book 
chapter, Blanton set out to some degree to remedy this 
theoretical deficiency. He defined five characteristics of 
corporate power (assembly government, corporate reg-
ulation of sources of power, “reflexive communication,” 
ritual sanctification of corporate cognitive code, and 
“semiautonomy” of lower-order subsystems). Building 
on this work, we (Blanton and Fargher 2008) evalu-
ated the utility of collective action theory for explain-
ing variation in premodern states using a worldwide 
cross-cultural sample of 30 states. The theory used in 
this study was largely taken from economics and politi-
cal science (Levi 1988; Lichbach 1995, 1996; Olson 1965). 
While Blanton’s work on corporate political strategies 
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informed the development of our coding scheme, we did not explicitly code 
for or consider the role of corporate political strategies in collective action. 
Consequently, we lack a clear understanding of the role of corporate power 
strategies in the construction of collective polities. For example, does corpo-
rate power correlate with collectivity or do they vary independently? Can col-
lectivity arise in the absence of power-sharing?
As such, in this chapter, I set out to better define the relationship between 
corporate political strategies and collective action. First, I review the philo-
sophical roots of power-sharing in both Europe and China. I selected these 
two cases because they are the two most important politico-philosophical 
traditions in human history, as well as being highly sophisticated and anti-
thetical, according to European thinkers. Accordingly, they offer an excellent 
basis for examining the different ways that state builders confront prob-
lems associated with power-sharing. I then use this information to build 
on and modify Blanton’s (1998a) classification of corporate strategies to 
develop a concise measure of corporate power. Next, I consider the relation-
ship between corporate strategies and collective action using our worldwide 
sample of premodern states (Blanton and Fargher 2008). Finally, I test my 
conclusions regarding corporate strategies using two diachronic cases: the 
rise and decline of the Sui-Tang dynasty and Terminal Formative/Early 
Classic Valley of Oaxaca. I selected these two empirical cases because they 
offer a historical and an archaeological perspective on a similar problem 
faced by state builders (i.e., control of regional or local elites). The results 
of this study indicate that power-sharing can take various forms (assembly 
government or bureaucratization) and that it is an effective strategy for con-
trol over regional elites.
Power-sHAring in two CiViLizAtionAL trADitions
Europe
With the transition from feudalism to the “modern” nation-state, European 
(and Euro-American) scholars devoted much energy to reworking ideological 
and political theory to allow for wider participation by citizens in government, 
to curb the power of the aristocracy and monarchs, and to develop work-
able models for power-sharing in functioning governments. Assemblies, suf-
frage, and social contracts were at the center of much of this theorizing (e.g., 
Hobbes 1651; Jefferson 1999; Locke 2003; Rousseau 1764). The general premise 
shared by these Enlightenment thinkers emphasized the existence of inherent 
rights among men (and women, as recognized in modern thinking) living in 
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a state of nature. Thus, the civil state forms when a community of free men 
gives up certain rights to the body politic in exchange for the protection of 
other inherent rights. Because all men in the body politic are equal in terms 
of rights, the limits and powers of the civil state must be set by the members 
of the body politic through “majority will” (democracy) and cannot be dic-
tated by a monarch or privileged aristocracy. According to Jefferson (1999) 
and Rousseau (1764), educated men with access to information are able to 
govern rationally, and it is through reason that they are able to establish order 
and protect the rights of the members of the body politic. In practice, this 
theory was translated into men voting on policy and selecting representatives 
for legislative assemblies.
What emerges from these works is an ideological focus on the equality 
of men and the importance of merit in the selection of governing officials, 
especially principals. Thus, these thinkers believed that education, enlighten-
ment, and reason were the capacities that individuals had to acquire in order 
to govern properly. Moreover, they concluded that legitimate government or 
the civil state emerges because rational men govern together (shared power) as 
members of the body politic. Thus, their theory emphasized voice and partici-
patory government as a remedy for monarchy and other forms of totalitarian 
government that did not respect the inherent rights of free men.
China
Classical Confucian political philosophy shares a number of fundamental 
concepts regarding power-sharing with its European counterpart. Confucius 
and Mencius maintained that all men (and women, as recognized in mod-
ern thinking) are born with an inherent capacity to do good regardless of 
social status, but this capacity has to be cultivated to reach maturity (sum-
marized in Chan 2002:3). Through education in ethics, compassion, ritual, 
social etiquette, and history, a man could become virtuous and live rightly 
or righteously (rationally) (Rainey 2010:31, 34, 42–43, 45). Thus, Confucius 
transformed the concept of “gentlemen,” which had been applied exclusively 
to the nobility, to mean a man who lived virtuously (Rainey 2010:42). Those 
who lived virtuously regardless of social origin could be considered “noble,” 
whereas, those who did not could be considered low (Ivanhoe 2009:21–22, 33, 
62, 74–75; Rainey 2010:42).
Mencius went on to espouse the view that, in order to be considered 
true kings, rulers had to be virtuous and take virtuous men into their ser-
vice (Ivanhoe 2009:passim; see also Rainey 2010:49). Rulers who did not 
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live virtuously were just lowborn individuals occupying the throne and, thus, 
could legitimately be overthrown by the people (Ivanhoe 2009:22). Virtuous 
men, on the other hand, should serve the king and advise him in policy for-
mation. According to Confucius, a good minister constantly admonishes the 
ruler and points out his errors (Chan 2002:4; Rainey 2010:49). Conversely, 
the king should work with his ministers, consider their advice, and act wisely 
upon it. Thus, a respectful relationship arises between the king and his min-
isters and good government results from virtuous conduct (Ivanhoe 2009:34; 
Rainey 2010:52).
Moreover, the concept of a social contract is well developed in this tradi-
tion. Confucius and Mencius argued that the role of the government was to 
protect the people and respect their rights (Ivanhoe 2009:3–7, 51–56; Rainey 
2010:48, 54). A good king should not interfere with the farmer, the craftsmen, 
or the merchant. He should create an environment where everyone can flour-
ish, both biologically and socially. Just as the farmer trades grains with the 
craftsmen for goods, farmers and craftsmen provide their goods as taxes to the 
king and his ministers in exchange for the service of good government. Yet, 
as gentlemen, kings and ministers are admonished to collect in tax only what 
they need to pay the costs of governing and to justly compensate themselves 
for their services.
The Philosophical Roots of Power-Sharing
From an ideological perspective, the philosophical roots of power-sharing 
in Europe and China are highly analogous. Both traditions emphasized that 
an inherent equality existed among all men regardless of social status (Chan 
2002:3; Hobbes 1651). For European thinkers, that quality was based in “natu-
ral law,” whereas Confucius and Mencius identified that quality as the capacity 
to do good or live virtuously. Both traditions emphasized the idea that educa-
tion made men eligible to govern (Chan 2002:3; Ivanhoe 2009; Jefferson 1999; 
Rainey 2010:31). Thus, both traditions emphasized merit over adscription in 
the selection of governors. Finally, both traditions emphasized that educated 
men should govern together (share power). For Jefferson (1999) and Rousseau 
(1764), ruling together took the form of assembly government, whereas the 
Chinese tradition emphasized a reciprocal relationship between scholar-offi-
cials (literati) and a virtuous king (Rainey 2010:42, 49). Thus, both traditions 
rejected hereditary rule by oppressive and selfish individuals and called for the 
overthrow of such regimes.
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CorPorAte Power strAtegies, CoLLeCtiVe 
ACtion, AnD ControL of PrinCiPALs
Bureaucratization is consistent with these philosophies (e.g., Levy 2009; Weber 
1947:329–334, 392, 404–406; 1978:948), and to some degree both Europeans and 
the Chinese used it to materialize power-sharing. Bureaucratization serves to 
fragment power between many individuals (agents and/or principals), lim-
iting the degree that any one individual can monopolize it. Fragmentation 
is achieved through hierarchization and specialization of duties/responsi-
bilities (e.g., division of powers), the rationalization of bureaucratic routines, 
and the open and competitive selection of officials based upon merit (Weber 
1947:329–341).
Combing the insights from the European and Chinese traditions with 
Blanton’s (1998a) discernments, I propose that corporate power is a complex 
construct consisting of three variables: (1) the number (or proportion relative 
to a polity’s population) of agents sharing powering within a single adminis-
trative territory or division; (2) bureaucratization in the selection and moni-
toring of agents; and (3) corporate cognitive code development (cf. Blanton 
1998a:147). Each variable (which I discuss below) can be conceptualized as 
ranging from low to high, and, thus, corporate power can be characterized as 
a continuum. Thus, I propose that states high in corporate power will have 
large numbers of agents sharing power within single administrative divisions, 
a high degree of bureaucratization, and well-developed corporate cognitive 
codes. Conversely, low levels of corporate power can co-occur with network 
strategies, but higher levels are expected in collective states or where state 
builders seek to control the agency of principals.
Number (or Proportion) of Individuals Sharing Power
Power-sharing can be achieved by dividing administrative tasks/policy 
making horizontally (e.g., dividing policing, tax collecting, judicial, and pub-
lic goods administration into separate hierarchies) (cf. Weber’s rational legal 
authority [1947:328–341]), so that any single administrative or governing agent 
has limited powers that apply only within a specified political field. Further 
subdivision of powers along a vertical axis can be implemented to develop 
clear structural hierarchies that facilitate the capacity of the state to respond 
to petitions, appeals, and complaints from citizens or officials (cf. Blanton and 
Fargher 2008:167; Weber 1947:331; 1978:957). Weber referred to such vertical 
structures as “precise appeal hierarchies” (Weber 1978:957). Another strategy 
available to state builders is to assign administrative tasks/policy-making 
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to committees or councils to achieve power-sharing (cf. Weber’s [1947:392–
404] collegiality and Blanton’s [1998a:154–155] Assembly or Commonwealth 
Government). Finally, these strategies, or combinations thereof, can be 
applied at any hierarchical level from local administrations to principals. The 
degree to which these strategies are implemented across all hierarchical levels 
of the state will result in more power-sharing agents and higher degrees of 
corporate power.
Ideally, this variable should be calculated based on a raw count of the number 
of officials occupying public offices or administrative positions. However, such 
information is rarely available for premodern and ancient states. Furthermore, 
the raw count should be standardized based on the size of a polity’s popula-
tion to facilitate comparison. Ultimately, highly accurate population estimates 
necessary for such calculations are difficult to ascertain or obtain. Thus, alter-
natively, coding, as in this case, can be based on qualitative descriptions and 
the construction of an ordinal variable (see below).
Bureaucratization
Previously, we (Blanton and Fargher 2008:166) developed a specific scale 
variable to measure bureaucratization “to assess the degree to which an 
administrative apparatus is consistent with the predicted requirements of 
collective action.” Here, I take a narrower view of bureaucratization (cf. 
Blanton and Fargher 2008:table 8-1). Thus, bureaucratization in this context 
is defined as the measure to which recruitment is open and competitive, the 
degree to which the actions of officials are monitored and evaluated/pun-
ished, and the degree to which officials are salaried (cf. Blanton 1998a:159–163; 
Blanton and Fargher 2008:168–169; Lichbach 1996:167; Weber 1947:312, 335–
336; 1978:948, 963–964).
Political agents selected from diverse geographic, ethnic, and socioeconomic 
backgrounds are expected to be less likely to favor narrow sectorial, class, or 
family interests (Lichbach 1996:167; Weber 1947:333, 335). Once incorporated 
into the administrative hierarchy, they are monitored to ensure that they do 
not use their positions for personal gain or overstep the limits of their posts 
(e.g., corruption, malfeasance) (Weber 1947:334). Finally, the degree to which 
officials are paid a salary as opposed to owning or controlling their incomes 
(e.g., prebends or benefices) provides the state with more flexibility to con-
trol and, if necessary, dismiss corrupt officials (Weber 1947:333–336). Again, 
bureaucratization can be applied at any level in the administrative hierarchy 
from local officials to principals.
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Corporate Cognitive Codes
Here, I define corporate cognitive codes as legal or moral codes that detail 
behaviors, actions, and ideologies consistent with corporate power strategies 
(cf. Blanton 1998a:159–163). Although, corporate cognitive codes may take a 
variety of forms, I identify three as the most important.
1. Ideological constructs that emphasize egalitarianism in the capacity to 
govern effectively regardless of geographic or socioeconomic origin. Such 
cognitive codes justify the open and competitive selection of political 
agents based on merit and serve to reduce the dominance of hereditary 
nobility (Weber 1947:331, 335).
2.  Ideologies that emphasize a shared corporate identity that cross-cuts 
geographic, tribal, or ethnic divisions. Such ideologies serve to create 
inclusive identities (e.g., a corporate body politic) that reduce the potential 
for factions, ethnic divisions, and class distinctions to be used in the 
development of networks of power.
3.  Codes that emphasize proper conduct on the part of governing officials 
and the equality of citizens in judicial and administrative proceedings 
(cf. “rationalization of bureaucratic routines” [Weber 1947:328–332, 340, 
392]). Built around the previously described ideologies, these codes 
serve to ensure that political agents comply with power-sharing goals 
and limit the degree to which certain individuals or sectors of society 
receive preferential treatment by the state. Where egalitarian legal and 
administrative codes have been implemented to rationalize bureaucratic 
functioning, principals cannot act despotically when dealing with citizens 
because they are enmeshed in structures that require officials to follow 
codified procedures (Weber 1947:333; cf. Mann 1986:185). Thus, well-
developed corporate structures divide and fragment power, making them 
antithetical to despotism.
A Test of the Corporate Construct
Using the data amassed by the collective action project (Blanton and 
Fargher 2008), I assembled the quantitative data for my corporate power vari-
able by summing the scores for four of the variables previously developed for 
bureaucratization (feasibility of commoner appeals and complaints, detection 
and punishment of malfeasance, officeholder recruitment, and degree of sala-
ried officials) (see Blanton and Fargher 2008:table 8-2; cf. Blanton 1998a:147) 
and a new variable (degree of horizontal power-sharing) (table 15.1).
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Data were insufficient to code for corporate cognitive code development. 
The simple variables in my construct for corporate strategies have strong inter-
nal correlation (Cronbach’s α = .904) and thus my construct is empirically valid.
The “degree of horizontal power-sharing” variable was developed from the 
cultural summaries for each case in the collective action data set. Specifically, 
I coded the degree to which state builders divided powers among function-
ally distinct departments or placed power in the hands of supervisory boards 
or assembles consisting of multiple individuals (table 15.2). I assigned a low 
score in cases where there was no functional division of powers and individual 
agents were the exclusive decision-makers in their administrative territories or 
divisions; an intermediate score when functional specialization or collegiality 
was present in part of the administrative hierarchy but not across the entire 
structure; and a high score when functional specialization or collegiality was 
present throughout the administrative hierarchy.
I then evaluated the relationship among the corporate power construct and 
the public goods, resource emphasis, and modes of control of principals con-
structs (the reader is referred to Blanton and Fargher 2008:tables 6–3, 7–2, 
9–2 for descriptions because space limitations do not allow for their detailed 
reproduction in this context). Corporate power strategies correlate strongly 
with public goods (rs = .707, p < .001, n = 30) and modes of control of principals 
(rs = .754, p < .001, n = 30), as well as to a lesser degree with resource emphasis 
(rs = .573, p < .001, n = 30) (figure 15.1). Alternatively, treating resource empha-
sis as a dichotomous variable (external vs. mixed) verifies the strength of the 
last correlation. States with an external revenue emphasis score significantly 
lower on average in corporate power (mean = 7.79, SD = 2.43) as compared 
with states with an internal or mixed revenue emphasis (mean = 11.1, SD 
Table 15.1. Corporate power variables
Variable Coding Construct
Code in Blanton and 
Fargher (2008)
Number of Individuals 
Sharing Power
Precise Appeal Hierarchy Feasibility of Commoner 
appeals and complaints
Number of Individuals 
Sharing Power
Degree of Horizontal 
Power-Sharing
 
Bureaucratization Office Holder Recruitment Office Holder Recruitment
Bureaucratization Monitoring of Officials Detection and Punishment 
of Malfeasance
Bureaucratization Degree of Salaried Officials Degree of Salaried Officials
Table 15.2. Degree of horizontal power-sharing codes
Case
Degree of Horizontal 
Power Sharing Code Sources
Tio 1 Vansina 1973
Bali 1 Geertz 1980; Schulte Nordholt 1991
Aceh 1 Hurgronje 1906; Reid 1975
Perak 1 Gullick 1958
Bakitara 1 Beattie 1971; Roscoe 1923
Pudukkottai 1 Dirks 1987
Nupe 1 Nadel 1942
Japan 2 Bolitho 1991; Hall 1991; Perez 2002; Tatsuya 1991
England 1.5 Cam 1950; Haven Putnam 1950; Holmes 1962; 
Morris 1940; Morris and Strayer 1947; Waugh 
1991; Wilkinson 1940
Bagirmi 1.5 Reyna 1990
Tibet 2 Carrasco Pizana 1959
Thailand 2.5 Rabibhadana 1969
Yoruba 1.5 Law 1977; Lloyd 1971
Vijayanagara 2 Saletore 1934
Inca 2 D’Altroy 2002; Julien 1982; Malpass 1996; Murra 
1980
Kuba 2 Vansina 1978a, b
Buganda 1.5 Roscoe 1965; Southwold 1961; Wrigley 1996
Java 2 Moertono 1981
Egypt 2.5 Brier and Hobbs 1999; David 1998; James 1984; 
Kemp 1989; Kitchen 1982; Montet 1964, 1981; 
Murnane 1998
Asante 2.5 McCaskie 1995; Rattray 1929; Wilks 1975
Lozi 2 Gluckman 1941, 1943, 1961
Swahili 
Lamu
2 Horton and Middleton 2000; Prins 1971; 
Ylvisaker 1979
Ottoman 3 Inalcik 1994; Lybyer 1966
Aztec 3 Davies 1987; van Zantwijk 1985
Burma 3 Koenig 1990
Mughal 3 Habib 1963; Hasan 1936; Sarkar 1963
continued on next page
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Table 15.2—continued
Case
Degree of Horizontal 
Power Sharing Code Sources
Rome 3 Birley 2000; Burton 1996; Eck 2000a, b, c; 
Galsterer 2000; Griffin 2000; Hopkins 1980; 
Levick 1996
Venice 3 Lane 1973; Norwich 1982
Ming China 3 Huang 1998; Hucker 1998
Athens 3 Gulick 1973; Hansen 1999
= 2.38) (Kruskal–Wallis Test s = 143, z = –3.07, p < .01; Kolmogorov–Smirnov 
Asymptotic Test KS = .258, KSa = 1.42, p < .05).
Discussion
State builders interested in achieving collective action (e.g., the delivery 
of public goods in response to taxpayer compliance with internal revenue 
demands) or limiting the power of principals to act arbitrarily can implement 
corporate power strategies. In his classic study, van Zantwijk (1985) argued 
that the altepetl (native state of the Basin of Mexico) divided responsibilities 
for various functions among constituent calpolli (neighborhood-scale political 
subdivisions of the state) in such a way that the various calpolli had to work 
together in order for the altepetl to function. As such, no single calpolli could 
dominate the altepetl and make the remaining calpolli subservient.
I think van Zantwijk’s insightful description of the altepetl provides a use-
ful analogy for understanding corporate power strategies. They divide power 
in such a way that political agents are forced to work together, in a recipro-
cal fashion, in order for the state to function (cf. Weber 1947:393). Thus, state 
builders employing a corporate strategy create an institutional structure that 
distributes power among numerous individuals and makes it impossible for 
any individual political agent, despite his or her position in the hierarchy, to 
effectively monopolize power because any and all actions must abide by the 
functional rules of the structure. Consequently, the most powerful agents in the 
structure (principals) have command over (or direct) the infrastructural power 
of the state (e.g., Mann 1986), but relinquish personal power in the process.
Conversely, principals wishing to maintain individual power must develop 
personal relationships with their agents, which can only be achieved by break-
ing down corporate strategies or operating outside the official structure 
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Figure 15.1. Correlation plots 
for corporate power with (top) 
public goods and (bottom) control of 
principals. 
(Blanton et al. 1996). Principals who operate outside the official structure 
usurp and undermine corporate political agents and can cause collapse if these 
activities are sufficiently persistent. For example in dynastic China, a persis-
tent problem for corporate state builders (literati) was the use of eunuchs as 
personal retainers by the emperor to bypass the official bureaucratic structure 
(e.g., Twitchett 1979:16). Thus, the personal ambitions of powerful individuals 
create a constant tension between corporate power strategies and interper-
sonal power strategies (e.g., network strategies).
CorPorAte Power strAtegies in two DiACHroniC CAses
The cross-cultural patterns in corporate power strategies indicate two 
pathways for sharing power: (1) horizontal functional specialization and the 
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development of precise-appeal hierarchies, and (2) collegiality. Each pathway 
is coupled with the development of corporate cognitive codes and bureaucra-
tization in the selection of political agents. In this section, I propose that, in 
some cases, state builders implement corporate strategies to reduce the per-
sonal power of elites (e.g., aristocrats) and exclusionary strategies as pathways 
to power. In the following discussion, I examine this hypothesis with two 
diachronic cases, Sui-Tang China and the Valley of Oaxaca. Like Feinman 
and Nicholas (chapter 13, this volume) and Earle (chapter 14, this volume), 
my case selection focuses on strategies and financing and does not seek to 
make typological distinctions between pristine and secondary states. States 
are constantly reconstructed, reorganized, and reformed as principals confront 
ever-changing problems associated with setting revenue policies, respond-
ing to voice, controlling agency, and achieving political goals. Thus, at the 
very moment a state is funded it is essentially “secondary,” and comparisons 
between any “types” of states in terms of political strategies and financing 
provides insights into human agency, cooperation, and political relationships.
Sui-Tang Dynasty
Following the disintegration of the Later Han (AD 220–581), political power 
fragmented among numerous petty kingdoms dispersed across the length and 
breadth of China. In the north, “powerful local magnates with personal con-
trol over extensive lands and numerous clients, families of cultivators and mili-
tary retainers,” dominated local politics (Twitchett 1979:2–3). Kings cobbled 
together decentralized states by linking these magnates into loose networks. 
In Southern China, a similar pattern emerged where aristocratic lineages and 
their generals dominated the courts of petty states (Twitchett 1979:5). Rule 
during this period was highly unstable and coup after coup placed one lineage 
after another on the many thrones of China (Twitchett 1979:5, 9).
After AD 581, the Sui dynasty began to consolidate political power through 
military conquest (Twitchett 1979). However, early on the Tang lineage took 
control of this process through a coup and completed the unification and cen-
tralization of power. In order to bring about integration and political stability, 
the Tang sought to reduce the power of other aristocratic linages and elite clans 
(Twitchett 1979:9–12). They did this by implementing a political structure con-
sistent with Confucian political philosophy (Wechsler 1979a:190–191). Central 
government was divided into three departments (Chancellery, Secretariat, 
and State Affairs), which in turn were subdivided into numerous bureaus and 
boards (Twitchett 1979). Provincial and local governments were brought into 
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this administrative structure, creating a “precise appeal hierarchy” (Twitchett 
1979:13). An examination system, modeled on that of the Han, was instituted 
along with state schools and a national university to prepare Confucian schol-
ars for political service (Twitchett 1979:15; Wechsler 1979b:179). This system 
began to supply Confucian scholar officials by the middle of the second Tang 
emperor’s reign (Twitchett 1979:9, 14–15). These officials were initially placed 
in prefecture and local government positions, displacing local magnates, and 
later came to dominate high offices.
All officials, in both the central and local administrations, were subject to 
monitoring by an independent department, the Censorate (Hwa 2008:9). The 
second Tang emperor, Tiazong (626–649), also reorganized provincial gov-
ernment, reducing the power of governor-generals by placing much of their 
supervisory and monitoring responsibilities in “circuits” (Wechsler 1979a:188, 
205). Thus, central officials were regularly dispatched from the capital to directly 
monitor prefectures grouped into circuits. Finally, the emperor personally 
appointed and reviewed all prefects (Wechsler 1979a:205–206).
Initially, Tiazong worked closely with his ministers to develop and evalu-
ate political policy. A relatively large number of high-level ministers partici-
pated in daily council meetings (Twitchett 1979:12–13). Officials were encour-
aged to submit policies, participate in the debate over them, and to criticize 
(remonstrate) the emperor (Hwa 2008). The emperor also expected his min-
isters to accept criticism in turn (Hwa 2008:13). He rewarded officials who 
remonstrated for the benefit of the state and the people, but severely pun-
ished those who agreed with the emperor solely to curry favor or used their 
positions to enrich/empower themselves. This system of power-sharing was 
no mere show to legitimate the emperor’s rule. All edicts had to be cosigned 
by both a high minister and the emperor before they could be published 
(Hwa 2008:10).
Tiazong and his ministers worked to create just and equal legal and admin-
istrative procedures. They reformed and rationalized criminal codes, remov-
ing harsh punishments (execution or amputation) for many lesser crimes 
(Twitchett 1979:18; Wechsler 1979b:178). They developed and implemented 
administrative codes (statues, regulations, and ordinances) to govern the con-
duct and activities of officials. Both the criminal and administrative codes 
were regularly updated about every 15 years (Twitchett 1979:18). These reforms 
created an ideology of equality within Chinese society. For example, landown-
ers and renters entered into contracts on equal terms and responsibilities were 
limited to the economic sphere, as in rental contracts today in the United 
States (Twitchett 1979:26).
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The system they developed at the beginning of the dynasty persisted with 
little change until about AD 755. During the reign of Hsuan-tzung (713–755), 
the central government was modified and the Chancellery and Secretariat 
were merged into a single department (Twitchett 1979:15). Hsuan-tzung 
reduced the number of chief ministers and increased their administrative 
powers, but he excluded them from policy formation. The emperor began 
using eunuchs and special commissions to bypass the regular bureaucracy, 
thereby increasing his personal power (Twitchett 1979:15). Finally, after a pro-
longed rebellion that ended in AD 763, military and financial power were 
transferred to the governor- generals, who by the end of the eighth century 
became largely autonomous (Twitchett 1979:17–21). They controlled revenue 
collection, appointed officials based on personal connections, and directly 
oversaw military personal. At the local and prefect levels, powerful landlords 
began to replace Confucian scholar-officials.
Valley of Oaxaca
As described in Joyce and Barber’s chapter (chapter 2, this volume), Monte 
Albán experienced a shift from a corporate political economy in the Middle–
Late Formative (500–150 BC) to an exclusionary network-based politi-
cal economy in the Terminal Formative (150 BC–AD 250) (see also Joyce 
2010:ch.5; Winter 1984). At the height of the Terminal Formative, principals 
at Monte Albán were probably receiving imperial revenues from conquered 
regions outside the Valley of Oaxaca and funneling them into a prestige 
economy centered on the hilltop capital (Blanton et al. 1996; Redmond 1981; 
Spencer 1982). Perhaps one of the most visible material correlates of this pat-
tern are elaborate cream wares decorated with elite iconography, such as step 
frets, which were produced in and around the North Platform and distributed 
to powerful provincial elites, probably during elaborate feasts that linked these 
elites with Monte Albán (Elson 2007:61–66; Elson and Sherman 2007; Joyce 
2010:144, 157; Kowalewski et al. 1989:180, 181–182).
However, at the outset of the Classic period (AD 250–750), Monte Albán’s 
exclusionary political economy came under threat. Probably in the face of 
Teotihuacan’s expansion during the Early Classic, Monte Albán’s imperial 
domain outside the Valley of Oaxaca apparently collapsed, and with it, impe-
rial revenues (Redmond 1981; Spencer 1982). At the same time, principals at 
Monte Albán faced an increasingly powerful regional elite that dominated 
emerging secondary centers across the valley (Elson and Sherman 2007; 
Kowalewski et al. 1989:180, 181–182). Faced with shrinking revenues and rising 
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competition from provincial elites, principals at Monte Albán implemented 
corporate political strategies to reestablish control over the valley. Here, I pos-
tulate that the central political strategy of the Early Classic was the develop-
ment of bureaucratic structures, which centralized power but divided it among 
many officials (cf. the assembly government of the Late Formative [see Joyce 
and Barber. chapter 2, this volume]). Essentially, comparatively faceless and 
impersonal infrastructural power replaced the personal power and prestige-
goods system (exclusionary strategies) of the Terminal Formative. These 
changes were coupled with a shift from external revenues to internal revenues 
and, probably, a more collective state. In the following discussion, I marshal 
archaeological and epigraphic data to support my conjecture.
Terminal Formative settlement patterns indicate a relatively decentralized 
regional organization. Large settlement nodes (segments) dominated the 
eastern and northern sections of the valley and smaller nodes proliferated 
at the edges of the valley, in the southern section and around Monte Albán 
(Kowalewski et al. 1989:162, figure 7.2). Settlement nucleation increased and 
relatively more people lived in defensive hilltop sites than in previous peri-
ods (Kowalewski et al. 1989:153–156). High-status individuals distributed 
small amounts of luxury cream ware ceramics through political channels 
(Kowalewski et al. 1989:171, 173, 180–181). Mound groups throughout the 
Valley of Oaxaca were relatively closed but showed little uniformity in ori-
entation or layout (Blanton 1989:444). The impression generated by these 
data is of a segmentary state integrated through elite interaction, includ-
ing the exchange of prestige goods, the construction of elaborate residences, 
two-room temples, and tombs, as well as frequent warfare (cf. Kowalewski 
et al. 1989:199).
Excavations at three of the most important secondary sites occupied during 
this period indicate that political agents enclosed formerly open public spaces 
and placed burials either under central temples (e.g., Monte Albán, Dainzu; 
see also offerings in Structure 35 at San José Mogote) or possibly under pri-
vate “plazas” (e.g., Cerro Tilcajete) (Bernal and Oliveros 1988; Elson 2007:40; 
Marcus and Flannery 1996:185; Martínez López et al. 1995:237). Apparently, 
an emergent hereditary elite “walled off ” public spaces and appropriated 
them as personal and ancestral property. Thus, these elites were claiming large, 
extremely elaborate architectural complexes that included palaces, temple 
mounds, and plazas as personal patrimony.
The transition from the Terminal Formative to the Early Classic (AD 
250–500) in the Valley of Oaxaca was marked by a massive political reform 
that extinguished the careers of the provincial elite. The decline of these 
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elites is evidenced by the abandonment of the elite architectural complexes 
controlled by these individuals and a major shift in settlement locations (e.g., 
Dainzu, Magdalena Apasco, Tejalapan, San José Mogote, Cerro Tilcajete, 
Tlatinango, Tlalixtac), probably as a result of state policy that created new 
bureaucratic centers in their place (Kowalewski et al. 1989:156, 206, 229, table 
8.4). Thus, the most important Early Classic centers were newly founded (or 
were only occupied by hamlets during the preceding Terminal Formative) 
(e.g., Jalieza, Tlacochahuaya, El Palmillo, Santa Cruz Mixtepec, Tilquiapan) 
and none were seats of entrenched local power (Kowalewski et al. 1989:229, 
table 8.5). A massive area encompassing Monte Albán, all of the southern 
arm of the valley, and the central portion of the eastern arm of the valley 
now formed the core of a highly integrated regional system (Kowalewski et 
al. 1989:210, figure 8.1).
The new system deemphasized elite lineages, as evidence by the paucity 
of highly elaborate Early Classic tombs in excavations at Monte Albán, El 
Palmillo, San Jose Mogoté, and Dainzu-Macuilxochitl (one possible exception 
is Monte Albán Tomb 112) (Bernal and Oliveros 1988; Feinman and Nicholas 
2003, 2007, 2011a, 2011b; Marcus and Flannery 1996:230). Construction on the 
Main Plaza at Monte Albán continued and the architectural arrangement 
became more formal and more closed ( Joyce 2010:figure 7.2). Several high-
status residences were built along the edges of the Main Plaza at this time 
( Joyce 2010:218). However tombs remained confined to household contexts 
and were not placed in monumental platforms (cf. the Terminal Formative 
and Epiclassic tombs in Oaxaca).
Ruler glorification during the Early Classic was also minimal. Urcid 
(2005:22) identified one small shrine that showed a named ruler (Lord 5 
Jaguar) and his father with 14 unnamed “secondary personages” (possibly 
bureaucrats governing sections of Monte Albán). At the end of the Early 
Classic, Lord 13 Night dismantled the shrine and used the carved stones in 
a resplendent construction commemorating his enthronement and military 
success ( Joyce 2010:213; Urcid 2005:22). However, this building was also dis-
mantled, sometime during the Late Classic, and yet another ruler reused 
the stones in the foundation of the South Platform (Urcid 2005:23). I argue 
that repeated dismantling of these monuments suggests a lack of hereditary 
continuity in rule throughout the Classic. I would expect that persistence in 
lineages would have resulted in preservation of previous monuments and the 
construction of new ones alongside them or the careful burying of previous 
monuments (cf. the North Acropolis and Temples 1 and 2 at Tikal [Sharer 
and Traxler 2006:302–303]).
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Away from Monte Albán, public architecture, although exhibiting a high 
degree of conformity in orientation in accordance with centralized control, 
emphasized numerous open and accessible plazas possibly associated with 
functionally specialized buildings that were not personal residences of politi-
cal officials (Blanton 1989:444, 446). Consistent with the deemphasis of tombs 
and more open public architecture, elaborate cream wares were replaced by 
standardized and relatively plainer gray wares (e.g., G-23 and G-35) that were 
widely distributed across the Valley, as well as across socioeconomic classes 
(Caso et al. 1967:311; Kowalewski et al. 1989:213–214).
Hereditary power only again became a dominant theme in architecture and 
iconography with the transition to the Late Classic/Epiclassic (AD 500–900). 
High-status lineages began to commemorate genealogies in mural paintings 
within elaborate residential tombs constructed below houses (e.g., Tombs 104 
and 105). Highly elaborate tombs abound from this period at Monte Albán 
(e.g., Tombs 103, 104, 105, 112, Atzompa Edificio 6) as well as many other sites 
(e.g., Reyes Etla, El Palmillo, Lambityeco, Yagul) (Bernal and Gamio 1974; 
Bernal and Oliveros 1988; Feinman and Nicholas 2003, 2007, 2011a, 2011b; 
Joyce 2010:204; Lind and Urcid 2010:ch. 7; Marcus and Flannery 1996:211–216; 
Miller 1995:68–73; Robles García et al. 2014; Urcid 2005:50, 63–64, table 1-1). 
At provincial sites, political elites begin to encroach on the open plazas of 
the Early Classic, reducing their area and closing them off with buildings 
containing subfloor tombs (e.g., El Palmillo [Feinman and Nicholas 2003, 
2007, 2011a, 2011b]). Also, Terminal Formative elite complexes at Dainzu and 
Cerro Tilcajete were reoccupied and new tombs were constructed (Bernal and 
Oliveros 1988; Elson 2007:89, 92).
I argue that the patterns in architecture, epigraphy, and artifacts sug-
gest that power was centralized during the Early Classic using corporate 
strategies that broke down traditional provincial elite domains. Based on 
the cross-cultural comparative data presented above as well as the specific 
case of the Tang dynasty, I hypothesize that corporate strategies centered 
on the establishment of horizontal divisions of power and the development 
of precise-appeal hierarchies that bypassed traditional elite power bases. 
Within this context, open and competitive selection for “bureaucratic” posi-
tions would have been an important strategy to reduce hereditary power. The 
decline of venerable elite lineages throughout the valley (evidenced by the 
abandonment of elite architectural complexes), the dramatic reorganization 
of the regional political system with entirely new administrative seats, and 
the largely faceless nature of power throughout the Early Classic correspond 
with this hypothesis.
326 LANE F. FARGHER
ConCLusions
Power-sharing is an important feature of many states across cultures and 
through time and is not limited to modern European nation states. In this 
chapter, I used power-sharing philosophies from two distinct cultural tradi-
tions (Europe and China) to guide the development of a cross-cultural measure 
of corporate (shared) power. I concluded that corporate strategies involve the 
division of power among functional specialized hierarchies or assemblies, as 
well as open selection and monitoring of officials and the development of cor-
porate cognitive codes that emphasize egalitarian administrative and judicial 
philosophies (Unfortunately extant data are insufficient to evaluate corporate 
cognitive codes, indicating an area that requires more intensive cross-cultural 
research). I then evaluated the correlation among corporate power strategies 
and collective action, as well as control of the behavior of principals, using the 
30-state sample coded for the collective action project (Blanton and Fargher 
2008). The results indicate that corporate political strategies are strongly cor-
related with both collective action and control of principals. I then went on to 
examine the deployment of corporate power strategies and their results in Sui-
Tang–dynasty China and Terminal Formative/Early Classic Valley of Oaxaca. 
In both cases, corporate strategies helped to centralize power and reduce the 
influence of hereditary provincial elites. The outcome in both cases was a high 
degree of power-sharing that lasted for about 200 to 250 years.
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